Parliamentary debates: Wednesday, 19 November 2025

Members, the committee is resumed on the Defence (Workforce) Amendment Bill. When we suspended last night, we had concluded the debate on clause 1. We now come to clause 2. This is the debate on the commencement of the bill. The question is that clause 2 stand part.

Thank you, Madam Chair, and I just have a couple of questions on this particular clause. Last night, in the Minister of Defence’s contribution, she spoke specifically to an instance at this time last year, where there was the fear that it would carry over into Christmas. From what I could see and from what I understand, that actually didn’t eventuate, and this is one of those stopgap, precautionary measures, if you will, to make sure that during that time, there is still an ability for the Chief of Defence Force and even the Minister to play their role to backfill a number of those positions, should there be industrial action.

My question to the Minister, put simply, is whether that is correct. She’s mentioned a specific instance. Her words, if I recall correctly—I’ve got them written down here—were that it was at about this time last year, and so I’m just curious. If that was the case this time last year, we’ve now gone through a full year, and here we are, in urgency, going through three stages of this bill. I wanted it just to be clear from the Minister whether it was indeed that instance this time last year that has, one, caused this bill, and, two, meant that it is the wish or the desire of the Minister to make sure that this passes before Christmas. Thank you very much.

In terms of the commencement, just following on from the Hon Peeni Henare around the commencement date, there are things, as we heard from the second reading and select committee stage, that are of concern. Particularly, I think we’ll explore this a little bit more and it’s more appropriately discussed under clause 4, but I just wanted to flag that there are also interactions with other parts of the principal Act—section 9, as well—that I think deserve a little bit more teasing out in terms of the implementation.

I think it would be good to check with the Minister of Defence if the Minister would even consider delaying it or potentially—as we see in one of the amendments from us—consider that the date, rather than being the day after Royal assent, be a date set by Order in Council. This is just so that we’re able to tease out some of the fish-hooks in this bill with regard to how that’s going to work and the issues that it will create, while also noting that this bill has implications for the House of Representatives as well, as we see in the later clauses. I wanted to check with the Minister if it would be prudent to delay the commencement date or to consider, like I said, one of our amendments to change it to a date set by Order in Council.

Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the Minister of Defence for her responses last night. Of course, the commencement date is tied to the fact that we’re hearing this bill under urgency, and that brings us back to the identification of the need for the bill and the gap that it’s filling. Last night, the Minister really helpfully responded to my question about section 9(8)(b) of the Defence Act, which allows the Governor-General to step in by proclamation and rectify the situation, but only in cases where the House has already been dissolved or expired, and so that was a really useful clarification from the Minister last night.

I had another question related to the identification of the problem, which is that the current subsections (2) and (4) of section 9 give the Minister powers to make these authorisations. I can’t spot whether there is a restriction on how many authorisations a Minister is able to make or the duration between authorisations. The reason that’s important is that it would seem to me that if there isn’t a restriction on the power of the Minister, then the Minister could well, under section 9 as it currently stands, issue a new authorisation, and it would just require that the Minister turn her mind to the circumstances that there are on the expiration of the 14 days. Now, to my mind, that is not a negative thing. It is what we require in terms of many of the delegated powers that are provided to Ministers.

I note that there has been a trend over different Governments over the last several years to increase the scope of discretionary powers, and so it is something that the House must be mindful of and ensure that when we are choosing to do that—elongating the period of the days—we’re doing that purposefully. But if there isn’t an actual gap in this case—because the Minister does have the power, once that order looks like it’s about to expire, to then make another order that also lasts for the 14-day period—and if there has been an assessment of the likelihood of two 14-day periods taking us through a summer break to allow Parliament then to sit and then potentially extend the second order, if you like, we’re using everything that’s in the current Defence Act, as opposed to there being any need for us to make these changes.

Thank you. I think we’ll answer those questions, thank you, Madam Chair. As we’ve said before, this bill has already gone through a select committee process, and so when I hear all these cries about urgency, we’re talking about a second reading, a committee of the whole House stage, and a third reading—it’s already gone through a full process. There were around 30 submissions, and they’ve been carefully listened to.

This is not an issue that’s only arisen last year; it’s actually an issue that’s been top of mind for the Chief of Defence Force: the inability to deploy his own staff, particularly where there are situations around, let’s say, the safety of the country, and health and safety. As I said yesterday, even when we had ammunition supply dumps, as we call them, or supply areas that were going to be unguarded for an hour a day, that would be, I think, totally unacceptable, and the Chief of Defence Force needs to have the ability to deal with that situation. It’s not just putting uniformed staff into roles currently undertaken by civilian staff; it’s actually about where there’s health and safety issues, where there’s national security issues, where there’s an urgency, and where there’s a deployment. These are quite limiting times, and it’s not like just shifting people around, like most other employers can do with their staff.

The Hon Peeni Henare has asked whether last year’s action prompted the need for the bill. Well, yes, it certainly showed that existing provisions were insufficient and not practical. One of the provisions addresses the risk that an extension is required when the House is adjourned, and that’s one of the issues that we dealt with last night after a question from Vanushi Walters. The risk didn’t eventuate, but it may well in future.

I think we should remember that the Defence Act is a piece of legislation from 1990, when peace had broken out in the world and every sensible nation thought that everyone else was going to be sensible from there on. What we’re seeing now, unfortunately, 35 years later, is that there is quite an aggressive stance in the world—particularly in our part of that world—and we need to be prepared for anything. Also the effects of weather events, cyclones, and all these sorts of things are all deployments that the Defence Force undertakes, and it cannot be stopped from doing that because there’s something going on.

There is no restriction on the number of authorisations that the Minister can make, or the period before them, but of course we have the opportunity in the House for members to ask the Minister of Defence—in this case, me—questions or to have urgent debates and bring the matter to the attention of the House. If the requirements of the bill are met, which is not just that there’s a strike going on but that there’s an urgency and a need for cover, the Minister can make a new authorisation, and so it is important to remember that there’s not just a willy-nilly “Let’s all go round and stick our uniformed staff in doing the civilian jobs.”; it’s actually that all these other factors have to be in place.

Thank you, Madam Chair, and good morning to the folks in the Chamber today. Just to acknowledge the responses so far from the Minister, I found that last bit constructive. There was a question that the Hon Peeni Henare—well, my interpretation of what the Hon Peeni Henare asked, and that was around the date. I do take a point from the Minister that we did have a select committee process and there were a number of submissions that we heard, and that’s helped to shape the bill as it is, but we are moving through the last remaining stages of urgency, which, if we weren’t moving through urgency, would have given us time to pause and reflect, given the gravity of the issues at stake here.

The question that I’m interested in is around that commencement date. There were issues last year, in 2024, which have prompted this legislation, and I am wondering, in terms of speeding this through and not having that ability to reflect on whether we have the best legislation moving through the process, whether the reason why we’re moving it through urgency is the proximity to Christmas. Is it around the certainty? I suspect that it is, but it would be good for the clarity of the committee for the Minister to share that with us, just in case I’m under illusions and that’s not actually the case.

I do understand what happened last year, when there was industrial action, but in my reading of the situation right now, that urgency doesn’t exist, because unless there are pending negotiations or pending industrial action that the Minister might want to share with the committee, then I guess the question is: why are we moving at pace with these last remaining stages, given that there are a number of issues that we’re trying to continue to put through? But I also acknowledge that we have addressed a number of those issues in the select committee process.

My question is around the commencement date: is there scope to move it out so that we can actually really get through more of the detail of what the best way forward is for military personnel and civilian personnel? Given that we do want these groups of workers to be able to work together in the best way possible, I note that in the departmental report and in the select committee process as well, that was an issue that was raised. The Public Service Association submission did talk about the fact that they have had off-the-record conversations that military personnel felt uncomfortable about where this was heading, and so a bit more time would be good to make sure that we have the best process possible so that if we get to the situation where industrial action is happening, then it’s done in a way which is to the benefit of the wellbeing of the entire workforce—the military plus civilian—in that space.

Thank you. I’m happy to address that issue. The date is the date after the Royal assent, which is the normal date for bills.

As for the proximity of Christmas, of course that’s an issue, to make sure that the House isn’t adjourned and we have a problem. But I’d just also point out that whenever Parliament is adjourned during the Christmas break, not only is it difficult to do anything through Parliament—since I can’t imagine that too many of us want to be called back in during that time—but also it’s when a lot of weather events happen, whether it’s in New Zealand or overseas, and so we do actually have to be prepared all the time.

The Defence Force can’t always plan on things happening in weeks or months or even days. Sometimes things have to happen straight away, and so it is very important that the Chief of Defence Force has the confidence to go into this break knowing that he’s got the ability to pull in the right people at the right time, and he’s not under this sort of threat that suddenly he won’t have anybody to undertake some, say, logistics works that he needs to have done for an urgent deployment.

There’s no industrial action that I’m aware of at the moment, and I just sort of hope that we won’t be going down that pathway. I think it’s really important that everyone works together as much as possible in defence and in every other part—and so I’m not aware of any.

Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you very much to the Minister of Defence for those last responses, which I also found really helpful. I am a bit concerned about the use of urgency in the House, and not only for all stages, but I think what we’re seeing more and more is that at the final stages of urgency, it’s viewed as not a problem or not an issue really, when one of the key things, to my mind, that happens during urgency is the proposal of amendments by members of Parliament.

Hearing from the public is absolutely important, as are the amendments. I do try and ensure that when I’m submitting amendments, they’re done constructively in terms of things that will improve the clarity of the bill. It’s a process of Parliament that should be used and valued, but I’m very concerned that it’s just not something that’s given much respect. Government members are laughing at the moment, which I think is demonstrative of that, and I think it’s a shame because the public are not just submitting; they’re also watching these stages of the House. They’re sending us proposals for amendments as well, which we’ll often include and submit, and I think they ought to be considered, even at a late stage.

I recall during Budget urgency that there was a suggestion that I’d put forward. It was about an interpretation of one of the phrases referring to I think it was the chief executive of Invest New Zealand. It looked to me like a drafting error, and I do think the House needs to be mindful of those, as well. My big point here is that the House’s procedures are very important, and so although the Standing Orders only require a reason to be given when urgency is invoked, I think there’s a duty of care in terms of the rule of law and democracy that the reasons are genuinely about urgent situations.

One more time, I go back to whether there’s a gap in the legislation, and I think the point of real clarity was when the Minister spoke to the fact that there is no limit on her ability to make those announcements to make a new power—a second power, if you like—on the expiration of the first. I’m again just curious about the benefit of changing legislation to extend when that power is already there to make a second—I forget the language around it—authorisation, and, in my mind, while there might be administrative ease rolled into a decision to do this, it removes some oversight. There is a balance here in terms of the right to strike and the ability to strike, but we’re also ensuring that we have a defence force that is capable and ready to go, certainly in emergencies and certainly when we need to act quickly—you’ll have no dispute from me on that. I think the question is one about appropriate ministerial oversight or parliamentary oversight, and the mechanism already exists.

This is an issue that’s tied to the commencement; it’s obviously an issue that’s tied to clause 4, as well. Interestingly, there are amendments on the Table that speak to this and the fact that in many ways, this part of the amendments is simply not necessary to meet the problem of us being able to give that direction over the Christmas break. I’d welcome a comment from the Minister, and certainly if I’ve misunderstood the advice from the officials through the Minister, but otherwise it’s an issue that I’ll certainly be bringing up in the debate on the next clause of the bill.

The question is that Teanau Tuiono’s tabled amendment to clause 2, providing for the bill to come into force on a day set by Order in Council, be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 2, providing for the bill to come into force on 1 January 2027, be agreed to.

Point of order, Madam Chairperson. As we seem to be traversing all parts of the bill as one, I’m seeking leave for all provisions to be taken as one question.

Leave is sought for that purpose. Is there any objection? There is objection. Members, we now come to clause—[Interruption]

Narrow it down.

Let’s stick to the clauses, then.

Well, can I just say before we start clause 3 that we were relating those questions to clause 2 back to timing. We had no closure motions. People were standing up and asking questions of the Minister. We have now closed on clause 2. It’s easy for some members to have a view on that side about what fits and what doesn’t, but I didn’t hear any speeches or any closure motions from that side during that debate.

Members, we now come to clause 3. This is the debate on the principal Act. The question is that clause 3 stand part.

Madam Chair. Oh!

Ooh!

Woah!

Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan.

I did not realise that mic was on. Thank you, Madam Chair. I do have a question for the Minister on the principal Act, because what we’re seeing here is that the bill only covers adjustments to the Defence Act 1990, which is appropriate. However, as we have heard from the Minister on quite a few instances, there are broader implications—we talk about health and safety, but we also talk in terms of emergency management. I know that in terms of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, there are clauses specifically pertaining to the Defence Force, and those are from a health and safety perspective. We’ve also got the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015. I want to check with the Minister: are there no actual amendments to those two other Acts as well that could be affected by the decision that has been made in this bill? It is a short question, but I think it’s an important question on the relativity of the other Acts.

No, the clause is very clear: the bill amends the Defence Act 1990, and then there’s a full stop. That’s it.

Members, we now come to clause 4. This is the debate on the amendment to section 9, “Section 9 amended (Use of Armed Forces to provide public service or assist civil power)”. The question is that clause 4 stand part.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I look forward to asking some questions of the Minister on this clause. Some of them I’ve signalled because they do also tie to commencement, but it really is about identifying the legislative gap here and why we need this as a solution. I have gone back a few times now and read section 9 of the existing Defence Act. My read of this section is that the legislators at the time foresaw circumstances such as the Minister describes, and this is why there are no restrictions on the powers under section 9(2), which is that the “Armed Forces shall be used to provide any public service in connection with an industrial dispute except in accordance with the written authority of the Minister, and that authority shall specify the part or parts of the Armed Forces that may be used and the public service or public services that may be provided.”, and also, importantly, subsection (4): this is where the Prime Minister or, if the Prime Minister is not available, the next most senior Minister, on available information that they’re satisfied with from the Commissioner of Police, they may instruct, essentially, the Defence Force to work with the New Zealand Police, in emergency circumstances.

All of us, of course, would want that power to exist. The defence forces are different from other parts of our workforce, and they absolutely deserve respect, but we acknowledge that there may be circumstances, such as those described in existing section 9(2) and existing section 9(4), where the Minister or the Prime Minister may need to give an authorisation that changes that. But I think that the legislators at the time foresaw that this may need to happen in quick succession or at multiple times. The check on whether that’s legitimate is, essentially, that period of 14 days, and that requires a Minister or the Prime Minister to turn their minds to whether it’s appropriate or not.

This is a really crucial function of our executive: the way in which they exercise their discretion. Actually, it feeds an entire, quite a large-ish group of lawyers’ work in New Zealand: public lawyers, who look at the use of discretionary power and, from time to time, will bring judicial review cases, not on the substance of a decision made but on whether particular Ministers or decision makers turn their minds to the things that they ought to have before making that decision. It’s a signal that, again, the right to strike is important. My view is that this was foreseen in the current legislation and it is already provided for.

Again, I’m just trying to understand whether there are administrative issues that I can’t see, which, if there are, the next question after that is: do they outweigh the right to protest and the right to fair consideration, that those employed in these civilian roles hold within our defence system? So simply that there is administrative delay would, to my mind, not be sufficient to say that we should then extend the period to 30 days. I imagine that the Minister, if a circumstance like this arose, would have a fair warning that there might be an expiry in the period—as we do now, in fact, heading into the Christmas period—so an assessment could be made before the actual expiration of the first authorisation in time for the Minister to, with due diligence, consider the circumstances and whether the second authorisation was needed over a period, and, also, take some advice about how far that second authorisation would get us and whether the House was likely to be sitting again or to resume at that period in time.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Just following on from Vanushi Walters, I want to ask a question of the Minister regarding clause 4(1). In the current drafting of section 9(8) of the Defence Act 1990, both subsections (2) and (4)—one of them pertaining to the Prime Minister or a senior Minister and one of them to the Minister in the chair, the Minister of Defence. What I don’t understand is why only the subsection (2) authority has been extended from 14 days to 30 days but not subsection (4). Presumably, the Prime Minister will have even greater power, or should be warranted, compared to the Minister of Defence. My first question is why only one of them was increased.

But also, I think my second question is that the purpose of the bill and the intention of the bill, as the Minister stated in some of the earlier debates, is to address the instances where the House is not sitting during the holiday period, and, therefore, if the Minister isn’t able to do what is needed in the event of a strike, for example, then the House needs to be recalled to be able to make that decision, but I don’t see how that relates to the 30 days, because the scenario that the Minister has referred to is covered under subsection (2). The only other thing I can think of is that it’s more of an unchecked—and I don’t know if it is, so the Minister can correct me—extension of the Minister’s power under subsection (2) from 14 days to 30 days, with no real, I guess, logical purpose for this extension, as addressed by the issue statement of this bill in the first place.

Those are my two questions for the Minister. I guess the first one is: why is it that only subsection (2) has been extended to 30 days? The other one is: considering it’s addressed in subclause (2) of clause 4 already, is there any need for us to extend it to 30 days in the first place? We do have an amendment under my name to revert the date from 30 days back to 14, and I would like to ask the Minister to consider that amendment, unless the Minister is able to provide a response to my questions.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Speaking to this particular clause, one of the things that I’m always aware of with the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) are, sort of, plan B strategies: something to make sure that there are fallback positions to allow the continuation of much of the work that they do. One of those is, of course, that the commander in chief, or in this case the Governor-General, has the opportunity to extend a number of matters—not just for the NZDF, but, ultimately, has the power in many circumstances to be able to just go on and extend matters to allow to consider it a plan B for some of the occasions when the House might not be sitting.

In fact, it was only last week at the Armistice Day, the Remembrance Day commemoration at Pukeahu, that the Governor-General was introduced as the commander in chief, which, of course, whether it’s in title alone—but it means that it comes with the responsibility of our New Zealand Defence Force and the ability to extend these matters until, at least, the House does sit.

There are a number of amendments that have been put forward in the name of my colleague Vanushi Walters. I have a couple there, too, with respect to clause 4. One of those is that there is no need for the changes that are being proposed by the Minister because of that contingency plan, whereby the commander in chief, in this case the Governor-General, can, in her power, extend these powers anyway until at least the House comes back.

Now, the only period where there are 30 days where the House isn’t sitting is through the Christmas period. I’ve looked through all the sitting calendars over the past few years and the only other time where it gets quite long is usually around July where there’s a three-week break, maybe even a four-week break, but that’s not 30 days.

What about an election?

That’s not 30 days. I hear from the other side there, “What about an election?” Well, there are still caretaker powers for a Government up until the time that a Government is actually put into place. I know that—I know that.

But the House doesn’t sit.

I know that, but there are still provisions in the Defence Act that, actually, as Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan has already pointed out, the Prime Minister can still do that; the Governor-General can still do that. The Governor-General doesn’t change at the same time as the elections; it doesn’t change the same time as the Government. There’s a reason why continuity happens that way.

There are a number of amendments there that we put forward to the Minister for her consideration. One of those is in my name, where we look towards a middle ground, if you will, from Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan, whose amendment proposes going to 14 days. Of course, the Minister wants to do 30 days. I say, why don’t we meet in the middle? Why don’t we just call it three weeks and call it 21 days? That’s a good, I think, safe place and a safe option, while remembering that we still have these contingency plans or plan Bs or reserve action plan that has the continuity or has the ability to make sure that there is continuity in these particular matters.

The other part too is, to my point in my amendment, and to support the words of my colleague Vanushi Walters: actually, what’s being proposed here by the Minister in this particular bill in clause 4 is just simply not needed. They’re just simply not needed. There are enough contingency plans to make sure that there is continuity in these matters. There’s an amendment there in my name that says, actually, we should just forget what’s being proposed here by the Minister and this Government in clause 4 and simply just delete what they’re proposing, because it’s just not needed.

The questions there are pretty straightforward to the Minister. That is about the commander in chief and their ability to make sure that there is continuity, regardless of whether or not the House is sitting. The other matter is, of course—because it was raised by National backbench MPs—what about if there’s an election? I wonder if the Minister has a view on whether or not the Government, or a Government, an executive, still has the provisional powers up until a new Government is elected—of course, on a no-surprises basis. Then the other part is the question about whether or not the Minister would consider bringing that into a sort of middle ground of 21 days for her consideration.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I think there are some good questions in there, which I’m happy to answer. To the question on why only section 9(2) is extended—by new section 9(9), inserted by clause 4(2)—rather than section 9(4): well, section 9(4) stays the same for the use of supporting the police during a serious emergency—for example, a terrorism emergency—because we just don’t get notice of that stuff, normally, and so we have to deal with it straight away. These provisions are for a different purpose and are not amended by this bill, because this bill deals with other situations.

Why are we changing the expiry of an authorisation in relation to Public Service employees outside the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) from 14 days to 30 days—that was the question that was pretty much asked? Well, it’s a practical and pragmatic change. The 14-day expiry is no longer fit for purpose in the context of present-day industrial action. Since the introduction of the Employment Relations Act 2000, industrial action has become a last-resort measure that occurs only when there has been a significant breakdown in negotiations, which can mean a longer strike. Modern industrial action—including practices of work to rule, or partial strike—mean that industrial action is now more likely to last longer than 14 days, and so any associated authorisation for military personnel to conduct the work of striking staff is more likely to require an extension.

Certainly, I can remember when the military had to be called in to run the prisons after strikes, and I don’t think that too many people would think that letting our most violent offenders free in the prisons, or to leave them without getting food or exercise or anything else, would be a good idea. We do need to be aware of that. I consider that 30 days is a reasonable period for which the Minister of Defence may authorise military personnel to conduct the work of Public Service employees outside of the NZDF.

Another question was: could an assessment be made before the need for an authorisation arose, to anticipate a recess of Parliament? Well, if the requirements of the bill were not met, an authorisation could not be made. It’s not just, “We’re coming up to a recess. Let’s all have this provision in place.”, because all these other things have to happen, and it would not be appropriate to grant an authorisation in anticipation as the requirements would not yet have been met, and these decisions are not made by the Minister of Defence—either myself, or those who have gone before and those who will, in the future, come after me—based on a gut feel or a reckon. They’re taken on very strict legal advice, and they’re actually done at the request of the Chief of Defence Force.

There has been some suggestion that the Government is pushing this through. This bill is not something that we—it’s not on our mandate and it’s not something that we campaigned on. The reason is that the issue has arisen at the request of the Chief of Defence Force. It’s the Chief of Defence Force—the actual operational person in charge of everything Defence Force—who needs to have this done. It’s not some will of mine to go round making up some authorisations or anything, and no Minister of Defence wants to have to do that. It’s a fact that it’s an actual need that’s been found to be there, and it’s being addressed.

As for bringing in the Governor-General to make rulings on all this, I think it’s always best to actually try not to politicise the Governor-General or her role. I think that it’s incredibly important that Governors-General are able to undertake their constitutional role without us trying to put them in a difficult position and politicise them.

Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the Minister for those responses, which I found very illuminating, particularly the point around partial strikes. I think the Minister put it exactly the way a number of members in this Chamber have put it around the reasons why you need to retain partial strikes: because it gives an avenue for people to be able to express themselves.

For those who don’t know what a partial strike is—which you can no longer do without getting pinged—it’s like, for example, if you’ve got a T-shirt with a slogan on it or you do something just to make your point, to allow you to have some sort of political expression. I wonder if the Minister would be interested in looking at an amendment that would allow partial strikes in this case, as well.

I ask that because we have a particular, unique situation with the workforce in the defence sector, as well, where you have military personnel and you have civilian personnel. If you’re military personnel, you sign up for that. You take your orders, and you go through and there’s a hierarchy, but there are certain things you can’t do if you’re a military person. You can’t go on strike. You can’t do partial strikes. You can’t do those sorts of things, because that’s what you sign up for. But working alongside them are 3,000 civilian workers. Amongst those, the last time I heard, were a thousand of them that are unionised. So it’s about 3,000. Maybe it’s decreasing because they’re jumping on a plane and going over to Australia—and it seems to be a lot of people.

But I think there’s a good argument here, and I find myself agreeing with the Minister in terms of the ability to have a partial strike to allow people to express themselves and have that point, as well, because, as the Minister was saying earlier, the reason why we’re turning towards the 30 days or 14 days and so forth is because of the likelihood of stronger industrial action, because that is the only pathway forward. That is one of the only things that people can do. So all of this bill is around trying to respond to the situation that happened last year, in 2024, which was the impact on those workers who, as was their right, were organising themselves to take industrial action, to strike. And so we are here debating this bill.

My question is: will the Minister consider, given the unique situation of the workers within the defence sector, an amendment that would allow partial strikes as part of this bill? If not, could the Minister provide a rationale as to why, given that this is a very particular situation? It’s a new situation, as well, and there needs to be a way for these workers to be able to find a way to express themselves—remembering that when they took the original action, the offer was zero pay rise. So workers are frustrated that the only way they can find a way to express themselves was to strike. But I think a partial strike, I think, would allow them to, I don’t know, take the steam off a bit. So will the Minister entertain an amendment that would allow partial strikes as a part of this bill?

Vanushi Walters was up first.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’ve had lots of coffee this morning, and thank you to the Minister for her responses thus far. I have a proposal for the Minister of Defence to consider on the basis of her answers. A colleague has asked the question about why clause 4, section 9 amended, remains at 14 days versus this one shifting, and the response is there’s a need. Yes, I see that response. However, I think the fact that subsection (4) remains at 14 days shows us that there’s a recognition that there should be ministerial oversight when these decisions are made, in terms of the Defence Force contributing to the police’s actions.

I’m trying to work out whether there’s a way through the middle to allow that oversight to happen rather than just extend it to the 30 days. I mean, my first question would be: what is the background in terms of understanding how that number was arrived at and what’s the logic of getting from 14 to 30? And, if possible, what are the specific situations that have given rise to that number—appreciating that where we have senior people in those roles on the ground who understand what’s happening, we absolutely should be paying attention to the circumstances that they say present?

The proposal: I’ve already spoken about a second authorisation being possible. We acknowledge that is possible. I’m not yet sure that there’s sufficient administrative burden to prevent that being the best route for us to continue to have in place. However, is there a way in which we could write into the Defence Act the ability of the Minister to approve the continuation of a first authorisation on the Minister’s affirmation that the circumstances continue to exist where such authorisation is appropriate? I’m just saying that to have eyes across an ongoing situation is important. We’ve acknowledged that in subsection (4), and there’s a middle ground which potentially could minimise some of the administrative burden of requiring a second authorisation to be prepared and legal advice to be provided on that and truly robust scrutiny to be given, but some level of oversight from the Minister could be written into the statute. That seems like something that’s worth considering.

I mean, briefly going back to the first thing of the second authorisation, if we were to make this change and we got to day 29 and for some reason Parliament couldn’t sit within that period, I imagine that the Minister at that stage would send through a second authorisation if needed, and so would use that power that I’m saying could just be used during the summer break period, regardless.

My second question was just taking further a point that the Hon Peeni Henare raised about caretaker powers. My read of current section 9(8)(b) of the Principal Act is that precludes the ability of the Minister of Defence and a caretaker Government, post-election, to be able to use the powers of authorisation. I just thought for clarity’s sake it would be useful to get the Minister’s view of whether that is her understanding of the read of that section, or whether post an election, a Minister of Defence could use the powers—and, actually, a Prime Minister, as well—under section 9(2) or 9(4) in a case of an emergency; or whether it would only be, at that stage, a proclamation from the Governor-General that could put in place a measure like that.

The reason I’m interested is I think that our Parliament is a very different place in an MMP world. Right now in the Justice Committee, we’re wrangling the difficult question of a rising number of specials and keeping within the period of the writ. We don’t talk as much about the period taken to form coalitions, but we’ve certainly seen periods in our past where it has taken far longer to form a coalition Government. The rules around caretaker Governments, in my view, are quite loose. There’s a sense that the term “caretaker Government” means one thing when, in terms of democracy, it should truly be parcelled up into very separate forms of legitimacy that various Governments get, whether they’re before the election period versus when they’re after—so just some clarification sought from the Minister.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

Vanushi Walters’ two tabled amendments to delete clause 4 are out of order as being a direct negation of the question.

The question is that the Hon Peeni Henare’s tabled amendment to clause 4 replacing “30 days” with “21 days” in subclause (1) be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 4 replacing “30 days” with “14 days” in subclause (1) be agreed to.

The question is that Vanushi Walters’ tabled amendment to clause 4 replacing subclause (1) be agreed to.

The question is that the Hon Peeni Henare’s tabled amendment to delete subclause (2) of clause 4 be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 4(2) amending new section 9(9) be agreed to.

We now come to clause 5, the debate on new section 9A, use of armed forces to perform work of civil staff. The question is that clause 5 stand part.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate the enthusiasm of my colleagues, because this is an important matter. We’ll see just by the nature of the way the bill is that this is quite a chunky part of much of the reason why we can’t support this bill. The proposals here and much of the context and the speeches that have been given to date have talked about the threat to national security, the need to uphold national security, and matters around health and safety, and those are all things that I think everybody in this House will agree to. That’s the reason for the amendment tabled in my name that looks towards proposing tightening up this area. This is where I believe the greatest grey area section is.

In my amendment, what we’re asking is that the Minister of Defence makes it very clear that we be far more explicit in the description of what it is those roles are. We know what they are. In fact, a number of speeches in this House have already spoken to it, whether it’s the protection of ammunition depots or dumps, whether it’s the ability to make sure a ship or a vessel can go out to sea, etc. So what I take and what I glean from that is that the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) knows exactly what those roles are, so let’s make sure it’s clear and that there are no grey areas.

What I’m proposing in my amendment tabled in my name is new subsection 9A(3)(a), inserted by clause 5: “Any authorisation granted under section 9A must comply with the following limitations.”—a very key word there, limitations. “Armed forces personnel may only perform functions that are (a) essential to maintain the security of defence installations and restricted areas”—that make sense to me; it’s already been mentioned several times throughout the course of this bill—“(b) necessary for the maintenance and safety of weapons, munitions, and explosive stores”—another one that has been well traversed during speeches in this House—“(c) required for aircraft and naval vessel safety checks essential for operational readiness; and”—it answers the question about making sure whether or not we’re still able to deploy—“(d) urgently required to prevent imminent harm to health or safety.”

Health and safety is, of course, one of those important issues that I know this side of the House takes very seriously, so let’s put those into scope here. Let’s allow the Defence Force, under very clear legislation, to understand exactly what it is and the parameters with which they can use these powers.

Of course, the flip side to that is—and this is where I think this is another one of those grey areas that my good colleague Teanau Tuiono has raised on a number of occasions—then where else could the armed forces personnel be used? What I’m proposing in my amendment is that armed forces personnel must not perform—and I’ll be very clear, must not perform—(a) routine administrative, clerical, or non-critical maintenance duties or (b) work unrelated to national security or immediate health and safety.

Those are pretty straightforward. That clears up the grey areas that many of us have with respect to this particular clause to make sure that the scope of this bill actually allows the NZDF personnel to do exactly what it is that is required of them without some kind of loose terminology that says it is in the national interest. Well, this one sets it out a little bit more and makes it clearer, at least from the reckons on this side of the House. I wonder if the Minister—and that’s the first question I put to the Minister, if she would consider any parts of that amendment that allow us to remove those grey areas.

Also the other important side of it is to make sure that NZDF personnel aren’t simply being used for the sake of being used to backfill positions which aren’t in national security interests or health and safety matters. That will help a big issue that the unions raised when they brought matters not only to the Labour Party and the Green Party, but also in parts of their submission. This kind of carte blanche opportunity to use NZDF personnel anywhere and everywhere it sees fit can be removed by this simple amendment that I’m offering to this Government in a way to make sure that this bill is sharper and actually gets to the heart of what it is we’re trying to achieve here.

Mr Chair, thank you. It is a pretty simple amendment from the member the Hon Peeni Henare The point is, though, that it’s a very prescriptive approach which leaves very clear gaps. For example, there would be no basis to backfill roles to secure the security of sensitive information or equipment, nor to ensure essential military training with partners can continue. Exclusion of administrative roles would leave a gap. I don’t like that term “just administrative roles”; they’re actually very important roles. There could be a circumstance where those roles are actually critical to a core defence output. That’s why the bill’s requirements are around the impact of the industrial action, not the specific roles that are in or out. It would be unworkable to apply the member’s amendments in practice.

I would also say to the member: think back to COVID times with the work of the Defence Force then, our uniformed personnel then—all within accordance with what he’s saying—and the answer would have to be no. I’ve heard speeches from the Opposition saying the Defence Force do not sign up to these jobs. They didn’t sign up for security guard duty, either. They didn’t sign up to having to front, every day, the COVID discussions or, let’s say, sermons from the pulpit. They didn’t sign up to that either, particularly when they didn’t actually have the power to do the things they should have been able to do, instead giving that to the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment staff. So I think it’s really important that we understand we don’t always know what’s going to happen, and that’s why it’s very specific about the effects of the industrial action, not who’s taking industrial action.

The other thing is, too, it does need to be in accordance with the rules under this amendment, and they are very strict rules. There’s no other employer in the country—that I can think of—that has to come to Parliament to say why they have to shift staff from one job to another; it’s really only the Chief of Defence Force. This is not for the benefit of the Government; this is actually for the benefit of the Defence Force and the Chief of Defence Force, who has the authority over thousands of people. But also, it’s not just that: it’s the requirement to do what is needed for the country. It’s not for the Government; it’s for the country.

I’m sure that people, when they think about this a bit more—administrative roles are not just administrative, they are important, otherwise they would not be there. We don’t have surplus funding to fund roles as “just” something; they are important. That’s why the Chief of Defence Force needs to be able to backfill those if needed in certain circumstances—not every day; not anything else; has to come, cap in hand, basically, to the Minister of Defence, who in this case is me, and say, “This is why I need it”, with legal advice, with the reasons for it, because it is a big step to take these steps. It’s a big thing to do, and we don’t do it just because we feel like it.

Also, just dealing with the fact that this preserves the right to strike. It is very clear there is the right to strike; there is a right to partial strikes. But the Chief of Defence Force has to also, in certain circumstances, have the power to backfill where that’s necessary. Otherwise, we end up with people—health and safety issues, obviously paramount; safety, security of the nation: paramount. The Chief of Defence Force needs to be able to do his or, in the future, her job. It is really important that they not be tied by the fact that this Parliament now wants to debate partial strikes. It’s nothing to do with partial strikes; it’s actually about giving the Chief of Defence Force the power to do his job.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’ve just got a question in relation to new section 9A and particularly subsection (2). I would be interested in the Minister elucidating for us—what reassurance can she give us in terms of the ratio of military personnel who have the relevant qualifications, skills, and experience to fill those civilian roles, and what work has she done to be able to reassure the House that such is the case?

I think this is important because—even though I see the language in the clause in relation to the work needing to be done to not prejudice national security or “the ability or readiness (or both) of the Armed Forces to perform specific operational activities”, or when it is necessary for reasons of health and safety—there doesn’t seem to be a provision around also having those relevant skills, qualifications, and experience for those roles. I think, to me, that poses the question as to whether the backfilling of those roles will be performed at the very same level of competency as the civilian roles that may not be performed at the time due to industrial action, for example.

I think this is particularly important because, previously, one of the safeguards that we had was the sort of parliamentary debate that would be triggered earlier, and, in such a case, the Minister could have given a much earlier reassurance and explanation as to whether there are the adequate skills, qualifications, and experience to fill those roles. With the diminishing of those safeguards, now it becomes even less clear to parliamentarians if we’re going to be able to get those answers now that a debate wouldn’t be happening.

Going back to my question: I’m keen to seek the Minister’s elucidation as to whether she sought advice as to the range of those skills, qualifications, and experience, and, if so, maybe to what extent did she get details in relation to that? If she got information that shows, perhaps, that there is a gap between those in the military personnel and the civilian personnel, if there is any, what work would be undertaken to make sure that military personnel are equipped with the necessary skills and competencies to ensure that when the Minister or future Ministers choose to backfill those roles, those roles can be performed to a degree that actually a civilian would have been able to do so?

Thank you. Happy to answer that question. I realise that the member who asked those questions is probably not very familiar with the excellent people in our New Zealand Defence Force and the remarkable skills, trades, and professions that they undertake. They’re not only infantry people, they’re also engineers, they’re lawyers, they’re doctors, they’re nurses, they’re electricians, they’re airplane technicians; there’s all sorts of trades and professions within our uniformed staff as well as within our civilian staff. Some of those actually cross over. Sometimes, for instance if you’re on a Navy ship, you’ll find that the galley is actually crewed by uniformed staff. They’re the chefs and the waiters and everything else; they’re the stewards. But if you go into an army camp, you might find that they’re civilian staff. It depends where they are and what they’re doing, and if they’re deployed, because it’s the uniformed staff who are deployed, which means actually leaving their families and being able to go and live on a ship or go and live in some tent somewhere or whatever. They are extremely highly trained.

I’d say there is a reason that Defence Force staff normally have no difficulties when they’re sick of being deployed—or their families, more likely, are sick of them being deployed—and they want to go into civilian roles: it is because they are highly employable. They are trained to think on their feet, to be able to not only understand and take orders, but also to think about them and to question, if necessary. So you’re dealing with people who are highly trained.

They would only conduct the work of civil staff if they had the suitable skills for the roles, and the fact is, you’ll see in many parts of the Defence Force; there are both civilian and uniformed staff there. Even in the public relations part of it, there’s both. There are all sorts of things. There are roles that are both, but it’s all about what is necessary at that time. Safety will always be a paramount consideration. There would be nothing that I can think of in the Defence Force around health and safety, generally, that doesn’t have uniformed staff already working in there.

I’m pleased to be able to give the member a little rendition about some of the excellent training, and, might I just say, it’s another way of saying to our young people out there: come and join the New Zealand Defence Force. If I can use this as a recruiting measure, I’m going to do so because they come out very happy, very well trained, very fit, and very ready for action.

Thank you very much, Mr Chair. I have a question for the Minister in relation to new section 9A, the “Use of Armed Forces to perform work of Civil Staff”. In particular, I’m quite interested to understand how this addresses some of the workforce issues that we have in defence. I’ll admit my familiarity in this space does stem from experience in the police, where there’s previously been a freeze on non-sworn staff in those roles, even a sinking lid in the past. What that has resulted in is uniformed staff coming in to fill those civilian roles, and that has a range of complexities.

What I’m interested to understand from the Minister is how this change under new section 9A addresses some of those systemic workforce issues and, in particular, the ability to not only attract but to retain those specialist roles that we want to make sure that we have in place, and to fix some of those basics, such as making sure that those specialist roles are paid fairly, that they’re not overworked, and they’re given the resources to do jobs safely and professionally, because it’s some of those pressures within the workforce that, effectively, make it really difficult for those people who continue to work in those roles. What I’m interested to know is, if we have uniformed staff taking up those roles that have been in the past civilian roles, what impact does that have on the workforce? Does it increase the stress on those staff? Are they taking up roles that they are potentially—are they trained for them? Are they prepared to do that work? Are they having to do more than their fair share as a result of freezing uptake of civilian roles in that space?

My other concern that I’m interested to hear from the Minister is that we’ve heard some commentary in the public that when you have a situation where you’ve got uniformed staff being brought in to fill when civilians are taking some kind of industrial action—how does that work for the general, I guess, cohesiveness of a workforce? Does that undermine, potentially, a collaborative approach to working together when you’ve got one half coming in to fill the spaces and could be perceived, potentially, as undermining the industrial action being taken by civilian staff in order to get a fair pay increase? How does that work for the workforce in general?

So just to recap, my question to the Minister really is: how does this bill, specifically new section 9A, address some of those more fundamental workforce issues such as attracting and retaining key roles and making sure there is a cohesive team in place that can be called upon in times when New Zealand needs them?

Thank you, Mr Chair. Thank you to the Minister for her ongoing engagement. I want to speak to some of my tabled amendments to this part of the bill. I actually have to start with an apology because, reading back through them, I note that I’ve submitted two identical proposals, which was not intentional at all. I’m going to put that down to the House being in urgency and attempting to get my head across a number of different bills, so I’m just flagging that.

I would start at the amendment that was submitted at 7.10.05 p.m. This is amending clause 5 and amends new section 9A and inserts new clause 9A(2)(c), which would say, “and consideration has been given to the impact of granting an authority on the right to strike.” It’s an explicit inclusion of the right to strike within the language of the legislation. I was delighted to hear the Minister reference the right and say that it is not extinguished, that it exists, and that it’s not extinguished, which I think is absolutely wonderful to hear from the Minister. Of course, we’ve got a strong history in New Zealand of strike action, so we know that strike action is one of the methods that does lead us to fairer outcomes really in New Zealand. We’ve had a history of striking in New Zealand from 1821 where Māori timber workers were striking about the way in which they get remunerated. They were remunerated at the time in, I believe, food and consumable products, and the ask from them was to be able to be remunerated in something that could be tradable, essentially. These significant moments in our history are important, and we’ve had the Waihi gold miners’ strike actions in 1912 and then several instances steadily into our future.

The right does need to be protected in New Zealand law. It obviously exists in international law—in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). That, I think, is an interesting place to start because it recognises the right, but it says it has to be exercised in a way that is within the bounds of domestic law. What domestic law says or doesn’t say about the right to strike is very important.

Earlier, I spoke about judicial reviews and the use of discretionary power and the challenge on what a Minister must turn their mind to when exercising their discretion. This is why my view is that if you had this phrase within subsection (2)(c) of the legislation, it’s a clear directive to the Minister that that must be specifically taken into account before an authorisation could be made. I’m hopeful that the Minister, having acknowledged the importance of the right and that it isn’t extinguished, agrees with me that that direction is a useful one.

I then go to the tabled amendment submitted at 7.10.06 p.m. This is the one that’s replicated, so the next one is one minute later. This one proposes to amend clause 5 to amend new section 9A(2)(a) and insert the words “before the expiry of the authority made under section 9A” between the words “the work needs to be performed” and “in order to avoid prejudicing”. The intent behind this proposed amendment is to indicate that there’s a certain amount of urgency to the work that needs to be done, which is, again, a request for the Minister to turn their mind toward the urgency of the work that needs to be done so that there can’t be a pause until striking work has come back into those roles. My view, again, is that we were expanding any discretionary power, if there is a useful option to provide some legislative guidance, as there is in this case, then I think that that is useful for the Minister to bear in mind and decide whether it’s appropriate for us to include it.

I do have other amendments that I’m interested in speaking to if the Chair is so willing, so I will be seeking another call. The next one is the amendment filed at 7.10.08 p.m., and that amends clause 5 to amend new section 9A(2)(b) to add after “health” the following phrase: “where regard has first been given to whether other measures can be put into place in the short term to avoid the need for the granting of the authority.” I’m just going to go to new section 9A(2)(b). This is where “The Minister may grant an authority … if the Minister believes on reasonable grounds that— … (b) it is necessary for the work to be performed for reasons of safety or health.”

I agree with this. I think it is important that if there are health and safety concerns, the Minister ought to be able to make such an authorisation. However, I’ve managed health and safety processes before when I was the manager of YouthLaw Aotearoa. Whenever I’d create those risk registers, one of the things I examined was the various options that I could put in place to manage said circumstance. It was almost never one thing. There were always multiple potential things that could have been done. Again, the question here is whether, for example, if there was an area that was being managed by a staff member who was on strike, you could minimise access to that area because the health and safety issue had arisen in that area. I’m sure discretion could be used. The question is: is legislative guidance useful, again, to anchor ourselves in the importance of the right to strike?

I am now going to the amendment filed at 7.10.09. This one is an amendment to clause 5 to add a new clause 9A(3)(c). That would be to read “the capacity and capability risks identified in other parts of the Defence Force as a result of an authority being made and how the risk is being managed.” This is in relation to where the authority has to be specified in writing and the things that it must specify. Currently, it only reads that the things to be specified are “(a) the part or parts of the Armed Forces that may be used and the work that may be performed; and (b) the period for which the authority applies.” I do think that it’s worthwhile, if the Minister is thinking through the risks that are identified to other parts of the Defence Force as well, that those are also specified in writing. Again, it’s very clear that the Minister has considered those risks and that, despite them existing, the Minister, regardless, believes that the authorisation should be granted.

I’ll then move to the tabled amendment filed at 7.10.10 p.m. This is to amend clause 5 to add new clause 9A(3)(c) to read “the alternative arrangements that were considered in determining a need to grant an authority under section 9A.” This is, again, the flip side of what I was asking before—that the Minister consider various things. This is that the Minister, in writing, provides her rationale, if you like, for making those considerations that she’s turned her mind to—other arrangements that could have been made. My example was closing off a particular area if there are physical hazards or health hazards in a particular area that is now not staffed and just reassuring the public and, indeed, the workers who are on strike that those considerations have been considered.

The next amendment I have to speak about is the one filed at 7.10.11. This is the one to amend clause 5 to add a new clause 9A(3)(c) to read “any indication that the authority will be subject to an automatic extension.” Given the other changes that have been made in this bill, I feel that the Minister may have a view, even at the stage of granting the authorisation, as to whether an extension is likely to occur. This would be useful, also, to flag at the outset in terms of that written authorisation.

Thank you, Mr Chair, and thank you for the contributions from members to date as well. I guess I want to begin by responding to some of the answers that the Minister has given, in particular a response to my colleague Ricardo Menéndez March. I guess if the Minister could clarify exactly what that process would be, in terms of determining how staff will be moved through. I do take the point, and I agree, that uniformed staff are highly qualified and come with a lot of expertise, but, sometimes, those with expertise and, sometimes, those specialists aren’t in large numbers. There could be only a small number of people. So what is the process in order to identify when there are gaps because of an industrial dispute to move people from one particular spot to another? How is that identified? Also, what happens if you don’t have qualified staff at that particular skill level available at that time? I think we want to get to a situation where we’re not number eight wiring ourselves through particular processes. I do take the points that people made about COVID as well. So if I could get some clarity from the Minister on that, that would be appreciated.

Also, the point that the Minister made around encouraging people to join the Defence Force as well: I hope that that also comes with good pay conditions, that that comes with suitable housing stock, because I have heard from uniformed personnel who have talked about some of the issues around some of the housing stocks. That would be my plea to the Minister, and hopefully, that’s being sorted out—

The irony—just because last year, the money went to the uniforms, and you opposed it. You wanted the civilians.

Tim Costley might want to take a call at some particular stage instead of yelling out across the Chamber. So if that could be clarified, that would be good.

On that, if I could draw the Minister’s attention to my Amendment Paper No. 442. This deals with new section 9A, inserted by clause 5, “Use of Armed Forces to perform work of Civil Staff”. In my proposed amendment, I propose that “In clause 5, new section 9A(1), after ‘Minister’ (page 2, line 14), insert ‘and following consultation with any union involved in the industrial dispute’.” I know that side is allergic to the unions, but we’ve got ourselves in a particular situation here, where last year, the union took some action, and now we’re here debating this bill as well. I think my amendment would go some way to providing an avenue for those discussions to happen as well, noting the very the different nature of the defence sector as well.

We’ve got uniformed staff, civilian staff, civilian personnel, and military personnel working together. Having a way for the union—the representatives for those workers—to be able to have a say and to have a talk and communicate with the Minister, I think, would be a good way to alleviate the situation in the workplace, noting that in the submissions, they did talk about how this could create awkwardness, uncomfortableness within the workplace. We want to avoid that. This House should try to strive to do everything to avoid that as well.

I did make the earlier point about partial strikes—having the ability to do partial strikes, the ability for civilian staff to be able to use that as an avenue to highlight the industrial disputes, I think, would also go some way to sorting out those issues as well.

While I’m up here, if I could draw the Minister’s attention to Amendment Paper No. 441, which relates to new section 9A(2)(a)(ii), “the ability or readiness (or both) of the Armed Forces to perform … operational activities … that are integral to core defence outputs;”. I agree: all jobs are great. Administrative jobs are really, really important, but I think it’s important for us to get some specificity about what those Defence Force outputs are, because it seems very vague; it’s very broad. National security: we can have discussions about that—that’s fine. There’re some parameters around how you can have the discussions. Emergency matters: of course, really important as well. But what is the “core defence output”? It could be anything, so that kind of discretion needs to be teased out. It is something that needs to be debated more thoroughly so that we’re not actually just giving a whole lot of power over to the Minister without any recourse.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

Now, members, there’s been quite a bit of contextualisation going on in a lot of the questions. We need to start getting reasonably specific. Probably the second part of Vanushi Walters’s speech, where she spoke directly to each of her amendments was a pretty good example.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I just thought I’d take some of the questions in sort of no particular order—a rather random order, really. I’m going to add some of them together and try and come up with some responses that are acceptable to the Opposition and to Parliament.

First off, it is not my role as the Minister of Defence to decide where staff are shifted, what roles they do, or anything like that; that’s the Chief of Defence Force. That’s why he’s in that job, not me. It’s very important that the Minister is not to be involved in that; otherwise, we could be accused of trying to give a preference to one person over another. That would be a very bad thing to happen, and this is not acceptable in a democratic society.

The bill very clearly maintains the right to strike. There is no attempt to affect the right to strike, because, you know, one of the hallmarks of a democracy is the right to strike. I always think it’s so important for people to remember that the right to strike is actually part of our democracy. It doesn’t mean, though, that an employer has to sit back and do absolutely nothing. It is important that when it’s a critical situation to deal with, like the Defence Force has to deal with, at the appropriate time, and only in those times, and it’s very clearly set out in the bill, that there is an ability to shift staff from one job to another in terms of uniform staff to civilian staff roles. Now, that doesn’t mean to say that the Chief of Defence Force is going to do this all the time; all these other steps have to be in place—all the other requirements, plus the Minister has to sign it off. It is really important that this is not just a general willy-nilly where they can do anything they wanted. Understand, too, for the Chief of Defence Force to shift a uniformed staff, a trained armed forces person, across to do a role which a civilian has been doing takes that person away from the role that the Chief of Defence Force actually wants them to be doing. So this is not something that is just every day; it is only in very prescribed situations.

There is an amendment to add that the work needs to be informed before the expiry of an authorisation to turn the mind to urgency. It’s superfluous. The bill’s really clear that the conditions in new section 9A(2), inserted by clause 5, need to be satisfied for the duration of the authorisation. This is not everyday work; this is a situation where those particular requirements are in place. If they’re not met, then there’s no need for an authorisation, because it would not be valid and it would be subject to judicial review and the Minister would be subject to debate in the House and it would be a matter for the House to debate.

Should there be an amendment to require the health and safety risk to be imminent? Well, that goes further than the current Employment Relations Act. So that would be more restrictive than the current arrangements. So, no, that would potentially create a health and safety risk that doesn’t exist or present.

How would our military personnel feel about being tasked with civilian roles? “Won’t this influence morale?”, essentially, is a question from Parliament. Well, I’m glad everyone is so worried about the morale of the Defence Force, because I am too. But I’m really happy to report that morale is pretty jolly good these days because they’re getting to do the things that they joined for. I’m not asking them to stand outside managed isolation and quarantine facilities. I’m not asking them to go and guard beaches, like the poor old police were made to do. I’m actually asking them to do their job, which is exactly what they are.

Can I also tell you that, first and foremost, our defence personnel are professionals—they’re absolutely foremost professionals in what they do. These types of taskings that we’re referring today only occur in extreme circumstances. This is all about needing to respond just when needed, not every day. We’re not uplifting them all and going, “You go fill this job; you do that.” It’s not like that.

I think, too, there were some comments about the striking and everything else, but our civilian staff are a key enabler of our military operations, and their work is valued. I’m not going to say to the Chief of Defence Force, “You point out exactly where that person’s work’s adding to operations.” They’re all adding to operations in many ways. The Government is committed to defence.

So I’m really pleased to hear the Green Party of Aotearoa is so supportive of our defence housing. I want to see them supporting us in the Budget bids that we make. I want to see them supporting the fact that we have a $957 million uplift in operational spending over the four years as part of Budget 2025. I’m so pleased they care about the standards and the work and the living conditions of our Defence Force, because I want to see them put their money where their mouth is. I want to see them coming out and saying, “Thank you. Thank you, Government for supporting our Defence Force.”

Thank you, Mr Chair. I really appreciate the Minister’s response to our questions and Amendment Papers. I also have a number of tabled amendments that I would like to seek the Minister’s support on.

I think we’ll start with my first tabled amendment, which was time-stamped at 9.00.03. This is to deal with what the Minister said before, and I think this is really timely, because the Minister just said, “Look, I’m not the Minister responsible. That is on the advice of the Chief of Defence Force.” This is an amendment that is replicating what we’re currently seeing in section 9(4) of the Defence Act, which states that the Minister, on information supplied by the Chief of Defence Force or a Vice Chief of the Defence Force, may grant the authority. I think this not only allows there to be some sort of safeguard that proper consultation advice has been given but that there is a paper trail for public transparency in terms of the decisions that the Minister makes. Hopefully, the Minister will consider that, because this sounds to be in line with what the Minister has just stated.

My second one is around what my colleague Teanau Tuiono has mentioned in terms of “core defence outputs”, and this is in new section 9A(2)(a)(ii). Now, “core defence outputs” is not a defined term within the legislation, including the primary legislation, and I think “core”, it can be argued, is up to interpretation. I wondered if the Minister would consider an alternative word or even just defining what “core” would mean and some examples of that. But my alternative that I’m suggesting is rather than “core defence outputs”, we look at “essential defence outputs”.

Moving on to my next amendment, which concerns new section 9A(2)(b): now, this is an interesting one, because the Minister and various members during the committee stage have consistently used the term “health and safety”, but in the legislation it is not “health and safety” or “safety and health”; it’s “safety or health”, as two mutually exclusive elements. I don’t know if this is a drafting error or there is a reason why those two things have now become mutually exclusive, when every instance that the Minister has referred to it, it has been “health and safety”. My proposal and my amendment is looking at what is stated in new section 9A(2)(b)(ii), which states “ability or readiness (or both)”. My amendment is to actually replicate the same thing—to say that “for reasons of safety or health (or both)”; or, alternatively, the Amendment Paper by my colleague Teanau Tuiono, which is just a simple adjustment of the conjunction from “or” to “and”, which then is also consistent with the wording in the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015.

Now, moving along to new section 9A(3)(b), which is around “An authority under this section must be in writing”, and must specify the period for which the authority applies. Noting that new section 9A is a separate section from section 9—from the previous section—there is no specific and defined date that is being given here. I think having a specified date is important, so I want to check with the Minister if she would consider to add a new subsection (3)(b)(i), which is “any period under subsection (3)(b) must not be longer than 14 days”—this is consistent with the existing drafting of section 9(8) of the Defence Act, which mentions subsections (2) and (4)—or if the Minister would like to extend that or clarify that it’s still the same as the previous amendment, which is no longer than 30 days, which is also a reasonable clarification. But at this stage, the period for which the authority applies has no defined boundary. This will be the same in terms of clause 5 of the bill, new section 9A(8). It’s also my amendment, which was time-stamped at 9.00.07, which is also including that particular time frame.

The last thing I want to mention is in new subsection (6), when it says that the Minister must inform the House of Representatives immediately if the House is sitting. There is an anomaly in terms of the previous clause, as well—I’ll be very quick, Mr Chair—in that the authority lapses—Mr Chair.

Lawrence Xu-Nan—I see you’ve got one more amendment.

One more. Just to clarify that, in terms of this, when the House is sitting, we normally assume that’s at the beginning of the House, but any of the authority that has been granted in this section, for example, and also in the previous section lapses until the next sitting of the House. But a motion that’s been raised by the Minister to provide a reason under new subsection (6) would not happen at the beginning of the sitting of the House, but, in fact, it would take, at the very earliest, after question time. What, then, we’ll see is a weird gap in which the authority has lapsed and the renewal for the new authority by a motion that’s been raised by the Minister has not been triggered. I want the Minister to clarify that, as well, in terms of the sitting of the House and what happens when that authority lapses for that brief moment of time.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I just have one further question for the Minister, and it’s in relation to, really, the key point of what this bill is trying to do. It gets to that section 9A—the ability to use military personnel to conduct the work of New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) civilian staff in the event of industrial action if it’s constrained in situations where there is a risk to health and safety. We know from the past that the constraints of section 9 were acutely felt, particularly at the end of 2024, when civilian staff undertook industrial action in support of bargaining for their new collective agreement.

My question to the Minister is in relation to some of the risks that have been highlighted in the regulatory impact statement. There’s a direct risk that has been highlighted that this will impact on the bargaining power of civilian staff to some extent. I’m interested to understand—I know that there wasn’t consultation with unions. The select committee process and some discrete consultation was undertaken, but it would be really good to know what her analysis is of the impact of this legislation on the bargaining power of civilian staff.

Secondly, I’m interested to know what this may mean for NZDF activities that cannot take place where the role of striking civilian staff is central to core defence outputs but there is no link to national security or health and safety. I think that’s an important point that we need to understand.

The final question I have in relation to this part of the bill is about the removal of the requirement to seek House approval to extend an authorisation. Is that, in the Minister’s view, compromising an important check on ministerial power in any way? I know that there are good procedural reasons to counter what we saw happen in 2024—those have been highlighted—but, really, I’m interested to know from the Minister if that removal of the requirement to seek House approval to extend that authorisation is perceived at all as a removal of a check and balance on ministerial power when we’re talking about industrial relations.

Thank you, Mr Chair. There were a few questions in there. There’s some concern that unions are not being consulted and stuff. Well, actually, industrial action is itself actioned by the union, so I understand there are always negotiations around that. In fact, the committee might be interested to know that the head of the Public Service Association has a meeting with me tomorrow, so no doubt we will discuss all sorts of issues and I will no doubt answer those queries in my usual way.

There was a question about why it says “safety or health” in the legislation. It’s because that actually mirrors section 97 of the Employment Relations Act. I think the member is taking the fact that I often talk about health and safety as it’s my area and I naturally go into that, and I’m probably the only person in the House with a graduate diploma in occupational health and safety.

We have talked about that.

We have talked about that, haven’t we? So I do tend to think in terms of health and safety, and it’s not to skite, actually; it’s not all about me. But it is important, I think, to have consistency across the legislation. And so that’s why it’s “health or safety”, or “safety or health”, as it is in the Act.

Why not have a time limit? Well, the Minister must set a period of time for which the authority applies. It’s all part of what the Minister has to do, but it can only apply during industrial action and when the criteria are met. The fact is that industrial action itself, the end of it, provides a de facto time limit anyway. So once the industrial action is finished or the other requirement has finished, then the authority lapses. There was a question around why the bill does not define core defence outputs. Is the criteria too broad—that was the general question. The full version of this criteria is “the ability and/or readiness of the Armed Forces to perform specific operational activities that are integral to core defence outputs;” and it is worded intentionally so that a number of elements must be demonstrated before this criteria can apply. This is still a high threshold which would require robust justification to satisfy it. This could include activities essential to maintaining armed forces’ ability and readiness for deployment or operations, such as responding to expected or unexpected events in New Zealand or overseas requiring military capacity tasks under security treaties or UN agreements, or emergency management.

Does the bill denigrate workers’ rights? That’s pretty much a question coming through. Well, the right to take industrial action remains. It’s the joy of being a democracy. You don’t see too many communist countries where that happens—just saying; it does not work that way. For those people who yearn for the communist utopia for workers’ rights, understand there is no right to strike without tanks coming at you. So understand that it’s only in democracies, and as a Government absolutely committed to democracy, let me tell you it is a core foundation of it.

This bill ensures that the security of New Zealanders and safety of New Zealanders endures should civilian staff exercise these rights. There are always consequences, and those consequences may be a loss of pay. It may be that someone else is doing the job, but the main thing is that the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) has to be able to deal with emergency and other situations that may arise.

Industrial action will still have a considerable impact on New Zealand Defence Force operations under these changes, and it’s because the work that would otherwise be performed by military personnel is less likely to be delivered whilst they cover for their colleagues, and the resources of the NZDF will be stretched to fill both military and civilian duties. It is not an ability for the CDF and for the Minister that they take lightly. I can tell you it is a very difficult decision to make and is only taken in situations where it really must occur.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

The question is that Teanau Tuiono’s amendment to clause 5, new section 9A(1), set out on Amendment Paper 442 be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, new section 9A, amending subsection (2) be agreed to.

The question is that Teanau Tuiono’s amendment to clause 5, new section 9A(2), set out on Amendment Paper 441 be agreed to.

The question is that Vanushi Walters’ tabled amendment to clause 5 amending paragraph (a) of section 9A(2) be agreed to.

Vanushi Walters’ other tabled amendment to clause 5 amending paragraph (a) of section 9A(2) is out of order as being a duplicate of a previous amendment.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, new section 9A(2), amending subparagraph (ii) of new paragraph (a) be agreed to.

The question is that Vanushi Walters’ tabled amendment to clause 5 amending paragraph (b) of section 9A(2) be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5 amending paragraph (b) of section 9A(2) be agreed to.

The question is that Vanushi Walters’ tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting a new paragraph (c) into section 9A(2) be agreed to.

The question is that Vanushi Walters’ tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting paragraph (c) into section 9A(3) to require an authority under the section to specify capacity and capability risks be agreed to.

The question is that Vanushi Walters’ tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting paragraph (c) into section 9A(3) to require an authority under the section to specify alternative arrangements be agreed to.

The question is that Vanushi Walters’ tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting paragraph (c) into section 9A(3) to require an authority under the section to specify whether it may be subject to an automatic extension be agreed to.

The question is that the Hon Peeni Henare’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new subsection (3A) into section 9A be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new subsection (3A) into section 9A be agreed to.

The question is that Vanushi Walters’ tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting the words “with urgency” into section 9A(5) be agreed to.

The question is that Vanushi Walters’ tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting the words “and the reason for giving it” into section 9A(5) be agreed to.

The question is that Vanushi Walters’ tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting the words “whether there is likely to be an automatic extension of the authority” into section 9A(5) be agreed to.

The question is that Vanushi Walters’ tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting the words “and whether there is likely to be an automatic extension of the authority” into section 9A(6) be agreed to.

The question is that Vanushi Walters’ tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting the words “whether other options were considered instead of granting an authorisation” into section 9A(6) be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5 amending subsection (8) of section 9A be agreed to.

The question is that the Hon Peeni Henare’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new subsection (8A) into section 9A be agreed to.

Madam Speaker, the committee has considered the Defence (Workforce) Amendment Bill and reports it without amendment. I move, That the report be adopted.

This bill is set down for third reading immediately.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I move, That the Defence (Workforce) Amendment Bill be now read a third time.

This bill is about balancing the right of New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) civilian staff to take industrial action with New Zealand’s national security and defence needs. I would like, once again, to acknowledge the members of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee who considered this bill and the principles that underpin it.

The core role of the NZDF is to protect New Zealand and advance New Zealand’s interests through military operations at sea, on land, and in the air. The security of New Zealand is a 24/7 issue, 365 days of the year. Our Defence Force consists of hard-working men and women who are sailors, soldiers, and aviators—collectively, the armed forces and their civilian colleagues.

The NZDF civilian staff are entitled to take industrial action. This is a fundamental right of employees, recognised in law. The civilian staff in our Defence Force play a significant role in keeping New Zealand safe, whether through providing security at military bases, testing of NZDF capabilities and technology, aircraft maintenance, and countless other important tasks. This means there will be times when industrial action could put New Zealand’s national security at risk or impact the NZDF’s ability to deliver the tasks expected of it.

This bill seeks to ensure the Defence Act 1990 is fit for purpose. This bill ensures that when it is justified to do so, the Minister can authorise the armed forces to conduct the work of striking civilian staff, and it streamlines the process for doing so.

Rather than authorisation lasting for 14 days, the Minister of Defence will be able to say how long an authorisation will last. This removes the requirement to have a parliamentary debate about whether the NZDF can deploy people within their own organisation for longer than 14 days. Parliament will be notified of such an authorisation and the reasons for giving it, and any member of Parliament can bring it to the attention of the House for further scrutiny. Likewise, the Minister will continue to be able to authorise military personnel to conduct the work of striking Public Service employees where not doing so could lead to health and safety risk, which they already can do under current legislation. Parliament’s role in approving an extension beyond that period will be maintained, and the House will not need to be recalled if an authorisation expires when the House is not sitting.

These changes strike a balance between ensuring industrial action can still go ahead and have its intended effect, while ensuring that critical activities can continue, that both health and safety are protected, and that national security is not put at risk. The passing of this bill is a further demonstration of this Government’s commitment to ensuring New Zealand continues to have a defence force which is ready and able to protect and defend New Zealanders, New Zealand, and its interests. I commend this bill to the House.

The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Madam Speaker, thank you for the opportunity to speak in the third and final reading of this particular bill. As we’ve done in other parts of this bill, I do want to acknowledge the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) personnel, both those who serve in uniform and the civilian staff, who I know contribute to the wellbeing of this country and contribute to the ongoing effectiveness of the New Zealand Defence Force, and it’s with them in mind for both sides of this House that this bill has been well debated. While we might not agree that we’ve managed to get any of the amendments, certainly from this side of the House, across the line, it is important that when we look towards the operation and the functionality of the NZDF, we acknowledge both those parts, because this particular bill pertains particularly to them.

Now, the Minister spoke about getting the balance right, and I think that is always an important thing, and we hoped that some of our amendments would strike that balance, get a bit of a middle ground, where we could continue to support both of them: those civilian staff who wish to take work action—strike or whatever it might be—and those NZDF personnel who continue to serve and could be utilised to backfill those roles. We will continue to oppose this bill for the reasons that we have spelt out through the first and second reading and, of course, the committee of the whole House.

We know that when you leave grey areas, regardless of the bill, or regardless of the legislation, that’s where people are unsure about what’s happening. We wanted to make sure that it was clear that we can continue to protect the national interest, continue to protect the health and safety of this country while also allowing work action to be taken by those staff and workers right across the country. So we don’t back down from the stance that the Labour Party has taken on this particular bill.

The other matter we want to make very clear to the House during the third reading of this particular bill is that when this Government came into power, the first Budget, the finance Minister made it very clear that there were cuts to be made across the public sector, and that included the Defence Force and, in particular, the civilian roles. Multiple times, the Minister and this Government were asked whether or not those cuts would impact on these civilian roles or, more importantly, impact on the ability for the NZDF to do their work—the important work—and we were told no, it wouldn’t. Yet we are changing the legislation—the Defence Act—to have a plan B or a “just in case”.

When we asked the Government these questions, we were told that no, it wouldn’t impact. Well, it’s clear, then, from the debate that’s taken place during the passage of this bill, that it indeed does have an impact on the opportunity for the NZDF to be deployable, to be ready to serve in times of crisis or emergency. It’s clear, then, that this particular bill is to cater or to cover a plan B, to make sure, at least in the eyes of this Government, that their readiness and deployability is at the forefront.

We always stand, as the Labour Party, on the side of the workers, and we make no apology for standing alongside the civilian staff and, indeed, the public sector. The instances that have been raised in this House during the debate are ones that sound reasonable. When we say that the NZDF can cover for public sector roles where it’s relevant and where it’s necessary, the one that’s always offered is Corrections. It makes sense to, I think, every New Zealander, when we say, “OK, for Corrections, because they’re doing an important job in securing our prison facilities right around the country.” However, when we try to approach this Government to make sure that we can be far more specific about what roles it can cover, or whose role it can cover, sadly, I didn’t think there was an open engagement with the Government on being far more specific.

Now, that begs the question: does it mean that when health staff go on strike or teachers go on strike or other parts of our public sector workforce go on strike, the NZDF could be deployed? I think, like I said, the New Zealand public are quite reasonable to think, “OK, Corrections; Police, maybe even; that makes sense to us.” But where it’s an important role in the health sector or in our classrooms with our teachers, I’m sure the New Zealand public would have some questions about that.

I thought there were also some really good amendments or suggestions put forward to the Minister that look towards some of those other fail-safe mechanisms around the ability to extend. We talked about the Commander-in-Chief or the Governor-General, and the role that they play in making sure that that can take place. We acknowledge, though, that if they come back to the House here, the House will be notified by the Minister. We asked also if that notification could have far more detail in it so that it could be discussed and debated in the House. Sadly, that didn’t get across the line, but we acknowledge that the democratic processes of this country are important, and when these important matters are raised, we always push that it should come back to the House for consideration—not something that continues to put power in the hands of the few. That’s something that we will always stand up against and make sure that the democracy that our country believes in continues to be practised here in Parliament.

One of the important things that the Minister mentioned in her third reading speech was about making sure that the Defence Act is fit for purpose. I think that should be something that we should always look at. Something that the Minister said during the committee of the whole House sort of raised the eyebrows of a number across the House, and that was that when the Defence Act was written, in 1990, it was written in times of peace. Now we’re making an amendment 25 years later because it’s important. Well, there were a heck of a lot of conflicts between 1990 and 2025, which I think serves up an opportunity for this House to look at the Defence Act as a whole. I mentioned it in one of my earlier contributions. It’s that beach batch or that holiday home in Coromandel, where you put a lean-to on the lean-to and before you know it, you’ve got a wet carpet, and the house is leaking.

The Defence Act is an important Act, and the Minister highlighted that, and I totally agree with her and support her on that matter. Therefore, the Defence Act should be relevant, it should be agile and, more importantly, it should be fit for the purpose of today’s Defence Force and the needs that confront our country.

It’s been made and highlighted, as points across the House, that national security is at a challenging time geostrategically around the world. We know that there are challenges, and New Zealand certainly isn’t immune to that, so we do need to make sure our NZDF is fit for purpose and the legislation that governs it is also as well.

The other part where I think the Minister made a really good point is that weather events, and right now in the hurricane season, mean that it’s really important for us to remain ready to deploy, ready to operationalise, to support not just New Zealanders. We’ve seen over the past few weeks the devastating floods in the south, the devastating fire in Tongariro, and we know that the NZDF will play their part in our community, and we need to make sure that they are able to do that. Of course, that extends to our friends and our neighbours and our whānau in the Pacific, where, if I recall correctly, even in my time as the defence Minister, the NZDF quite regularly was deployed because of hurricane season or tropical-storm season.

I think the House and the Minister make really good points there, to make sure that despite the debate on this bill, New Zealanders need reassurance that our NZDF will be there for them. That’s what I want to give to our community that are listening or the community that follow this debate: the NZDF, and, of course, the public, the civilian staff, and the uniformed staff—the reassurance that the NZDF is there to serve our country, and we know they will; the reassurance that despite the challenges, known or unknown, that we might face in the coming weeks or months, the NZDF will be in the best position to be able to support, however the Minister and the Government sees fit. We support that.

We want to encourage and make sure that our whānau out there feel safe and secure because we know, whether it’s in the Pacific or locally, that when a grey ship shows up after an event and it’s got the Kiwi or the Royal New Zealand Navy on the side, that brings assurance, and it brings security to those areas. I reflect back on the volcanic eruption in Tonga. The HMNZS Aotearoa was the first ship to arrive. After having spoken with the Tongan people, they said they couldn’t have asked for a better blessing, and that wasn’t just because it was the first one to arrive. It was because it was Aotearoa who answered the call.

It’s really important, despite the debate, and the backward and forward across this House, that our public know our NZDF are always ready to go. They’re highly deployable, highly trained, and will always answer the call when needed.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I rise on behalf of the Greens to speak on the Defence (Workforce) Amendment Bill in this third reading. We have just completed the committee of the whole House stage, which was illuminating. The Minister of Defence was very engaging, and, I guess, one of the things with that Minister in particular is that you don’t need to read a crystal ball—they’re pretty straight up whether you like the answers or not. I didn’t like the answers, but at least they were clear, so there is that as well.

I will say that the comments around the right to strike didn’t land well with me; I think there was some talking around that right as well. I still see this as limiting the right to strike, and I think that this bill weakens the right to strike by allowing striking civilian staff to be replaced with uniformed personnel. It’s called strikebreaking. It creates lots of pressure on staff, whether they’re uniformed staff or civilian. In the committee of the whole House stage, we did talk about the unique nature of the Defence Force—you have civilian staff, you have uniformed staff, military personnel, and that’s a unique situation. When you sign up for the military or when you sign up for the defence force, you sign up for a hierarchy, and you sign up for a whole lot of issues. You don’t get to strike—you don’t get to do partial strikes, and so on and so forth—and that is the expectation there, but you do have 3,000 civilian workers, and at least 1,000 of those civilian workers are unionised, and it is incredibly important that they have the right to strike. The issues around bringing in uniformed personnel or other parts of that staff to take those roles is also something we should be incredibly careful about as a House.

One of the illuminating things—I think it was one of the earlier clauses where we were talking about the reasons why this bill is coming to the House in the form that it is—was that there could be an escalation of an industrial dispute because that is one of the only ways that workers can actually engage when they’re not being paid properly. I immediately thought, “Well, is there an exception that can be made in this case, because of the different circumstances with the Defence Force workforce, for partial strikes?” For those who sat in this House when partial strikes legislation was being moved through the House, that was something where if you do partial strikes, you will get your pay docked. Just for people’s clarification: for example, you had teachers who were participating in partial strikes where they just wore T-shirts saying a particular political slogan. You’re not allowed to do that, but, because you’re not allowed to do that, you go straight down the strike avenue as well. I think there is a strong argument there to allow for partial strikes as well.

In another one of my amendments, I did talk about making sure in the legislation that the union is informed—that there is consultation with the union. I think that’s important, and I think that’s important because it provides a way to have that discussion, that negotiation, because the reason we are in here at this particular time is because, in 2024, Public Service Association members in New Zealand Defence Force civilian staff roles were offered a zero pay increase. That’s amazing to me. It’s not even the beginning of a negotiation that people could agree to, right? You show up to the bargaining table and the offer on the table is “Here’s nothing”—here’s nothing. The workers used the tools that were available to them—used the avenues that were available to them—and good on them. They actually won that strike. That is the rules working as they should. The unique situation you have with the Defence Force with uniformed personnel and civilian personnel has to be taken into account, and I don’t think that this bill fully addresses that at all.

We also had a bit of a discussion around the use of urgency. This House has seen a lot of urgency over this parliamentary term—too much, some would say, and I would say as well. There was a bit of a discussion around that, but this particular bill did have a select committee process where we did have submitters coming to the select committee. They presented very strong arguments, I thought—strong arguments that I don’t think were picked up in either the departmental report or in the select committee report. There were issues that were not resolved adequately as well. Although I acknowledge the straight answers that we did get from the Minister, I was not left feeling that submitters who had come to the select committee could feel that those issues had been resolved at all.

This bill only had a couple of stages going through urgency. We had the first reading, it went to select committee, and then it came here; then we had the committee of the whole House, which we’ve just finished, and now this is the third reading—so part of it was under urgency. One of the questions that we did pose to the Minister was: why was this particular part in urgency? We should only really use urgency if we really need to, but, in this case, half of it was and half of it wasn’t. What was the rationale? Is it the proximity to Christmas? Is the Minister aware of any industrial disputes that might be arising? Why was the timing such that we’re rushing this part of the bill through under urgency?

I think there is an argument that we could actually—by acknowledging the unique circumstances that we have with Defence Force personnel, both uniformed and civilian—find other solutions to help to allow civilian staff to be able to express their rights, and to allow civilian roles to be able to fully use the rights that they have for them. I know that, for myself when I was sitting on the select committee, and for others as well, I was actually quite surprised with how many people there were in civilian roles—3,000 is quite a lot. There’s the other question around, well, why are so many of these roles being done by civilians when you would assume, and I did assume before the select committee process, that a lot of them would be done by military personnel—by uniformed personnel? Is it a cust-cotting—cust-cotting—apologies—

Cost-cutting.

Cost-cutting—that’s the one! Thank you, Madam Speaker. Is it a cost-cutting measure? If so, just be straight up about it. Is this the reason why you have so many roles? I do take the point—and possibly there could be some agreement on this across the House—that people made around, well, if you’re going to put people into these roles, and I’m particularly thinking about the uniformed side of it, you should pay them properly. You should make sure that their housing stock is up to scratch as well. I’ve talked to enough people to know that although there are plans in place to make sure that housing stock is being replaced, in the case of Waiōuru, as far as I have heard, that has not happened.

Yes, it’s important to note that this a career pathway that people choose, and I did note that the Minister was talking about the large amount of money that she was able to get through the Budget—but how much of that is actually going into the pockets of the workers? How much of that is being put into the pockets of both uniformed personnel and civilian personnel? We know that, on the civilian side, when they went into that negotiation, they were just offered a zero pay increase. It’s all very well and good to talk about all the money that is coming through the Budget lines, but you’ve got to look after people. You’ve got to make sure that they can put food on the table, keep the lights on, be able to look after their families and look after their kids—that’s incredibly important. You have to ensure that the housing stock is good as well. If you have issues with that, there is no recourse that I know of within the uniformed side of it—the military personnel side of it—where you can actually rectify that and speak up. In some ways, if there are issues around that, you have to rely on those who are within the civilian roles to raise those issues—those incredibly important issues about the impact on workers.

There were a lot of questions that were posed, and there were a lot of straight answers, but a lot of those answers missed the mark. A lot of those answers went around and didn’t address the concerns of those that came to the select committee. There’s an old saying: if you’ve got a hammer, and that’s all you’ve got, everything looks like a nail, and I think this is the situation that we’re finding ourselves in. There was an industrial dispute that happened last year; the Minister wanted to fix that, but she’s only got a hammer, and she’s using it on the nail. The other thing that is really important is that if you really wanted to solve industrial disputes, pay workers properly. Pay workers properly—pay them what they’re worth, make sure that it keeps up with inflation, and make sure that we look after workers. I do not commend this bill to the House.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I rise on the third reading of this important piece of legislation. But just to remind those at home, in no shape or form does this reduce the ability for industrial action. I think I said in my second reading speech that it’s awfully disruptive to any industry when there is industrial action. Being able to use and utilise your staff in order for the safety of our Defence Force, our personnel, and, actually, our country’s safety and security—I think that’s a very fair and reasonable bill, and I commend this bill to the House.

It is an honour for me to rise to confirm New Zealand First’s support for this Defence (Workforce) Amendment Bill. I would also like to acknowledge the incredible work that our Defence Force does, being prepared to put themselves into harm’s way on our behalf. I know that that view is shared across the House—well, at least I think it was; we’ve had some fairly moderate support, would I say, from some of the other parties here, but certainly not from us. In fact, we’ve been very proud in the past, in the 52nd Parliament—I know that the Hon Ron Mark held that portfolio. I know no one would have been prouder to hold the portfolio than Ron, a returned serviceman himself, and someone who I know still keeps a very keen interest in what the Minister of Defence is doing in this this respect.

It’s important to note that this is not only about armed conflict—we know that geopolitics is dangerous around the world and there are heightened tensions at the moment—but it is about emergency management as well. We’ve seen numerous examples lately, where our Defence Force personnel have come to the service of people, New Zealand citizens, here at home. Actually, just a couple of weeks ago down South, with the big winds, we actually had military personnel out, with communications down, going door to door, delivering flyers to farmers to just let them know what was going on with the telecommunications being down. So we really appreciate what they do for us.

This bill enables the New Zealand Defence Force uniformed personnel to carry out civilian roles in the event of industrial action. The military simply must be able to function, whether it is in an offensive manner or whether it is here at home delivering flyers in the Clutha region. This does not undermine the right to strike. There is absolutely the right for those civilian personnel to strike. It was a ridiculous assertion that was made—in, I think, the committee of the whole House yesterday—where the Hon Phil Twyford said that it somehow equated to the 1951 waterfront strike, and the Government would be using this to bust strike action. I thought that was alarmist and completely irrelevant to what this bill actually does.

This is a moderate and sensible measure. It enables the military to perform its key functions, and maintains civilian employees having the right to strike. There is a formal process to go through, there are checks and balances, and there is still parliamentary oversight. Minister Collins has done a great job bringing this pragmatic measure forward, and New Zealand First supports it to the House. Thank you.

The next call is a split call—Oriini Kaipara.

E te Pīka, tēnā koe. On behalf of Te Pāti Māori, we oppose this bill in its entirety because it makes it easier for the armed forces to replace civilian defence staff and Public Service workers who are taking lawful strike action. Let’s be clear: soldiers cannot strike, but civilians in the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) can. This Government now wants to use those soldiers as strikebreakers. The bill gives the Minister of Defence a new and expanded power during industrial action by NZDF civil staff.

The Minister will be able to authorise the armed forces to do the work of those who are striking whenever the Minister believes there are reasonable grounds where national security, operational readiness, or safety could be affected. That authorisation only has to be in writing; not agreed by Parliament, not independently tested, just signed off by the Minister. The Minister must then notify workers that the military has been sent in to perform their jobs and must notify this House after the fact—not seek approval, not justify it, but simply tell us what they have already done.

For Public Service workers, the Minister’s power is widened again from 14 to 30 days. If Parliament is adjourned, the authorisation just rolls over automatically. This is a step change that removes the safeguards that recognise how extreme it is to use the military to undermine strike action. It normalises military interference in civilian industrial disputes. The people most affected are the people who keep our country running; the people who have already been denied fair wages.

The Public Service Association has been absolutely clear. They said this legislation restricts defence workers’ rights and is completely unjustified. Last year, their members were offered zero pay increase. They only achieved something better because they took strike action, the precise right that this bill now seeks to silence. Fleur Fitzsimons has said—[Knocks glass over]—plainly bringing in the military as strikebreakers is “extremely serious”—sorry.

It’s OK. I’ll just get one of the clerks to bring a towel. Thank you.

“To the left, to the left.”

“To the left”—that’s right. OK. Fleur Fitzsimons has said plainly bringing in the military as strikebreakers is “extremely serious”. What used to require a resolution of this House will now require only the stroke of a Minister’s pen. Unions have called it extraordinary and an attempt to undermine New Zealanders who are standing up for better pay and conditions, and they’re right. My colleague Teanau Tuiono’s recommendation for partial strikes must be noted and supported. From a Te Pāti Māori perspective, this bill does not align with our kaupapa.

Mana motuhake: we oppose any move that strips away workers’ rights and suppresses collective power. Māori make up a majority of the NZDF civil staff, as well as the wider Public Service. We are nurses, we are teachers, and we are firefighters. Now, at any time, the armed forces could be deployed to replace us when we strike for fair pay. That is an erosion of rights that will ripple into every workplace here in Aotearoa.

Mana ōrite: this bill makes it harder for workers to negotiate improvements, harder to achieve pay equity, harder to challenge unfair systems. Our incomes policy is clear: uphold pay equity and strengthen collective bargaining. This bill does the absolute opposite.

Finally, mana mokopuna: when workers lose their rights, our mokopuna lose security. They lose whānau stability. They inherit a society where the power of the State can be used to silence legitimate dissent. That is not the future we fight for, and let’s be honest: if the Government were truly concerned about safety, wellbeing, and national security, they would pay our nurses properly, they would value our firefighters, they would resource our teachers, and they would uplift the New Zealand Defence Force’s own civilian workforce, not undermine them.

Instead, this Government wants to send troops into schools and into hospitals, into our communities, not to help but to break strikes, to weaken workers, to keep wages low. Te Pāti Māori cannot and will not support a bill that erodes rights, undermines collective bargaining, and weaponises the armed forces against civilian workers. We do not commend this bill to the House.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. Civilian staff are critical to supporting us when disaster strikes, and it’s really important to note that armed personnel depend on civilian staff, even within the New Zealand Defence Force, to keep them well—whether it’s in IT roles, health roles, or administration roles. Actually, the Minister, during the committee of the whole House, acknowledged that those were incredibly complex, highly qualified roles. This includes engineering roles that help the military personnel equipment to adequately function, so I find it really interesting that that every time that we have a bill that erodes workers’ ability to participate in strikes, we have speech after speech from the right-wing politicians thanking those very same workers they are undermining. Their actions actually speak louder than their words. It’s hard to believe their speeches are thanking those very same workers they’re about to undermine when we have a bill in front of us that follows, literally, a 2024 zero pay increase for the Defence Force civilian staffers, which would have seen them take effective pay cuts due to inflationary pressures.

Make no mistake: this bill is a direct result of what we saw last year. What else can you call a bill that seeks to erode the parliamentary checks that are in place to ensure that a Minister is adequately accountable to a decision to replace civilian staff with military personnel and that makes it easier for military personnel to replace civilian staff? During the committee of the whole House, one of the questions that I asked was whether the Minister had sought advice or reassurances or was able to elucidate to the House the advice that she received as to whether military personnel had the adequate skills, qualifications, and experience to actually replace civilian staff. She wasn’t able to actually substantiate this, and all she gave us were just platitudes about the highly qualified military personnel, which no one was necessarily challenging. It was more a matter as to whether those roles would be able to be replaced to the very same competency that the civilian staff are able to perform.

If the Minister is not able to tell us that she did receive reassurance and advice on this very same matter, it’s hard for us to have faith in a bill in front of us that seeks to erode civilian staff’s ability to adequately withdraw their labour as a tool of bargaining, which is one of the most powerful things workers can do when they are trying to prove their worth to their employers. By withdrawing your labour, you demonstrate the importance of your work. If the Government is choosing to, instead, deploy the military to fill those very same roles, they are undermining people’s ability to take industrial action, to fight for better wages, and to fight for better pay and conditions and safe staffing levels.

I do not buy, nor believe in, any of the Government’s arguments that this is not about undermining the ability to strike, because even though the Minister says that striking is part of a democracy, well, clearly this Government doesn’t really believe in the right for workers to take part in strikes without those very same actions undermining their ability to make ends meet, because, otherwise, they would have not introduced legislation this term to actually add pay deductions to striking workers. You can’t say that striking is part of our democratic process and then, at the very same time, bill after bill after bill, erode workers’ rights and people’s ability to sustain industrial action.

The Green Party is clear that independent of our criticisms of this Government’s encroachment and alignment with the US when it comes to the military-industrial complex, the New Zealand Defence Force plays a critical role in supporting us when natural disasters strike. Therefore, we cannot stand by a bill that seeks to erode those very same workers’ ability to perform their duties in a way that is adequately dignified.

The members who have talked and thanked the personnel should actually be standing up for those workers’ ability to fight for better pay and conditions, instead of defending zero pay increases, while, at the very same time, they’re handing billions of dollars to landlords, to tobacco industries, to fossil fuel companies—

That’s rubbish.

—while everyday workers struggle. If the members on my left call out “rubbish” when I say those things, what do they call those billions of dollars going to entities that are ripping our planet and our communities off?

The Green Party will fight to improve workers’ conditions and ensure that everyone has a dignified life. Judith Collins may call that a “communist utopia”, but we call that simply socialism, which is, actually, honouring the dignity of everyone.

Storytime is over; we’ll come back to reality here—the simple, practical changes that this bill makes to ensure we can uphold our national security. It’s, frankly, embarrassing that neither of those two previous speeches, and indeed some of those before, from the Opposition benches had not a single mention about upholding national security. All they care about is their union mates being able to strike. That is an absolute disgrace. This bill ensures that we can maintain national security on our bases at a time when, unfortunately, globally, it’s becoming increasingly important. I commend this bill to the House.

Thank you, Madam Speaker, for an opportunity to take a call on the third reading of this bill just after we’ve had actually quite a robust committee stage. I’ll refer to some of the conversations we had during committee stage in my contribution.

We won’t be supporting this bill, but I would like to start by recognising first the important role that our Defence Force plays. I think we have a rich history of a strong, well-resourced defence force. It didn’t always start that way. I’ll make a few historic references in my contribution. The first defence force in New Zealand was actually set up in 1863 under the Colonial Defence Force Act. It was a regular force of only 500 troops, who were all voluntary and expected to serve for a term of three years each, funded to the tune of only £30,000.

Of course, since then it’s grown rather substantially, and quite rightly, the Minister and others have pointed to the fact that the Defence Force plays an integral role in terms of national security, but also in terms of peacekeeping and our aid contribution, and also in terms of emergencies. Certainly, on this side of the House, we respect that role and we are grateful for that role. My contributions are all made in the context that I think that is a fundamental part of the role of the State and that it’s important that we have carve-outs for the Defence Force as well, to ensure that they can act where there are threats to our security. We recently had a family member who became a private in the Defence Force, and it gives me a huge sense of pride to see her become a member of our Defence Force as well.

In the context of that deep respect, it really is how I look at this bill, and what I always look for with any legislative change is: what is the problem statement, where is the gap? That’s why I spent a considerable amount of time in the committee stage questioning the Minister on the rationale for the bill. I think what became clear is that it doesn’t appear that there’s a gap in the way it has been described at the stages of the bill coming through the House.

The way in which I understood the gap initially was that if we had a period where the House is adjourned—adjourned only; not concluded for that term, but just adjourned over the summer break—and you have an authorisation that expires during that period, there is no way for an authorisation to be extended by the House. Now, while that is true—and that became clear through the committee stage—it was also clear that the Minister can make a second authorisation. My line of questioning was really about whether that was the case, and clearly it is the case. There is no gap. The Minister can make a second authorisation. My line of questioning was then around whether there would be administrative delays that would cause detriment to our national security and whether that was the thought process that gave rise to the bill. I’m still a little unclear as to whether that is the case, but I did propose to the Minister that perhaps if it was, one way of rectifying that would be to create a power in the bill that allowed the Minister alone to extend an authorisation.

If we were looking at levels of scrutiny, the first level you would have is for Parliament to authorise it on the expiration of the 14-day period. That’s obviously the best-case scenario; not always going to be able to happen in a long extended period where Parliament isn’t sitting. However, your next best option in terms of scrutiny would be to have the Minister extend the authorisation. Now, the beauty of this is that then there is still a level of scrutiny, and the Minister would be expected to turn her mind to whether the circumstances were still such that an extension should be authorised. I don’t know that the House has quite had an answer as to why that wouldn’t be a suitable thing to do. Just recognising again, as we all have across the House, that the right to protest is in fact important, and so minds must be turned to that when weighing up if the circumstances are appropriate to make an authorisation, and, if so, what that period should be.

I remain of the view that given the timeline in section 9(4) of the Defence Act has not changed, there’s a recognition that, actually, 14 days is a reasonable period of time for, in that case, the Prime Minister or the next senior Minister to turn their mind to whether it needs to be extended by the House or not. Again, I don’t think that we really travelled sufficiently through the argument why those two provisions are as different as they are.

There’s a solution—well, the first thing is there is no current gap, unless there is an administrative difficulty for the Minister over that summer, and I think the House needs to be clear about that. And, in the second part, if there is an administrative difficulty, there is a fix to that, which would still overlay that ministerial oversight. I think, unfortunately, we haven’t explored, in truth, the proposed amendments, which I think would have gone some way to improving the bill—and broadening the powers, actually—because right now, the Minister doesn’t have the power to extend on her own; it’s only the House who can do that. However, it would just be the next layer of broadening that we would be doing.

A number of submitters at select committee—I wasn’t on the select committee dealing with this bill—pointed to the issues that have been spoken to across the House. Again, I think it would have been prudent to consider some of the changes that we suggested in this bill, but unfortunately that was not done. Again, I go back to the issue of I guess what I’d almost call a bleed into treating urgency as just a way of churning or getting legislation through the pipeline as opposed to genuinely considering whether the reason is urgent or not.

As I’ve said earlier, in my view, there is no urgency tied to the summer break period, given the Minister could issue a second authorisation. That argument simply isn’t there. I wonder, as we continue going through this week of urgency in the House, whether it’s an obligation on us all to consider whether the Standing Orders are sufficient in their requirements for moving the House into urgency. Currently, the requirement is that a reason be provided by the Government, but, again, what we’re starting to see—and I’ll acknowledge here that this has been something that’s come up regardless of which party is leading Government—is a reason be given as opposed to a genuine reason that ties itself to why we’re skipping through certain stages.

Attached to that is my concern that if the select committee stage is fulfilled—if a bill is sent to select committee at all—that’s now deemed to be sufficient in terms of engaging the democratic process. I don’t believe it is. I think, again, we’re seeing a bleed to shortened select committees. It certainly hasn’t gone unnoticed by me that there seems to be an increasing use of the four-month-and-one-day behaviour, where bills are referred to select committee for just over the period where, if they were under four months, there would need to be a debate in the House. Then, of course, it’s the select committee who decides what period of time submissions are called for.

Now, this presents the problem that if you layer one atop the other—the shortening of those periods—you would have a public who doesn’t feel consulted. You would have members who are viewing amendments sometimes at the last minute, and you’d have Ministers who aren’t truly considering Amendment Papers as they should in the committee stage. I mean, this is probably not the worst example of it, but it’s certainly an example where there were some sensible amendments which I had hoped would be considered but haven’t been. Thus, sadly, I cannot commend this bill to the House.

This bill is not about helping the Government. It’s not about helping the National Party or Minister Judith Collins. This is about helping our Defence Force, supporting our Defence Force, from the newest recruit to the Chief of Defence Force. It is telling to see the Labour Party and the Green Party come out firmly opposing that support—not only that they won’t debate the issue that exists but they spread these mistruths. We hear about the 1951 wharf strike, and this could be used to break it. The Green Party tell us, “Oh, it could be used for forestry workers.” No, it can’t. This is only an internal thing for the Defence Force. It shows the lack of knowledge, it shows the lack of respect on that side of the House for our Defence Force, and it shows the lack of support. The National Party supports our Defence Force. National supports every single service person, and we support this bill.

This is a split call. I call Helen White.

Thank you. It’s a split call, and that gives me five minutes to tell you why I don’t think that it is fair for the member of the Government who just stood up to talk about this as an ill-informed Opposition. This Opposition has done its level best, in urgency, to take this matter seriously. That has been very evident in the questions that have been put. My friend on the other side of the House has just raised the thorny issue of the 1951 strike. It clearly hit home when the Hon Phil Twyford talked about that. It’s an absolutely relevant thing to talk about if you’re from the Labour Party, because those times were definitely very, very formative for this party.

I want to talk first of all just about the value of strikes. There’s a little bit that may have been said by other speakers, but I want to reinforce it. When the Labour Party and the Green Party talk about this as having an impact on striking and being a strikebreaking tool, that’s because if a military worker takes the position of a striking civilian worker, they undermine the power of a strike. We set about a striking mechanism in a structure. You can’t strike for any reason in New Zealand, and you can’t strike at any time in New Zealand. You can only strike when the legislature says that’s a legitimate tool in the tool box, and you have to give good notice, and there are essential industries in this country where there is a lot of notice required because they are essential to the population. It is a managed ability that people have.

What this piece of law does is it says that people can be ordered or forced, because they are military, to go into those positions and do those jobs in a time of strike. That actually does undermine the industrial rights of that group of people. That’s a big deal, and it isn’t that the Labour Government hasn’t seen a balancing act here, because this is our military and this is an important part of the mechanisms that keep the country safe. That has been an important thing. It’s only an amendment to a law. There was already a checks and balances system in place, and part of that checks and balances system was coming back to this legislature if we extended the period that the military were going to do that. People had to come back to this legislature. They no longer need to do that in the same way. That’s an erosion. That’s a lack of balance.

What my friend the Hon Phil Twyford talked about, that seems to have really got up the noses of some of the Government members, is that, right now, we are in a world where we have seen military forces on the streets in the US. We have seen that happen. I never thought I would see that. I never thought I would see that kind of intervention. We’re in a time of great change, and so it’s very important we hold and respect our organised rules for things like striking and for things like the use of our military. We respect those young people who come into the military. I talked about it in the committee stage. My volunteers who come in are full of wonderful ideas and ambitions, and they join the military, and they don’t expect to be told that they must go over and do the work of a plumber, because that happens to suit the Government of the day. That is not what they signed up for. That is not why I value them. I value them, and I respect them, and I respect the fact that they are human beings doing great work and being brave. There is a balance to be struck. Thank you.

It really fills me with sadness hearing some of the comments from the other side of the House. I haven’t had the pleasure of being on the select committee that dealt with this bill, but, from the basic reading, I can see and hear that what’s being said on the other side does not reflect what we’re doing here. As the Hon Judith Collins just said, the arguments against are showing actually how much the other side cares about our Defence Force—or, rather, doesn’t care for our Defence Force. This law, essentially, keeps New Zealand safe around the clock while still respecting the right of civilian staff to strike. I commend this bill to the House.

Thank you very much, Madam Speaker. I often go to the regulatory impact statement for the truth because that’s one area where it’s harder for the Government to spin things. The regulatory impact statement makes it incredibly clear what we’re doing today. It says in it that back at the end of 2024, when civilian staff undertook industrial action in support of bargaining for a new collective agreement, that caused problems. That was when they got a zero percent pay rise.

The member Rima Nakhle, who has just resumed her seat, talked about the fact that they care about the Defence Force. My question would be: why, then, did this Government offer them a zero percent increase in pay? Then when they took industrial action, they’ve introduced this legislation as a direct response to prevent those civilians from being able to take collective action such as strikes in the future. Essentially, what this does is use military personnel to conduct the work of New Zealand Defence Force civilian staff in the event of industrial action. That is incredibly short-sighted because if we are seriously talking about our defence workforce, about the wellbeing of New Zealand, about how we grow our defence service to be capable and able to respond, this is a short-term stopgap measure to simply prevent situations that occurred at the end of 2024 when civilian staff took industrial action because they got a zero percent pay increase. That’s the nub of it.

I think it’s important to note that this bill is No. 8. There are more, but this is the eighth thing, in general, that this Government has done to undermine the rights of working New Zealanders, and so I think it’s important that we put it in the context of all of the things they have done since being in Government.

The first one was to repeal fair pay agreements—that was done right away. They’ve brought back 90-day trials, removed the 30-day rule, removed the ability to give workers access to the collective agreement when they first start work—that’s been taken away. Pay deductions for partial strikes—we’ve discussed and debated that one in the House. The ability to partially strike has been removed by this Government. You’ll have your pay eaten into by your employer if you determine you’d like to partially strike. The next one is that if you earn over $180,000, you cannot take a personal grievance against your employer—huge undermining of rights in that one—and the public sector funding cuts right across not just Wellington’s local economy, which is completely downwardly spiralling as a result of those cuts, and right across the country we’ve seen workers who can’t afford to feed their families and pay their bills as a result of that. And, of course, we have the scrapping of 33 pay equity claims.

This bill is hot off the heels of those changes that this Government has made, and I do not take to heart and believe this Government when it says that it has the Defence Force’s interests at heart. We do not accept that at all, because this comes in the context of an ongoing undermining of workers’ rights in New Zealand. This bill is an answer to a question that nobody in Defence is asking. Nobody is asking that question. At a time when the New Zealand Defence Force is facing staffing shortages as well, this House should be focused on real solutions of how we build our workforce, not political theatre masquerading as reform.

Does this actually solve any of the real problems that the Defence Force is currently facing? Does it strengthen our country? Does this improve the lives of New Zealanders in the Defence Force who are struggling to pay their bills without having a decent wage? This bill fails on all of those tests. The defence workforce is not struggling because of a lack of rules or powers or structural levers. It is struggling because people can’t afford to stay, and so are only coming when unemployment is peaking to such a level that we might see a slight uptick. They are struggling because pay has not kept up with inflation. That is the problem, not the fact that we’re going to suddenly install uniformed people to take the roles of civilians to prevent them for striking for decent pay. Military families cannot secure housing near their bases because specialist roles are leaving faster than they can be replaced.

This bill does not take any steps towards addressing those problems—problems such as burnout from long hours, repeated deployments, and persistent vacancies, and the hollowing out of morale of the defence service. This bill actually takes steps to increase or further erode the morale by having uniformed or civilian Defence Force personnel potentially having issues if they’re stepping into those roles. This bill deals with none of the pressures that have led to it. Instead, this Government has brought forward legislation that tinkers with obligations, expands bureaucratic oversight, and creates compliance costs that are absolutely unnecessary. It’s a complete disconnect with the workforce issues that we are seeing.

One of the deepest concerns that has been raised is that the Defence Force should be supported in a way where we have a long-term plan to build our workforce. This bill does not do that. One of the most alarming aspects of this legislation is the lack of evidence that underpins it. The Government has repeatedly asserted that the bill will strengthen the workforce but when we’ve looked for data, when we’ve looked through the submissions and we’ve looked at that, there’s absolutely no evidence that the proposed interventions resolve any of the issues that were heard at select committee, and there’s no evidence that this will actually make a real difference to the problems we’re seeing.

Good lawmaking requires evidence, and this bill offers a bunch of slogans instead. It is not really assisting in any way. We would like to see meaningful change that raises the wages of those people and enables their ability to take collective action and to have decent working conditions. By simply taking this and doing this, it fails to modernise the workforce or address future challenges. New Zealand’s Defence Force deserves to have that oversight and that foresight and a future planning model in place, and this bill is incredibly short-sighted.

I would like to conclude by saying that it’s all well and good to talk about what a great service the Defence Force provides. We hear, “Aren’t they amazing and don’t they do a great job?”—yes, they are, and they deserve better than this. They deserve better than having this kind of tinkering at the margins that doesn’t go to the heart of addressing the fact that they deserve to be paid better. They deserve to have oversight and a plan in place that supports that. They deserve to have support for their families. They deserve to have improved housing and cost of living conditions taken into account. They deserve to have expanded mental health and wellbeing services. They deserve to have stronger recruitment pipelines in engineering, aviation, healthcare, and IT. We would like to see those things put into this House. We would like to see better retention incentives that match the reality of the modern labour market.

This bill does none of that. All this bill does is take another step in the long line of assault on workers’ rights that prevent situations that happened at the end of 2024, when we had people striking for more than a zero percent pay increase. New Zealanders expect to have a defence force that is ready to respond in floods and fires, geopolitical risks, and humanitarian crises, but, instead, this Government has delivered a piece of legislation that responds only to its own political messaging, and that’s a sad loss.

I have never heard so much rubbish in my life—it’s just unbelievable. I’m delighted that I’ve got the last word on this bill, because I’ve got a few things that we need to clear up. Let’s just remember, shall we, that the Government of the previous regime had six years in which they did nothing for Defence—not a single thing. The attrition rate in Defence in their time was out the gate. It has now turned around.

I just want to reiterate a couple of things that my colleagues have said. It’s shameful that the Opposition thinks it’s OK to leave armaments and secure bases unprotected in times of strike because striking people are more important. No one denies that they are allowed to strike—if you want to strike, happy days; go for your life—but let’s just remember that some of those places need to be protected in that time. You can’t tell me—no, not you, Madam Speaker—

Good point.

The Opposition can’t tell me that nurses and doctors leave the hospital when they strike and nothing is put in place to help people in that hospital. There are people that go in there and they take up those places so that people get looked after.

No, they don’t. There are limited life-preserving facilities.

Yes, they do, because I know some that do it. Let’s just remember that we support our Defence Force and our service personnel and we want to make sure that they have safety and security as one of their key areas of focus, leaving the civil personnel to strike if they see fit.

It’s very simple, this bill. The Opposition members seem to have whipped themselves up into a frenzy, thinking it’s a whole lot of things that it’s not. It’s simple: if you want to strike, you can strike if you’re a civilian member of the Defence Force. This is plan B. This makes sure that those places are looked after. It’s quite simple, and I commend the bill to the House.

Madam Speaker—oh, no?

Actually, that’s my call. Is this a point of order?

No.

Thank you, Madam Speaker.

The question is that the motion be agreed to.

I declare the House in committee for consideration of the Education and Training (Early Childhood Education Reform) Amendment Bill.

Members, the House is in committee on the Education and Training (Early Childhood Education Reform) Amendment Bill. We come first to Part 1, which is the debate on clauses 4 to 13—“Amendments to principal Act”—and Schedule 1. The question is that Part 1 stand part.

Madam Chair, thank you. We come to the committee stage of the Education and Training (Early Childhood Education Reform) Amendment Bill. I’d like to reiterate my thanks given in the second reading to the Education and Workforce Committee for their work on this bill—

No worries.

Happy to help.

—oh, good—and also just give a brief overview of Part 1, the first part of two parts in the bill. The purpose of this legislation, as has been said, is to establish a Director of Regulation, with a set of statutory objectives and some powers and some obligations. All of this is set up so that people in the early childhood sector can actually point to their rights—that the person that holds the power over them will actually have some laws that restrain how they use their power, while also making clear what their priorities are.

If we go through the clauses in Part 1, we begin by interpreting what early childhood education is and, therefore, what kind of services this part of the law will apply to: early childhood services and play groups that opt in to being certified under the Act. We then talk about the purpose of this part, and it is to regulate early childhood education in such a way that there are “minimum standards for quality early childhood education that allows all children to establish strong foundations for learning, well-being, and life outcomes;” and also to “support the choice of parents and caregivers to participate in the labour market.”, which is important to a lot of parents up and down this country.

Once you have that purpose, there are certain objectives that are pursued in order to support the purpose. First and foremost, and absolutely critical, is protecting the health, safety, and wellbeing of children. Then there’s educational and developmental outcomes, there’s accessibility and choice for parents, and then there’s informing parents and caregivers, because one of the things that was found in the Ministry for Regulation’s review of the early childhood sector was that parents often can’t actually identify what good is and what to bring market pressure on to providers to improve. Finally, the objective of implementing a licensing and certification system is something that the Director of Regulation will do to achieve this purpose.

It then goes on in new section 27A in clause 7 to set out that the Director of Regulation must be appointed and must be an employee of the ministry at the time of the appointment, and it goes on, in new section 27B in clause 7, to list the functions that the director carries out. Those are things such as issuing the licences, providing support and information, and also assessing and responding to complaints about licensed early childhood services, and so that’s an important avenue for parents. New section 27C in clause 7 goes on further to say how the director’s functions and duties are performed. It says, first of all, that in accordance with the purpose and objectives that we have discussed, they’re accountable to the Secretary of Education—the chief executive of their respective department, and, finally, in new section 27D in clause 7, there are some principles. The health, safety, and wellbeing of children is the first principle that they have to follow. Similarly—and I’ll skip to the end—they must have regard to “good regulatory practice, including (without limitation) decision-making that—(i) [must be] risk-based, proportionate, fair, and transparent; and (ii) avoids imposing unnecessary costs on parents, caregivers, and service providers.” Then, in new section 27E in clause 7, “Delegation of Director’s functions, duties, and powers”, this can be done—obviously, there won’t just be one Director of Regulation. There will be a number of people working for them, but they need to delegate those powers in writing.

Subsequent to that, there are really a lot of changes that you might describe as mechanical, or minor and technical, but I think I’ve laid out most of what Part 1 does. It sets out the purpose, the objectives used to achieve the purpose, then there’s the Director of Regulation, and then there are their duties and the principles for which they carry out those duties to fulfil the objectives and achieve the purpose. All of this is offering transparency to the people who are regulated.

There is a minor and technical amendment in my name that the Government intends to support. We’ve reviewed other amendments as they’ve come in. We do not intend to support other amendments. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the Minister for walking us through what this bill purports to do, in his view. Labour strenuously opposes this bill because it doesn’t do what it says on the tin. It talks about facilitating early childhood education reform, when, in fact, what it does is it has a very strong labour market focus, and it doesn’t—

Sorry to interrupt the member. Can I just ask members to refer to the clause that you’re speaking to.

Yes, sure. What I was doing, Madam Chair—thank you for the guidance—was that I was just about to talk this committee of the whole House through Labour’s approach to this, because when I come to my questions on clause 4, given that the Minister has given an overview, I would also like to give an overview of how we plan to approach this, if I may. The Minister himself has raised the purpose of the bill and he’s talked about the effect of that, and it will be our view, as we interrogate the clauses, to show that, actually, there is a denigration of children’s rights and we will be doing that through Part 1.

He has also talked about minimum standards. We will be interrogating the Minister about how those standards are upheld and what safeguards there are. He has also mentioned the complaints procedures and, through the parts relating to that, we will be asking for the processes that are involved and also about the vulnerability of the Crown to judicial review.

As I’ve said, he has mentioned the purpose, and, clause by clause, we will see how, in our view, the drafting does not align with the purpose. Therefore, we have a number of amendments that we would like to table to make the drafting align further.

The Minister himself mentioned new section 27 in clause 7—and, indeed, that is a fundamental section that we will be going through very carefully—where a lot of the changes are made that, essentially, decouple the stewardship of the Ministry of Education with its regulatory role. This goes against the OECD best practice, and we will be referring to that in some of our questions in wanting to understand how New Zealand will be aligning itself with OECD countries, given that the decoupling goes in the opposite direction of what the OECD recommends.

The Minister has also talked about having health, safety, and learning as priorities. We will have amendments relating to that, and to having a very strong focus on Māori and Te Tiriti. We are wanting to understand, and to get on the record for Hansard, as well, not only why Te Tiriti is not mentioned but there seem to be implicit references in parts of the bill and, therefore, we will be asking the Minister whether, in his view, Te Tiriti is implicitly to be considered when this bill is applied.

Finally, just in response to the Minister’s own opening remarks, where he talked about the schedules as being, essentially, technical: in fact, we find that many of the powers that will go from the Secretary of Education to the Director of Regulation are conferred by Schedule 1, and then the safeguards that we would expect to see in Schedule 2 are not there. We intend to spend some time on Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 to unpack how they could be improved and what the risks are as we see them, because we do not see the safeguarding in the legislation before us.

Having said that, and being aware that this is the committee stage, I’ll now turn to clause 4 with my specific questions. Clause 4 is really around definitions, as the Minister has said. This question will come up in relation, I think, to each of the clauses because we’ve heard from many submitters that there are no Te Tiriti obligations, and so we want to understand why Te Tiriti is not mentioned in clause 4. We also want to know what advice and evidence he has sought on the impact on tangata whenua education.

We would also like to understand what the Minister thinks a playgroup entails. What is his definition of the word “playgroup” in paragraph (b) of the new definition of “early childhood education” in section 10(1) of the Education and Training Act, in clause 4 of the bill? It talks about “a playgroup that opts to be certified”. Can he please define a playgroup for us, and also what are the circumstances in which a playgroup would not be able to be certified under the Act? Is any playgroup able to be certified, or are there some criteria, and where will those criteria be located so that the director can do their oversight job? Finally, what is the difference between an early childhood service and a playgroup?

I do also have some other questions on this regarding the regulatory impact statement (RIS). We have heard in the RIS that there has been a lack of consultation. This is mentioned on page 48, and so, again coming to these definitions that the Minister has referred to and that we see in new paragraphs (a) and (b) of the new definition, what assurance do we have that the definitions that he provides around playgroups and early childhood services actually align with the sector expectations? We also want to know how they will be assessed for standards when they haven’t been consulted on them, and that, again, refers to the RIS, at page 48, where there is actually a repeated theme throughout the RIS about the lack of consultation.

I also have some legal questions. Given that I’ve referred to the absence of Te Tiriti, does the Minister accept that this could undermine the Crown obligations, and, if not, why not—if he could answer that question. Why doesn’t it include Te Tiriti obligations in the key definitional clauses?

Some of our other questions relating to Treaty will be around the impact of the absence of Te Tiriti. Those are different questions, but for the purposes of this clause, we would like to know why it is not mentioned in the key definitional clause, and that will go to my later question, which comes around under the Schedule, where we see implicit references to things like puna reo, kōhanga reo, and so on.

Finally, in the RIS, at page 30, there has been an identification of a risk of confusion. Again, this is around some of the lack of certainty around the early childhood service and the playgroup, and so we need to get a very clear steer from the Minister as to where he gets these definitions from, whether they align with the sector, what consultation, if any, was done, and what will happen in the absence of having alignment on those definitions. Also, there are minimum standards and a playgroup that opts to be certified—are there circumstances in which they cannot be? If so, what are they—and it is the same in relation to an early childhood service. We will have many more questions on Part 1.

The member Ingrid Leary has just taken eight minutes to ask two very simple questions. First of all, a playgroup is defined in the wider Education and Training Act as a group that meets on a regular basis but where children don’t attend for more than four hours at a time. There are other definitions, but the point is that the definition is already in the wider Act.

On the absence of a definition of the Treaty in the interpretation section of this bill, I’m an ambitious politician and I thought about perhaps getting some of my ideas about defining the Treaty into this education amendment bill, but I actually just don’t think that defining the Treaty of Waitangi should be done here in this interpretation section of the Education and Training Act.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Moving on to clause 5, this is an important part of these reforms. There were a number of submitters who wanted us to spend some time here and really understand the trade-offs and the choices that are being made by the Government to prioritise certain sets of values in the education system here.

Just for the committee’s attention, section 14 in the Education and Training Act 2020, which is being amended by clause 5 has three parts. Some of those are being picked up here, but some of those are a bit different. They are about setting standards for quality. There is also a mention of provision there, which we’ll get to in a second, but the second one is about health and safety and the wellbeing of children, and the third one is about enabling parental choice.

Those are all important things and they are mirrored here, but the difference is that submitters came to the committee and they raised their concerns, particularly those providers of things like kindergarten services, those providers who are community-based and who have had a long history of provision for children—after, say, the Second World War, with the establishment of play centres and playgroups. Those organisations that were represented at the Education and Workforce Committee by their bodies continued to raise the point that in putting in the new section 14(b), as it is here, and then also backing that up with inserting the new section 14A points around establishing this for parents so that parents and caregivers have more information—they felt that there was a sort of decentring of children’s wellbeing and children’s rights in this, and that’s a fair enough point.

I want to first ask the Minister whether it is his intention to do that. Is it deliberate that these objectives sort of create a new hierarchy of how you might balance both the wellbeing of children and education provision with the rights of parents—which, obviously, do exist and have been catered for in the original Act at section 14, but in a different way—or is it the case that it is the same balancing exercise, and yet we are then introducing other sorts of provisions about how you might interpret that?

The second question is around how this should be interpreted. When we talk about new section 14(b), as it’s written here—“support choice of parents and caregivers to participate in the labour market.”—that is a good thing. Is that an acknowledgment of, really, just the administrative arrangements that are around this now?

Some departments that are outside of education manage this as an allocation, and they have done that well before the 2020 changes, let alone these changes. Departments like the Ministry of Social Development, for instance, administer the Out of School Care and Recreation (OSCAR) programmes, which are about providing education services, but they’re predominantly because of labour market force participation. It’s going to be a goal of any Government of New Zealand, I would suggest, that people who have the care of children in their ordinary life should have options and choices around that. So is that intended to be given effect in some different way here or is it the same balancing exercise, or is there more of an emphasis now—which is what the submitters suggested there was—on this active labour market participation, and, if so, should that be recognised?

Should it be clearer, if the Minister is trying to give effect to those administrative arrangements that have grown up over time in the Public Service, that we also have this secondary goal of making sure that parents can participate in the workforce? Should it be making it clearer that early childhood education is about that? If that is an intention and that’s what he means, then we should say that, and so those dual purposes there should have a sort of hierarchy and a balance between them, because there are trade-offs to be made by any Government.

If early childhood education is intended to provide a real range of services that are outside of what is currently being provided for in the market by those providers who came along to the committee and said that their number one concern was the welfare of children and their educational development—if it is the intention in New Zealand to have another sort of service which is more like the OSCAR services, which are available to older children, where that is predominantly around the active labour market participation of parents and caregivers, then should we be setting that out more clearly here? Those are my two questions, and I have more on this.

Can I quickly address these two questions in relation to new sections 14 and 14A in clause 5. The member Arena Williams asked what the Government’s intention is in having twin purposes for the Act. One is to implement minimum standards for quality education for children, and the other is to support the choice of parents and caregivers to participate in the labour market.

I think it’s clear to most people that early childhood education policy has those objectives now and has for a very long time. Successive Governments have introduced policies to boost that. What we’re doing here is putting in statute law that those are the purposes that the Director of Regulation for early childhood education should be following. I can’t make it any simpler than that. Those are the widely acknowledged objections; we’re putting in law that the regulator must take heed of them.

Then there was a question about whether new section 14A(d), by providing information to parents and caregivers—the member described that as decentring children’s rights. There are a couple of things in response to that: first, that comes three paragraphs after paragraph (a), which says that “protecting the health, safety, and well-being of children” is the first objective in the list; and, second of all, I don’t know if the member has met any three-year-olds, but one of the best ways to help them is actually to ensure that their parents are enabled, because most three-year-olds are quite dependent on their parents and caregivers, and so by informing and helping them, we actually are centring the child. We could, of course, give all the information directly to the three-year-old, but—I don’t know—they might eat it or something, and that wouldn’t work so well.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for the Minister’s response, and I love the fact that the Minister is literally telling a mum of young children about what it is like being a parent of young children. I’m sure that that is something that Arena Williams will have more to say on, but I want to pick up on something that the Minister has said. I want to start with clause 5, as well, because it is an important part of this bill, along with the Director of Regulation and also the regulation of early childhood education (ECE) in general.

But just looking at this first part, broadly, I see that the intention here of separating out the purpose and the objectives, and we’ve seen that as well in terms of other legislation, particularly in terms of some of the broad objectives we’ve seen in the education bill that was passed last week. But what the Minister said was interesting to me because new section 14(b) in clause 5, to “support the choice of parents and caregivers to participate in the labour market.”, is not in the existing legislation. That is new, and it’s a very peculiar one because this is saying that the purpose of ECE is to ensure that we free up our parents to go and work. What we’re looking at here, which I thought was a very interesting purpose in education because, I mean, unless the Minister can quote a specific section, there is no other part of the Education and Training Act about parents working in jobs—like, that is not even covered within the overall purpose of the Education and Training Act.

But while that is what a lot of parents have to do—and I do acknowledge all of the parents who are in this Chamber at this stage of the bill, and all of your spouses and partners who have to work and have to ensure that their children are going there. But what it also means, by this singular clause, is to treat early child education not as a place where tamariki learn and develop skills but, essentially, treating it as a babysitter—essentially, a nannying service—and—

That’s not what it says—that’s not what it says.

But that’s exactly why we have this particular section here, and I cannot fathom why the Minister would consider including this part when it’s not in the existing legislation.

Conversely, what we’re not seeing—and it’s quite an obvious gap within new sections 14 and 14A. There is not a single mention of teachers and there’s not a single mention of the resources that support teachers who are working in ECE to ensure that a lot of this does take place. Again, I agree that parents do perform an important role in all of this, but in terms of providing for some of these teachers, it also performs an important role, and so if we’re speaking to a separation of purpose and objectives—you know, providing clarity—I understand that. But I would ask the Minister to consider my amendment so that new section 14(b) to “support the choice of parents and caregivers to participate in the labour market.” isn’t actually something that is needed within this section, especially when it’s not in the existing legislation.

Furthermore, I would ask the Minister to start by considering my amendment that says that supporting qualified teachers and workers to ensure that they are well resourced and supported as part of the objectives—I’m not asking the Minister to include it in the purpose of Part 2 in new section 14; I’m asking the Minister to include it in new section 14A, under the objectives. So I’m going to start with those two questions, which are about the peculiar inclusion of new section 14(b) and what is the intention of that, and, in the purpose and objectives, why are teachers not mentioned at all?

If the member Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan had listened to the debate, he would have heard my earlier answer. New section 14(b) in clause 5 is being put in the legislation because it reflects the simple reality that many New Zealanders actually do send their child to early childhood education so that they can go to work. I mean, if the member seriously doesn’t think that that’s what happens in New Zealand, I don’t know where he has been—certainly not listening to this debate. I won’t repeat myself again on that topic.

He then asked why we do not include teachers. Well, very simply, this is about children. This is about getting outcomes for children. I know that there will be people who want the service provider to be put at the centre of the policy, but it’s not—we’re doing this for children, and we have no intention of supporting the member’s amendment.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I just want to pick up on a point that the Associate Minister of Education raised there about new section 14(b) in clause 5, and the kind of unusual answer that he gave, where he said that he was not willing to repeat himself. Well, I wouldn’t want him to repeat himself, either, because that would be very tiresome to listen to.

But my question that I would like to put to the Minister is that throughout the regulatory impact statement, there has been constant referral to the lack of consultation. There’s been constant referral to the possibility of being opened up to future litigation, which we will probably ask questions about, a little bit further on, but I just don’t see the need. The Minister said before that parents and people know that early childhood education (ECE) is an educational service, but it’s also known that parents use it when they are in the workforce. They use ECE services and send their children to ECE services when in the workforce, and so if that was something that everybody already knew, why is it so important to make it a specific purpose—

To remind you.

—in the Act? Maybe you could take a call—oh no, maybe not, because I don’t think you’d have anything worth listening to. But perhaps you could explain then, if it was well-known, why there is a specific need—

I think the Chair is worth listening to.

I’m asking the Minister, Mr Bates, not you, and so please be quiet. I can’t get my question to the Minister if he can’t hear through your barracking. I’ll go back. My question to the Minister with regard to new section 14(b) is: if everybody knows that that’s what was happening and occurring in ECE, then why feel the need to make a specific purpose for this piece of legislation?

Also, given the lack of consultation out there—I noticed that there was some consultation undertaken as part of a review, but not direct consultation with regard to this piece of legislation, particularly with teachers and parents. That is concerning and we will have more questions around that a bit further on. I also wanted to know why there was the need to take the wording about supporting health and safety out of the purpose section and put it into an objectives section when that doesn’t really specify how to go about protecting health and safety.

I see some of this as being extremely unnecessary. Having come from the sector myself and having been a teacher, and also having been a centre owner, these things were never an issue, and so I don’t understand why the Minister feels the need to specifically tease these out and add these really unusual purposes in. It would be really great to be able to understand the Minister’s thinking there.

In relation to the first question about why, in clause 5, we are putting the requirement in new section 14(b) in statute, well, the whole purpose of this exercise is to put into law the rights and responsibilities of the regulator and, therefore, also the rights and responsibilities of the regulated into law. That’s the whole purpose of doing this, which I explained in my opening remarks, and I’m not sure if that member heard them.

Then the question was: has there been enough consultation? Well, actually, this is a process that began in June 2024. Eighteen months ago, the Ministry for Regulation began consulting literally thousands of teachers, centre owners, and parents about their desires for the regulation of early childhood education, and this bill puts into place the recommendations that Cabinet agreed after that consultation process. There’s probably never been more consultation on a bill of this length to make improvements to regulations, and so, no, I’m very comfortable and the Government is very comfortable with the amount of consultation that’s occurred.

Thank you, Madam Chair. OK, those are very useful questions, and I thank the Minister for his explanation of new section 14(b). As you can see, this is something that my colleagues on this side of the Chamber and submitters have been quite interested in, and it is useful for us to clarify what this means.

My first question, then, in this part is on the difference around the provision wording in the original section in the Education and Training Act, and then the words “to provide for”, which the Minister has chosen. The difference there seems to me to be that provision across locations is not something which is either—geographic locations or for certain communities or to make sure that there is a choice for parents isn’t something which is included as a purpose in this part, and I’d like the Minister to clarify that. On the old reading—

Can you please clarify which part you’re speaking to.

Sorry, I’m talking to clause 5, which creates new section 14, which is entitled “Purpose of Part 2”—

Thank you.

—and under subsection (a) here, we have the words “set and implement minimum standards to provide for”. That is a formulation of that word “provide”, which means that the regulator is regulating for the regulated to provide services to a set of minimum standards.

Under the old formulation, which uses the word “provision”, the settings there are around ensuring that the provision meets the needs of parents. The difference there is that as electorate MPs, we know that many of us do not have enough early childhood education centres for children locally to go to. It’s not clear whether that’s a problem in some communities, because many parents drive their children from one area to another—so from, say, Manurewa to central Auckland—because they are working parents, and so that’s fine and we don’t need to solve that problem and that situation. But we don’t know that, because the standards aren’t set in such a way that it would be clear that that was a policy problem that needed to be solved.

Under the old provision, though, there was still a reason and a purpose for the regulator to make sure that that problem to be solved was a problem that could be solved. Under the current provision, the formulation “set and implement minimum standards to provide for” is about providing minimum standards for those providers of education, in whatever location they happen to be in, to meet the standards that are required of them. That’s fine if you want to take that approach, but it is a change, because there is a policy problem when parents can’t access these services that they need in the locality in which they need them. The question, then, of the Minister is whether that is deliberate, or are you meant to read that “to provide for quality early childhood” as if there is still a requirement that, somewhere, someone—either the Secretary of Education or the Director of Regulation—knows that there is a policy problem there to be solved around provision, be it equitable provision or otherwise just simply geographic provision, and is there a mechanism by which to solve that that is enabled by this, probably under new section 14(a), that I’m not seeing?

My second question in this part is around what these services that, as the Minister has explained, support the choice of parents and caregivers to participate in the labour market look like, because these services, under the old formulation, probably didn’t exist. They were probably down at an end of the market that we didn’t have under the old formulation. Here’s my guess: they are probably less expensive, they are probably less intensive, and they are probably less focused, perhaps, on educational outcomes.

There are a range of services for the care of children which are outside of the education system at the moment now, but they are designed for older children—like the Out of School Care and Recreation programmes, or like babysitting, which my colleagues have discussed. Is this a new sort of service which will exist under this new formulation in new section 14 which the Minister envisions here, where they are primarily about the labour market participation of the parents, and, if so, are they meeting that need and not meeting the needs for the educational wellbeing of the children—what does that service look like? What should New Zealanders expect to see, or is there no new service and this is simply recognising currently that this sort of provision of day-care services is also meeting that need? That would be a helpful clarification.

Just two further quick points, and, actually, I’ll have to raise this with the Minister later, but it is about grandparents. There are 10,000 grandparents in New Zealand—as was advocated by Seniors New Zealand—who undertake the parental care of their grandchildren. They are constantly invisibilised in our regulations and our primary legislation, and they should be recognised in this new section 14.

Grandparents can be caregivers for the purposes of this Act. There is not any type of new service envisaged that we are putting in place. The purpose with which the Director of Regulation will regulate—there’s not any suggestion anywhere here that a new type of service is being created. The member Arena Williams seems to ask why the legislation doesn’t seek to require the supply of early childhood education (ECE). To start an ECE centre requires initiative, and, by definition, you can’t force someone to take an initiative, and so we’re not seeking to mandate that people open early childhood education centres.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Just one last call on clause 5, from me, anyway, before I move on to the latest section. I appreciate the Associate Minister of Education’s response to my earlier question.

Now, when it comes to the purpose of Part 2, I wanted to check this. One of the barriers, currently, for parents—and I understand that the Minister has clarified that the purpose is to support the choice of parents and caregivers to participate in the labour market. But one of the challenges we’re currently seeing in early childhood education (ECE) is that even though parents are participating in the labour market, ECE providers are actually too expensive for parents to be able to afford that, and I think that that is a really important part if that is going to be a purpose of what the Minister is proposing. So I wanted to check with the Minister in terms of my amendment to this, which would include a new purpose, which is to ensure that we have a well-resourced public early childhood education system.

Early childhood education should be a part of the public system, like schools, and the purpose should reflect that, and I think that that would go hand in hand with what the Minister is proposing under new section 14(b) in clause 5 in terms of parents participating in the labour market, because the parents are, I guess, more encouraged to do that if they are able to have free or cheaper ECE services, but at this stage, that’s simply not the case in terms of the costs. Therefore—to focus on the parents—why would they use an ECE service and enter the labour market if they’re actually going to be worse off overall than if they hadn’t done that in the first place? That’s one of my amendments that I would like the Minister to consider.

Now, on to new section 14A in clause 5, I have a number of amendments around this as well. The first one—and I think that the Minister kind of touched on that—is that under new section 14A(a), when you’re looking at protecting “the health, safety, and well-being of children receiving early childhood education;”, I think it’s important to give a specific example here, and I want to engage with the Minister on whether he would consider my amendment, which would be to include having an adequate teacher-student ratio. Probably one of the most important things that the sector is asking for is to have a sufficient student-teacher ratio, which would align with protecting the health, safety, and wellbeing of the children. We are seeing at this stage that for certain providers, the ratio is stretched to the point that the teacher cannot even take their legally entitled leave, because the minute they take leave such as a lunch break, etc., the ECE centre will break ratio, which is not going to be good for the health, safety, and wellbeing of the child. Like the Minister has said, that’s probably the most important focus that we have here: the health, safety, and wellbeing of the child.

Now, moving along in terms of some of my other amendments, I want to engage with the Minister on improving educational and developmental outcomes, which is paragraph (b) of new section 14A, “Objectives”. I think that education and development outcomes are really, really, important, but one thing that potentially isn’t covered in that—unless the Minister is able to clarify whether it falls under “developmental”—is emotional outcomes, and I ask whether that is something that we are going to be seeing as a part of the objectives, because, again, we’re seeing an increasing number of students with higher needs, both in terms of entering into ECE but also in terms of entering into primary school. That’s an ongoing trend, and I ask whether that is something that the Minister would consider.

Finally, one of my other amendments would add another objective to new section 14A, and I think that this objective reflects two objectives. One of them is around our international obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and also, if we are looking at taking on something like this—akin to what we’re seeing in terms of section 127 of the Education and Training Act in terms of board objectives, but maybe for ECE—it is also looking at ensuring that early childhood education gives effect to the relevant student rights set out in the Act but also the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and the Human Rights Act. That’s my final amendment that I want to check with the Minister on.

There was a lot of, frankly, indecipherable speech there. What I did get out of it was that in new section 14A(b), should we add emotional outcomes? Well, actually it’s hard to imagine how to—

Point of order, Madam Chairperson. I just want to seek your clarification and guidance on something. We are hearing these patronising little jabs from the Minister. I want to just check with you: does that mean that it’s open slather for everyone to start their speech with—

That’s not a point of order. Holding the committee of the whole House in order is the role of the Chair, and I will rule if there is unparliamentary language. I was listening.

Thank you, Madam Chair, and that’s probably a good example of why there should be more emotional development in early childhood education. But it’s clear that developmental outcomes include emotional development, and the Government has no intention of adding the member Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s amendment.

There was a question of whether the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and the Treaty of Waitangi should be added to new section 14A, “Objectives”. I think that for people watching this at home, you’d just have to ask yourself—if you’re running an early childhood centre, you’re focused on the quality of the education, the safety of the children, and the information provided to the parents. There’s an unreality about the suggestions that maybe they should also be asking about the Treaty of Waitangi and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, and it’s exactly the kind of reason why I recall—and, in many ways, it’s the genesis of this bill being here—seeing 500 early childhood operators absolutely steaming before the 2023 election. They were furious at the rubbish that they’d been subjected to, and not a single member of the then Government fronted, which really astonished me.

We are getting rid of the extraneous stuff. We’re putting in law the true purposes of regulating early childhood education so that those people can tap on the sign and have explained to them why it is that we regulate early childhood education, and it is so that all of us can get on better and have more effective services for the youngest New Zealanders. It’s as simple as that.

Members, it’s time for me to leave the Chair for the lunch break. The committee is suspended and will resume after question time.

Members, I’m sure that you’d want to join with me in welcoming the Hon Sakiusa Tubuna, Chair of the Standing Committee on Economic Affairs from the Parliament of the Republic of Fiji and his accompanying delegation, who are present in the gallery.

Members, I seek leave for the Hon Jenny Salesa to be appointed as a temporary Assistant Speaker until 11.59 p.m. on Saturday, 29 November 2025. Is there any objection to that course of action being followed? There is none. Thank you.

Point of order, Mr Speaker. Just to try and save getting complaints, I believe you—do we need to do the prayer?

No, because the House is still in session.

I just wanted to avoid that, just in case.

Yeah. No, thank you for raising that. I’m sure that there will be a lot of people watching the broadcast who will wonder why we didn’t start with the prayer today. It’s because the House has sat this morning and this is a break from urgency. Therefore, the House is in continuum from yesterday.

Before I call the next question, I’ll just go back to the drill sheet for a Government motion that I understand was circulated to the House.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I seek leave to move a motion without notice or debate to recognise the anniversary of the Pike River disaster.

Is there any objection to that course of action being followed? There is none.

I move, That this House notes that 19 November 2025 marks 15 years since the Pike River disaster; express its condolences to family and friends who will forever be profoundly impacted; and thank rescue and support teams for their service on that day and the days that followed.

Members, the House is in committee on the Education and Training (Early Childhood Education Reform) Amendment Bill. When we were considering this bill earlier today, we were debating Part 1, so, once again, the question is that Part 1 stand part.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’ve been listening very carefully to the Minister’s responses, and I’m sure you have been following along behind the scenes. I know that we have interrogated a bit on clause 5, so we are coming shortly to the end of those questions. I do just want to clarify for this committee that when I referred to the inclusion of or reference to Te Tiriti o Waitangi in an earlier section, I think the Minister misheard me as wanting a definition. It was actually a question around why Te Tiriti was not included. It was not to define it. I just thought I’d put that on the record.

I have been listening to the Minister’s answers, and I just want to seek clarification, please, on some of the answers that he gave to the Green MP Lawrence Xu-Nan regarding section 14. I guess I’ll frame it like this so that it’s really clear for the Minister: we’ve got subsection (a) and subsection (b) both as purposes, and he gave some answers around the common understanding of why a labour market rationale should be supported. When we look at the submissions from some of the big hitters in the sector, they don’t agree with the Minister’s interpretation of labour market forces being as valid as section 14(a), which is around educational outcomes.

Really, what I’m looking at in section 14 is the word “and”, which separates subsections (a) and (b), and whether the Minister sees these as complementary or whether they are mutually exclusive, because if we look at the submission from Kindergartens Aotearoa, they critique it. They say, on page 3 of their submission: “The purpose is narrowed and the interests of children are no longer the primary focus.” If we look at the Office of Early Childhood Education (OECE), they say that the bill’s “purpose, objectives, and guiding principles … [in Part 1 undermine] children’s rights” and position early childhood education (ECE) as labour market support. If we look at Montessori Aotearoa New Zealand, in their submission they said that there is a “Risk that an emphasis on supporting parental workforce participation may overshadow quality improvement goals.” That is in the section under “Key Risks” in their submission. Finally, under the ECE Parents’ Council Aotearoa, they have said: “By embedding workforce participation as a core purpose, the bill shifts ECE away from child development and learning, and family support.”

My specific questions on this: the first one is around whether the Minister believes that the word “and” is sustainable there, or whether that replaced by the word “or”, and what would that mean for the director? In effect, that is what this bill is doing. Is there a hierarchy in those two parts, subsections (a) and (b)? If they do not prioritise the child’s learning, then can he, please, let us know that on the record—or is he saying that children’s learning is still prioritised? In which case, it would be really important to have that on the Hansard so that there can be some kind of accountability to the director in their interpretation of that purpose.

The second question is around what evidence the Minister has—he still hasn’t produced any to support his contention around this kind of common understanding that parents and caregivers want to participate in the labour market. While I accept the contention, as the basis of a policy that is being put into the purpose of Part 2, I’d like to know what evidence the Minister has for that, because he still hasn’t given us the evidence from the sector to say that that is what the sector itself wants.

The other question I have is around whether he agrees with his Minister of Education that all children learn the same way—I have heard the Minister of Education say, in this House, that all children learn the same way—and the reason I ask that is because of the failure to have a Te Tiriti reference in there. If that is his contention—and I refer to his comment before lunch that Te Tiriti was, in his words, “extraneous” or one of the extraneous matters, and that was a word that he did use—then where is his evidence that all children learn the same way? If there isn’t that, how will he make sure that Māori children are able to get the same learning outcomes?

I still have just a couple more questions on this, and this is really bringing us to the end, I think, of Labour’s questions on this clause.

Well, perhaps the member could ask those couple of questions now if you’re ready to take another call?

Sure, and then—thank you.

Madam Chair, seeing as she hasn’t taken another call—the question of whether or not parents and caregivers pay to send their children to early childhood education centres, with one of their goals being to go and work, I’ve now addressed this several times. That is one of the reasons parents do it. If anyone wants to dispute that, they can, and the people watching from home can judge for themselves.

There was a question, “Do all children learn the same way?”. No, they don’t, but there is, actually, a science of learning where you can make advances by testing hypotheses, seeing what works, and advancing. That is what this Government is committed to and what Erica Stanford, our education Minister, is committed to. The idea that, somehow, the Government thinks that all children are the same—it doesn’t; it just thinks we should use best possible knowledge when it comes to curriculum and pedagogy, which we do.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I have a question on this clause 5, section 14A, “Objectives of Part 2”. Now, I’m not a member of the Education and Workforce Committee that has covered this bill, so forgive me if I’m asking a question that members of the committee already know the answer to, but I don’t. I’m interested in hearing the Minister’s answer to my question with regard to section 14A(e). Throughout the regulatory impact statement, it talks a little bit about the current regulations etc., etc., being somewhat confusing, needing to provide clarity for centres, parents, etc.

In Objectives of Part 2 paragraph (e), where it talks about “implementing a licensing and certification system that provides service providers, parents, and caregivers with certainty and clarity, as far as is reasonably practicable, regarding minimum standards for quality services.”, I’d like to know why the wording “as far as is reasonably practicable” is in there, because surely that doesn’t provide certainty and clarity. Why could it not be without those words, where it just says, “certainty and clarity regarding minimum standards for quality services.”? I’m interested to know what “reasonably practicable” means in this particular part. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’m going to move on to a new clause. I’m going to move on to clause 7, “The Director of Regulations”. New sections 27A to 27E are a substantial part of this bill regarding the new role that the Minister is creating. I’m going to focus my contribution, this time, on new section 27A, “Director of Regulation”, and also new section 27B, “Functions of the Director of Regulations”. To begin with, because this is something that the select committee and also submitters have raised as a part of that, they just want to get clarification from the Minister about whether, in this case, the Director of Regulations would also be overseeing kōhanga reo and puna reo, as part of their role? If I can get a nod from the Minister—oh, great, thank you, Minister, for that first clarification. In which case, I think that it’s important to bring to the Minister’s attention one of my amendments on new section 27A, which is in clause 7, new subsection 27A(2), after “experience and expertise”, to specifically include “experience and expertise when it comes to Te Tiriti o Waitangi”.

Now, this is not simply us wanting to include Te Tiriti for the sake of including Te Tiriti but actually offers a very reasonable explanation for why that is important for the Director of Regulations, because if the Director of Regulations does indeed—like the Minister has just nodded to and acknowledged—have oversight over kōhanga reo and puna reo without any understanding or background in Te Tiriti, that would, potentially, mean that they can’t really perform their duty or power or functions as effectively as they ought to when they are looking at Māori-medium early childhood education (ECE) services. I want to check with the Minister, first and foremost, if that is something that he would consider under new section 27A.

Now, in terms of new section 27B, we’re looking at two main areas: we’re looking at the “Statutorily independent functions” of the Director of Regulations, but also at “Other functions”. I want to check with the Minister from an “Other functions” perspective. There are a number of things in here that, I think, seem odd, unless the Minister thinks that paragraph (j) does, in fact, cover it. But things like, for example, new section 27B(g)(iii)—“incidents at licensed early childhood services and certified playgroups.”—one would assume that when it comes to incidents, particularly critical incidents, it is important for the relevant health and safety agency—for example, Worksafe—to also be involved as a part of that. Despite the fact that the Director of Regulations may have certain powers and functions, there are specific requirements, as the Minister may understand, in terms of the Health and Safety at Work Act, but there are also relevant regulations as a part of that, in terms of the health and safety of children in an ECE service.

I know that the Minister, specifically, wants to talk about synthesising or distilling some of the regulatory environment, but it is important for the committee to also recognise the fact that the deregulations that we’re seeing across the Ditch, in Australia, have led to more critical incidents in ECE centres, as well as a growing trend of unsavoury behaviour that we’re seeing in ECE that may eventuate if we do look into distilling or even deregulating. I do want to check, as a starting point, whether the Minister will consider one of my amendments, which is around the fact that when we’re looking at incidents, for example, and critical incidents, in licensed early childhood education certified play groups, the relevant health and safety agency must be involved as a part of that.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Lawrence Xu-Nan has quite correctly pointed out that clause 7 is indeed a bit of a heavy-hitting clause in this bill. Nevertheless, we have skipped over clause 6, and I would just like to ask the Minister some questions about it because clause 6 amends section 22 of the principal Act in relation to records. It effectively puts “or the Director of Regulation” after “the Secretary”, so it expands what information early childhood education services must make available to the director. This is referred to in the regulatory impact statement (RIS) at page 38, but there’s also some real caveats in the RIS around this.

On page 33, it notes that the regulatory actions could be seen as punitive by the director. It also confirms, again, that there was no consultation with providers on expanded information requirements, and at page 30—and this is probably one worth really getting an understanding of from the Minister—is how this new regime is going to deal with the confusion risks during the transition period. That has been highlighted in the RIS at page 30.

If we look at who is going to bear the brunt of this, once again, it’s going to disproportionately affect small, Māori-medium, and community-based services, so I have a question for the Minister about what advice he received regarding the impact of this particular clause on smaller and Māori providers. I’d also like to ask the Minister about the Privacy Act implications. Clearly, there is a need for limits on information collection and use. Could the Minister, please, just let us know what rules or protocols will cover this? Will this happen through secondary legislation, and if so, when can we expect to see that, and what will the level of scrutiny of that be? What will the scope of that be, and this is really important given the Opposition’s concerns about the direction of travel, which, in our view, seems to be heading toward a weighting towards privatisation.

How will that data be protected from commercial exploitation? Who will be accountable if there are failures to protect that data, and what are the sanctions? What advice, if any, did he receive about Māori data sovereignty? That has a different suite of issues and concerns that need to be answered. Also, why were providers not consulted on the new information burden?

The totality of the question really is: how will the Minister ensure that information-gathering powers will respect privacy and data sovereignty? Will they follow the same regime as the secretary, even though the director’s powers are more extensive? Are the safeguards to be equivalent, are they not there, or are they intended to be proportionate to the extended powers, and where will they sit?

Then, when I can come back for another call, we’d really like to go into detail on new sections 27A to 27E, in clause 7, where we have a plethora of questions.

Thank you, Madam Chair. While the Minister’s just getting some advice and also potentially responding to some of my earlier questions, I do want to raise a specific example—and a very recent and topical example—when we’re looking at the functions of the Director of Regulation and what the Minister for Regulation would then think in terms of the interaction between the new Director of Regulation and the existing function.

The specific example I wanted to address is the recalling of play sand that has asbestos. Currently, that’s going through our schools and also our early childhood centres. The reason I want to address that particular example is that the person who is currently managing that particular incident—that is done by Ministry of Education (MOE); that is currently done by the Deputy Secretary Operations and Integration, and that has a direct line of reporting to the Secretary for Education. But, when you’re looking at the Director of Regulation for early childhood education (ECE), it reports to the secretary, but other deputy directors in the MOE don’t necessarily report to the Director of Regulation, and the Director of Regulation doesn’t necessarily report to the deputy secretaries. I’m assuming that we’re looking at a lateral sort of organisational chart when you’re looking at the function of Director of Regulation.

If the Minister wouldn’t mind walking us through that, in these sort of situations, when you have currently about 90 early learning service centres that need to have the play sand with asbestos recalled and potentially shut—temporarily closed while we assess the situation—how would the Director of Regulation be able to work with this function? Or, alternatively, the Minister may say that that’s actually not the function of the Director of Regulation, and that particular aspect of the operation—integration of the ECEs—still falls within the appropriate deputy secretary within MOE. That is a very topical, I think, example of how this is going to, potentially, play out on who is going to be the person responsible for the ability to address that particular incident.

Now, in terms of my other tabled amendments, while I’m waiting for the Minister, in terms of some of the Amendment Papers that were already proposed—giving the chance to speak to those—I do want to address another tabled amendment that I’ve got—well, actually, a couple more—and that still is to do with new section 27B. That is that, after new section 27B(k), there should be additional clauses that we’re looking at. Both of them cover, in terms of both our obligation under the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child, which I mentioned before—that’s not necessarily a bureaucracy, as something internationally that we genuinely just signed up to and is held accountable for. In that particular case, I’m proposing to the Minister, alongside when we’re looking at “[carrying] out proactive, regular, risk-based monitoring of compliance by service providers with applicable requirements under this Act”—and that is new section 27B(e)—that there should be a separate clause that talks about carrying out proactive and regular monitoring of compliance alongside the Children’s Commissioner against the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

I think this is quite an important thing, because also, as the Minister understands, with the passing of the Regulatory Standards Bill, etc., and everything that’s attached to that, and how we can look at things like regulatory impact statements, it’s also prudent to mention that the bill the Minister himself has brought doesn’t actually have a child impact statement attached to it, even though this is probably—arguably—one of the bills that will affect children the most. I think it would have been beneficial for the committee to be able to assess some of the impacts it would have to children through that particular assessment. Those are my few questions for the Minister at this time.

Thank you, Madam Chair, for allowing me to take a call on this bill. I wasn’t in the Education and Workforce Committee, so I have been following the conversations with interest. I just have a couple of quick questions for the Associate Minister of Education, looking at what the difference is between the role of the secretary and this new role of a Director of Regulation. I think that’d be really helpful for folks at home to sort of try to understand why there is this extra layer.

To support the contributions made by my friend and colleague Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan around the inclusion of Te Tiriti o Waitangi—I support the reasons that he did so, because kōhanga reo and puna reo have a very specific pedagogy and a specific role to play as well. Getting those answers, I think, would be important—but, just to add to that question as well, around the role of te reo Māori quality assurance, if I can put it that way, because if you’re going to kōhanga reo and you’re going to puna reo, it’s going to be all in Māori. How will that function work in terms of this Director of Regulation? How are they going to assess whether the appropriate standards, whatever, are being met as well? I think that’s a really important question for the Minister to answer. It’s specifically about the quality of te reo Māori language quality assurance, and also the way that it links to te reo Māori pedagogy and curriculum as well, because you can’t just walk into a kōhanga reo and not understand the language and then be able to do this function. I would be interested to hear some answers from the Minister around how that function fits in with the very specific role that kōhanga reo and puna reo have as well.

Also, I was looking at sections 27B(e) and (g), inserted by clause 7, which are “(e) to carry out proactive, regular, risk-based monitoring of compliance by service providers with applicable requirements under this Act:”, and “(g) assess and respond—(i) to complaints about licensed early childhood services and certified playgroups:”. Perhaps this has been covered before, so apologies to the committee if it has been. I’m thinking about the role that teacher-pupil ratios will have—early childhood ratios. As the Minister probably does know, and probably the committee knows as well, that is a point of contention within the sector as well, and it’s always different as well. If you’re looking after—I’m just thinking about my own kids—a bunch of two-year-olds, they’re all different than if you’re taking care of children that are younger than two-year-olds, and, of course, as they get older as well. What role does the Director of Regulation play? And things around teacher-pupil ratios: is there a role; isn’t there a role? I would also be interested to hear the Minister’s response, and how that could be possibly linked, or not, to WorkSafe considerations as well, because if you’re trying to juggle lots of kids and you’re just one person and they’re babies, that’s a lot of work. What compliance tasks will the Minister expect this Director of Regulation to do? What are the functions that they could have as well?

I’ll just recap for the Minister. Just for someone like myself, who wasn’t able to get to the select committee, the differences between the secretary and the Director of Regulation—also, those questions around the inclusion of Te Tiriti o Waitangi, not because it’s just a constitutional element, which I think is important, but because it defines particular early childhood spaces such as kōhanga reo and puna reo. How will the function of this Director of Regulation check on the quality of te reo Māori language assurance and quality? My last question is just around ratios as well: how will that work? We do want teachers to be able to do their job safely, to look after our kids’ safety as well—it’s incredibly important. If there is some function that is outlined there, it’d be good to hear that.

I’ll address, quickly, a number of questions that have been asked. Jo Luxton asked what “reasonably practicable” means. It means what it sounds like: people should be required by the law to do what is possible, but they can’t be asked by the law to do impossible things. It’s used in a lot of drafting. I faced a similar question, I think over the Regulatory Standards Act, or maybe it was the Medicines Amendment Act, but that should be a familiar term to people who are paid to make laws in New Zealand. It’s through many of the laws we make.

Lawrence Xu-Nan and Teanau Tuiono both asked about incorporating a Treaty clause, particularly in relation to kōhanga reo and te puna reo. We could do that, but I would stress to them that actually New Zealand is a place with many settlers of different backgrounds and many different types of education. It’s not obvious why we would put one of them in legislation. What we want is people who work for all children, and that means that you may look at section 14(a): the select committee actually said “education that allows all children to establish strong foundations”.

Lawrence Xu-Nan said he had an amendment in relation to that. I’ve addressed this issue of the Treaty several times; we’re not going to accept that amendment. There was also an amendment suggesting that WorkSafe be involved. WorkSafe is already involved, because this is a workplace under the Health and Safety at Work Act; that’s played out where the Ministry of Education and WorkSafe have worked together over the coloured sand issue that’s being dealt with as we speak, so there’s no need for WorkSafe’s role to be put into this legislation.

Ingrid Leary asked a series of questions about clause 6, about information and the custody of information and respect for information. She even asked about Māori data sovereignty. Quite simply, all that clause 6 of this bill does is shift a role from the Secretary of Education to the Director of Regulation. That person will be subject to exactly the same requirements, acting under the Public Service as they would be, regardless of what particular role they had or what we called it, so there’s not actually a substantial change there, in clause 6 that’s relevant to what she’s talking about.

Then there was a question, I think, about—Lawrence Xu-Nan asked if the Director of Regulation would be accountable to the secretary. I think it’s really helpful, I’d say to Dr Xu-Nan, to read what it says here: the Director of Regulation is appointed by the secretary. They have to be an employee of the ministry, which the secretary is in charge of. I think it should be pretty clear: if you work for someone and they appoint you to a position, you’re accountable to them. I can’t make it any simpler than that, much as the member might need me to.

Then there was a question of whether there should be a child impact statement added, in some sort of analogy to the Regulatory Standards Act. No, we have no intention of doing anything like that.

Finally, there was a question from Teanau Tuiono in relation to new section 27B and the functions of the director and whether the director would be a policy maker, for example, setting the ratio of students to teachers. Well, the answer to that is no, and part of the purpose of what we’re doing here, and the reason that we’re setting it up this way, is that we want the person who makes the policy and the person that enforces the rules to be different. We wouldn’t want, for example, the police to be making the laws and then enforcing them. We try to have a separation, and that’s generally considered now to be best-practice regulation; that’s what we’re doing here, in part. It’s one of the things that we’re doing with this bill, so that will continue to be made by the Government, advised by the Ministry of Education, not by this director.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I have two questions for the Minister. One’s a new one, but the other one is that I just want to seek some clarification from the Minister with response to my earlier question. I accept what he has said there, and I’m not trying to be difficult; I’m just trying to understand really clearly—really clearly—where “as far as is reasonably practicable” is used in new section 14A(e), “Objectives of Part 2”, inserted by clause 5. I want to understand why those words are in there when it says clearly that you’re trying to implement—“implementing a licensing and certification system that provides service providers, parents, and caregivers with certainty and clarity … regarding minimum standards for quality services.”

Why are those words “reasonably practicable” in there when this is going to be implementing a system that provides clarity and certainty regarding minimum standards for quality services? I still don’t understand why those words are in there, and I’m genuinely not trying to be awkward when I ask that question. I wasn’t a member of the select committee, so I really am keen to understand that, when it should be something that should be quite clear and easy for the objectives to be.

The other question I have is around the Director of Regulation, new section 27A, inserted by clause 7—that “The Secretary must be satisfied that the person has the appropriate experience and expertise to perform and exercise the functions, duties, and powers of the Director of Regulation.” What is deemed to be the appropriate experience and expertise? Are they going to be required to have a sound knowledge of the early childhood sector or otherwise? Is that going to be a requirement or not? I note some of the questions that were raised by the Kindergartens Aotearoa association with particular regard to this point.

What mechanism is in place to ensure that, in discharging their duty, the director is not in conflict with ministry policy and practice? Do they remain an employee of the ministry when their responsibilities will sit with the Education Review Office?

I’m interested to know about the appropriate experience and expertise. Who will decide that? What is deemed to be appropriate experience and expertise? Surely someone who’s going to be in charge of a sector like that should have—it would be good for them to have—certain knowledge of the early childhood sector and how it has operated in the past and what it is that the Minister is trying to achieve going forward in the future with early childhood education service as well. It would be really good if the Minister could clarify.

I will just try once more on “reasonably practicable”. I guess the point is that the law has to be upheld, and it could be upheld in a court. If the law didn’t say “reasonably practicable” and it said that the regulator had to provide certainty and clarity to parents, without any qualification, then it’s a standard that could never really be reached, because there would always be somebody who said that something was too uncertain or unclear. You can test whether a person has done all of the things that they reasonably could have done, so it actually allows the law to be followed and interpreted, whereas it could become meaningless if it’s a standard that can never practically be reached.

As far as the appropriate knowledge and expertise, the bill doesn’t say what the appropriate knowledge and expertise for the Director of Regulation is. What the bill says is that the person who appoints them has to be satisfied that they have the appropriate knowledge and expertise. Now, in that circumstance, the person might well be asked, “What did you think was appropriate? Why did you think this person was the right person?” and they would have to give their reasons, and that would be subject to public scrutiny. Like many of the purposes of this legislation, we are trying to ensure that the purpose of regulating and the quality of regulation is set out in law so that ordinary people can say, “Hey, you’re not doing this right. Parliament said how you should do it.” It’s all about giving people some standing and some status and holding people accountable.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I just want to thank my colleagues over here for defending Māori education, and, in this case, our kids. I want to stress the point, the relevance, and the place of Te Tiriti o Waitangi in education legislation and endeavour over the last 50 years. This is not just a case of “Can you put pop the Treaty in?”, and this speaks more broadly to the broad attack on Te Tiriti o Waitangi and the removal of it in education, from preschool all the way through to university.

Now, it’s been the adherence to Te Tiriti o Waitangi, the requirement of adherence to Te Tiriti o Waitangi, in education legislation over the last 50 years that has taken Māori from a place of being almost boxed out of education, be it in preschool or university, in the 1950s and 1960s, that has been hard fought through the 1970s, the 1980s, the 1990s, and the 2000s, all the way up to today, to us producing the highest results in education—the highest in the country. Have a look at NCEA, have a look around, and have a look at the participation rates of today versus 1980. Have a look at it all. It all tells us that the inclusion of Te Tiriti o Waitangi is part of the success.

The Māori education model has been tried, tested through fire and through everything, and has come out still going strong, OK? It’s the best educational model for Māori. It’s the same in preschool. It’s the same in puna reo, in kōhanga reo. It’s the same in kura kaupapa and wharekura. It’s not lost on me that we have a Minister here who’s actually using the kura kaupapa model to promote his other endeavours in education. It’s just beyond me.

OK, so it has been the adherence to Te Tiriti o Waitangi that has enabled all of that development. So why, oh why, in 2025, are we taking it out, getting rid of it, stripping it back? We’re making it, oh, just, you know, no longer a commitment. It’s completely beyond me—it’s completely beyond me.

There has been generation after generation of Māori academics who have stood up and proposed these things—educational hypotheses, completed doctorates—and who became professors, led universities, and started their own to prove all of these things. All of it is proven beyond a shadow of a doubt—that’s what the evidence tells us—and yet here we are, having to defend the Māori science of learning—the Māori science of learning.

OK, these things have been done already and they’ve been proven. The link between language and knowledge system is a known thing. In te ao Māori [Māori society] we call that te reo Māori me ōna tikanga [the Māori language and its associated traditional practices], and what’s known is that it is connection, and the earlier you can get it in, the more powerful those young people become along their educational journey. Proven fact—proven fact—time and time and time again. Then, here we are, with someone not so schooled in educational endeavour, leading the bandwagon of getting rid of the Treaty. It is absurd—it is absurd and obscene. It’s obscene, because as I think about the 30 percent of young Māori who are going to form the labour workforce of this country into the future, you are talking about undermining their educational experience. I just cannot fathom what the reasonable answer is, and I cannot fathom it because there is not one there.

So as I think about these things—these are all in Part 1, by the way—and as I read through it, there’s no requirement for anyone in this piece of legislation to give any thought to anything a young Māori learner or their whānau might need. How can that possibly be a community, family, or a representative model where one culture is just completely sidelined?

If we want to talk about the relevance and the place of Te Tiriti o Waitangi, you’re talking about the constitutional founding document, the document that gives constitutional validity to Māori and constitutional validity to every other person in the country, and the Minister thinks, “Huh, well, there are a lot of us in this country. Why would we put that one in?” We’d put it in because it represents every single person in the country—that’s why. So I’d love to hear any response this Minister has to any of the things I’ve put forward. Kia ora tātou.

I’m going to take a question from Teanau Tuiono, but I am looking for new—

Yeah.

And questions.

It’s a couple of quick questions, and to acknowledge the responses so far from the Assistant Minister of Education. I do hear what my colleague Tākuta Ferris was saying, as well, in terms of Te Tiriti, because, for a number of us, that would solve a lot of the issues.

We were talking earlier about the role that the Director of Regulation would play, and I haven’t yet heard an answer around how when you go into, say, a kōhanga reo or a puna reo, you don’t have the language or cultural competency—how is that going to work practically? That’s what I want to know. This person will have a number of new functions under this legislation. How are they going to understand them, let alone all the other early childhood centres which operate in other languages, as well? So it’s a practical question about exactly how that particular element would work.

There are a number of us that think that if you put Te Tiriti in there, in the references—and I just acknowledge the tabled amendments by my friend Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan, which would take care of that and ensure that that would be taken care of. But if they’re not in there, how is that function going to be carried out in a way which is useful? If they don’t understand the language, it makes it very, very tricky if they don’t understand the cultural context as well, and there has to be a depth of language, as well, in order for that to be useful.

The other quick question that I have is around ratios. I heard what the Minister was saying that this is about compliance, and if they’re not compliant, then that should have a feedthrough with policy. I understood that. But what happens with the situation where you have complaints that are arising because particular early childhood centres are breaking ratio, where you have too many kids or babies per teacher, and that’s creating unsafe working conditions for both the tamariki and mokopuna, and also for the teachers, as well? Does that fall into the function of this Director of Regulation? Are they able to make recommendations to the policyholders or to the policy creators, as well?

My understanding is that ratios are determined by Order in Council, and the one that we have—unless we’ve changed it since I was following this issue more closely—is still stuck on what the old ratios were years and years ago, even though the research is telling us, “Actually, you’ve got to be able to deal with our babies differently, as opposed to our toddlers.”, and so on and so forth. So my question is: what is that link, and I ask if the Minister could be give a specific answer around the ratio question. If complaints arise because of the functions of the Director of Regulation in terms of breaking ratio, or all of those other issues that I’ve talked about, what is the follow-through so that you can get some policy change?

Look, in the first speech, there was actually nothing of substance to respond to. In the second speech, from Teanau Tuiono, he’s asked, well, what happens if the rules are not being addressed? New section 27B in clause 7 is the section that he might look at. It’s the job of the Director of Regulation to address breaches of the rules.

He’s then asked me about the fact that there may be some people who would argue that the research suggested ratio should go up, and others would suggest that they should go down, but, as I’ve said, that’s not part of this bill. That’s not something this Director of Regulation should decide. But section 27B(b) does say that they should enforce the rules that are there.

He’s also asked about language and culture, and asked whether people will be confident, given that you’ve got Māori there as first settlers, and you’ve had many waves of settlers since then—people with different aspirations, language, and culture. If you go into a place which might be Chinese, for example, will they be able to speak to that? Obviously, when you come to hire people, hiring people that are capable and confident is going to be important. But that’s not something in this legislation, other than perhaps the requirement that the person who is hired as the Director for Regulation has the capability required in the opinion of the Secretary for Education who hires them.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

The question is that the Minister’s amendment to Part 1 set out on Amendment Paper 440 be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 4, amending the new definition of early childhood education to insert “that opts to be certified under this Act”, be agreed to.

Can I please ask people to be prompt with their voting, and also just to make sure, under Speaker’s ruling 71/3, that it’s just the person who calls out who gives the vote for or against, and the number that they’re voting for, and nothing extra.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 4, deleting the words after “a playgroup” in the new definition of early childhood education, be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, replacing the word “system” with “service” in new section 14, be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting words after “system” in new section 14, be agreed to.

Mr Willis, I’m just going to ask you if you can be just a little bit quicker getting to your feet with those votes, please. Otherwise, start standing up a little sooner.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, deleting the word “minimum” from paragraph (a) of new section 14, be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, replacing paragraph (b) of new section 14, be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, deleting paragraph (b) of new section 14, be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, adding the word “grandparents” after “parents” in paragraph (b) of new section 14, be agreed to.

The question is that the Hon Jan Tinetti’s tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting paragraph (c) into new section 14, be agreed to.

Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting a new paragraph (c) in new section 14, relating to Te Tiriti o Waitangi, is out of order as being the same in substance as a previous amendment.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting new paragraph (c) into new section 14 regarding resourcing for early childhood education, be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting paragraph (aa) into new section 14A, regarding children’s rights and welfare, be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, replacing “receiving” with “participating in” in paragraph (a) of section 14A, be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting “as the primary objective under this Part.” in paragraph (a) of new section 14A, be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting the words “including adequate teacher-student ratio” in paragraph (a) of new section 14A, be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting the word “emotional” into paragraph (b) of new section 14A, be agreed to.

The question is that Tākuta Ferris’ tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting paragraph (ba) into new section 14A, be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting “grandparent” after every instance of the word “parent” in new section 14A, be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, amending paragraph (d) of new section 14A, regarding monitoring and reporting of the performance of the early childhood education system, be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, adding the words “geographic availability and equitable provision” to paragraph (d) of new section 14A, be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, adding the words “availability and price” to paragraph (d) of new section 14A, be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, adding the words “geographic location and availability” to paragraph (d) of new section 14A, be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, deleting “as far as is reasonably practicable” from paragraph (e) of new section 14A, be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, deleting the word “minimum” from paragraph (e) of new section 14A, be agreed to.

The question is that the Hon Jan Tinetti’s tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting paragraph (f) into new section 14A, be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting paragraph (f) into new section 14A, relating to funding and resourcing for teachers and staff, be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting paragraph (f) into new section 14A, relating to implementing a curriculum that gives effect to Te Tiriti o Waitangi, be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting paragraph (f) into new section 14A, relating to relevant student rights, be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting paragraph (f) into new section 14A, relating to the elimination of forms of discrimination, be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting paragraph (f) into new section 14A, relating to the reporting on early childhood education, be agreed to.

The question is that Tākuta Ferris’ tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting a new section 14B headed “Kōhanga reo”, be agreed to.

The question is that Tākuta Ferris’ tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting a new section 14B headed “Kaiako pay equity”, be agreed to.

The question is that Tākuta Ferris’ tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting a new section 14B headed “Equity-based funding for Māori medium education”, be agreed to.

Looks hard work—take a break in between if you’re tired.

In response to the question from the Hon Kieran McAnulty, a break in between would not be very helpful.

Well, it’s just she was tired, Madam Chair.

I know, I can see that, but a break would not be helpful. The question is that Tākuta Ferris’ tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting a new section 14B headed “Te Tiriti o Waitangi”, be agreed to.

Point of order, Madam Chairperson. In light of the comments from Kieran McAnulty being tired of voting, I seek leave for the remaining Opposition amendments to be skipped in terms of voting.

Leave is sought for that purpose. Is there any objection? There is objection.

Point of order, Madam Chairperson. I think everybody knows that that’s not what I said—you certainly know that—and I don’t think that leave should be taken seriously when it is quite clearly a misrepresentation of what has been said. The comments were between you and myself, not between the Minister and myself, and you, at the time, took it as a light-hearted comment. It shouldn’t lead to leave being sought for those purposes.

Speaking to the point of order, I was aware that the proposal that I made was not his solution to his problem. I was just giving him my solution to his problem.

Well, thank you for those points of order. Look, I will say that some of these times in the committee are quite tedious, and I do question what value the public who’s watching on TV gets from this process, but it is a political thing that’s been going backwards and forwards for many years. Given that there’s some more votes in front of me, I think we’ll just carry on. If anyone does want to withdraw their amendment and we have a rest, they’re more than welcome to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting a new section 14B headed “Clarity of obligations”, be agreed to.

Point of order, Madam Chairperson. I’m not sure how the member from New Zealand First voted, I don’t believe that to be clear, and, just for clarity, I’d like him to say in either of the official languages how it is that he voted.

Thank you. Would the member like to repeat his vote?

Eight votes opposed.

Thank you.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 6, replacing “Director of Regulation” with “Regulations Review Committee of Parliament”, be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 6, inserting the words “if the information relates to regulatory compliance or efficiency only”, be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 6, inserting the words “by agreement of the Secretary”, be agreed to.

The question is that Tākuta Ferris’ tabled amendment to clause 7, amending new section 27A(2), be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 7, inserting the words “including Te Tiriti o Waitangi” into new section 27A(2), be agreed to.

The question is that the Hon Jan Tinetti’s tabled amendment to clause 7, inserting subsection (5) into new section 27A, be agreed to.

Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 7, inserting the words “alongside the relevant health and safety agency” into new section 27B(k), is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 7, inserting paragraph (j) into new section 27B, relating to compliance with Te Tiriti o Waitangi, be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 7, inserting paragraph (j) into new section 27B, relating to compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, be agreed to.

The question is that Tākuta Ferris’ tabled amendment to clause 7, amending new section 27D(c), be agreed to.

The question is that Tākuta Ferris’ tabled amendment to clause 7, inserting paragraph (ca) into new section 27D, be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 7, inserting paragraph (ca) into new section 27D, relating to the role of qualified teachers and staff, be agreed to.

The question is that the Hon Jan Tinetti’s tabled amendment to clause 7, deleting new section 27D(d)(ii), be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 7, replacing paragraph (aa) of new section 27E(3), relating to delegation of functions, be agreed to.

The question is that Tākuta Ferris’ tabled amendment to clause 7, inserting a new section 27F headed “Annual Māori education equity report”, be agreed to.

The question is that Tākuta Ferris’ tabled amendment to clause 7, inserting a new section 27F headed “Monitoring of racism and discrimination”, be agreed to.

The question is that Tākuta Ferris’ tabled amendment to clause 7, inserting a new section 27F headed “Māori early childhood workforce development”, be agreed to.

The question is that Tākuta Ferris’ tabled amendment to clause 7, inserting a new section 27F headed “Māori Standards Authority”, be agreed to.

The question is that the Hon Jan Tinetti’s tabled amendment to clause 9, inserting subsection (5) into new section 619A, be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 9, inserting subsection (5) into new section 619A, be agreed to.

Just before we start the next vote, I’d just ask the member not to interrupt the member who is so diligently doing all that voting over there. Thank you.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendments to clause 10 be agreed to.

The question is that Tākuta Ferris’ tabled amendment to clause 11, amending new section 636(2)(b), be agreed to.

The question is that Part 1 as amended be agreed to.

Members, we now come to Part 2, the debate on clause 14—“Consequential amendments to other legislation”—and Schedule 2. The question is that Part 2 stand part.

Part 2 consists of one clause. It is clause 14, “Consequential amendments”, where it says, “Amend the legislation specified in Schedule 2 as set out in that schedule.” It goes on in Schedule 2 to make a series of amendments to the early childhood and the playcentre regulations, both from 2008. These are changes and cross-references, replacing the word “Secretary” with “Director of Regulation” for example, because as we know, the purpose of this bill is, in part, to create the Director of Regulation who takes on the role the secretary would have played.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Part 2 has been described, previously this afternoon, as being mainly technical, and I think he’s given us a flavour of his view of that. Indeed, it could look administrative. But actually, the system-level impact of Schedule 2 is significant. That is because it operationalises the full removal of the Ministry of Education from regulation decision-making in early childhood education (ECE).

This is about the decoupling. Unfortunately, we were not really able to interrogate what that would mean in the previous debate, which was shut down rather early, in my view, because there were supplementary questions around the level of uncertainty in the roles of the secretary and the new director. What this schedule does is it replaces the “Secretary” with the new “Director of Regulation” in every clause that deals with licensing, and there are many of those and we will have some questions around that, specifically around including the conditions of licence and suspension and withdrawal of licences.

It also regulates monitoring and inspection. We did not get to interrogate the lack of safeguards around the new enforcement powers that the director has, which are broader than the secretary. Again, enforcement actions: the same issue there around safeguarding, notification to parents, notices of intention to take action, compliance processes, minimum standard check, permission to vary ratios and premises uses, and many of the clauses there are also relating to that.

I don’t think we heard adequate answers from the Minister regarding some of the questions that were raised by the Green Party on that. That speaks to educational quality, to ECE pedagogy, to curriculum support, teaching workforce issues, and licensing and regulation that will now sit in different agencies. Let’s remember, also, that the licensing is currently done by Ellen MacGregor-Reid, who has been around this building for about 10 years. There will be transitional situations that will arise. We haven’t been able to interrogate what will happen to the case law and the decision-making whakapapa, if you like, when that changes. As I’ve said, the Director of Regulation has broader delegation powers than the secretary did, but there are no safeguards in this schedule.

We still have unanswered questions around conflicts of interest, private sector influence, profit -driven quality drift, and less focus on education. I want to ask the Minister a few questions specifically, but I also want to pick up on something that he himself said, which was he talked about this being a bill of best practice—that this is about having separation of powers essentially, and he mentioned that in relation to regulation. But I would like to point the Minister to the regulatory impact statement where there was a lack of consultation. But also, there have been select committee submissions that have talked about the strong pedagogical oversight and effective transition from ECE to school requiring clear public accountability and having a model where the secretary and director role are together, where there is one overarching governance structure.

ECE may be the outlier as far as regulation goes, but that is what the OECD report says. It’s in a report called Starting Strong. It was alluded to by submitters. In page 126 to 129 it talks about when you decouple there are uneven service qualities, there’s confusion amongst parents, there’s regulatory inconsistency, weak accountability, gaps between educational goals and regulatory enforcement. On page 21 of that report, it also, basically, foreshadows what this bill is exactly doing in Schedule 2 by wholesalely transferring over these regulatory-making powers without oversight by creating a semi-autonomous regulator, it allows a third-party delegation of regulatory functions, and it moves oversight away from an education-led framework.

That raises a whole lot of questions, which I will be asking, about accountabilities, because we don’t see those powers elicited and alluded to and framed correctly in legislation. This is just a wholesale of moving from one role to another under, presumably, secondary regulation.

The member is attempting to debate a series of policy questions; these were resolved in the debate on Part 1, and, indeed, in the select committee and in the first and second readings, as well as the policy developments and the Ministry for Regulation’s review, which engaged thousands of people as far back as last June, nearly 18 months ago. This is a schedule that changes a series of words—mainly replacing “Secretary” with “Director of Regulation” in order to give the consequential amendments to the things agreed in Part 1.

Furthermore, the member has made a suggestions that this somehow moves the regulator to the Education Review Office. It does not do that. There is a separate bill before the House which does do that, and we can debate that in that bill, in the appropriate place. So far as this bill goes, it simply shifts the position within the Ministry of Education from the current secretary to someone appointed by the secretary. And, by the way, Ellen MacGregor-Reid, great as she is, has been in the job for two weeks. The person who is appointed to this role might well have longer experience than her.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I do agree with the previous speaker, Ingrid Leary, that this section—although, despite what the Minister is saying, it’s a switching of various numbers—simply highlights the scope of the role of the Director of Regulation in comparison to the Secretary for Education. Now, before, when we were discussing Part 1—and I’m going to say the same thing that the Minister said to me: if the Minister had listened to my questions carefully, the Minister would have remembered that I didn’t ask regarding the interaction between the Director of Regulation and the secretary but, in fact, the Director of Regulation and the deputy secretary. The instance I raised was around the playcentre asbestos, because it was the deputy secretary who had to manage some of that—specifically, the Deputy Secretary of Operations and Integration.

Coming to Schedule 2 of Part 2, I still would like to know from the Minister how that organisational chart will potentially look when you’re looking at, potentially, a lateral appointment. Again, I stress that the Director of Regulation will report to the secretary, but so would other deputy secretaries. How would the Director of Regulation interact with the broader Ministry of Education (MOE) when you are determining some of these regulations, as we see in Schedule 2? Again, a person may have that in title, maybe functions in power, but how would that work in terms of potentially overstepping what is within their mandate? Or if the mandate overlaps between the role of a secretary or deputy secretary and the role of the Director of Regulation, especially when things overlap in multiple areas? Early childhood services, for one, as well as schools, as in the example that I provided previously. I do want to check with the Minister that, for someone who does say they want to see a reduction in regulation and bureaucracy, this has inadvertently created a different layer of bureaucracy that someone needs to manage or look into. That covers most of the regulations, specifically, when you’re looking at some of the ones that are to do with even, let’s say, for example, ratio, which is Schedule 2 of the regulations.

Just a simple question to the Minister: how does the Director of Regulation interact with the broader MOE in that organisational chart—again, not to do with the secretary?

Thank you, Madam Chair. I can only reiterate that the member Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan is openly trying to relitigate debate from Part 1, where the questions were addressed. He may not have liked the answers, but they were certainly given. This part is very narrow; it simply makes consequential amendments to give effect to matters that we’ve already debated.

Just before I call the next speaker, this schedule and this part, which I can see is really narrow, does actually bring in the fact that you can talk about the secretary and the Director of Regulation, because that is, really, as I can see, what this whole schedule is about. Then it refers to various other regulations that are affected by the change that is being proposed.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Yes, just to give an example of that: if we look at what is being amended in the early childhood services regulations, there are quite a number of regulations to do with applications for licences, or a probationary licence, classes of licences, home-based licences, suspension of licences, circumstances where licences are changed or replaced, appeals, health and safety, and so on.

These are quite significant matters of public interest when it comes to the safety and efficacy of early childhood centres and play centres. I don’t think we have had adequate explanation from the Minister, either in this debate or in previous ones, about the areas where the regulatory impact statement itself has identified that there is some area of potential confusion and overlap between the role of the secretary and the director. Just in relation to the Minister’s comment about the secretary, he is definitely right—she has just been appointed in the last two weeks. The point is that she has been in the role for about 10 years. What happens when you have a system where somebody has got that institutional expertise and knowledge and also case knowledge versus a director that is no longer under the auspices of or accountable to the Ministry of Education? I think that’s really what we are trying to interrogate here in Schedule 2.

If we look at new regulation 41(1A), in Schedule 2, it says that “the Secretary is the Minister’s principal policy adviser.” Then we’re looking at what the relationship is between those two roles. I guess the questions we’d like to know from the Minister is, really clearly for Hansard, who sets the standards, who monitors them, and who do affected parties appeal to under the regulations? Say, for example, there’s a revocation of a licence or a change to the circumstances of a licence under the previous early childhood services regulations 39 and 39A, who handles complaints, and also who really does oversee the director? I think the critical question here was difficult to bring out in the previous debate because there were a number of clauses that we didn’t get to. The question is: who does the director report to? It is correct to say that, in reality, it is the Minister, because once again we are seeing from this Government a lot of power vested in a particular Minister. Particularly, we’ve got a director who is no longer beholden to the ministry.

I still haven’t heard an answer regarding whether Te Tiriti obligations are implicit given that Schedule 2 extends the director’s authority over kōhanga reo, puna reo, and bilingual units. The Minister has danced around the topic, but it would be very useful for those in the sector to understand, given that those are referred to. Does that mean Te Tiriti is extraneous, as he has said previously this afternoon, or is it implicitly conferred by this bill? I think he just needs to take a position—and I can guess what it is. It would be good for the public to know what that is, because then we have to query how the director’s authority extends over those when there are no Te Tiriti obligations to underpin those kōhanga reo, puna reo, and bilingual units.

The other question is: how will the ministry ensure system stewardship when they are no longer regulating early childhood education services? That is really what this debate is about. We’ve got this clever division of power between a secretary and a regulator, and one of them is beholden to the ministry and one of them is quasi-independent. There is some fuzziness around what the role is, particularly when it comes to secondary legislation and the regulation and the transitional arrangements. All of that looks like a way to avoid public accountability and scrutiny and to, really, allow more privatisation of the sector. Now, if that is not the case, I’d like to hear that from the Minister.

There is no other reason to wholesale replace “Secretary” with “Director of Regulation” under the schedule, which is really a wolf in sheep’s clothing, because it’s making it look like it’s distinguishing policy leadership. That is how the Minister has described it. In fact, it is all about avoiding accountability that the ministry needs to be accountable for—suddenly there’s this director out there in quasi-autonomous role, with some fuzzy kind of duties, who doesn’t have to respond to the ministry. It does come to policy, Minister, because that is essentially what the schedule is doing wholesale.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I can only reiterate, and it might be helpful for people at home: Schedule 2 says things like “in regulation”, “definition of contact person”, “replace ‘Secretary’ with ‘Director of Regulation’ ”, and it carries on like that for about two pages. We debated, in the previous part, what the Director of Regulation will do. We debated what the relation of the Treaty of Waitangi is. All we’re doing here is making the consequential amendment that since we agreed, in Part 1, that the Director of Regulation would exist and fulfil roles similar to those currently fulfilled by the secretary, we’re going to replace the word “Secretary” with “Director of Regulation” in quite a few different places. That’s all we’re talking about.

Before I call the next speaker, can I just say that I had been on select committee prior to coming here, so usually I would watch this kind of debate before I take on this role. But I do understand that this part is actually much more narrow and that a lot of what has been debated was covered in Part 1. However, we are in urgency, so, given that we are in urgency, I’ll give a little bit of leeway, but I will actually ask everyone to, very soon, make it much more narrow.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Actually, my question goes back to a question that wasn’t addressed and resolved, and you made a determination on that that it was in scope, and that was from my colleague Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan. It was around the relationship between the Director of Regulation and the deputy secretary.

I think this is really important because we need to understand what the relationship is between this new role and the entire ministry, and what it practically, actually means. I think we’ve heard a bit about the ideology around the reasons why the Associate Minister of Education has brought this to the committee, but we actually haven’t heard about, exactly, practically, how it would work. This part is narrowly defined, but there is that question around that relationship between the Director of Regulation and the deputy secretaries and, indeed, the rest of the ministry as well.

I also take the point made by Ingrid Leary around how these different regulations will follow through. We did talk about Te Tiriti o Waitangi in the previous part, but the question still remains around the benefits that come from Te Tiriti o Waitangi. I get that that side of the Chamber is allergic to Te Tiriti, but what about the things that it actually brings to the education sector—the quality of te reo Māori, making sure that kōhanga reo and puna reo are resourced? How does this practically work? And how does that relationship work between this new Director of Regulation and the deputy secretaries? It is fuzzy and it is grey, and that has been highlighted by members.

My questions are: what is that relationship between the Director of Regulation and the deputy secretaries, and, as an example, how will that work? For example, if we’re not going to have Te Tiriti o Waitangi—I think we should—how are you going to ensure language and cultural competency matches Māori pedagogy, Māori-medium pedagogy, which supports the wellbeing of those tamariki and mokopuna?

I move, That debate on this question now close.

The question is that the debate on this question now close. All those in favour, say Aye, to the contrary No. A party vote has been called for. The Clerk will conduct a party vote.

Point of order, Madam Chairperson. Sorry, but you didn’t declare a result. Did the Ayes have it or did the Noes have it before a party vote was called for?

Can I call it again—

Yes.

—because I wasn’t really listening to who was louder, which is usually carried by voice.

The question is that Part 2 stand part.

Shanan Halbert’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, inserting the words “in other legislation” into clause 126 of new Part 7 of Schedule 1, is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

Shanan Halbert’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, inserting the words “and responsibilities” into clause 126 of new Part 7 of Schedule 1, is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

The question is that Shanan Halbert’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, inserting “and responsibilities” into clause 127 of new Part 7 of Schedule 1, be agreed to.

Shanan Halbert’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, inserting “previously” into clause 127(1)(a) of new Part 7 of Schedule 1, is out of order as not offering a serious alternative form of words.

The question is that Shanan Halbert’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, inserting “and is not near completion” into clause 127(1)(b) of new Part 7 of Schedule 1, be agreed to.

Shanan Halbert’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, inserting “or persons” into clause 127(1)(c) of new Part 7 of Schedule 1, is out of order as not offering a serious alternative form of words.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, inserting paragraph (d) into clause 127(1) of new Part 7 of Schedule 1, be agreed to.

The question is that Shanan Halbert’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, amending clause 127(2) of new Part 7 of Schedule 1, be agreed to.

Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, replacing “all” with “and” in clause 127(2) of new Part 7 of Schedule 1, is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

The question is that Shanan Halbert’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, amending clause 127(3) of new Part 7 of Schedule 1, be agreed to.

The question is that Shanan Halbert’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, inserting paragraph (c) into clause 127(4) of new Part 7 of Schedule 1, relating to documents still considered to be given by the secretary, be agreed to.

Shanan Halbert’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, amending clause 126(5) of new Part 7 of Schedule 1, is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

The question is that Shanan Halbert’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, inserting paragraph (c) into clause 127(5) of new Part 7 of Schedule 1, be agreed to.

The question is that Shanan Halbert’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, inserting paragraph (c) into clause 127(6) of new Part 7 of Schedule 1, be agreed to.

Shanan Halbert’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, inserting “and is still held” into clause 128 of new Part 7 of Schedule 1, is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

The question is that Shanan Halbert’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, amending clause 128 of new Part 7 of Schedule 1 to insert text relating to privacy protections, be agreed to.

The question is that Shanan Halbert’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, deleting clause 129 of new Part 7 of Schedule 1, be agreed to.

Shanan Halbert’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, amending clause 129 of new Part 7 of Schedule 1 to insert text relating to early childhood education as a public good, is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

Shanan Halbert’s tabled amendment to Schedule 1, amending clause 129 of new Part 7 of Schedule 1 to insert text relating to Te Tiriti o Waitangi, is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

The question is that the Minister’s amendments to Schedule 2 set out on Amendment Paper 440 be agreed to.

Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendments to Schedule 2, inserting the words “and consequences” in two places, are out of order as not offering a serious alternative form of words.

Members, we now come to our final debate, which is the debate on clauses 1 to 3: “Title”, “Commencement”, and “Principal Act”.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’m going to be a little bit unorthodox and start on clause 3, regarding amending the principal Act. The reason is to question whether in fact this is ultra vires because of the Legislation Guidelines 2021 edition, where any amendment to a principal Act must serve the purpose and objective of the original Act or the policy objective of the new Act. It should not be inconsistent or contradictory. I’m quoting there, pretty much, from what’s known as the LDAC. That is the best-practice guideline for writing legislation, and there is a caveat that, if an amendment significantly changes fundamental features, the policy rationale must be clear, and coherence with existing law must be addressed.

As the previous debates have shown, and as we can see with the regulatory impact statement (RIS), this really does call into question whether clause 3—or can say that this Act truly amends the Education and Training Act 2020. When I read section 4, the purpose of that Act is to support the learning and development of every learner. It honours the partnership under Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and it supports Māori-Crown relations, and it also talks about having equitable outcome for learners. We do not see, particularly around Te Tiriti, anything in the amendment that supports the principal Act, and in fact by omission, and has been heard from submissions, that is undermined and is completely inconsistent in our view.

When we look at the RIS, we can also see that the bill is undertaking large structural changes that may have been better with a new Act rather than something disguised as an amendment Act with a completely different policy purpose. In fact, we haven’t really heard what the problem definition is. I would quite like to hear it from this Minister. We didn’t hear it from the previous Minister in the chair, but that may help us to be able to understand whether this clause 3 actually does conform to the LDAC guidelines.

Going back to the RIS, we can see that the reform says it’s to improve regulatory effectiveness and reduce compliance burden. We haven’t had an explanation of what regulatory effectiveness means, and that certainly doesn’t sound like it supports the primary function of the Education and Training Act, section 4, which is around the learning and development of every learner, supporting and honouring Te Tiriti and so on—equitable outcomes. We do not know what a compliance burden is under this amendment Act. We don’t know what it means in relation to accident reports, food handling, police vetting checks, and so on. We don’t have a list of what is in and what is out.

Page 8 of the RIS talks again about the limited analysis of the impacts, costs, and benefits, so how do we know this does what it says it’s going to do on the tin when the very purpose that it is saying that is going to achieve does not align with the principal Act as far as we can hear, particularly with the emphasis given to the labour market facilitation?

The other issue, I guess, is the legal problem that this creates, because, in our view, given the weak answers to the previous debate on the regulatory decisions and also this misalignment that is clear with the principal Act, it does call into question judicial reviews. It probably calls into question the defensibility of future regulatory decisions, and we really want to know how the Minister can justify making these major legislative amendments when the RIS has acknowledged such limited analysis on page 8, and also the lack of consultation on page 48.

Those are questions that are quite fundamental, but I think it’s really important because, really, what we are seeing is a misalignment between this amendment and the principal Act. Why did the Minister not just introduce a bill to repeal the principal Act or create a new bill? Why are they calling it an amendment bill when it does not align and therefore is not good lawmaking if we apply the standards that are set out in the Legislation Guidelines 2021 edition? We will have more questions, too, on the title and commencement.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I rise to make a contribution to this debate on the title and commencement. When you look at the title “Education and Training (Early Childhood Education Reform) Amendment Bill”—we have a number of education and training amendment bills come through this House on a regular basis—it isn’t what it says on the tin. I think we need to think about other terms to more accurately reflect what this bill does.

There were a number of contributions made through the select committee process, but also through this committee of the whole House stage, and I think the Associate Minister of Education didn’t adequately resolve those questions—in particular, Te Tiriti o Waitangi. As numerous people said, our kōhanga reo and our puna reo have a very, very specific cultural pedagogy and language pedagogy built on the foundation of Te Tiriti o Waitangi. I get that that side is allergic to Te Tiriti o Waitangi; they’re allergic to the constitutional founding document of this country and can’t see that, actually, by including that in this legislation, it could go some way to helping to do the policy intent of this bill. We had a number of questions in the committee of the whole House which did highlight that as well.

If you’re not going to have Te Tiriti o Waitangi as a part of the bill, how is the Director of Regulation going to ensure language quality assurance, cultural competency, if that isn’t factored in? The ability to be able to speak te reo, the ability to do that in a fluent way which is matched with expertise, is something that would be required in order for this Director of Regulation to be able to do their job properly. My first suggestion for an amendment to the title and commencement is: “The Education and Training (Allergic to Te Tiriti o Waitangi Early Childhood Education Reform) Amendment Bill”, because I think that will address more accurately the concerns that were brought to the select committee process but also brought in contributions by members across the Chamber today, as well.

The other thing I would like to think about, as well, is around the opaque nature of some of the questions that were posed. I think they were reasonable questions that were posed to the Minister, questions around the impact of ratios—that came up a number of times. I’m sure it was me that was bringing it up, as well, because when I talk to early childcare providers, they talk about making sure that the working conditions of our teachers are the learning conditions of our tamariki. If you have good working conditions for your teachers, those are good learning conditions for your tamariki and mokopuna, so making sure that the ratios are well set for our babies and for our toddlers is incredibly, incredibly important. When we put questions to the Minister about whether this Director of Regulation would be able to intervene if they found that there were unsafe working conditions, the answer was “Well, actually, they don’t make policy; they just follow up on complaints.”, so on and so forth, and kick the can down the road, when there is an opportunity to actually address that and to make this bill more useful.

At the heart of it, this bill is ideological. I get it; we come to this House with ideas where we want to change our communities and our societies for the better, but those changes have to be practical. Those changes have to work. When we made contributions from this side of the committee to ask the Minister “Well, actually, how is this going to work? How is it really actually going to work? You’ve got this Director of Regulation—how does it work with the Secretary of Education and the Deputy Secretary of Education?”, what I can see is that this person will roll up to kōhanga reo, puna reo, and also to other places, and not have the skills to be able to do it, not have the ability to actually engage not just with Māori but with everybody else, as well. The real risk here is that the regulation that this Minister wants to dismantle within the Ministry of Education will just be replicated somewhere else.

My other question to the Minister is around the commencement date. Given these concerns that have not been resolved by the previous Minister in the chair, will the Minister push out the commencement date so that these issues are resolved? After the Royal assent of this bill, what is in place to make sure that this Director of Regulation, and everything else with them, will be able to do the job properly? We cannot see that. I do not commend this bill.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I just want to follow from my colleague Teanau Tuiono and just to also check with the Minister if the Minister is happy to consider one of my amendments on the commencement date, particularly because, in the commencement date, this Act comes into force two months after Royal assent, but as my colleague Teanau Tuiono and also as the previous speaker, Ingrid Leary, has expressed, there are actually still a number of issues that haven’t really been teased out throughout this stage. I think the Minister’s response actually doesn’t give the committee any confidence that the right settings are in place to ensure that something like this could be done within a two-month period. My question to the Minister is whether the Minister would consider my amendment, which pushes out, not by long—not saying that it shouldn’t, but it pushes it out from two months after Royal assent to six months after Royal assent. We have seen a number of other bills brought to the House which introduce new roles into a particular agency, etc., that do allow for a six-month period.

Now, my second thing is around the title. I do have another amendment on this that I genuinely want to engage with the Minister on, because, when we’re looking at the bill, the title itself, in terms of early childhood education reform, doesn’t necessarily express the content of this bill, mainly—

That’s why we suggest you read it, Lawrence.

Would you like to take a call and just explain what the bill is? Because, frankly, I have read this bill thoroughly—every single clause. What’s clause 5?

Madam Chair.

Order!

Point of order, Madam Chair. I think the member just offered to yield so that I could take a call.

I did not hear him offering to yield. I heard him offering you a chance to make a speech, so I will go back to Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan.

Thank you. You too can take a call, Mr Simon Court. Now, in terms of this bill, the majority of the bill is to do with regulations. You know, we have a new Director of Regulation. We have changes to the regulatory systems in terms of Schedule 2. I think just saying “early childhood education reform” makes it sound much broader than it really covers, because there are certain areas here that are quite narrow. My changes to the title that I’m proposing to the Minister are simply changing from “(Early Childhood Education Reform)” to “(Early Childhood Education Regulatory Reform)”, because that seems to be more in line with what we’re seeing in Part 1, particularly clause 5 to clause 13, in fact, as well as Schedule 2 and Part 2. Those two are my two amendments that I would like the Minister’s engagement on.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I will answer the member Ingrid Leary’s questions first, and I can confirm that the Education and Training (Early Childhood Education Reform) Amendment Bill does indeed conform to legislative guidelines. I can also advise that there is no misalignment with the principal Act; it does support the purpose of the principal Act, and remind the member that the principal Act goes across the whole of the education sector: early childhood education, compulsory, through to tertiary.

I thank the two members of the Green Party for their generous offers of amendments, but we won’t be accepting those. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I have some supplementary questions regarding the commencement and then the title. Basically, the question is: what is the basis of the two-month period? What is the evidence base that the Associate Minister of Education used, or was it a time frame as part of a coalition deal that perhaps wasn’t on paper but occurred behind closed doors?

The reason I bring that up is that, once again, we are in urgency in this House. We’ve got a very rapid time frame, and it’s not just us who are saying it and it’s not just the submitters either—it’s the regulatory impact statement (RIS). On page 47 and page 48, the RIS highlights that the implementation time frames are compressed, and it even says that the Minister intends to bring changes in rapidly. My question is: why do we need to have these changes introduced rapidly rather than go through them in a less hurried way and have better lawmaking?

Also, on page 8, it talks about tight constraints on the options considered. It talks about a rushed timeline. We have already raised the confusion risks that arise, but unfortunately the RIS also, on page 30, raises those as arising from structural transitions that are going to be exacerbated with a rushed timeline.

Then we have concerns that have been specifically raised with insufficient planning for Māori medium and also for rural providers. I say this as the member for Taieri, where we have a number of rural providers who have got very small infrastructure and who are feeling really shocked at the prospect of having to suddenly conform to this new amendment within two months. Why the rush for those? They are amongst those who have capacity risk, which the RIS has highlighted on page 47 and page 48—that’s the rural sector, but also actually Māori-medium providers.

The question is: where did the time frame come from? Is it like many of the things we hear in this House, which is that it is part of a coalition agreement? We’ve already had the Auditor-General say that executive decisions should not be based on coalition agreements; they should be based on evidence and the good executive powers of lawmaking, not political agreements. If there is an evidence base for it or another reason apart from the coalition agreement, we would really like to hear it.

My second request is that if the Minister is not going to entertain the really useful suggestions by the Green Party members about a short stay of execution, if you like—a little bit of charity or perhaps compassion, particularly towards some of those Māori-medium providers and rural providers—would the Minister entertain a carve-out so that the commencement date could be for bigger providers who probably have been planning and will have bigger infrastructure to be able to respond to the changes that are required; that maybe they could have the two months, but as a fall-back? Perhaps Māori-medium providers and rural providers, in particular, could have a longer period of around six months just to be able to get their systems in order so that they are not left behind.

The other question I would have about the commencement is: has she received any advice about what the impact of the commencement date two months after Royal assent would have on any of the transitional arrangements to do with, for example, licensing? We’ve seen in Schedule 2 that many of those changes where the powers go from the secretary to the director involve licensing arrangements, and those are not to be taken lightly—they’re things that allow early childhood centres to operate and the framework in which to operate and to ensure that they do so safely.

Also, if some of them are involved in complaints processes or want to take a judicial review, is there a way that there could be a carve-out so that, if they are currently in a transition and they can identify that in a sensible way, perhaps the Act does not apply to them for the six months, in the same case as the rural early childhood centres and playcentres and also the Māori-medium providers?

I move, That debate on this question now close.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Just a final question, really, on the title, and I have heard some really good titles coming from the Greens. As you’ve heard, I have some reservations about whether this actually even aligns with the original Education and Training Act, and although the Minister for Vocational Education, the Hon Penny Simmonds, referred to the umbrella, I guess, almost omnibus kind of character of the original legislation, she did not explain how this legislation conforms with the Legislation Guidelines. I haven’t heard an assurance that there has been a quality assurance on that or what kind of checks have been made, particularly because we are in urgency. I’d like to know, for example, whether Parliamentary Counsel Office did do an LDAC check or whether we just take the Minister’s word for that. That would be really useful.

In terms of the bill names that could perhaps be used to replace “Education and Training (Early Childhood Education Reform) Amendment Bill”, it could be something shorter and pithier like “(Profits Before Kids)” bill. It could be the “(ECE Minus Te Tiriti)” bill. That one in particular I think would be quite useful, because it really spells out that Te Tiriti is not there, and we did not get a clear answer from Minister Seymour about whether Te Tiriti obligations were implicit, even though they were not explicit. To really get around that confusion, we could just say that and say “(ECE Minus Te Tiriti)” bill. We could have “(Risking Kids’ Wellbeing)” bill. I’m not sure that one would land, so probably won’t do that one.

Perhaps a more sensible one, and this would apply depending on the answer to the previous question around the timing and whether that’s part of a coalition deal, would be the “(Coalition Education Agreement)” bill. That would be really useful, because it would also highlight that many of the things that have been agreed to in the bill are not on an evidence basis, because the consultation hasn’t been done. If they are to be done through coalition agreements, let’s be transparent about it. I think capturing the name of that in the title of the bill would do that. It may possibly, then, also call into question whether there needs to be an Auditor-General process to actually see if the executive should be doing that, because certainly, in the case of some of the other things that have happened, they’ve been told they shouldn’t rely on that, and that has come from the Auditor-General. I’m thinking about the Gumboot Friday agreement.

My final suggestion would be “(Centralising Education Powers)” bill. I thought about this one really carefully, because it does centralise the power of—it vests a lot of power in the Minister. Even though on the tin it looks like it’s separating the powers, and the Minister himself tried to say this is around good regulation that requires separation of powers between the secretary and the director, what we know from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development report is that, in fact, in education it’s better to have one regulatory system. When we get forensically into what those powers look like and what the reporting lines are, we discover that, in fact, there is a lot of say with the Minister over the director and there is virtually no say from the Ministry of Education, so in some ways it could be called “(Centralising Education)” and in another way it could be called “(Obfuscating)”—but that’s a very hard word to say. That’s why I didn’t put it in the title that I was going to suggest.

I think “(Centralising Education Powers)” bill would be quite good, because I think also then it just kind of points to the trend under this Government, who have a centralising direction of travel in Ministers. We’ve seen it with fast-track legislation. We’ve seen it with taking decision making away from localities. We’ve seen it with the undermining of local government. There is all of this kind of vested power in Ministers. Then what we’re seeing is the creation of this director role, which is purported to be one thing but is actually really just about vesting more power in the Minister. I probably could have called it the “(Vesting Power in the Minister)” bill, but I don’t think that would get through.

I really would like the Minister to consider the “(Continuing Education Power)” bill or the “(Coalition Education Agreement)” bill, and if the Minister was inclined to do the latter, then giving us some certainty about what agreements took place around the timing, what the rush is about—the two months. Why are we trying to do it this side of Christmas? Has it got anything to do with election year? And why can we not support our rural communities and Māori-medium providers in particular, who are really going to have to grapple with the stress that this is going to cause them within a very short time frame?

I move, That debate on this question now close.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 1 replacing “reform” with “centralisation” be agreed to.

Arena Williams’ remaining two tabled amendments to clause 1 are out of order as not being objective descriptions of the bill.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 1 replacing “early childhood education reform” with “early childhood education regulatory reform” be agreed to.

The question is that the Minister’s amendment to clause 2 set out on Amendment Paper 440 be agreed to.

The Hon Jan Tinetti’s tabled amendment to clause 2 is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

Arena Williams’ three tabled amendments to clause 2 are out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 2 is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

Arena Williams’ two tabled amendments to clause 3 are out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

Madam Speaker, the committee has considered the Education and Training (Early Childhood Education Reform) Amendment Bill and reports it with amendment. I move, That the report be adopted.

This bill is set down for third reading immediately. However, it is time for us to stop for the dinner break. The House is suspended until 7 o’clock.

Right, the House is resumed. Welcome back, everyone. When we finished, prior to the dinner break, we were about to start the third reading.

on behalf of the Associate Minister of Education: I move, That the Education and Training (Early Childhood Education Reform) Amendment Bill be now read a third time.

That legislative statement is published under the authority of the House and can be found on the Parliament website.

I’m pleased to bring this bill to its third reading. Today marks an important milestone in reforming the early childhood education (ECE) regulatory system. To recap for the House: this bill is part of the Government’s response to the Ministry for Regulation’s regulatory review of the early childhood education sector. The review identified a number of issues with the approach to regulating ECE, in particular the following: a lack of clarity around regulatory decision-making; a lack of role clarity and accountability of the regulator; and, thirdly, a reactive approach to compliance monitoring.

The bill addresses these issues so that parents who use licensed or certificated early childhood services can have confidence that their children will receive quality education from a service provider that is supported and incentivised to keep children safe while in their care. The Director of Regulation, a new role established by the bill, will be responsible for licensing and certificating services and for proactively monitoring and enforcing compliance with regulations that are underpinned by a clear legislative purpose and objectives. The Director of Regulation will also be required to adhere to guiding principles that make children’s health, safety, and wellbeing paramount.

The bill has clarified the purposes and objectives for the regulatory system. Service providers will have greater clarity and certainty about regulatory requirements. They will also receive information, support, and guidance from the Director of Regulation on how to meet these requirements. The bill enables regulations to be made that would allow the Director of Regulation to use a graduated set of enforcement tools. This would enable more proportionate approaches to be taken to enforcement than is possible under the current regulations.

The bill’s commencement date was amended at committee of the whole House to be 23 February 2026. On this date, the role of the Director of Regulation will be established in the Ministry of Education. As has been said at first and second readings, responsibility for these regulatory functions and the role of the Director of Regulation will be transferred from the Ministry of Education to the Education Review Office by a separate bill. This will address the lack of clarity and consistency the review identified in relation to regulatory decision-making.

The Government is committed to the successful implementation of this bill, which will update the early childhood education regulatory system and align it with good regulatory design and practice and improve its effectiveness. I commend this bill to the House.

The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. Thank you for the opportunity to make a contribution in the third reading of the Education and Training (Early Childhood Education Reform) Amendment Bill. Sadly, in the committee stage that we have just completed, none of our suggested name changes made it through the amendment process, so I suppose that’s the one we’re going with.

I just want to make a few high-level comments before going into some of the detailed points that we want to make in terms of this bill. I think it’s really important for those that are listening at home to understand that this bill shifts the focus away from children, who should be at the heart of any changes to early childhood education. The role early childhood education plays in a child’s life is immense, and what happens in their early years, including how they learn, affects them for ever.

Narrowing the focus on the kids and loosening the rules from centres may result in greater risk of harmful situations and lower quality of education, and this opens the door to early childhood education (ECE) centres operating at the bare minimum for profit, which will erode the quality of our youngest children’s learning.

It was really concerning to receive really thoughtful submissions and contributions from the public and two that I want to highlight, in particular, in this contribution, are the submissions from the ECE Parents Council Aotearoa. Early on, they say they are disappointed in the lack of consultation in the development of this bill, that it has been rushed, it was opaque, and it compromised consultation. What the ECE Parents Council of Aotearoa say is that it excluded the very stakeholders it claims to serve—that’s parents, families, and whānau. They say that by sidelining parents’ voices and experiences with ECE, the process undermines the legitimacy and any resulting changes.

They also pointed out in their submission, as was pointed out by many of the contributions in the committee of the whole House stage, that this waters down Māori as tangata whenua and Te Tiriti o Waitangi. Many times, the opportunity was put to the Minister to engage in debate on that, to consider amendments put forward by my colleagues, to answer questions, but the Minister was very dismissive, yet submitters highlighted that there is an omission of Te Tiriti o Waitangi. One of the central criticisms is its failure to acknowledge Te Tiriti o Waitangi. We talked about kōhanga reo, we talked about puna reo, but we also talked about all early childhood centres.

So the bill does not recognise Māori as tangata whenua nor ensure Māori participation in decision making, and the concerns persist that Māori language, culture, and pedagogies will not be adequately supported and the omission threatens aspirations for bicultural and culturally responsive ECEs. The ECE Parents Council says that the design hides major quality reductions behind intimidating jargon and complexity for whānau.

One of the key concerns raised is not having children at the centre of the purpose of early childhood education. Many submitters pointed out that the inclusion of and embedding of workforce participation as a core purpose—a core purpose—shifts ECE away from child development and learning and family support. Education legislation, they say, should have tamariki and their learning at its centre—social, emotional, physical and cognitive—rather than adult employment needs.

I want to also draw on the submission that we received from Mana Mokopuna, the Children’s Commissioner. They too pointed out that this was being pushed through while things were still being worked through, that it fails to ensure the rights of mokopuna are the first and primary consideration in ECE regulation and decision making, and also that it fails to ensure that Te Tiriti o Waitangi is a primary consideration in ECE regulation and decision making.

They recommended that actually this bill be paused until work on all the proposed reforms had been completed and further consultation was undertaken with key stakeholders on final reform proposals. They also recommended that the Government undertakes a child impact assessment on the final reform proposals to ensure they uphold children’s rights and prevent or mitigate negative consequences for children.

They also, though, given that the Government is clear that it wasn’t going to pause or slow down, or—you know, we had questions and contributions on the commencement date and those suggestions around that were also dismissed. So Mana Mokopuna had made recommendations that if the bill were to proceed, there were a number of things that it should be amended to, which included recognising and protecting all children’s rights under the children’s convention—sadly, that was ignored in the previous stage; explicitly stating that children’s rights are the first and paramount consideration in ECE regulation and decision making—sadly, it isn’t, and parents working is in there with the primary objectives of these changes; clearly state Te Tiriti o Waitangi must be given effect in ECE regulation and decision making—I don’t think anybody in the House is surprised that the Minister David Seymour rejected that suggestion—and require the Director of Regulation to undertake the child impact assessments to ensure they are exercising their functions, duties, and powers consistently with the children’s convention and Te Tiriti o Waitangi—again, all ignored in the previous committee of the whole House stage.

There are real concerns that this is going to lead to the lowering of the quality and the deregulation in the early childhood sector. Recently, I attended a kindergarten meeting on behalf of the Hon Jan Tinetti, who cannot be here today to give the speech as she is remembering, along with others, Pike River and the anniversary of that event. So I attended that meeting on her behalf, and they played a documentary about what has happened in Australia—the prioritising of the privatisation of early childhood education, the profit-making in early childhood education, the deregulation in the sector, and the disastrous impact that that has had.

It was really concerning to all of us who were at that meeting that it feels like and looks like, and here tonight we have in the third reading steps that could be working towards a very similar situation that we are seeing in Australia. So we only have to look across the Ditch to see the disastrous impacts of deregulation in the early childhood sector education sector could have here in Aotearoa.

So we raised these concerns, these points, and we put forward amendments for the Minister to consider. We outlined the concerns of submitters: parent voices ignored, the voice of Mana Mokopuna, the Children’s Commissioner ignored. Whose voices are being prioritised in this legislation change? Once again, I have to remind the House that this is actually as a result of a coalition agreement. The regulatory impact statement pointed out that there is a problem definition, that there has been a rushed process, there hasn’t been sufficient consultation, there is evidence lacking in many areas, and we should all be very concerned here in the House tonight that this type of lawmaking is once again going on.

Last week, I stood and talked about how policies were not educational; they were ideological, and here is another example of that. It is political and ideological and it is based on something the Minister campaigned on and negotiated into a coalition agreement. It does not put children, our babies, at the centre of this decision making. We do not commend this bill to the House.

Before I call the member, can I just remind members about referencing members who are not in the House. Just a reminder.

Point of order, Madam Chair. I’m aware of the convention and Speakers’ rulings on not mentioning the absence of people who aren’t here, but the Speakers’ rulings do also point out that there is a balance to be struck and that there are instances where the absence of a member is so significant that it’s appropriate to identify the fact that they’ve chosen not to participate in the House at that given time. So I’m just wondering whether you’re saying that the member’s reference recently didn’t meet that threshold, or whether you’re just making an observation for our guidance.

Well, wonder away, but it was a general reminder to members. I’ve done it on several occasions in the last couple of weeks, but obviously we need to keep remembering.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. For the House , the context of this bill is that the Associate Minister of Education essentially wants to—to put it plainly—destroy our education system. But how did we get to this stage in the first place? Well, like the previous speaker, Willow-Jean Prime, said, it all started with the coalition agreement and also with the desire that they are going to get the Ministry for Regulation to do this survey and then consult on what is going to be happening. Yet as we see from the report of that bill, and as I see when this bill went through select committee stage when we did ask the Minister questions, when we did ask officials questions—there wasn’t a clear link between what they produced and what is being produced here as the final form of this bill.

Despite the fact that, during the committee stage, the Minister said on multiple occasions that this has been consulted on, we’ve done a survey. That survey is not the same thing as a bill and a consultation on a particular bill—as we’ve seen in the regulatory impact statement and as the officials themselves have expressed. The bottom line of this—and, again, as we are drawing on different resources because, as we said, the consultation process has been opaque—is the fact that it’s about cost, but not actually about children or safety.

One should expect that children are being placed at the centre when we are making decisions on education, but it is not the case with this bill. In fact, for a political party and for a Government who love to talk about red and green tape, we’re seeing an awful lot of blue and yellow tape when it comes to bills like this and the introduction of a ministry or the introduction of the Director of Regulations.

But on this bill and what some of this bill is doing, I think it needs to be mentioned, first and foremost, the lack of Te Tiriti o Waitangi in this bill. The fact remains that Te Tiriti o Waitangi is for everyone. We have a Minister in the chair who wants to talk about, “Well, what happens for the Chinese people?” You know, as a Chinese person, I can say, hand on heart—which the Minister couldn’t—that Te Tiriti is for everyone, that tauiwi [non-Māori] of colour are here to honour Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

What we are seeing is that the Director of Regulation will also be overseeing kōhanga reo and puna reo. But there is no requirement for this director to have any understanding of Te Tiriti o Waitangi; any understanding of what is expected of that person when it comes to the oversight and potentially setting policies and potentially even intervening and assessing and quality controlling kōhanga reo or puna reo without an understanding of Te Tiriti o Waitangi. As we see in the state of te reo Māori report by Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori, the number of kōhanga reo or Māori-medium early childhood education (ECE) centres in Aotearoa has reduced. That should be a concern for everyone in this House. That should be what we’re discussing here. That should be what we’re seeing in terms of the bill in front of us, how we place our tamariki and mokopuna at the centre of our decision making.

But, no, instead what we see is a bill that creates more bureaucracy and shifts the obligation from the Ministry of Education (MOE)—from the Secretary for Education—into this ephemeral Director of Regulation that the Minister himself, through the committee stage, could not clearly articulate what that person is really going to do. To be fair, the Minister spent a lot of the contributions in the committee stage throwing little comments and patronising comments here and there about like, “Oh, that member isn’t listening.” You know, that’s fine. Kei te pai. We forgive that Minister. We know the Minister has been a little bit sensitive recently considering all of the other projects within education have failed and fallen flat on that Minister’s face, but it still doesn’t excuse that Minister and the Government from introducing a bill that is going to actively harm our tamariki.

What is also peculiar about this bill—and, you know, again, the Minister liked to, during the committee stage, talk about the fact that, in terms of the principles, the purpose, in terms of the objectives, that’s existing in the current legislation. But you know what isn’t existing in the current legislation? The idea that ECE is there to support parents to work. That is the most peculiar thing to put in the Education and Training Act. The Government is saying, “You know what? We want our early childhood education system to be in place, and its sole purpose is so that you can spend as little time from your children as possible.” That is what is happening here and that’s what that clause is really saying. Rather than saying we want to provide jobs, we want to provide sufficient resources so that way for families, for whānau, they’re able to spend as much time as possible with their children, with their tamariki, what we’re seeing is now that a purpose of this bill is, “We want you to just work and leave your child to be babysat by ECE.” That is what it’s saying here in this bill.

The thing is the Minister talked a lot about what’s happening here. But to be honest, talk is cheap. There is no substantial evidence in here and no international evidence that we can see where, if we have an ECE system that does not centre the experience of the children and the staff who work in those ECE centres and the teachers but instead focuses on the privatisation of ECEs and how we can squeeze as much money out of parents as we can, there’s no international evidence that that is going to provide a safe space where tamariki will have a sense of belonging, where they’re able to learn, and where they’re able to thrive.

We have seen evidence in Australia of what happens when you deregulate the ECE sector. We have seen harm to their children, and we have seen systemic harm to their children. Because, you know what? For the governing members, this is going to be their legacy: the legacy of putting our children in harm’s way. Every single parent, when we’re looking at the survey that’s being produced, I do acknowledge the fact that for parents, the most important issue—the most important thing for them—is to ensure that their child is safe in the ECE centre. Because that is their taonga that they are placing in the hands of someone else. That should be what’s really important here. But what are some of the criteria that ensure safety and health? Not a Director of Regulation. No, it is having good ratios, it is having qualified teachers, it is putting children above profit. They are the things that are going to be benefiting. They are the things that are going to be most reassuring for our parents.

I gave the Minister an example of the play sand and asbestos that we’re seeing currently that’s a live issue. And the Minister couldn’t even respond on how the Director of Regulation would work with MOE in that situation to resolve the issue. If the Minister himself could not even respond on a bill that he has introduced, what confidence should the public have on this bill and on their vision and this Government’s vision for early childhood education?

But what I will finish with is the Green Party has a solution. In our Green Budget, we have made a commitment that we will bring ECE into the public system like schools. We will make sure that there are qualified teachers in our ECE centres. We will ensure that Te Tiriti is front and centre in ECEs because it benefits all children. We will ensure that the teachers are well remunerated and well resourced for the work that we do, because we are here for our children.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. On the same day that the Education and Workforce Committee sat in this building and heard from the Education Review Office on the implementation of maths and English, and the success that that has been—unprecedented success—we continue to have an Opposition that says no, that doubts, that doesn’t want to have confidence in a Government that’s actually delivering educational results for parents. So trust that this bill, in relation to early childhood education, does what it says on the tin. For once—for once—I ask the Opposition to just say, “Hey, we’re going to support this because this is a Government that’s delivering for parents and for education.” I commend it to the House.

I think the Opposition is reading a different bill to the bill that I think we on this side of the House are reading. They talked about profit in the early childcare centre area; that’s been around for years. There’s been a strong private sector component to the delivery of early childhood education.

The second thing they talked about is saying that the child is not at the centre. I invite them to look at new section 14, inserted by clause 5 of this bill. What does it start with? It starts “set and implement minimum”—so you’ve got to be above that “standards to provide for quality early childhood education that allows all children to establish strong foundations for learning, well-being, and life outcomes;”. That sounds like putting the child at the centre.

The second bit there they talked about is the choice of parents to go to work. Well, guess what! That’s the reality. Most parents want to get out and go to work and have their children be looked after properly.

The next two things: they’ve also talked about the safety of their children—that is one of the supporting objectives right below that—and then improving educational development outcomes for those children.

I think they’re reading a different bill to the one that we’re reading. I commend this bill to the House.

Tēnā rā koe e te Pīka. Tēnā rā tātou e te Whare. E tū ana ahau ki te waha i ngā kōrero mā Te Pāti Māori i te pō nei, me tēnei pire e hāngai ana ki te mātauranga.

[Thank you, Madam Speaker. Greetings to us all in the House. I stand to give voice to the comments on behalf of the Māori Party tonight and this bill that relates to education.]

Te Pāti Māori opposes this bill, which in our view applies regulatory standards principles to early childhood education (ECE), in a violation of Te Tiriti o Waitangi, while placing profits over the wellbeing of our mokopuna. This bill completely flies in the face of proven kaupapa Māori movements and efforts to restore the rightful place of tikanga and te reo Māori in the only country that will for ever remain the permanent home of taonga tuku iho, inherited to us by our tūpuna. E te iwi, we continue to see sustained attacks on Māori initiatives, undermining kaupapa Māori education, pushing policies on to our whānau, and championing privatisation over whakapapa. Te Pāti Māori stands with our people, who are the only true kaitiaki safeguarding one of the most important Māori institutions ever created by our kuia and koroua. We stand with you in full opposition to the direction this Government intends to take on Māori education.

Education should be led by experts, not economists. The whakapapa of this bill shows that these reforms never had the best interest of our tamariki at heart. Econo—econom—tēnei reo Pākehā, he āhua uaua mōku [this English language, it’s a bit difficult for me]. Me kōrero au i roto i te reo Māori, he pai noa iho tērā. Ko ngā tāngata e whai pēhi nui ana ki te ao penapena moni, nui ake i ngā kaiako i roto i te kura. Ko ngā tāngata kua whai wheako i roto i ngēnei momo wāhi, i roto i ngā kura kaupapa, kua kitea ka utaina ko Te Whare Tapawhā o te tamaiti, i mua rā anō i te pūtea.

[I should speak in Māori; that’s quite easy. The people who are subjected to suppression in the financial savings sector, they are more than just teachers within schools. The people who have experience in these types of places, within kura kaupapa, it has been seen that the holistic health of the child is addressed long before any funds.]

Lowering safety, building, and teaching standards will reduce the quality of our early childhood education. This bill will push the wages of early childhood educators down by removing the need for qualifications. Now our kaiako, holders of one of the most important roles in society, who have been historically underpaid, are having their wages diminished even further. They will suffer, the quality of teaching will suffer, and, ultimately, our mokopuna will receive a worse-quality education, all because of this Government’s agenda to maximise corporate profits. There is no table fit to make decisions about the education of mokopuna Māori [Māori grandchildren] without Kōhanga Reo and Te Rūnanga Nui o ngā Kura Kaupapa Māori at it. They are more equipped than any Government body to know what our tamariki need, not just in the classrooms but for their future.

This bill is a violation of Te Tiriti o Waitangi. It will remove the legal requirements for the ECE sector to acknowledge Māori as tangata whenua, to support children’s rights to cultural confidence, and to teach our tamariki about Te Tiriti o Waitangi and our history. This is a continuation of the assimilation agenda that has dominated the education system since the Native Schools Act 1867. We cannot afford to take a step backwards in early education. We cannot return to a time where mātauranga Māori was sidelined and speaking te reo Māori was punished. Research shows that a strong sense of identity is central to the success of tamariki Māori. Instead of removing Te Tiriti responsibilities, defunding key programmes, and continuing to allocate just 1 percent of the total education budget funding to Māori education, the Government should be investing in the Māori educational systems that are already delivering for our tamariki.

In conclusion, as it currently stands, this bill will violate Te Tiriti o Waitangi, harm our kaiako, and harm our mokopuna. The Government must be held accountable for its commitments to the recommendations made in Wai 2336. That’s means creating stand-alone legislation with policies specifically designed to support Māori education and give whānau real, meaningful choices. Our mokopuna deserve an education system shaped by their needs, which must be led by the total immersion Māori education sector. Ko ngā hua kei roto, ko ngā rongoā kei roto i tēnei ko te uta i ngā penapenanga moni ki ngā kura kaupapa, ki ngā kōhanga reo puta noa i te motu. Tēnā rā koutou.

[The benefits within, the solutions within this, are the contribution of financial savings to Māori medium schools, to kōhanga reo all across the nation. Thank you all.]

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I rise on behalf of the Greens, supporting the comments by my friend Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan. I begin with a whakataukī. The whakataukī goes, “Ko te manu e kai ana i te miro, nōna te ngahere; ko te manu e kai ana i te mātauranga, nōna te ao”.

[The bird that partakes of the berry, theirs is the forest; the bird that partakes of knowledge, theirs is the world.]

The people over there might appreciate that. The bird that partakes of the berries of the forest, their domain is the forest. But the bird that partakes of the berries of knowledge, their domain is the world. The issue there is, of course, what happens if you privatise those berries? What happens if you swap out those juicy berries and replace them with burnt school lunches?

As we were going through the committee stage, I was reading the select committee report and I was worried. I was worried about the digestive tracts of our National Party colleagues who once again have to swallow another “Burnt School Lunch (ACT Party) Bill”, because we’ve had the Regulatory Standards Bill go through the House, we, of course, have the Ministry for Regulation, and now within this bill we have a Director of Regulation. It’s Orwellian in its reach. It’s Orwellian and its doublespeak because who is going to regulate the regulators? These people are going to trip over themselves trying to do the job, and trip over themselves to figure out what exactly they are doing.

When we posed questions to the Minister at the committee of the whole House stage, the answers were less than fruitful. I only have to look at the select committee report and notice that, actually, the commentary which comprises the differing views outweighs the rest of the report. I could only surmise that there was a bit of Stockholm syndrome happening for our National Party colleagues who were forced to once again push through another ACT Party bill under duress.

One of the questions that we asked the Minister, and I think it’s really important to put on record again in this third reading, was about the role of the Te Tiriti o Waitangi. I get that that side is completely allergic to Te Tiriti o Waitangi. They are allergic to the constitution, they are allergic to the founding document of our country, but it actually is important. It is an important document and there are a lot of people around Aotearoa who recognise that importance, but we understand that their allergy is very real on that side of the House.

So, instead, we asked the Minister, “Well, actually, what about the benefits that Te Tiriti o Waitangi brings? What about the benefits around te reo, around cultural competency?” You’re going to have this Director of Regulation, but how are they going to support kōhanga reo? How are they going to support puna reo? How are they going to be culturally competent to actually get in there and to help those Māori-medium setting early childhood education places? We did not get an answer. And so we’ve got the Regulatory Standards Act, the Ministry for Regulation, and this new Director of Regulation and no clarity from this Minister or this Government.

The other question, and it was picked up by my friend Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan, was around ratios. This is an incredibly important issue within the early childhood sector as well. The health and wellbeing of our tamariki and our mokopuna is incredibly important. The working conditions of our teachers—those are the learning conditions of our children. So it is important that we do everything to support teachers as well. So we posed questions around the health and wellbeing: what is in place from this Director of Regulation? How can this person be used to actually address some of the health and wellbeing issues that are very live issues within the early childhood sector, particularly on ratios? How will they make sure that our tamariki and our mokopuna are well looked after? Every parent in this House will know that looking after babies is a lot different than looking after toddlers and a lot different than looking after older children as well. So that’s why ratios are really, really important. But where is the follow-through? Where is the link-through?

We did get one response saying that “Actually, this is going to be a compliance thing, and those will be made by the policy makers.” But where is the link? We’re going to have all of this regulation, and we’re going to have all of this “yellow tape”, as it has been put, and the guise has been around deregulation, around getting rid of all this other sort of tape, but, actually, we’ve got lots of yellow tape that is happening. There is no clarity at all about how this is going to help our tamariki and mokopuna, and how this is going to help those people that are in front of our tamariki to do their jobs. We do not commend this bill to the House.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. This is the third reading of the Education and Training (Early Childhood Education Reform) Amendment Bill, and some people might have mistaken it for being a Treaty bill, but this is about making sure that there is actually a position that is created, which is the Director of Regulation for early childhood education.

No one is imagining that that person will be the one who goes into all of the different kinds of centres. There will be a team of people around this one person, so I’m sure that if there are other skills that are needed, they won’t need to reside in one person. This is a sensible change, and I commend the bill to the House.

Well, we follow the soothing tones of Vanessa Weenink. You know, Erica Stanford, the Minister of Education, talks a big game on educational achievement, and that’s OK—that’s OK. She talks a big game, but we’re up for more educational achievement. We want our kids to do better, and so with Minister Stanford, we can at least have a debate about how we get there. We all want our country to succeed. We want our kids to do as well as possible.

But with the Associate Minister of Education, David Seymour, it’s a whole other kettle of fish. This is the man who brought New Zealand millions of burnt plastic school lunches. He’s the man who subjected the nation to months and months of needlessly divisive undermining of our country’s race relations with the Treaty principles bill. He’s the man who put in place the charter schools framework that allowed in West Auckland over the last few weeks a bizarre, hostile takeover of a highly regarded local high school, Kelston Boys’ High School, that has only just been resolved with this dodgy community organisation who was trying to mount the takeover withdrawing their expression of interest.

And so to let David Seymour loose on the early childhood education (ECE) sector is a cruel trick to play, because—I think for most people in this House, actually, and certainly for members on this side of the House—the early childhood education sector is one of our most treasured parts of the education system. We entrust our most vulnerable, our youngest children, into the care of an early childhood education sector. We want them to be safe. We want them to be well looked after. And yet this bill raises all sorts of alarm bells with right-thinking people, because David Seymour, with all of the kind of right-wing libertarian baggage that he brings to this Parliament, has set out to reform the regulatory system within which early childhood education operates. He’s put in place a regulator that has—from our reading, our interpretation of the provisions in this bill—a mandate that has shifted away from education and the wellbeing of children.

He’s taken the regulation of the early childhood sector out of the Ministry of Education. Well, why? Is it not education? Why wouldn’t it sit with the rest of the education system? It doesn’t deserve the same kind of priority that tertiary education does? It doesn’t deserve the resources and the focus that our compulsory education sector does? Why? The Government benches haven’t been able to answer that in the course of these three readings and committee of the whole House stage. What are we supposed to think when not only is he taking it out of the Ministry of Education but, in the mandate and the framing of the mandate for the regulator, they explicitly say that the purpose is to give parents the option—the choice—to be able to enter the labour market?

Now, we all know that’s a big part for parents all over New Zealand who want early childhood education for their kids, because it’s very hard for working families to get by on only one income. Both parents have to work if they can, just to survive. But for that to be a key part of the framing of the mandate of this regulator—that says to us that, actually, the whole system is being dragged and dropped out of education into a more economic framing. That has sparked for members on this side of the House what is really a values clash that has been brought to the surface with this. If we were drafting a new regulatory framework for the early childhood education sector, we would be putting the wellbeing and the learning achievement for children at the heart of it. That would have to be the paramount objective—and yet it is not, under this framework. Why?

We are deeply suspicious that the regulatory framework and the appointment of this regulator is designed to do what we know, from all his other public statements, David Seymour wants to do, and that is run the early childhood sector on the basis of a competitive market. We know from experience that when you do that, inevitably, the quality outcomes, the safety of children, the quality of the learning environment, the educational experience that they have—the whole experience of setting our kids up for a successful life in those crucial early years is likely to suffer. We know that that Minister is not committed to having 100 percent qualified early childhood education teachers—and for us on this side of the House, that’s an article of faith.

Many colleagues have commented in the course of this debate that the omission of Te Tiriti o Waitangi is a glaring gap, and it’s par for the course: this Government, in one bill after another that comes before the House, have been stripping out the clauses that would direct whatever institution it is—the other day it was our compulsory education sector that would have required schools to give effect to the Treaty of Waitangi. That’s gone. There’s nothing in here that would say to the sector that delivers early childhood education that they should give effect to the Treaty; that they should be mindful and conscious of the special place of Māori as tangata whenua in this country, and the need for the ECE sector to give appropriate importance to the worldview, the values, the culture, and the experience of Māori in that system. There’s a reason we talk about it as our founding document, but this Government is hell-bent on stripping out from every bit of law that they can, any kind of commitment to the Treaty.

Many submitters expressed real concern that a child-centred approach was being taken out and put to one side with this bill in favour of a more economic, market-based approach, and we share those concerns. If we were drafting a bill like this, we would be looking to put equity and access issues at the heart of the regulatory framework for the early childhood sector. Access is still expensive for many families around New Zealand and, of course, what that means is that lower-income families struggle to get access to early childhood education for their kids or to have good choices about where their kids are going to go, and so what we would want to see is a much stronger commitment to ensuring that the non-profit part of the early childhood education sector is supported and has the conditions that would enable it to thrive.

I mentioned the importance of qualified early childhood education teachers. That is something that is extremely important to us. There’s nothing that even comes anywhere near talking about that as an important priority in this bill. It’s a terrible gap. We think there has to be more support for teacher qualification, for professional development, and, above all, paying our early childhood education teachers properly so we can retain good skills. I’ll leave it there.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I rise to take a call on this very important bill. I just find out rather ironic that here we are getting lectured on how to fix the early childhood education sector from the member of Parliament who couldn’t build one KiwiBuild house, let alone 100,000.

Look, moving on to the guts of this bill. Honestly, what we’re trying to achieve here is to give great education for young children in New Zealand and break through the red tape to allow the people that are prepared to risk and invest money in providing these services so that we can have more options for parents and more affordable options for parents.

That is what it’s about. It’s about the children being able to get provided with education. Up until we’ve got through this, to this opportunity here today, early childhood centres were shutting down and that is not what we wanted to see. I commend this bill to the House.

This is a split call. I call the Hon Jo Luxton.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I want to begin my contribution tonight by acknowledging all the early childhood (ECE) teachers out there in the sector, all the ECE teachers who chose early childhood teaching as a career and trained for many years to become qualified in this sector.

Being an ECE teacher is not easy job, but it is a very rewarding job. I know this because I was an ECE teacher before coming to Parliament. I was also an ECE centre owner. When I was an ECE teacher and then an owner, it was under the previous National Government—the John Key National Government—and even then I felt hugely concerned that that Government held no value against early childhood education and what it provided to our young people, and this piece of legislation just simply cements that in my mind.

I am really concerned that this is just the beginning of the deregulation of the ECE sector, and I am concerned that Te Whāriki our curriculum document will be next, and I think everyone should feel very concerned about that.

I am not a part of the Education and Workforce Committee so I wasn’t there to hear the submitters and all the things that go along with being a part of a select committee, but I was concerned to hear that the majority of submitters opposed this piece of legislation, and I was really concerned to read in the regulatory impact statement about the lack of consultation.

The Minister today said that there was consultation with the sector. There was consultation with the sector from the Ministry for Regulation but not on the specific piece of legislation. Actually, I think this piece of legislation is completely unnecessary and a waste of time, and as members who spoke before me have said, it’s just part of a coalition agreement and it serves no purpose to improving the educational outcomes for our tamariki.

And be aware that that is what early childhood education centres are all about—educating our children. And this piece of legislation has wording that says that the purpose is “supporting parents and caregivers to participate in the labour market.” It sounds like some kind of robotic factory that will send our children off to stand in line to have nappies changed, be fed, and be put to bed without any value on the actual educational outcomes for our youngest and most vulnerable children in the years where their brains are just absolute little sponges. They learn through being curious, through making mistakes, through problem solving, through learning, and through building trusting relationships with other adults.

This piece of legislation simply makes it sound like, “Here’s a facility where you can drop your children off to babysit because we want you to get back to work.” And whilst it is absolutely necessary for a lot of families to have two-parent working families—it is essential—that is not what the purpose of the ECE sector is fundamentally about. It is about educating our preschool-age children.

I come back to the lack of consultation I was reading about in the regulatory impact statement. There was some real concern in the advice that was given to the Minister with regard to—I won’t be able to find the piece I’m looking for but one of the documents I have here in front of me relates to Treaty of Waitangi obligations. There were several limitations and constraints on the regulatory impact analysis, including limited time to both undertake detailed analysis of the impacts of the proposals and undertake consultation with key stakeholders. And it goes on to say that the Minister of Education advised Ministers that these limitations on the regulatory impact analysis create risk of policy failure and litigation.

This is an absolutely unnecessary piece of legislation. The early childhood regulations were very clear about the health and safety requirements, standards, and licensing requirements about ECE centres. Early childhood education is about educating our youngest and most vulnerable children. I do not commend this legislation to the House.

It is my privilege to take a very short call on this bill. Let me mihi to the kōhanga reo and the many kindergartens and childcare centres in the electorate of Maungakiekie. There’s over 70 of them.

We’re excited about this piece of legislation. We’re excited about what it brings to that sector. I also mihi to the childcare centre on whose board of the charitable trust I sit. I tautoko the many comments that I’ve heard about the fact that serving the early childhood centre is as much a calling as it is employment. We totally tautoko that on this side of the House, and that’s what this legislation is about. I am delighted to commend this bill to the House.

This bill is really a race to the bottom when it comes to our kids’ education. For some reason, I have an image in my mind of chickens in a barn just being herded in. It’s kind of babysitting; it’s “Let’s get the kids into a babysitting place so we can get the parents out to work.” It’s going to be deregulated, and the pedagogy is not going to be there.

Then I compare that kind of image with the Dunedin Study—an internationally renowned study—which has shown unequivocally the importance of the first 2,000 days. I had the privilege of having a walk through some really exciting programmes that have been rolling out through our ECEs around New Zealand—programmes like Enrich and Engage—which really are play-based and have a strong pedagogy, fantastic evidence base, and results to show behaviour regulation and decision making, the types of behaviours referred to by my colleague the Hon Jo Luxton. Enrich, as well, adds language skills so that, by the time our children go to school, they are really well set up to be able to continue to be curious and to learn in the best possible way.

What this bill does is flies absolutely in the face of that, and it’s hard for me to believe that it’s even allowed to be called the Education and Training (Early Childhood Education Reform) Amendment Bill, because when we look at the Education and Training Act, in section 4, the purpose of that Act states very clearly that this is about learning outcomes, it is about supporting Te Tiriti, it is about supporting Crown-Māori relationships, and it is about supporting equity. There is nothing in there that talks about the labour market and getting people into the labour market as being one of its fundamental values. In fact, it goes in the opposite direction because the failure to include Te Tiriti means that it flies in the opposite direction of what the primary Act has legislated. I have real questions around the potential ultra vires, if you like, of section 3 of the principal Act. When I asked the Associate Minister of Education about it at the committee stage, I had dissatisfactory answers. In fact, I don’t believe the Minister in the chair at the time even bothered to answer.

We heard numerous complaints that came via the submitters, the ones that I read, but also through the regulatory impact statement (RIS), about the lack of an evidence base for this amendment, the rushed process, and the lack of options that were able to be considered. It was no wonder the Minister was not able to answer our questions when we asked about specific things. At one point, he mentioned that Te Tiriti was extraneous. He could not tell us whether the inclusion of kōhanga reo and puna reo and bilingual units meant that Te Tiriti was nevertheless implied, because it is certainly explicit in the primary Act. We have no Hansard recording for that; there will be confusion there. He could not answer our questions around that when we queried in Schedule 2.

The other concern I have, actually, is that we didn’t really get to the bottom of some of the critical clauses in Part 1; it was a fairly truncated debate, in my view. We had some questions around the role of the director and the secretary. The RIS makes it very clear that there is potential for confusion because the director is quasi-independent. There are question marks over their accountability to the Minister, but also there are questions over the decision-making hierarchy, particularly in the transitional period with the director and the secretary—and the RIS points that out. The Minister was not able to answer our questions on that.

We didn’t even get to clause 8 and onwards. I’m quite concerned about those because any time a member of this House sees words to do with enforcement powers and—let me have a look, I’ll find it in the bill—the director’s powers, which are much broader than the secretary’s, I have to say, we have sections that we couldn’t even ask about to do with administration of Part 2, with being able to use regulatory actions that could be seen as punitive, especially if the information demands were onerous. That was mentioned in the RIS at page 33.

We didn’t get to clause 10, which expands warrantless entry and inspection powers. Now, warrantless entry and inspection powers are not things to be taken lightly in democracy. They deserve to be considered fully. They are human rights based. This is New Zealand. We expect this to be done properly, and yet there are multiple references in the RIS that we did not get to ask the Minister about: page 33 with inspections being perceived as punitive potentially; that major structural shifts could cause confusion over the regulatory powers—that’s page 30—that the State’s regulatory actions must be proportionate—as a warning on page 29—and that there was no consultation with the sector on expanded enforcement powers, on page 48.

There was a trivialisation, in my view, of the human rights elements of this. When people raised the rights of children, there was a bit of sneering from the other side of the House; the Minister looked disengaged and bored. Let’s not forget that we have just gone through an abuse in care royal commission. Let’s not forget that there should have been a New Zealand Bill of Rights Act report on this. We did not get to ask questions about that because of the truncated debate. We did not get to ask questions about the ACC liabilities in the event that there was an overreach of these powers. What would the police involvement be with some of these extended powers of the director? What would the rights of appeal be? There was evidence in the submissions about more mistrust of the State by Māori. Now, if I go back to the primary legislation that this is supposed to be amending, one of the clear purposes in section 4 is Crown-Māori relationships and also supporting Te Tiriti. How on earth this can be seen to reconcile with that, I do not know.

We then also had a whole lot of information-gathering powers, which are broader than those of the current secretary. We didn’t get any satisfactory answers about how that would be managed, when it comes to privacy rights. Again, these are fundamental human rights in a democracy.

What I would like to do, though, is really challenge what the Minister said when he tried to suggest that this is about best practice and regulation. We have an OECD report that is widely recognised as best practice in countries that we compare ourselves to called Starting Strong. It repeatedly highlights that fragmented ECE governance systems can lead to uneven service quality, confusion amongst parents, regulatory inconsistency, weak accountability, and gaps between educational goals and regulatory enforcement. We can see, from the way this bill is written, that it absolutely does risk doing all of those things, because it fragments the governance so that you have a director who isn’t responsible or answerable to the ministry. That’s been done very deliberately and in quite a Machiavellian way, in my view, to essentially privatise, as has been said, and to avoid accountability.

There are numerous places in the OECD report that stress that child-centred and not market-centred regulation leads to the best educational outcomes. New Zealand was in the group of countries that had done that pre-2024—with Norway, Sweden, Estonia. The research was bearing out those results. Mark my words, when this comes into effect in the coming years—if there is even adequate monitoring and evaluation of the impacts of this, and that is questionable given the lack of accountability—we will see educational achievement go down and, most specifically, we will see it go down for Māori and for our rural sector, and they are the most vulnerable.

You saw it go down for ages, and what did you do about it? It’s accelerated it. You wrecked the education system.

Point of order, Madam Speaker. If the member would like to take a call, can he please take a call?

That’s not a point of order.

Well, it’s really hard to hear myself think when someone’s yelling. Thank you, Madam Speaker.

We’ve heard a lot about Māori being the ones who have been most disadvantaged. When we asked about the rushed time frame, which was mentioned in the RIS many times, and there was no evidence base for doing that, we said, “Please, at least for our Māori-medium providers and our rural providers who would not be able to get their affairs in order to be able to respond quickly enough and for whom there was no impact assessment done, at least push the start date out to six months.” The Minister didn’t even bother to answer that question, and so I really feel for the rural ECE providers in my electorate of Taieri. I also want to acknowledge the tireless workers of the ECE sector who do the work for love, not for money. This is going to be a very sad day for them.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. Just like my colleague over here, Greg Fleming, I just want to start off by thanking all those that look after and care for our young ones in the early childhood sector and thank them for their passion and their care.

This bill provides clarity. It provides clarity around regulating early childhood education. It introduces principles to inform the decision making while keeping children’s health and safety as a paramount objective. I commend it to the House.

I present a legislative statement on the Crimes (Countering Foreign Interference) Amendment Bill.

That legislative statement is published under the authority of the House and can be found on the Parliament website.

I move, That the Crimes (Countering Foreign Interference) Amendment Bill be now read a third time.

This Government has committed, as we all know, to restoring law and order and strengthening democracy and freedoms. I’m pleased that this bill has now reached its final stage, because it supports both of those important goals. However, it’s unique in the sense that unlike our other law and order issues we’ve debated in the House, which arise from domestic challenges, this bill responds to a threat we collectively face that comes from outside New Zealand. It specifically addresses the growing issue of foreign interference. Foreign interference goes beyond the appropriate forms of State-to-State engagement. It is activity that is intended to deceive, corrupt, or coerce New Zealanders to unduly influence, disrupt, or subvert our national interests.

Our intelligence and security agencies report that foreign State - sponsored attempts have been made to deceptively influence policy makers and undermine the independence of our democratic and foreign policy objectives. Public submissions on the bill reported communities are being harassed and monitored and attempts are being made to prevent them from expressing views that foreign States consider subversive. This cannot be tolerated in our democracy. We must send a clear signal to the public and other States that foreign interference from any source is not acceptable.

Like America.

This bill—thank you, Mr Waititi, for your commentary—strengthens New Zealand’s criminal law to support a justice response to foreign interference and espionage activity targeting New Zealand. It specifically introduces two new offences that criminalise foreign interference, and updates existing offences to better hold people accountable for disclosing information that’s likely to prejudice New Zealand’s security or defence. The measures are country-neutral of course, and apply to anyone or any nation undertaking foreign interference against New Zealand and those who support foreign States through malign, self-initiated conduct.

The first new offence criminalises the act of foreign interference. To commit the offence, a person must know, or ought to know, that they are committing or acting for or on behalf of a foreign power. They must also be acting in an inappropriate manner and mean to compromise a protected New Zealand interest. All elements of the offence must occur to attract criminal liability. This ensures that the offence doesn’t criminalise appropriate foreign influence occurring through diplomatic or political channels, or when foreign States or their agents advocate for their country’s interests in an open and transparent manner—which, I’m sure, is everything that people assume. It will also mean that the offence does not apply to people who do not know and do not have a reasonable way of determining that they’re being used by a foreign State to undertake foreign interference against New Zealand, and that’s important.

The second new offence further criminalises existing imprisonable offences where they are committed for or on behalf of a foreign power to benefit in specified ways. The offence recognises that some activities used to undertake or support foreign interference are already offences in New Zealand. The significance of these criminal acts and the harms that they cause increases when they are committed to support a foreign power. This will now be accounted for in our criminal law.

Safeguards, of course, will be in place to ensure lawful and appropriate conduct does not inadvertently attract criminal liability. This includes requiring the Attorney-General’s consent to prosecute. The Justice Committee also made important changes which further clarified the bill’s intent to target harmful foreign interference and protect the exercise of rights and freedoms. I appreciate and I welcome the committee’s contributions.

With respect to changes to existing offences, the bill clarifies and strengthens accountability for committing espionage and disclosing Government information that is likely to prejudice New Zealand’s security or defence without authorisation. The bill inserts a definition of “A person who owes allegiance to the Sovereign in right of New Zealand” into the Crimes Act. This definition does not apply to the new foreign interference offences, but instead provides greater certainty for who can be held accountable for committing espionage and a small number of existing offences that include this term.

New offences are being created to address criminal liability gaps under this bill. Anyone who owes allegiance to the Sovereign and right of New Zealand can now be held liable as a party if they assist others to commit acts that amount to espionage against our country.

Collectively, these changes strengthen our criminal justice response to foreign interference by providing a means to better hold people to account for committing harmful acts against our country and our communities. I’m proud that New Zealand will be taking this stand against foreign interference. We encourage cooperation and mutual respect between States, but we also must be clear that we will not tolerate acts that seek to undermine our sovereignty, security, and our way of life.

By passing this bill, we are supporting the resilience of New Zealand’s democracy and working to ensure our country remains a place where everyone can enjoy the guaranteed rights and freedoms afforded to them under our laws. On that basis, I commend this bill to the House.

The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Kia ora, Madam Speaker. The Labour Party will be supporting this bill, but not with the excitement that the Minister of Justice gave his speech in, because this bill seeks to strike a balance between what is, essentially, national security and the rights and freedoms of its citizens. The area of national security is one in which it is particularly challenging to do that, because the interest protected—the interest of national security—is somewhat amorphous; and, in terms of foreign interference, the conduct which is by this bill criminalised would, in many settings, be innocuous, and I want to just outline how innocuous it might be.

Some people might be aware that the Economic and Cultural Office of Taiwan had an event the other day, and some MPs attended. Some MPs received a letter from the Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, which was, essentially, a reprimand. Now, if it went no further, the ambassador, in a perhaps ham-fisted way, is trying to influence the conduct of parliamentarians. So far, nothing in particular to see here, in terms of this legislation, but you only have to add one ingredient. If, for example, the ambassador asked someone, a New Zealand citizen, perhaps an immigrant, what MPs were there, then let’s run that through this piece of legislation, because the question is: is the passing on of information improper conduct? The short answer to that is that, under this legislation, it is, because it’s passing on private information, or information about a person, without that other person knowing. Are they doing it knowing that they’re going to assist a foreign power? Well, if they’re handing it on to someone from an ambassador’s office, they’re clearly doing it because it’s useful to that other person.

What is the effect of that? The effect of that, if we look at the letter that was sent, is to seek to impede the conduct of a public official. The members of Parliament who are there, members of this legislature—the ultimate aim was to seek to interfere with the discharge of their duties through influencing their behaviour. If you peel that back, we’ve got something that looks pretty innocuous: “Yes, I saw Duncan Webb at that event”; you wouldn’t think that that’s criminal, and that’s why I say this is a difficult piece of legislation.

We support it, but we want to be clear that we need to strike a careful balance. What I don’t want to see is people who are doing innocuous acts, perhaps carelessly, perhaps even recklessly, because that’s the test: was that person reckless as to whether or not they were assisting a foreign power in seeking to exert influence? I think we need to approach this with a degree of caution, because, ultimately, it will be, I assume, the police who will be enforcing this, and they will need to strike a careful balance between not just the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act protected rights but also the importance of the freedom to act in what we would consider to be a normal way. So if we think of the test, “they know or ought to know”, so they could be acting innocently, but a person who is perhaps a bit smarter or a bit switched on, or perhaps just not quite as thick, would know. So that person ought to know.

Then, of course, we’ve got this test of “the person engages in conduct being reckless as to whether doing so is likely to compromise a protected New Zealand interest.” Now, an ordinary person in the street is unlikely to understand what a protected New Zealand interest is and is unlikely to see the nuance of what is a national security interest: defence, easy; selling submarine designs to the Russians, easy. But telling people who were at an event, or things of that nature, who met with who; that’s hard to understand, but, nevertheless, it could be interfering with a protected New Zealand interest, because a protected New Zealand interest includes not only the economic wellbeing of New Zealand but also the functioning of the executive, judiciary, or legislature. Saying who Ministers met with or who parliamentarians met with or where judges play golf—those kinds of things could all be seen as in breach of this legislation. It even goes further down the Public Service, because interfering with “the exercise or performance of any public function, duty, or power conferred … on [any] person or body”. So even if you’re talking about the conduct or the behaviours or the relationships of a public servant, particularly senior public servants, that’s going to run into problems.

Of course, the conduct in itself—there’s some conduct which we know to be problematic. Coercion is an obvious one: threatening to disclose harmful information if someone doesn’t give you a secret—of course it’s going to be wrong. That’s the kind of coercion in foreign interference that, clearly, falls over the line. But what about just concealing a person’s actions or identity? Not telling someone your real name in a conversation? If you’re working for an embassy and you’re at a party and you don’t tell them you work at the American Embassy and you, therefore, get disclosures about what they do, who they are, their role in Parliament, some staffer talking about the work they’re doing for a senior Minister—well, simply by not saying, “I work for the American Embassy”, when you’re talking to staff at the Ministry for Economic Development office, that is concealing a person’s identity. Similarly, “obscuring the existence of an association or relationship”—that also falls foul of it. Or, in the one I referred to earlier: “collecting or sharing information about a person without their knowledge or consent”—it doesn’t say “private information”; it just says “information”.

I think, when we come to look at this, foreign interference is a problem; we need to absolutely address it, but one of the challenges at select committee, and one of the things that I, to be honest, wasn’t entirely satisfied with, was that the boundaries of this criminalisation—the fringes—are not clear. The centre is clear. The prohibition on spying and illegitimate influence is clear, but at the fringes, the kind of small behaviours that actually are the bread and butter of the intelligence community are not clear. We need to be constantly vigilant that we don’t have a kind of authoritarian creep where things which we ought to accept as an ordinary incident of living in a free and open and democratic society all of a sudden become subject to, essentially, criminalisation—and criminalisation in a way which is hard to defend against, because there’s not a great deal of mental element here and the actus reus, the actions which are prohibited, are broad indeed.

This bill is needed. Addressing foreign interference is needed. But when the courts come to interpret this, I am hopeful that they will look at it and say that we need to interpret this not just against the background of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act but also against the background of how a free and democratic society operates, and what kinds of behaviours are assumed to be permitted and what kinds of interactions are presumed to be permitted, and to ensure that only people who really know that they are leveraging a foreign power’s influence in an inappropriate way are criminalised by this legislation. So, on that basis, we will be supporting this bill, but we will look with interest at its implementation.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. Just to acknowledge the previous speaker, the Hon Dr Duncan Webb, he made a lot of really, really good points—he always makes a lot of good points; enough points, actually, for me to not support this bill. Surprise, surprise! The Green Party do not support this bill. While we understand it’s important to ensure New Zealand is protected from genuine threats of foreign interference, this legislation does not ensure sufficient protections for civil liberties and democratic freedoms.

The point made around being influenced by foreign entities, by foreign countries, I think, is an important one, and the illustration by the Hon Dr Duncan Webb, a very specific one. I don’t have anybody from a major foreign power following me on social media, who might comment or watch what I am sharing on social media, but I think it is an important point, because if you add the extra influence of a foreign country on to somebody whose conduct is reckless, then the court can actually pile on a lot more penalties—up to around seven years, I think it was.

In the committee of the whole House stage, I did propose an amendment to clause 10, which I thought would actually rectify that. It was to replace “funding, or agreement” with “or funding” to make sure that it’s not necessary to actually have the agreement of a foreign power, because people are sometimes reckless and are doing wrong, but they might not be conscious that, actually, a foreign power is influencing them, or actually agree that this foreign power is agreeing with them. So, actually, having something in there, I think, would have been quite useful.

The committee of the whole House stage was interesting; we canvassed a whole range of ideas. We had this really interesting discussion around the definition of owing allegiance, and despite the debate and despite the discussion, I still found it quite unclear and unclear exactly how this legislation will apply that particular part of the bill. One of the interesting examples that was brought up was around people with whakapapa or a heritage connection to Aotearoa New Zealand. There’s a very live case at the moment—and I noticed the Hon Minister Tama Potaka in the House, as well—where a family took this through to the Waitangi Tribunal in order to get their passport. The contention of the Waitangi Tribunal, in that case, is actually that you should be able to get New Zealand citizenship within two generations, as well. In that particular case, this could apply to somebody overseas who has that whakapapa connection within two generations if the Minister and the Government would agree with the Waitangi Tribunal, and I think there are really good reasons why the Government should do that.

There were also discussions around owing allegiance around various visa types, as well. These are very interesting questions. People come here on different visas, so what does that actually mean for them? How do the owing allegiance provisions specifically impact them as well? I felt that those questions were not resolved very well by the Minister. We also were concerned around the discussion around foreign agents who become residents but not citizens, who might fall outside of the allegiance definition, as well.

There were certainly some conversations around how this would apply to people who hold allegiance that live outside of New Zealand. I have a particular interest in that, because I am also from the Cook Islands: we have New Zealand passports; Niueans also have New Zealand passports. What does that mean for us? You have a large number of us living here in New Zealand. Then you also have people in the Ross Dependency, as well. It wasn’t very clear. I think that the answer that we got to was: determining what the type of citizenship somebody—like myself and my relatives over in the Islands—might have is a question for the courts.

There was a discussion around how common law could be applied to people, to citizens, as well. But here’s the thing around access to the common law: you actually need some resources to be able to go to the court to determine whether you fall under the provisions or not. That was, I felt, a question that was also unresolved by the Minister, as well.

There’s also lots of different questions around temporary allegiance, as well—that was something that was brought up, which I thought was quite interesting; I think that was Vanushi Walters that brought that up, and I had actually never heard of that before until that particular debate as well—and historical legal concepts of temporary allegiance, where non-citizens owe allegiance only while present in the country. That’s an important point to make, because if you owe allegiance and you fall under the auspices of this legislation and you’re at a meeting and you’re a bit reckless at the meeting and someone likes your stuff on Facebook, you could be facing even more penalties. I think that was really unclear, as well.

Also, there were questions around how this would apply to migrants, visa holders, and people with dual obligations. I’ve heard of people in this House who have dual citizenship—I think maybe even triple citizenship, but I’m not too sure if that’s actually possible; it probably is. These questions were also canvassed at the committee of the whole House stage, as well, but I still don’t think that those were adequately addressed.

There is the wider question around the influence of Five Eyes countries, as well. The submitters that came to the Justice Committee were very specific about a particular couple of countries, and that was what the focus was. If you’re getting foreign interference from anyone, from any other country, then it’s appropriate that things need to be put in place. But there was no resolution for the vast number of submitters who came to the select committee who were concerned about the importation of culture wars—for example, the influence of groups like the Atlas Network. We only have to see what happened just outside in the last Parliament, when they burnt down the playground, as well—people influenced by social media, and the influence of social media on New Zealand citizens, as well. These are all examples of foreign interference, of foreign influence by outside entities, whether we agree with the people that were influenced by that or not.

This bill does not address that, as well, and I think that continues to be an important question for this House, as well, particularly when you give the trajectory of the Government. They’re cosying up to the Trump administration—too close, I would say, to the Trump administration. I think it’s really important that we have an independent foreign policy, and getting too close to the Trump administration I don’t think is a good idea, particularly when it doesn’t pay the dividends that you think it would. I recall the announcement of the Wellington FBI office: everybody was surprised it was open, but no one was more surprised than Todd McClay because, the very next day, New Zealand got pinged with 15 percent tariffs. So here you have it: we roll out the red carpet—well, the Government rolls out the red carpet for the FBI, and they can’t even give us a good tariff rate. So we’re being influenced to roll out the red carpet for the FBI, and it doesn’t even do anything for us.

These really important questions need to be resolved, these really important questions need to be put to the House, about how you do actually deal with that situation. We do not want—or I don’t think we want—to have the impact of culture wars being imported into the country, culture wars predominantly via America, influencing our society. I think that’s incredibly, incredibly important. This bill doesn’t do anything to resolve that. This bill does nothing to resolve that at all. It is very, very specific and targeted at one particular group, and pretty vague in that way, as well.

We won’t be supporting this bill. There were too many unresolved questions around who owes allegiance to who; the potential legal gaps and loopholes, as well; how this will impact people who are dual citizens or triple citizens; access to the common laws so you actually can figure out what your rights are, because not everybody has got money to actually to roll up to the court and say, “You know what? I was a bit reckless, I was a bit disorderly, I went to a function, I met the Hon Duncan Webb and I put something on Facebook and a foreign power liked me on Facebook.” Those things are not clear. We don’t think this bill hits the mark, and the Greens will not be supporting this bill.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. It’s a privilege to stand on behalf of ACT and support the Crimes (Countering Foreign Interference) Amendment Bill. This Government made a commitment to restore law and order, and that comes in many shapes and sizes when it comes to dealing with criminal offences. Part of this is around strengthening New Zealand’s ability to detect, deter, and respond to foreign State interference by creating new criminal offences, modernising espionage and treason laws, and tightening protections around sensitive information and national institutions. This all makes sense because it’s important to protect New Zealand’s interests. It’s important to make sure that there’s accountability when there is foreign interference in our country that actually threatens our national interests.

We are strengthening the law to provide a better means to hold people accountable when they are undertaking foreign interference. Whilst it is OK and normal for diplomatic activity to happen—transparent lobbying and other forms of open and cooperative engagement are welcome—when it becomes hidden and when it becomes deceptive and quite corrosive and corruptive, we need to have a way of dealing with this.

I’m really proud to be part of a Government that’s looking at all areas of law and order and making sure that we’re protecting New Zealand’s interests and making sure that everybody is safe in this country. I really commend this bill to the House.

I rise on behalf of New Zealand First to speak in support of the Crimes (Countering Foreign Interference) Amendment Bill. The bill directly affects New Zealand’s ability to uphold and defend our sovereignty. Criminalising and applying harsher penalties to new kinds of covert acts intended to compromise our sovereignty will protect New Zealand, New Zealanders, and our New Zealand interests.

This is a very clear piece of legislation, which is raising questions as to why it’s causing so much consternation. This is about the deliberate deception, corruption, and coercion of individuals. It is the undermining of our ability to secure our sovereignty, protect our democracy, and protect our way of life. I think, ultimately, that is the message that we are sending. For any questions around criminality, as those who understand law will know, this is about combining mens rea with the actus reus—so there is a combination. When you break down an offence and talk clause by clause and ignore the fact that this is an “and, and, and” piece of legislation and that all of those components have to exist in order for the criminality levels to be met, and, again, always, as with any law, the threshold of reasonable grounds to believe before any prosecution can take place and, further than that, beyond reasonable doubt to achieve a conviction, I think, will provide the assurances that those across the House have questioned in debating this bill.

New Zealand First supports this bill because it gives our enforcement agencies the powers they need to tackle any kind of foreign interference. As we know, we are more connected globally than we ever have been, and, therefore, with that comes the risks of foreign interference. We need to ensure that we can trade openly, that we can engage equally, and that we can grow our identity across the world, whilst having the protections from foreign interference that would seek to undermine our way of life and our democracy and our national security. Therefore, New Zealand First has no hesitation to commend this bill to the House.

Kia ora, Mr Speaker. Well, I’ve heard a lot this evening, and what we have here is a Government that continues to use scaremongering tactics with our people here in Aotearoa, without any true evidence. We’ve had a few bills passed through this House this year. One was about regulating space because there was an imminent threat—we weren’t told what that imminent threat was. The social engineering that this Government continues to do to the New Zealand public is actually frightening, because what you actually do is you start to prepare and you start to create legislation that, in actual fact, if you were to peel it all back, you will find that the foreign interference happening here at this particular time is actually aligned with the Americanisation of this country.

Absolutely. Trumpism.

It’s Trumpism. It’s Trumpism at its best. Just like everyone else in Aotearoa, we do not want foreign powers. When you start to criminalise owing allegiance to the Sovereign in right of New Zealand—you have got iwi in this country who understand what sovereignty is, and we never swore sovereignty to the Crown of England, and so that is—

That’s a matter of opinion.

That’s not a matter of opinion. Read Te Tiriti o Waitangi. This is your problem, sir. This is your problem. That member hasn’t read Te Tiriti o Waitangi. It never ever said that Māori ceded sovereignty. We’ve got Ngāpuhi over there, and we’ve got Mōkai Pātea over there. You go and have a conversation with those iwi. I can tell you right now that those particular clauses in this particular bill will be damaging, and we cannot support this bill. We cannot support this bill, because it fundamentally goes against our vision for foreign policy in Aotearoa.

There was inadequate consultation with tangata whenua in the development of this bill. Te Tiriti is absolutely absent in it. This looks like another step in Aotearoa cosying up to the United States. Our policy is straightforward. Te Pāti Māori will assert our mana motuhake in a foreign policy grounded in tikanga Māori and anti-imperialism. We will reject the war agenda and reaffirm military neutrality for Aotearoa. We cannot let foreign powers turn Te Moana-nui-a-Kiwa into a strategic war zone, and we cannot align ourselves with Government committing or sponsoring war crimes.

How can our people trust the Government to act in their best interest when they are not even willing to engage with us on matters of national security and when they are actively harming our people with their domestic policies? How can we trust that this bill will protect us from foreign interference when this Government has a track record of aligning Aotearoa closer to the United States? They’ve set up an FBI office in Pōneke, they’ve refused to recognise Palestine’s Statehood, and they are laying the groundwork for joining AUKUS. This is just a realignment to Five Eyes—all while the United States enabled and funded a genocide. This is shameful—this is shameful. The reason that this Government cites for alignment is the pressure from traditional security partners—Five Eyes, AUKUS—and growing geopolitical competition in the Pacific, hence the bullying tactics over the whanaunga in the Cook Islands: cybersecurity and shared intelligence concerns; dependence on trade with China versus ties with the West. China is our biggest trading partner, but you treat them like the second cousin sitting over there, and you align yourselves to the US.

Regulation of our space territory was another one. Not only did you allow the protection—

I haven’t done anything, Mr Waititi.

It’s all part of it; it’s all part of it, Mr Speaker. It’s all part of counter - foreign intelligence, because it all aligns. It all aligns. All the legislation you’ve moved aligns with this, because what you’re doing is allowing one country to have interference in ours, and your alignment with that—

Mr Waititi, just less use of the word “you”.

OK. They are aligning with the—are you happy now? They are aligning with the Americans and allowing our country to be sold off, not just in our security and our social security but, also, in a commercial instance. You constantly align yourselves with Five Eyes and AUKUS. Absolutely—absolutely. We are unequivocally against this bill, and we will never, ever support a bill that goes against the true sovereign of this country, te iwi Māori. Kia ora tātou.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I think I want to start by talking about some of the issues that we have explored in this bill during the committee stage. I think the first thing that we’re looking at is the definition of who is supposed to be covered in this bill and the “Meaning of person who owes allegiance to sovereignty to the Sovereign in right of New Zealand”.

Now, there was a lot of discussion but, to be honest, we didn’t get the clarity that we were hoping for from the Minister when we’re looking at some of these definitions, and I think a lot of them have been pushed down the lane as saying, “You know what, that’s more for case law to determine.”, but we have seen in Aotearoa that there is a barrier for people when it comes to access to justice, and that barrier is particularly high for those whose English is their second language. So that, first and foremost, wasn’t something that we were particularly impressed by during the committee stage.

Once we were looking more into it—and I think, specifically, that my colleague Teanau Tuiono has explored some of these areas around, well, what does “recklessness” in this case mean? You know, mens rea is a particularly important component when committing an offence. I propose the example: what happens if an MP were travelling abroad, took their devices, and then that somehow got left behind or some of the data was accessed? Is that considered recklessness under section 78AAA, subsection (3)? That is a really important question, because that’s an actual, genuine example that may eventuate if we are looking at this bill that potentially has a very broad scope.

We also did ask the question because, I think, when you are looking at a bill like this and the kind of advice that the Government has received, it’s also: who is the target of this particular bill? We do want to explore the fact that if you’re looking at the definition under section 78AAA, subsection (6), in terms of who would be considered a foreign interference body or a foreign power, you could include things, like a foreign public official like Elon Musk when he was part of the Department of Government Efficiency. You could be looking at a company, body, or organisation like the Atlas Network, and the way that it has infiltrated even some of the decisions that Aotearoa New Zealand makes in this term.

Don’t let facts get in the way of a good story.

This is an important question, and this is an important point, and I love the fact that people are saying, “Well, what is the fact?” To be honest, we are already seeing that. We have seen that this very week and also last week, in terms of some of the bills that get passed in this House. What is considered, then, foreign interference? Because, clearly, the Government has a particular target in mind.

Now, foreign interference is a serious issue and it should be something that people take seriously. Particularly for the migrant community, this is something that is being taken seriously in terms of what it means. But I’m also fearful for my communities, because this sort of fear mongering will be reverberated on them. Nothing in this bill and nothing we have heard so far talks about the impact this will have for my community when they are being targeted by racism and by people who do not understand what this bill is trying to do but have bought into the fear perpetuated by this Government.

People always say like, “Well, you know what, sovereignty is really important.”, but they are also the same people that we have seen who are quite comfortable selling Aotearoa to overseas powers. Te Tiriti is our defence, but we have not seen Te Tiriti once in this this bill; we have not seen tangata whenua being consulted, and hapū and iwi being consulted, in the making of this bill. Why? Because the biggest colonial power and the biggest foreign interference of Aotearoa is the colonial power, and it’s perpetuated and permeated in the history of Aotearoa. But we are seeing the Government continuously undermining that. So, no, the Greens will not support this bill because it’s two-faced, frankly.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. The deeper that we get into this evening, the more we see drama, theatre, performance, and fiction, and, over here, we see fact and a Government that is looking to get things done to get this country back on track. Let me give you some facts this evening. This bill does a few simple things: it ensures we’re clear on who owes allegiance to the sovereign and the right of New Zealand; it clarifies the effect of dual citizenship; it replaces the term “enemy alien”; it makes it a question of law whether a person owes allegiance; it makes simple amendments to the offence provisions; and it ensures safeguards for protests, advocacy, and industrial action. It is a simple bill. Let’s forget the fiction; let’s focus on fact. I commend it to the House.

Tēnā koe, Mr Speaker, and thank you very much for this opportunity. Foreign interference grows and evolves when our communities let their guard down. Foreign interference takes many shapes and forms in our communities far and wide. For the most part, New Zealanders go to bed at night and sleep well, blissfully unaware of actually what is happening out there in this country and, indeed, around the world.

In my years as defence Minister, I saw firsthand the challenge that our services face and, of course, the challenges that this country faces when it comes to matters such as espionage and to matters such as foreign interference. The hardest part during that time was trying to decipher between the overt kind of foreign interference and the covert kind of foreign interference.

In terms of the overt: when you’re engaged in espionage-like activity, it becomes pretty clear that it’s not the right thing to do, and there are mechanisms to ensure that that person or those people who are found to be engaged in that kind of espionage or those kinds of acts certainly come before the judgment of the courts and, indeed, the public scrutiny that this country should expect.

However, the more covert part is the challenge, and I take the point of a number of colleagues on this side of the House, in particular, who talk to the fact that for the large majority in our community, simply scrolling on social media becomes a part of that grey area, because a large part of that interference, a large part of that influence, comes through social media and other mechanisms which might not be so overt to all of us here in the House. But it is a challenge and it is a question that should be asked.

I understand that through the course of this bill there is some good engagement, and, indeed, I know members on this side of the House offered a number of amendments and suggestions that could strengthen this bill and make it in the shape where we could support it, which is what we will be doing this evening—but we still do have some questions. What we know, too, when it comes to matters such as foreign interference is that they evolve quickly, they change quickly, and, of course, they’ll outpace anything that this House does with respect to legislation. It just does; it’s a fact. In order to make sure that we can give ourselves the best protection, we must make sure that legislation—this particular bill and any future legislation that can be proposed in this House—can look towards making sure that it is fit for purpose.

Now, I know, and we all know in this House, that, particularly led by this Government, there seems to be a very “big stick” approach to these matters. “Increase the fine and that’ll deter them.”—that’s usually what we hear: “Increase the fine and that’ll deter them.” Well, my experience in this space as a former Minister is that fines don’t deter them, because the outcome of foreign interference is far greater than any fine that can be thrown at them by this House. That’s just a fact. We’ve got to ask ourselves, then: are bills fit for purpose?

A number of the amendments in this particular bill are, I think, smart ones. They’ll continue to look towards making sure that we can have a bill that is fit for purpose, but there are still questions and those questions must continue to be answered. We are welcoming many more people on to these shores to fill key roles in our workforce and in our community. These people find themselves in our community. They become a big part of our community, and what we don’t want is the kind of reverse effect where everybody looks over their shoulder or takes a second look at our whānau, takes a second look at people in our community who call New Zealand home. And they have every right to; they raise their families here. They’re involved in our community, they’re a big part of our community, and most people think that’s just in Auckland. That’s not true. We have so much diversity right across this country, yet the views across all those different places can differ significantly from Auckland all the way down to the South Island. It’s important that we make sure that in this approach, in this particular bill, we can continue to have a mind towards communities to keep them safe and those who call our communities home.

I take the point made by Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan with respect to his community and how we can make them feel safer here in New Zealand. This bill does part of that and we support that, and that’s why we should, but we also know that there are other matters that continually come up in this House that aren’t necessarily covered by this bill but are looked to be covered in other parts that a Government might explore in its legislative agenda, such as matters like free speech. We’ve already been very clear on this side of the House and in the Labour Party that the right to protest is part of being in a good democracy, to make sure that whānau and people right around this country can stand up for what they believe in, as long as they do it safely and as long as they don’t impinge on the rights of others. But they can make their point really clear.

However, the problem when we talk about foreign interference in the manner that I’ve heard this evening and, indeed, through the passage of this bill, is that, sadly, that brings more question marks with respect to parts of our community, and I’m sure that’s not the intention. However, that is the language that we’re hearing and that is a concern to us.

I think you should vote against it.

I appreciate Mr Steve Abel and his approach and the Green Party’s approach to this. I understand my colleagues in the Labour Party worked really hard to make sure that we could express our view, in particular. But what I want to be very clear on is I can’t stand here in the House and agree with much of what my tuākana Rawiri Waititi said, and that’s simply because of my experience as a defence Minister. It’s easy to stand up and say, “Oh, it’s an alignment that looks like this.” Well, actually, if you look into those particular agreements and those treaties of the past, they are very different—they are very different. While I understand his concern, I can’t support much of what he’s said this evening simply because, for the most part, it does seem rather inflammatory. It does seem, as a view towards gaslighting, something that is actually very serious. It should be considered by all members of the House as something that we can engage in in order to protect citizens in this country.

As I’ve said, we will be supporting this bill. We want to make sure, though, that we continue to keep an eye on these very important matters to make sure that, however this bill moves forward into the future—and, indeed, any bill that might come after it that looks towards matters around countering foreign interference—it is fit for purpose, given the quick and evolving nature of foreign interference around the world.

During this urgency session, we spoke on a number of bills around the national interest. The national interest is something that must continue to be a test where we look towards protecting the national interest, at all costs. I think that for a number of the bills that have been passed through this urgency, we’ll continue to debate them. We’ll continue to make sure that we test them and challenge them so that that particular matter of national interest is held to the forefront.

Finally, from me, many of the members in this House won’t know it, but there is a significant and somewhat large community in the intelligence and security space in this country. You may not know it, but you’ll walk down Lambton Quay and you may pass some—but that’s the beauty about the skills that they have, is that they seemingly are just a part of our community. You wouldn’t recognise them if you’re walking up the road with your whānau, but they play an important part in our country’s security network and architecture, and I want to acknowledge all of them. There are a number of agencies that are involved in that. They all have different parts—from information to the matters that the New Zealand Defence Force will cover off. So, just finally, I want to acknowledge all of them.

They’ve gone through a number of changes in the past few years. There is a strengthening of the architecture of security in this country, which I actually encourage and I support. Why? Because we’ve spoken many times in this House about the growing geostrategic competition, and it’s important that New Zealand continues not only to protect itself but, also, to play its part in an international network to protect sovereign countries around the world. That is the least we can do. That is part of making sure that a rules-based order is something that this country and this democracy continues to believe in, while also protecting our own interests.

So in that vein, I will support this bill for my part as the speaker for the Labour Party, and we look forward to looking towards the next bills as we sit here in urgency.

Thank you very much, Mr Speaker. That was quite a balanced and reasonable contribution from Peeni Henare, and I commend him for it, but the gap between his contribution and the others that we’ve heard, particularly from Te Pāti Māori, is extremely stark. The tinfoil-hat wearers over on that side better have a listen to, actually, what their potential coalition partner just said in his contribution, because the gap is incredibly large. Actually, the reason we support this legislation and are bringing it about is because there is real common sense behind it. There is not the scaremongering that those on that side of the House are so concerned about. The Trumpism that Rawiri Waititi talked about and the Atlas Network and all of this sort of stuff that they constantly go on and on about is just complete rubbish—it is complete conspiracy theory playbook 101. This legislation strengthens New Zealand’s criminal law to better prevent and respond to foreign interference which is targeting New Zealand. It is a good thing, a common-sense piece of legislation. That’s why I commend it to the House.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I am the co-chair of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC). This is a cross-party group—which means that it is supposed to not be political—which looks at the influence of China around the world. One of the things, from my about five years in that role, that I’m very clear about is that the best protection from any foreign interference is to be country-agnostic and to assume that there is interference from people from all over the world, from State actors everywhere, and to safeguard and protect your own sovereignty. I think, for those reasons, I do support this bill but very much with the caveats that were raised by the Hon Dr Duncan Webb, because it is a fine line in terms of drawing the net to make sure that human rights are observed.

I’d like to make the point that I had concerns in my IPAC role about potential unintended consequences of this bill for Chinese New Zealanders. There is evidence, through IPAC internationally, to show that sometimes, while the intention of a bill like this may be to provide more support and freedom of speech and safeguard from coercion, in fact, the experience can be one where they tend to go underground and will be less likely to engage with New Zealand officials—such as the police, for example—and may also face more stigma and harassment. I guess we have to watch and wait and see, and the fourth estate will have a very important job to do in terms of assessing what the real impact of this legislation will be.

It is intended to provide those safeguards, but I have to say that sunlight is the best disinfectant for foreign interference, and my nervousness is also that the Government members are trumpeting this as if it is a bit of a silver bullet when, in fact, as the Hon Peeni Henare said, foreign interference comes in many forms. It can be a real slow burn. We see influence via business, via funding, via university research, via land acquisition, and also, actually, in the interests that make our strategic assets vulnerable. We have seen, for example, legislation go through this House this year that has weakened our overseas investment rules, which I think puts in peril, or at least at risk, some of our strategic assets—these are things like ports, airports, infrastructure, and so on—not only because, ultimately, in some countries they can be taken over by a foreign State in conflict but, also, it does make countries more vulnerable to the funder. That’s just a reality of life, and that is country-agnostic. We need to think very carefully about the strength of our national interest rule.

Also, the bill is pretty narrow. It is targeted at individuals around covert activity, deception, coercion, corruption, and so on. To me, it seems a little bit like the anti-smacking law: while the intent is good, it is very difficult to draw the lines, and it’s going to take some real judgment from the authorities in terms of how this is applied. In the area of foreign interference, that is extremely difficult, because it’s inevitable that politics will come into play and that the executive of the day, depending on how they see the world, could have a bearing on the way these laws are interpreted. Again, I would stress that being country and actor - agnostic and really looking at behaviours and safeguards is the only way to approach this when applying the law.

The other thing I would say is that we’ve got numerous things we need to do apart from safeguarding our national security laws. I think we need to really resource strengthening cybersecurity. We’ve seen data breaches already. We need more awareness. I feel, when I speak to IPAC colleagues from around the world, that there is a level of naivety in New Zealand around the exposure to foreign interference from all sorts of States. We probably need to have stronger lobbying disclosures, in my view, and that raises issues, but it’s a discussion that needs to at least be had. There needs to be more inter-agency sharing of data. We need to really monitor disinformation and misinformation campaigns, and there’s some great models of that, for example in Taiwan, where they have an active unit set up to assess the veracity and to provide counter information where that information is shown to not be credible. As I’ve said, I think we need more resourcing for our intelligence agencies.

This is not a silver bullet. It’s a good start. I hope that it has the intended consequences, particularly for our Chinese nationals living in New Zealand.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. The Crimes (Countering Foreign Interference) Amendment Bill strengthens New Zealand criminal law. It ensures New Zealand criminal law sufficiently addresses the harm of foreign interference, and it will better equip relevant agencies to hold people to account. I commend this bill to the House.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I, like my colleagues in the Labour Party, rise to speak in favour of and support of this bill, but I would just like to start by saying, in reply to Tom Rutherford’s comments that he made earlier congratulating Peeni Henare—quite rightly so; I thought that was an excellent speech, as well—I think, in terms of that big gap in the question of balance, I would have liked to hear more of an acknowledgment from that side of the House that, yes, this is something that we need to do, but, eyes wide open, we are touching on rights here. There is genuinely some broad language—for example, in the intent space, there is “ought to know” that they are concealing their identity, etc. There is quite broad language, and when we move into a space like legislating in the security and intelligence space, there are times when we must do it, but we have to also acknowledge that there are rights in play, and there are pieces of legislation that should deservingly be under review and active monitoring. This is certainly one.

I am often concerned that, sometimes, when we shift the lines of the law, it will shift behaviours, as well. What we’re seeing internationally is the growth of transnational repression by some States. Often, we’ll see the hard end of that in the news. I read an article by Human Rights Watch, and it was titled “We Will Find You”. It was a story about how some Governments continue to actively monitor dissidents when they leave their countries and find ways to pressure them, or even, at times, execute them. One quite famous example of this is Jamal Khashoggi, who was a Saudi national who left Saudi and went to Istanbul, and he was entering a building to get marriage papers for him and his wife when he was executed inside, while his wife was waiting on the outside. Those are the stories that make it into the news, but in reality, what is happening more and more—and Freedom House reports this—is that Governments are often putting pressure on students to undertake various seemingly innocuous activities, which they must do or they lose some of their benefits in their home country, or family members might be losing benefits, as well. That is happening, and I do think we need to be aware of shifting behaviours as we put this legislation into place.

I often look to Canada in this space as a model of a shift in terms of legislation and policy and what we could be doing or what, perhaps, we might do next. This year, Canada appointed its first foreign interference commissioner, and they did so off the back of a public review on foreign interference last year. This was one of the steps that they took, and the quote that came out with the announcement included: “We put the world on notice that Canada is an independent, sovereign nation with a clear ability to ensure the safety and security of Canadians.” They were basing this move very firmly on data that showed that it was happening to a huge extent. We haven’t done that in New Zealand—we haven’t done a public review that shows us all the corners of where interference might be. This piece of legislation is coming out of a Government piece of work, but there hasn’t been that broader public review. The Justice Committee does often include this as a component on its election review, but my view is that it’s timely to do a more public review, over a number of years, and that this piece of legislation should also become part of such a review to test whether it’s working in the way that we wanted it to.

There were a number of amendments that were proposed—both by submitters but also at the committee of the whole House stage—which weren’t included, and also questions for clarification that I agree with my Green Party colleagues about. We were referred back to common law principles, and I made the point that, well, common law defences, in particular, can only be incorporated if they are reasonably clear. In this case, they aren’t, in terms of when you can denounce your citizenship and whether you still owe that allegiance or not. There are certainly things in the law as it’s written now that do need to be tested, potentially challenged in the court, and then brought back to the House in terms of a final review, a periodic review, at some stage.

I thought other proposals that the select committee made were excellent, including one that many have referenced about ensuring that the question of allegiance is one of law. The difficulty is that, regardless of that being clarified in the legislation, we will still have a question of fact largely before the courts because it isn’t defined as well as it potentially could have been. The other issue that was raised was about the definition of improper conduct and, also, clarifying the scope of committing an imprisonable offence to benefit a foreign power.

The Law Society also made some very interesting points, I thought, including a very novel argument. They suggested considering providing a defence, equivalent to a proviso that they had suggested earlier in their document, that if there is conduct counselled or procured that’s lawful in the jurisdiction where it occurs but unlawful in New Zealand—and they gave the argument of someone who had been instructed through the military to do some action that might be considered mutiny, but they were directed to do it lawfully in the third country—we should, therefore, take into account circumstances where we wouldn’t necessarily want to have liability incur in those circumstances.

I want to make just a point about the House’s consideration of issues like this. We haven’t seen the Government members engaging with some of the rights issues that were raised in select committee—not in this discussion. Granted, some of them did engage, in the select committee process, with those rights issues and where the balances ought to be. I did think that it was unfortunate that the section 7 report didn’t conduct an adequate analysis of whether the limitation of the right to freedom of expression was reasonable or not. Looking at section 22 of the section 7 report, it says this: “The right to freedom of expression has been interpreted as including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information of all kinds. However, it is accepted that the exercise of the right needs to take into account other rights and interests and may be subject to necessary restrictions, as provided by law.” That’s it—that’s all it says. “One such restriction is the protection of national security.” It’s possibly the broadest framing of how you could justify a limitation on the right. It goes on to say: “We consider the limits on [section] 14 embodied in the amendments … are demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”

I’m a bit troubled—especially given the importance of the right to freedom of expression—that there has been such a loose and light assessment of (1) whether the limitations that are set out in the existing drafting are reasonable and (2) whether there are other ways of drafting the limitations to ensure that there isn’t an over-impediment into freedom of expression. Again, I go back, as the final example of that, to the new section 78AAA, where one of the mens rea for the offence is that “the person knows, or ought to know that they are engaging in the conduct for or on behalf of another foreign power;”. You can imagine, with that many degrees of separation, that there may be cases where individuals simply do not know.

Once again, while I am supporting this bill, I do so with eyes wide open that there are rights issues here, and I urge the House to consider a more thorough review of security, intelligence, and interference—including transnational repression. For now, I commend the bill to the House.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I feel really privileged to be in this position, where, as the last speaker, I am ushering the Crimes (Countering Foreign Interference) Amendment Bill from a bill stage to an Act of Parliament stage. As our excellent Minister of Justice said earlier, foreign interference is not acceptable. As someone of a Lebanese background, I know firsthand what foreign interference does to countries like my beautiful parents’ homeland of Lebanon. Sometimes it’s very inconspicuous; it’s masked as the greater good. But it was, in fact, foreign interference and still is in Lebanon, so I’m glad that we are passing this tonight. I commend this bill to the House.

I declare the House in committee for the consideration of the Crimes Legislation (Stalking and Harassment) Amendment Bill.

Members, the House is in committee on the Crimes Legislation (Stalking and Harassment) Amendment Bill. We start with Part 1. This is the debate on clauses 3 and 4, “Amendments to Crimes Act 1961”. The question is that Part 1 stand part.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Thank you for the opportunity. I’ll be upfront: there’s been a number of people waiting a long time for this legislation to pass, so we don’t intend to hold this up. We want it to proceed because it has been well overdue in being implemented. So I will briefly speak to the three amendments in my name that were tabled. All three amendments relate to clause 4, new section 2160(1)(b) and that’s in relation to the mental component for the offence of stalking.

One of the main issues that has been repeatedly raised by advocates within the sector is that quite often the accused stalker—in situations where there is an ongoing, repeated pattern of stalking—that person who is doing that behaviour is often deluded or unaware of the impact on the victim. Sometimes they are, but sometimes they aren’t. So our concern—and it is not just on this side of the House; it is in with advocates in the sector, as well—is the mental element of “knowing” may not be able to capture a prosecution, because quite often someone thinks that their affection is wanted or even reciprocated when it is not.

This tabled amendment amends the Crimes Legislation (Stalking and Harassment) Amendment Bill—and I’ve provided three different options for the Minister to consider in the three separate amendments. That would be to replace “knowing” with—the first option is to “having reasonable grounds to believe”. The second one is “without believing on reasonable grounds”. The third one is when a person “knows or ought to know”, so a reasonable person test being introduced as the mens rea component to this offence.

The primary reason is that we believe that it will be difficult to prove that the person was “knowing” that they were likely to cause fear or distress. To prove that a defendant did know their behaviour was causing fear of distress would potentially require proof beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that they engaged in a pattern of behaviour that caused that fear and distress to another person. For example, if they were intoxicated, if they were cognitively impaired at the time, the defendants could argue that they did not knowingly engage in that behaviour that causes fear or distress to that other person.

While we are strongly supportive of this legislation proceeding, we do believe that the mental component of this offence could be strengthened by replacing “knowing” by a reasonable person test, to make sure that—in a situation where the accused is saying they didn’t know or they weren’t aware of the impact of their actions—that would not result in there not being a prosecution when there should be one. This is specific to this offence, for the fact that potential offenders to be captured under this legislation are, more often than not, not in a rational state about the reciprocation of their feelings to another person.

We believe that it’s quite a specific ground and we’ve had direct feedback from previous victims and from advocates within the sector that this change would strengthen the legislation and make it stronger for victims to be able to have their safety protected and to prevent situations where stalking is ongoing.

Thank you, Mr Chair. We echo the same sentiments as my colleague Ginny Andersen, in terms of advocates who have pushed so hard for this bill have been waiting for decades for this, so we don’t want to prolong that any further. My questions are around a similar aspect to Ginny Andersen’s, around the mental component of knowing that your actions might cause harm to somebody. I wanted to ask whether the Minister would consider inserting provisions around “ought to know” or, potentially, “knowing that an act might cause harm to person B or any reasonable person.”

The reason that we’re interested in these kinds of amendments is because stalkers can be delusional, and they can be completely unaware, whether deliberately or not, of the psychological impacts of their actions, and so we want to capture that so that if a perpetrator tries to deny, that they didn’t realise it would cause harm or distress, that isn’t a defence in that case.

The other tabled amendment that I want to speak to in relation to clause 4—it’s under my name—is around police notification. I’m really hoping that the Minister might be open to collaborating on this aspect. Obviously, this bill introduces police notification upon the first reporting of any of the specified acts under this bill. We are asking that the constable that is involved in any investigation informs the victim before they provide the notice under that police notification. The reason that we want the police to give this information to person B is because this will give them a heads-up that their perpetrator will be informed. This means that they can make preparations themselves to ensure that they are safe, to ensure that they know what is coming, to insulate themselves against any retaliation that person A might undertake in order to intimidate person B.

Those are really the only questions we have on Part 1, but we really would like the Minister to consider our amendment around the constable having to inform person B before serving the notice to person A.

Thank you, Mr Chair. Yeah, so just looking at this bill and there are only two points that I have got, two Amendment Papers that I would like to speak to. Potentially, we’re happy for the Minister to ignore these Amendment Papers if the ministerial intent is already such that these are being considered.

The first one is around the new section 216P(1)(a)(v) inserted by clause 4, which is “damaging or undermining person B’s reputation, opportunities, or relationships:”. I’m just seeking the Minister’s advice, I guess, because my Amendment Paper says afterwards “including through sharing information person B does not want to share with others”. The intention of that is to ensure that the recording or tracking of person B will adequately address the kind of information—sorry, I just realised that that was looked at in a different section. But the idea is that when you are looking at something like this, the amendment is hoping to address the behaviours are adequately covered. So the idea is that when we’re looking at opportunities or relationships that are damaging for person B that it also includes through sharing of information that potentially might be publicly available, such as social media.

For the other Amendment Paper, we are looking at section 216P(1)(a)(vi), which is after “to a reasonable person”, insert “in these particular circumstances”. Again, this comes from submitters and organisations who have had a lot of experience dealing with cases like this—just to say that, for example, for women with additional vulnerabilities, the threshold for person A to cause fear or distress may be lower than a reasonable person, and the defence is turning on whether what a reasonable person should be expected to tolerate may also be unfairly prejudicial to minority groups.

Again, for both of these two amendments, if they are things the Minister thinks are already covered under the existing definition, that’s all good; we’re happy to leave the amendments. But we just want to get a steer from the Minister.

I think, lastly, just to my colleague Tamatha Paul’s point in terms of her amendment. This is something that we’re hoping that we have adjusted this particular amendment from “constable must consult” to “inform” but considering this is something that we’ve seen in overseas jurisdictions and it’s hugely beneficial, we do seek the Minister’s support on this particular amendment.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’m very pleased that we’ve got to this point of the committee of the whole House stage. As members have already noted, this is something that petitioners, and particularly women’s groups, have been asking for, for many years. The good news is that we as a Government said we would aim to have this legislated before the end of the year, and I’m very delighted that, with the support, I think, of all sides of the House, we’re managing to achieve that. I want to thank all members in Parliament for that support.

The issue that has been raised a couple of times already is around the question of mens rea. People tuning in might be wondering what that is. There has been great debate about the test, because what this legislation does is criminalise stalking and harassment. It includes a very wide range of behaviours: watching, following, loitering near, or obstructing a person, recording or tracking a person, contacting or communicating with a person, damaging or devaluing or moving or entering or interfering with property—a long list of things. Of course, a lot of those things people do on a regular basis in many ways, and so we held it was important to include a standard that “[knowing] that pattern of behaviour … is likely to cause fear or distress”—knowing that the pattern of behaviour is likely to cause fear or distress—and doing two of such things within a two-year period.

We think that’s important. If you took that away and just said “ought to know”, or lowered that threshold, there is a real risk—you know, there is potential maximum five-year prison sentence. If there was a lower standard, there is a risk, given the wide net of specified acts, that we would subject people who are annoying but innocuous to being liable to a lengthy prison sentence. That’s why we do think that the clear hurdle of knowing that the pattern of behaviour is likely to cause fear or distress is important. Of course, I mean, a lot of behaviours where it’s a threat of harm made to a victim would obviously be that, but in other situations, a prosecutor would only need to show that a victim or a friend or a family member told the stalker that they were scaring the victim and that would deliver that. And, of course, we’ve also developed a Police notice system to take that even further.

I just want to mention briefly that the National Party has decided to agree to Tamatha Paul’s Amendment Paper 439, that a constable must inform person B before providing a notice under the subsection of the Act, so that police can inform victims. Now, that was something that was raised by committee members and submitters. The advice I’ve had is that Police operational guidelines already require staff to consult with victims when decisions are made to issue warnings or other notices. We don’t think it’s strictly necessary, but we’re prepared to accept that one. Otherwise, we’re keen to get this legislation through. I’m happy to answer any more questions.

Thank you, Mr Chair. Just a question for the Minister of Justice, just in relation to the Amendment Paper by Tamatha Paul, it does seem sensible, but I do want to just understand in more detail what the actual term “consult” does mean. You referred to police operations already consulting, but what does actually consulting mean in this case with “person B”, and would that actually—yeah, I mean, we just want to understand a bit more about what that means, just to make sure that this isn’t going to inhibit people actually being charged under this regime.

Well, my reading of Amendment Paper 439 is that the constable must inform—the word “consult” is not used; it’s “inform”, 439. Have I got that?

No, and that’s why I’m asking for—it actually does use the word “consult”.

Oh, we might be able to explain.

Minister, feel free to take time to consult, if you’d like.

Thank you. Mr Chair. Just to clarify for the Minister of Justice and also for the member Todd Stephenson, Amendment Paper 439 does in fact say “consult”, but that’s not the paper that we’re going to be looking at. It is a new tabled amendment that we just put forward. It should be available on there, and it’s also under the name of Tamatha. We’re no longer looking for support for Amendment Paper 439; it’s the new one.

OK, thank you, well, that’s helpful clarification, but maybe if the Minister of Justice can just make sure he has the right amendment and we are clear about what we’re agreeing to.

Yes—yes.

Feel free to take time to sort out—you’re right?

Yes, I’d just like to know the number of the—

Well, they’re both called 439; that’s the issue.

All right, well, Todd Stephenson, you’ve still got the call; I think I’ll go back to that.

Oh, well, thank you. I mean, yeah, Minister, once you’ve got the right amendment, and if it is “inform”—is that now the term, rather than “consult”?—maybe the Minister just wants to comment on the term “inform”, but it does sound then that it’s like a very straightforward amendment.

Yes.

But it’s probably good that we have that clarity at this stage.

This is the interaction we really want in a committee of the whole House.

Thank you, Mr Chair. Again, just to reiterate, the Amendment Paper—that is, 439—is not the version that we’re hoping to seek the support of the Minister of Justice for; it is the new tabled amendment that has just been put on the Table that we’re seeking the Minister’s support for. Thank you.

With the same number?

There is no number because it’s a tabled amendment, so I guess the tabled amendment that is 9.15.04 on 19 November 2025 is the most accurate code I can provide.

Thank you, Mr Chair, tēnā tātou e te Whare. To the Minister of Justice: I want to get, if I could, some sense of your confidence in the application of when—like, in this instance, if we’re talking about “inform” or “consult” or whatever it is, probably the key word is “before”—that sentiment or that expectation is. When patterns are as they are in stalking, or patterns in family harm, or patterns in domestic violence—patterns when they’re set are hard to break. I did want to check if the Minister could just elaborate on that a bit.

My own experience in this field tells me that it takes a lot of practice, and shift of attitude and mind in this space, whether it’s about stalking or family harm, but in this instance it is about stalking and patterns. Simply making a change—some good changes, by the way; I support it. But it’s always in how these things end up being applied on the ground and what confidence you have, and I’m sure you do—that then when we’re talking to advocates that are continuing to contact and go, “Minimal—is this far enough? How secure can we actually feel when these things kick in? How safe can I really feel?” So I’m keen to get some confidence, if you’ve got some confidence, that when it’s applied, it’s true, it’s safe, it’s genuine, and women—mainly women—that are survivors, or not survivors, of this terrible situation can feel safe or better off because of it. Thank you, Minister.

The question is that the Hon Ginny Andersen’s amendment to clause 4, new section 216O(1)(b), to replace “knowing” with “having reasonable grounds to believe”, be agreed to.

The question is that the Hon Ginny Andersen’s amendments to clause 4, new section 216O(1)(b), to replace “knowing” with “without believing on reasonable grounds” and replace “likely” with “unlikely” be agreed to.

The question is that the Hon Ginny Andersen’s amendment to clause 4, new section 216O(1)(b), to replace “knowing” with “when Person A knows or ought to know” be agreed to.

The Hon Dr Duncan Webb’s amendment to clause 4, new section 216O(1)(b), to replace “knowing” with “in circumstances when they know or ought to know”, is out of order as being the same in substance as a previous amendment.

Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s amendment to clause 4, new section 216O(1)(b), to replace “knowing” with “that person A knows or ought to know”, is out of order as being the same in substance as a previous amendment.

The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 4, new section 216O, set out on Amendment Paper 439 be agreed to.

The question is that Tamatha Paul’s tabled amendment to clause 4, new section 216O, inserting subsection (3A), be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 4, new section 216P(1)(a)(v), be agreed to.

The question is that Kahurangi Carter’s amendments to clause 4, new sections 216P and 216Q, set out on Amendment Paper 351 be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 4, new section 216P(1)(a)(vi), be agreed to.

Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 4 inserting new section 216QA, set out on Amendment Paper 438, is out of order as being outside the scope of the bill.

The question is that Kahurangi Carter’s amendment to clause 4 inserting new section 216T, set out on Amendment Paper 352, be agreed to.

Members, we come now to Part 2, the debate on clauses 5 to 27, “Amendments to other Acts”. The question is that Part 2 stand part.

The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment inserting new clause 24AA set out on Amendment Paper 437 be agreed to.

Members, we come now to our final debate. This is the debate on clauses 1 and 2, “Title” and “Commencement”. The question is that clause 1 stand part.

Mr Speaker, the committee has considered the Crimes Legislation (Stalking and Harassment) Amendment Bill and reports it with amendment. I move, That the report be adopted.

The bill is set down for third reading immediately.

I present a legislative statement on the Crimes Legislation (Stalking and Harassment) Amendment Bill.

That legislative statement is published under the authority of the House and can be found on the Parliament website.

I move, That the Crimes Legislation (Stalking and Harassment) Amendment Bill be now read a third time.

Stalking and harassment is vicious, sinister, and can be deadly. After years of discussion, this Government has strengthened the law to put a stop to this insidious behaviour and to keep victims safe. Stalking and harassment, sadly, can affect any New Zealander. However, women are greatly overrepresented as victims by the deluded, the sexist, and the abusive. Even worse, their children are frequently exploited to surveil victims, pass on threats, or even be threatened themselves.

This bill will help to protect everyone, but especially women and their families. This bill would not be possible without the tireless advocacy and help of many people. Last year’s petitioners championed this cause, and I want to personally thank the Coalition for the Safety of Women and Children for organising the petition. I’m pleased that as a Government, and indeed as a Parliament, we’ve been able to keep our commitment to pass legislation before the end of this year.

I also want to thank the more than 600 submitters to the Justice Committee. Many of them bravely shared their own stories, experiences, and the impact of stalking and harassment on their lives. The Justice Committee itself deserves special thanks: they listened carefully to those stories to improve the bill for everybody’s benefit. The committee’s work shows that when an important issue comes up, the House can work together to make a difference for all New Zealanders.

I’d like to take a moment to step through the important aspects of the bill. The bill amends the Crimes Act to create a new offence of stalking and harassment. The new offence is defined as a pattern of behaviour which the offender knew was likely to cause the victim fear or distress. The pattern of behaviour is defined as two specified acts within a two-year period. These specified acts are listed in the bill and are broad. The police notice system and relevant offences are also built into the new offence.

Supporting amendments are made to other legislation. These changes increase protections for victims and their families. Protections include allowing the Harmful Digital Communications Act and restraining orders to be made at a sentencing for the new offence, adding the offence to the Firearms Prohibition Orders regime, and preventing intimidation when giving evidence. Together, the offence and these supporting amendments provide a comprehensive response to criminal stalking and harassment.

This has all been drafted very carefully. Stalking and harassment is difficult to address because it can be done by any person in any way to anyone, and can occur through an open-ended list of behaviours making up a pattern of behaviour. The bill cuts through this problem with a solution: a wide net is drafted to be absolutely clear that a wider range of behaviours can be stalking and harassment. What really matters is the impact of that behaviour, and so it casts the net in three ways. First, the specified acts are drafted broadly; they capture many different forms of stalking. As an example, many people asked if the specific behaviour of making intimate visual recordings would be captured by the bill. I’m pleased to say: absolutely. This behaviour is captured by the widely defined specified act of tracking or recording. The specified act could also capture audio or any other kind of intimate recordings made in public or private.

Second, the bill states that a specified act is captured if it is done “in any way”, including directly or indirectly. This makes it clear that a stalker or harasser cannot work around the offence with technology or covert strategies. To continue my previous example, people asked if using spyware apps to film victims through their phones would be captured. Again, this is captured by the specified act of recording or tracking with the assistance of these “in any way” rules.

Third, the bill states that a specified act is captured even if it is done through a third party. This might include a friend, teacher, relative, or even a business. This addresses an especially worrying problem I mentioned earlier: abusing the trust and innocence of children to stalk parents. This might be asking a child to pass on threats to their parent, spy on their parent, or even stalking the child itself.

Of course, the other defining feature of stalking and harassment is its repetitiveness; in this bill, a “pattern of behaviour”. It’s been a subject of extensive debate in the media and in this House. As a result, the bill has changed through the select committee process and has a wider pattern of behaviour of two specified acts in two years. This is an important refinement of the bill.

Similarly, the mental element, the mens rea for this offence, which has also been heavily debated and just also in the committee of the whole House stage; I do remain satisfied that the current standard, “[knowing that] the pattern [of behaviour] is likely to cause fear or distress”, is appropriate for two reasons: first, that the standard does capture the many motivations behind stalking and harassment. Those opposed to the standard argue that defendants will get away with stalking through their lies and delusions, and I understand that worry, but I have every confidence that our prosecutors and ultimately our juries are not so easily fooled. In many cases, knowing fear or distress was a likely outcome will be implicit by the nature of the behaviour—for example, where threats of harm are made—but in other situations, a prosecutor might only need to show that a victim, a friend, or a family member told the stalker they were scaring the victim. Thirdly, there’s a police notice system that takes it further if it’s issued to a stalker but the behaviour continues. A presumption of knowledge is established against the stalker.

Second, as lawmakers are responsible for maintaining proportionate offences, the offence has a significant maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment. If we lower the standard to such as “ought to have known” alongside the very wide net of specified acts, we risk losing proportionality. I understand why people feel very strongly about it, but I’m convinced that the current draft and legislation achieves the right and appropriate balance.

I’m mindful that laws are only as effective as their enforcement and, to give the police agencies time to properly prepare for the new offence, the bill will come into force six months after the Royal assent. Time will be used to set up the systems necessary for an effective response.

Before I conclude, I’d like to thank advocates, submitters, and members of the House who have supported this bill. It’s been a long time coming and this has been a very busy Government in the justice space. We’ve passed a lot of legislation, but I’m very pleased that we have been able to find the space and the time to get this legislation through. I want to thank the House for their support in doing this. This is a victory for the people who have argued for it for so long, for their families and for our broader society, because it sends a very clear message. It sends a message to people who think that it’s appropriate to get away with these sorts of activities that society does not accept it, will not tolerate it, and will deal quite harshly with people who stalk and harass their fellow New Zealanders. I’m proud to say that I commend this bill to the House.

The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Tēnā koe e te Māngai o te Whare. This bill is for Farzana Yaqubi. I was the Minister of Police when I was informed by officials that there would be an Independent Police Conduct Authority (IPCA) report coming out on her death, and the IPCA report found that there were significant failings in how her case was investigated and brought forward, and this legislation is the direct result of that.

Farzana was a young woman full of life. She knew that she was being stalked and she took every action she could do to keep herself safe. Despite her efforts and despite doing everything that we would ask of someone in her position, she lost her life. Farzana’s death is a stark reminder to us all that stalking is not a minor irritation or an interpersonal misunderstanding. It is harmful, it escalates, and without clear legal tools to intervene early, the risks can be fatal. To Farzana’s family, friends, and community, our thoughts are with you today. The best way this House can honour her memory is by ensuring others, hopefully, do not face the same failures and, hopefully, this legislation takes some steps towards achieving that.

Stalking often begins with behaviour that can appear insignificant. In isolation, it can be a message, someone waiting outside a home, an unwanted visit to a workplace, or even an online contact from someone who comes up as anonymous. But victims experience these acts as part of a wider pattern that creates genuine fear within people’s lives—predominantly women’s lives.

Too often, victims minimise what has been happening to them because they worry that they will not be believed. For many, they are right: the existing tools have not been fit for purpose, particularly with the rise of digital tracking, technology-enabled harassment, and the use of cameras, as well, as we heard at the select committee.

This bill begins to address some of those gaps. By creating a clear criminal offence of stalking, for the first time stalking will be clearly defined as a pattern of specified acts, and—after the changes made at the select committee which I will speak to later; that is two acts within a period of 24 months—the act will be directed at a victim and carried out with knowledge that the behaviour is likely to cause fear or distress.

This clarity matters. It reflects how stalking accurately occurs, and it ensures that police and the courts have the power and the tools they need to act. The bill sets out a modern list of specified acts, including tracking someone digitally, repeatedly contacting them, watching or following them, interfering with property or pets, or any act that could reasonably cause fear or distress. It also recognises that stalking can occur directly, indirectly, or through digital means such as devices, spyware, and even drones.

This bill, I hope, will incentivise early intervention and will also prevent harm. A key part of this bill is the ability of police to issue a formal notification when they believe someone has already engaged in one or more specified acts. Once that notice is issued, the individual is presumed to know that any further acts could amount to stalking. This enables earlier intervention and removes the excuse of ignorance when behaviour continues over a period of time.

I believe that this bill provides accountability and fair protection as well. The new offence carries a maximum penalty of 5 years’ imprisonment. The bill also includes reasonable exceptions for lawful purpose, reasonable excuse, or public interest, ensuring balance and fairness remain central. This is a modernised, practical approach that strengthens victims’ protection without undermining legitimate activity.

I’d like to acknowledge the process to date, and first and foremost I would like to acknowledge two women in particular, and they are Alison Towns and Leonie Morris. Their relentless advocacy in this space is probably the single greatest reason why we are here seeing this legislation pass tonight in the House. They will be aware—and I hope they are watching—that the Government clearly stated that passing stalking legislation was not a priority for this Government. When they advocated and organised and got over 8,000 signatures delivered to the front steps of Parliament, and when they worked with me to draft a member’s bill that introduced stalking as an offence and put that into the members’ ballot, we saw a change in the Government. The Government changed its position and committed to passing this legislation. It is a rare and beautiful thing to happen, and good on you, Paul Goldsmith—you got there in the end. I’m really pleased that we got this far.

There were significant changes made at the select committee and they strengthened the bill and made it more likely to be able to achieve a prosecution. There is key change that I’m proud we got. Previously, it was three of the specified acts in a period of 12 months. Now that is two in a period of 24 months. So, for those who are subjected to stalking behaviour when they celebrate an anniversary—it might be a birthday or something where it’s a common occurrence to have an annual reminder—having a period that exceeds 12 months was really important, and that was feedback that we had from victims.

The strength of submissions we received at select committee were phenomenal, and I would just like to acknowledge all those people who stepped forward and told their personal stories. That made making these changes even more convincing as to the reasons why we needed to do that. The advice and support we received throughout from advocacy groups was amazing. The level of advice and the intricate knowledge of where legislation overseas should be brought here to New Zealand and how that should work really assisted us to achieve this bill in the form it takes. This bill is not perfect. There are many areas that could be improved, but it’s a good start and it’s a lot better than the first draft we got at the first reading.

I’d like to acknowledge Andrew Bayly as the chair of the Justice Committee. He was pragmatic. He listened to victims. He understood where we could strengthen the bill and made positive changes. So I’d like to thank him for his work.

It’s important that we state why this bill matters. This bill is about real people whose lives have been disrupted, constrained, put at risk because someone has refused to leave them alone. It is for those who have changed jobs, who have moved homes or altered their daily routines in an effort to try and feel safe. It is for those targeted online or monitored through technology, and it’s for the families who have already paid a price that is too high. We cannot undo the past, but we can ensure the law is no longer silent in the face of escalating harm.

This bill brings our law into the modern era. It provides clear definitions, earlier intervention, and stronger protection for victims. It gives police and the courts the tools they need to act decisively when behaviour starts to escalate. While no legislation can change what has happened to past victims like Farzana, this bill takes meaningful steps to ensure others have better protections in the future, and that is my hope for what this bill does. This is real victim-focused reform, and I commend it to the House.

I might get a little bit emotional giving this speech, because I think this is a bill that’s gone through this term that I will probably remember for the rest of my life. I think a lot of the people in this room right now can be so proud of themselves for being a part of history. Finally, after decades and decades and decades of advocacy and campaigning and, above all else, women experiencing stalking and harassment and abuse and discrimination and harm in real life—mentally, physically, virtually—we’re finally here passing New Zealand’s first bill that defines and acknowledges stalking as a form of abuse.

Off the back of that committee phase, I want to acknowledge the Government; that will be the only time you hear that coming out of my mouth this term. But I do want to acknowledge Minister of Justice Goldsmith for accepting our amendment to this bill, and, through accepting that amendment, strengthening this bill for survivors. I also want to echo acknowledgments to the chair of the Justice Committee, Andrew Bayly, for the way that he treated survivors with dignity and respect and believed them and heard them.

Most importantly, I want to acknowledge survivors who have endured experiences of stalking. In particular, there are two women that come to mind. The first is Zeni Gibson. In the second reading of this bill, I spoke at length about her experience—it’s been well publicised—but this is the story of a young woman who interacted with a stranger one time in passing, which resulted in her being violently, graphically, sexually stalked for nearly a decade, which I think really illuminates the nature of stalking in some instances. It can seem completely unexplainable that a stranger can grow such a strong, intense obsession with someone they don’t even know. But that is very real, as we’ve learnt from submissions, and that is something that was not priorly addressed within our legislation. So I want to acknowledge Zeni and her courage to speak up about someone who did, and continues to, stalk her, who is also a free person, from my understanding. This is a person who is walking around the streets. She spoke up fearlessly, knowing that that person was walking around the street, so I want to acknowledge her and say, Zeni, your courage contributed to us being here today.

But there are other survivors who are not here today to see this finally happening. I also want to mihi to Farzana Yaqubi, and just the regret in which we come to this, today, having lost so many women, because we experience too much violence in this world and in this society, but also because we didn’t have the laws in place, or the police protocols in place, to keep her safe.

Most importantly, there have been tireless advocates who have fought for this bill, and there is nobody who has been more vocal in getting us here today than the incredible, formidable, compassionate, amazing person that is Leonie Morris. She has met with all of us in this room; she’s met with every party; she has, more importantly, met with countless survivors and made sure that their voices have the driving force. And she’s done this for a really long time. Leonie—I know you’re watching at home—this is the fruit of your labour. What a legacy to be proud of and to share with people for generations to come.

I also want to acknowledge a few other people who have been instrumental in getting this law, including Awatea Mita, who led the campaign for Auckland Women’s Centre; also, of course, our very own Jan Logie, whose work in the sexual violence space has set the groundwork for laws like this to come into place; obviously Ginny Andersen, who was a massive part of this bill’s inception; every other woman who has fought tirelessly for this bill; and, of course, allies.

This bill is unique because it acknowledges the impact of psychological harm. It’s also unique because of a point that Awatea Mita, who was an advocate for this bill, continued to lament throughout submissions on this bill, and that is that this bill establishes and recognises patterns and context. If you look at “specified act”, some of these things might not seem obvious as crimes; you know, things that could come across as innocent, or acts that could come across as innocent, if you were looking at them objectively without context. Things such as sending a message or dropping a letter in someone’s mailbox; these things might seem relatively innocent. However, this bill acknowledges that when you have a pattern of behaviour is when the psychological harm can come about, and it acknowledges the context in which these behaviours happen. Those are two things—pattern and context—that weren’t formally recognised within our laws.

I really want to acknowledge positive changes that have been made throughout the Justice Committee process, and following that. I think that this bill represents the best of our democracy. It’s an example where submitters were heard, and their changes—which were pretty substantial changes—have been incorporated. Thanks to those submitters, and thanks to the willingness of collaboration from the Government and from all parties, we’ve managed to get the threshold of specified acts down from three acts to two acts; we’ve managed to get the timeline expanded from 12 months to two years. We also tried new techniques of collecting submissions for this; Ginny and I proposed that we use social media as a way to elicit submissions for this bill. We also have been, through the select committee process, pioneering the use of anonymous submissions, which I think is something we need to do more when it comes to sensitive matters around family and sexual violence.

As we just did in the committee of the whole House, we accepted the amendment around police notification, which I’m so happy about. In June, it was pointed out that there was a gap in this legislation, which meant that when police serve that initial notification to the perpetrator, they did not have to consult, inform, or gain consent from the victim. We were really concerned about this, and here’s a quote from Leonie Morris: “One thing that we’re very concerned about is that at the moment police can notify a stalker that he has been stalking and that he’ll be breaking the law if he does it again. We’re happy with that, but we don’t want police to do that until they’ve notified the victim that that’s what they’re going to do and they’ve talked through with the victim a safety plan—because otherwise if just out of the blue he is told that she’s gone to the police and the police are now saying to him, “You need to be much more careful with your behaviour,’ he could retaliate against her.”

We worked through different iterations of this amendment to make sure it was one that everyone was happy with. We went from requiring written consent, which was just going to be too hard, was going to be too difficult, and not necessarily victim focused—so we moved from that to “consult”, and then we were informed by Government advisers that “inform” is the best language for that; another example of collaboration, democracy, and what committee of the whole House should be for.

I’ve only got a minute left, and it’s so hard to wrap up the last year working on this bill in a minute. But there’s still work to do. I think the online space, where a lot of stalking and harassment takes place, is an area that we really have to cast our minds to. I know there are some bills that will be coming through the House that address some forms of this around deepfakes, and we look forward to supporting that. But there’s still massive gaps in the way that people can use social media and online websites to stalk and harass other people, so we need to address this. We need police to get this right, and that is why we put our amendment forward. We need more funding for things like the Fixated Threat Assessment Centre, who deal with people who have got the psychological illness of obsession with people and abusing them through their obsession.

Thank you, Mr Speaker, thank you to everyone in the House today; we can be really proud of ourselves when we go home tonight. To all of the survivors, we hear you, and we’re here because of you.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I rise in strong support of the Crimes Legislation (Stalking and Harassment) Amendment Bill. I agree with the previous speaker, Tamatha Paul. There are moments in time that we will look back at and see this as a massive win for victims of a pretty horrible crime that has been ignored for far too long. For years, stalking has fallen through the cracks in our laws. For me, this is rather personal, and I’ve spoken about this before, but I don’t think it can be said too many times. The effects that this has on not just the person who’s been harassed and stalked but on their family, their children, and their wider network, who are constantly worried about their loved one and whether their loved one is going to be safe that day; whether their loved one got home safe; whether their loved one is at home, scared and crying and worried about what’s going to happen to them that night. It changes a person. It takes away their life force. It takes away everything within themselves that sees the world as a good place, and often the light disappears from that person. I don’t think, until you see the extreme end of what harassment and stalking can do, you can fully comprehend the damage it does to a person.

I myself have witnessed this where I have seen a person who I really care about not be able to put a sentence together, because their brain had shut down through years of fear—to the point where their brain could no longer put a sentence together, they couldn’t say their name, and they could not look after themselves. This is not a crime that should be taken lightly, and I am grateful for these changes because now it won’t be. It will be seen for what it is. It is destructive, and it needs to stop.

This is a crime that is not just about a single moment in time. Instead, it becomes a lived experience. It changes how people walk to their car, it changes where they shop, it changes how they’ll organise their day, and it also changes the way they think when they go to bed at night. It changes the amount of times that they check the locks on the doors and make sure that the windows are closed through fear of somebody entering and harming them. It changes the way family members look when they are visiting the person who is going through this. It changes how everybody behaves in their everyday lives.

This is something that has been very close to my heart in making sure that this is done right. This is what fixing matters truly looks like when it comes to law in this place. We often talk very technical; we often talk about crime with statistics and numbers, but we often forget that there are names, faces, and families behind the statistics that we’re speaking to. I feel really privileged to stand here today and know that women and men will get justice when it comes to this horrific crime.

I listened to some of the stories across the time that this has come through the House, and I heard some of the stories that were brought to select committee. Those stories were gut-wrenching and heartbreaking and sadly showed that this happens far too often. They’re everyday New Zealanders who have lived through months and years of suffering only to be ignored or brushed aside, and that’s not OK. Victims have often been told that the creepy, obsessive behaviour that they face didn’t meet the threshold of the offence. What this could mean in practice is that you may have had an order that that person cannot come on to your property, but that didn’t mean that they couldn’t stand at the top of your driveway and stare down the top of your driveway to let you know they’re there. But they weren’t breaching any rules. It was intimidating, it was scary, but there’s nothing that you can do about it. You can ring and ask for help, but on the other end of the phone, you are told that they are actually not breaking any laws, and unless they step on to your property, they are not breaking the rules back under the old law. Under the new law, they will be.

The new charges under this bill will, hopefully, mean that women and men will feel like they can share the problems they are facing. It’ll bring some sunlight to this issue, take the shame away, and allow people to actually have a really open conversation about what this looks like. Hopefully, it will deal with other issues that come alongside harassment and stalking, where isolation, fear of leaving the home, and fear for your children will also be helped under this new legislation.

Last off, I would just really like to thank the brave people who came forward, shared their stories, were involved in the process of the select committee, and helped to shape this law to be better and to make sure that it really did make a difference. Without those voices, we may not necessarily have a bill as good as it is right now. Again, I think this is an excellent piece of work. When we come into this place, as a member of Parliament, I often used to think: how can I help everyday people to make their lives better? I would say that this bill, in particular, is one I will be proud of for a very long time. I hope that I have made the person that I spoke about today, and who went through this, proud, too, so that what they went through wasn’t for nothing and so that their story that they shared with me and the journey I went through with them has also made a difference in this country for the betterment of all the victims of this crime. Thank you, and I commend this bill to the House.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I rise on behalf of New Zealand First to speak in support of the Crimes Legislation (Stalking and Harassment) Amendment Bill. There has been much said in this House already around the importance of this legislation. One of the things that I know and appreciate strongly about victims and the reality that they face is that the ability to be heard and seen and understood is a big part of a healing process. I think what was achieved through both the bringing forward of this legislation and the select committee process was providing an opportunity for those who have been so badly affected to be seen, heard, and understood.

The specified acts defined in this legislation have been worked on to develop a robust piece of legislation that ensures that it’s not just recognising what the acts are but how they can be done and through a third party to ensure we capture all of the components. This is an important piece of legislation, and I would applaud the Justice Committee on how well they work together to ensure that this is the best piece of legislation it can be. I can appreciate it would have been challenging and difficult to hear a lot of the submissions, but at the end of the day, we have reached a piece of legislation that is effective, it is timely, it is important, and it shows that when the Government and this House come together, we can achieve some very positive outcomes. On that basis, I have no hesitation in commending this bill to the House.

I rise on behalf of Te Rōpū Kākāriki, with sincere gratitude in my heart, to tautoko the speeches tonight. I reflect particularly on our Minister Chhour’s kōrero tonight because, as wahine, you can affiliate with what has been shared, particularly the intergenerational ripples of the impact of stalking and harassment, not just on the mother but also on the children and mokopuna. I agree that there is a change—a change in the family, a change in the way in which they behave—and there are the constant stress levels that ripple through a home and through the lives of loved ones.

As I listened to the speeches tonight, I reflected on the stories of our wāhine who have endured many years of this type of violence, where they were never taken seriously and they were muzzled or muted in the way in which they could go to the authorities and seek help because there was just not enough evidence for it to be taken seriously at the time. Providing these levers legislatively now unlocks an opportunity for us to put some boundaries in place as wāhine in relationships but also for children to hold parents to account, as well. We can now see that a door is open for conversations for whānau to provide safeguards for their loved ones.

I just want to refer to the amendment that was agreed to tonight. It also ensures that the victim is at the centre of decision making, and when the police do make approaches to the offenders or to those who are suspects, yes, notify them that “We know, and we are watching.” But the victim, ultimately, needs to know what is happening around them and about the incidents that are being followed up on, because follow-up is so important, but we also need to protect the voice and the safety of the whānau of the victim as the police go about their work. So the agreement made tonight by the Minister of Justice and by members of this House is not something to be ignored, because we’re trying to provide a suite of tools so that the authorities—those who are tasked with implementing this legislation but also all the support networks that try and wrap around the family as they grapple with these challenges—have a decent set of tools whereby they can start dealing with this type of behaviour.

I do want to also bring to the House the consideration around treatment, around rehabilitation, and around support for the victim but also for the offender. What is the pathway to support all of those impacted by this? I’m not sure that this legislation provides room for it, but maybe it’s an “and, and” so that we start looking at that side of the continuum too, because at some stage the offender will come out and they will need to be supported to be a good parent, a good spouse, and a good whānau member in the future. But the victim, the whānau, the children, and the mokopuna also need to have the relevant safeguards in place so that the behaviours and the experiences that they have seen, shared, listened to, and witnessed are coped with, but they are also supported so that they have the ability to not take on some of those behaviours that they may have fallen victim to over time.

We’re paying tribute to the victims and whānau, and the victims who were strong and who came forward in the Justice Committee to be the voice of those who are the voiceless, as it is a silent issue within whānau and communities. This is a silent issue. It is spoken about quietly amongst friends and amongst whānau. Shame still exists within this space, but with the way that this House has united, in a sense, tonight, it lets us know that we can do these things together, and this is providing safeguards, not only for the victims of today but for our mokopuna and those to come in the future. Kia ora.

Mr Speaker, thank you for the privilege of being able to speak in the third reading on this bill as we pass it this evening, in this House. During the process of guiding the legislation through the Justice Committee and through the House I had the opportunity to meet with a group of women in my electorate who advocated for a change to the number of specified acts and the period of which those acts covered.

I just want to thank the coalition partners I worked with in ACT and New Zealand First as we worked out how we would respond and ultimately land on the amendment that was made to the piece of legislation that has been passed this evening. Therefore, I commend it to the House.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. It has been quite gratifying to listen to the speeches from around the House as we come together, for a change, on this Crimes Legislation (Stalking and Harassment) Amendment Bill.

As many people have said, the credit does go largely to the women who have advocated for this change for a long time, and their persistence; persistence, above and beyond. It crosses the line sometimes, but at the end of the day, it brings results, and that’s what’s happened. Even when the bill was introduced, they didn’t see their job as done. They continued to advocate for what they saw as the best outcome. I know that, even now, they’ll see what we’ve done today and they will think that we haven’t done everything we should have, but that’s what this place is. I do think we’ve landed in a pretty good place.

I do want to recognise Ginny Andersen, who spoke earlier, who’s been working very hard. She did have a member’s bill on exactly this topic. I want to put it on the record that, but for that, I don’t think the Government would have been spurred into action. The Government was spurred into action, and good on Paul Goldsmith, as the Minister of Justice, for doing that. It was also good to see him here looking genuinely at the Amendment Papers that are on the Table and adopting one of those which he was of the view was good.

In the Justice Committee, we did hear a lot of personal stories that talked about the very significant impact that stalking behaviour can have, and we’ve heard others in this House do that as well. I don’t want to dwell on that, but I do want to just put on the record some observations about this new offence. It is an offence, and the reason it’s a challenging offence in some ways—unlike the kinds of crimes that we think of—is that it’s not a crime of physical violence; it’s a crime of mental intimidation, if you like. Where the harm occurs is, in fact, inside someone’s head, and as the Minister Karen Chhour said, that harm is still real and can have very significant impacts but it’s not visible and it’s hard, from the outside, to understand that. That’s the first thing; we’ve got to have that effect: that someone does feel intimidated. Then the other thing, the critical second aspect of this offence, happens in someone else’s head—in the perpetrator’s head—because they have to know that their behaviour is likely to cause this effect: “to cause fear or distress”, in the words of the legislation. That’s a challenging area for the law to seek to intervene in.

Now, there are tools to assist with that. There’s a list of kinds of behaviour, almost presumptively specified acts, such as the traditional ones that come to mind: watching, following, loitering—that’s the kind of visual image we have of stalking—but also acting in any other way that would cause fear or distress to a reasonable person. Here’s the interesting thing: it is essentially recognising cyberstalking. A specified act might be done by or through any means whatsoever—for example, tracking devices, digital applications, spyware, drones, or the use of artificial intelligence. This offence which we have created is not just that offence of visiting someone’s workplace or following them home, or whatever it might be; it’s a whole plethora of possible activities, and I think it’s really important that we understand that.

Of course, I think the other thing to recognise is that whilst some people who engage in stalking behaviour know exactly what they’re doing, one of the other challenges that we recognised in select committee, and the Police recognised, was that there’s a large portion of people who aren’t quite wired the same way as a normal person. They don’t understand that, when they are rebuffed, to send someone flowers at their workplace is creepy and disturbing and distressing to them. That’s why the ability of a constable to notify a person—essentially, to sit someone down and say, “Hey, what you’re doing is creepy. It’s stalking behaviour. It’s really causing distress to the other person. You’ve got to stop.” Of course, now they can go to that next step and say, “Look, if you do it again, you’ll be committing an offence.” That’s why we needed that extra measure to allow constables to, essentially, put someone on notice. Tamatha Paul’s amendment, which I referred to earlier, is a good one, because it does make sure that, in doing that, the victim of the behaviour is aware of what’s going on and can participate in that decision-making process.

Having said that, the warning isn’t a necessary part of it, and, of course, the other thing that really cropped up that we struggled with and made some changes to is the number of incidents and the span of time needed. There’s no perfect solution here. The danger that was identified was that if you have a strict limited period—two stalking behaviours in two years—you’ll get two stalking behaviours in two years and one day, and by dint of that day, which does seem arbitrary, the offence isn’t committed. I think, in having a limited period, we’ve probably landed at a reasonable position. The two incidents: again, you could say, “Why do you have to have more than one?”, or “Should it be three?” Again, I don’t think that there’s a perfect solution there, but we’ve probably landed at the right place.

I guess what I’m saying is that this is a good addition to our criminal law, but at the same time it’s not a straightforward piece of legislation. I’m sure that operationally—and I think this will be the actual challenge, more than legally, operationally—the police will need some time to work through exactly how it can assist them in both keeping people safe and also keeping people feeling safe, which is, in many ways, what stalking is about. Of course, stalking can lead to genuine violence, but in many cases it’s just, essentially, harassment and intimidation, which equally people—especially women—deserve to be protected from. As I said before, it’s going to be a challenge. The legal questions will roll out, and I think the mental element—what it means for someone to know that it’s likely to cause fear or distress—will need development.

My sense is that sometimes it’s so blindingly obvious that what you’re doing—following someone, following an ex-partner home at night—is going to cause fear and distress that saying, “Oh, I thought she wouldn’t mind.” is not going to hold any water. There will be other cases where it’s perhaps not quite so clear cut, but it’s good legislation. Again, to those people who have for a long time advocated for this to become part of our law—to go alongside harmful digital communications, the harassment Act, and our other family protection legislation—I think, well done. I do think there’s space to get a more uniform approach, because it’s very patchwork, and there’s always a danger, when you’ve got a patchwork, that something falls between the cracks.

This is a good legislation, and once again, congratulations to Ginny Andersen for the work that she’s done, and also the select committee. It gets a bit feisty from time to time, but we actually did knuckle down on this one, and whilst we had good discussions, we worked cooperatively. I think, at the end of the day, we’ve got a pretty good outcome for everyone, most importantly a good outcome for women, predominantly, who will feel safer and be safer as a result of the work that we’re doing tonight.

Thank you very much, Mr Speaker. The only shame about passing the legislation right now is that it is 10.40 p.m. on a Wednesday night, and ensuring that people have an understanding that this legislation is being passed—it’s coming into force next year; and it’s got the support of every political party in this place—it says we take it seriously, particularly for women across New Zealand. They are not the only victims of stalking, but they are predominantly most of the victims of stalking across New Zealand. To say we’re doing something about it; it’s not about a particular political party taking a win, but it’s actually about this Parliament saying that we’ve listened to the victims across New Zealand who came and spoke to the legislation, who’ve numerously shared their stories with many, many members of Parliament. Finally, Parliament has come together and said we’re going to do something about it. It is a really good day; therefore, I’m going to commend this bill to the House.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I wanted to start by acknowledging that this week is a week that we remember how violent New Zealand society can be, and that children have paid the price this week for violence being not addressed in our communities. I wanted to make a case for the correlation of things like stalking with that violence. Sometimes I think it gets a little bit lost; it’s seen as something lighter. In fact, it’s a precursor. The people who end up in women’s refuges, I think 75 percent of them are recorded as having been stalked before they left the relationship, and 65 percent afterwards. I suspect, actually, that is an underrepresentation of the number, because there are also, now, new methods of stalking people, and there is an incredible use of things like spyware. It is quite shocking. These kinds of things just weren’t available before, and we have a culture which has changed in some ways so that children are being taught that it’s OK that their parents know where they are all the time, etc., and it’s one of the issues that’s raised: that we’re actually changing our norms and values in our society so that we think that knowing where somebody is all the time is our right. It is a method of control and it is an addiction to control.

We also have a wave of misogyny out there; an absolute wave coming to our shores. It is everywhere on social media. It is a violent space on the internet, and people are learning new violent behaviours and thinking that they are acceptable. So it is an important time for a piece of legislation like this, and it’s important not to see it as a lighter form of issue but see it as a precursor and a form of violence, because that’s what it is.

So it’s important, I think, that this legislation recognises how important fear is in people’s lives. We all have a right to feel safe, and being afraid erodes our actual sense of being. We’ve had some of the other speakers tonight talk about how they’ve seen that happen, but I think it’s just really important that we acknowledge that that form of safety, that is the right of every woman in this country. It is under attack; they are under attack. We have to get to the root of that and say it is completely unacceptable. We are seeing it in leaders in other countries, we are seeing it out there being seen as an OK thing to do, and it is never going to be.

I wanted to say that and I wanted then to just talk about the collegiality of this House on this issue, because I think that’s a wonderful thing. That’s not something that we see a lot of; it’s really great that it’s happened over a bill like this. Thank you to Ginny Andersen, who was the person who started this process. Thank you to the activists who were involved in bringing this issue relentlessly to every party in this House.

But I just want to say that it’s actually significant that it’s over an issue like this; that this is something that is moving beyond any issue that is party political, in some ways. But it needs to be recognised that we face a crisis. We are seeing more of this violent behaviour, and we’re seeing a normalisation of it. So this is a kickback against that. This says, “Actually, those behaviours are controlling, manipulative, violent, and totally inappropriate in New Zealand society.”, and so I am extremely pleased and relieved to see this House on the same page with regard to this.

Thank you for passing this bill tonight—the entire House. Thank you to Ginny Andersen for bringing it here. I commend the bill to the House.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. It’s a privilege to be able to stand and speak to the Crimes Legislation (Stalking and Harassment) Amendment Bill on its third reading. Stalking can be randomly triggered and escalate quickly to dangerous levels. This bill seeks to clearly define the elements of stalking and harassment. By doing so, it also recognises the vulnerability of victims and the real harm and risk they face. The bill will also enable timely and effective interventions and prosecution of offenders. I commend this bill to the House.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I’d like to start by acknowledging the advocates and stakeholders and family members who will be watching tonight, after having advocated for this law change for years. To Ginny Andersen, who championed this issue so early, but also to the House, just reflecting on the comments made across the House, it’s clear that members all across the House recognise how important this is. I was thinking of the comments made by Minister Chhour about the all-encompassing impact that stalking can have on people’s lives and the importance of this change we’re making.

The Hon Ginny Andersen talked about being the Minister of Police and receiving the Independent Police Conduct Authority report when Farzana Yaqubi had passed and there was the inquiry into it. At the time it happened, I was the member of Parliament for Upper Harbour, and I still remember getting the call about that happening and how extraordinarily traumatic it was for Farzana’s family. Ibrahim Omer and I went to visit her family the following day, and the grief that they were steeped in was just incredible. I remember speaking to Farzana’s sister, and we talked a little about what had happened but also the criminal prosecution that would follow. She continued to say, “But it won’t bring her back—it won’t bring her back.” This won’t bring her back either, and I’m very, very acutely aware of that, but I do hope, as the Hon Ginny Andersen said, that it will do some justice to her memory in terms of what it will prevent.

Farzana’s funeral we also attended several days later, and the impact on her community more broadly was also extraordinary. She was a law student at Auckland University of Technology, very well respected. We spoke to some of her friends as well as her family, but it was just a huge number of people feeling that grief. Comments have been made about the ripple effects when things like this happen, but also those early stages of stalking and how much they impact families. That was certainly the case.

I think what’s striking about her case, though, is that as others have said, she did everything right. She did report it, and I wanted to walk through some of the timeline of her reporting to demonstrate that, because I do think it’s absolutely appalling. She made her first complaint on 25 October 2022. She made a 105 online report to the police. She took screenshots of the messages that she was being sent; she sent them through. On 3 December, she updated her online report. She told police that she was extremely fearful for her life. On 6 December, she made a formal statement in person at the Henderson station and she was told the file would be moved on, and just a number of days later, on 19 December, she was murdered. So, yes, it is important that we change the law, but it’s also important that we change the way we listen when complaints are made, and that is in many ways a bigger problem.

Some of the submitters who wrote to select committee made submissions in that regard, and as I was reading some of their submissions it occurred to me how the submissions that related directly to proposed legal changes instantly got recognition but some of those equally important other changes they were arguing for didn’t. One such submitter was the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists’ submissions. They argued against some specific parts of the bill as it was then, including the link to three separate occasions within a period of 12 months; they argued it should be broader. They then made a whole set of recommendations about policy, behavioural change, including developing sector guidance and educational resources for police, justice, and mental health services to ensure front-line staff recognise stalking behaviour and respond appropriately. They made a recommendation about developing a specific support framework for victims of stalking to ensure appropriate psychosocial support is available.

This is also something that Kim McGregor has spoken about in the past, our former Chief Victims Advisor, and Ruth Money has spoken about as our current Chief Victims Advisor; that need for more comprehensive support for victims. They both speak about a victims’ commission and actually having an advocate who’s funded well enough in the system to be your advocate at those very early stages of a complaint. While we do have places like Community Law, and certainly you can access lawyers, often that happens after the fact, and I do think there is real merit in us looking at some sort of framework like that.

We also had submissions from others like WAVES, the Waitakere Anti-Violence Essential Services. One of the points that they made which I think is absolutely valid is that, while the bill as it is now is excellent, we need to consider how people can be manipulated through a broader set of relationships. Their argument was that the definition of “family relationship” as is outlined in the Family Violence Act 2018 is too narrow and you need to look at the other relationships that can be used to really target someone. I think this is, interestingly, also relevant in a political context where many of us have electorate office staff who are very regularly dealing with people who do frequent the office because they’re frustrated about certain issues, etc. I do think that’s one area where we will need to monitor whether the bill is as effective as it can be.

Several people have spoken about how broad the Acts are that could fall within the framing of this new offence, that it isn’t existing criminal offences; it is about looking at the context, and that is hugely important. Something that came up several times was the idea of gifting and whether it was problematic to include gifting as one of the potential Acts, but in fact this is something that frequently does happen when you get an obsessive relationship, particularly where you have a relationship breakup that then results in stalking behaviour.

There were some interesting studies done, one of which was quoted in the regulatory impact statement (RIS) and it gave us a table of victims of intimate partner stalking and the types of behaviour that those people were engaged in. It was things like sending dozens of text messages, sitting outside their school or home or work, phoning them often, asking friends to follow them. Often dropping off gifts and notes was almost 60 percent, so a really significant thing in terms of what can seem innocuous subjectively but really does have an impact on people.

The other thing that stood out to me in the RIS when I read it was the table that showed the difference between stalking behaviour of members of Parliament between 2014 and 2022. On every measure except for alarming behaviour at an electorate office, the percentages in terms of how that had been experienced have gone up—some quite considerably so—including inappropriate social media contact. This is absolutely a live issue. Changing the law is important; changing behaviours must also follow, so we do need, as a Parliament but as Governments—regardless of which Government is in place—to put in place education and other policy measures to ensure that there’s a culture shift.

I’d finish just by recognising the folk who came in for the glass prison exhibition here this week from Massey University, talking to people about their experiences of harassment and stalking. These were alarming quotes to read. We do need more of this research. Unfortunately, that might not be the case for them, but, again, this is an important piece of legislation. I commend it to the House.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. It’s a little bit difficult to articulate the feelings that a lot of us are feeling tonight as we progress with this bill. It is, in a matter of minutes, going to become a law. I remember during the campaign, in 2023, seeing the now Minister Paul Goldsmith on the news announce that we will be implementing a law which makes stalking illegal, makes it a new offence, and I reflect on that as I reflect on how with the conversations we had and we’re lucky to have with our Ministers, as the Coalition for the Safety of Women and Children were approaching the steps of Parliament, he made the decision that, yes, we are definitely going to do this as a matter of urgency. I’m so grateful to the Minister—and Ministers Upston and Mitchell as well—for the conversation to progress this. I’m grateful for everyone that’s participated.

I want to say that whenever I look at a picture of Farzana Yaqubi, my heart weeps. It weeps. It weeps for the life lost; it weeps for her mother and her father. What I’ve learnt is that for a mother and a father, the worst nightmare is to lose a child. But through the loss of this beautiful girl, we can say, really, it was the catalyst for us to move fast with this bill. So I’m thinking of her parents today. I’m thinking of the loss of life. I’m thinking also of David White, who gave a submission because he also lost a daughter, and he said that stalking is a psychological weapon, wielded with purpose by the perpetrator. It is a mind game that can reduce a victim to fear and tears in a crowd when the perpetrator is seen, and so I’m really proud of what we’re doing here tonight.

Nothing will take away the pain that every parent has endured when their child is lost because of crimes like this, but I’m glad that we’re commending this bill to the House.

I guess I will start, Tom, by saying I will say good things because this is a good night to say good things. The good of it is that there is a combined thinking and feeling and heart for this particular piece of legislation. So I tautoko mārika i te whakaaro, ngā kōrero katoa [I absolutely support the idea, all of the comments.]

This bill won’t bring back those that we’ve lost, but going forward, what it will do is it will continue to remind us and have the lives that have been lost matter. I recognise the number of stories that have been shared tonight. I think, sometimes, we might get a bit like, “It’s another story, and people say certain names often.”, but what is critical about it is telling the story, lest we forget. I want to acknowledge all the women that have stood in the House tonight to say the names, to repeat those stories, and to keep the reality of these things front of mind. So e mihi atu ana ki ngā wāhine katoa i te Whare [I acknowledge all the women in the House.]

Then, probably, I might say that I want to acknowledge the men in the House tonight and just acknowledge tāne mā. Keep speaking up. Please, keep speaking up, speaking into the circles—the men circles, the male circles, and the tāne circles—because I think that’s a critical space where only men can influence men in your own way. I just want to acknowledge that.

This is the final stage of this bill, and it is a pleasure and a duty to stand and speak to it. This bill tackles one of the most insidious forms of violence: stalking and harassment. This is merely not just theory; this is about real lives and real harm. It is about accumulated harm. It is about accrued harm. It is important that, tonight, this is settled. It seems to me that it is recognised well across the House.

I want to acknowledge Tamatha Paul and her kōrero tonight. She started by saying she thought it was going to be quite emotional for her, but she held the line in telling the story, I think, in a very powerful and young wahine way. Again, I think it’s important to acknowledge Ginny Andersen for her efforts through her own member’s bill. Persistence is omnipotent—particularly for women with this kind of issue—because too often, I’m sure everyone would agree, when women speak out against things like this, we can often be, for some crazy reason, called crazy or neurotic. Unfortunately, those things, those attitudes, are pervasive, and it’s hard to get rid of those things. Again, I just acknowledge all the good men in this room for working hard to get rid of those attitudes that need to change.

I’m probably there, now, in just saying that I support this bill. A lot of it, I guess, for me, comes from working in family harm and the family harm and family justice sector for some years before coming into this role and then also working in rape crisis when I was 17 or 18. I understand the enduring journey that is carried, in the harm that is carried by women and their families. I just acknowledge the work to get the bill to this point. Tom, I hope those were good things. To all the men and the women in this House tonight, tēnā tātou katoa. Tautoko mārika [absolutely in support].

I present a legislative statement on the Land Transport (Clean Vehicle Standard) Amendment Bill (No 2).

That statement is published under the authority of the House and can be found on the Parliament website.

I move, That the Land Transport (Clean Vehicle Standard) Amendment Bill (No 2) be now read a second time.

The Government wants the clean vehicle standard to lower the cost of living, not raise it. This bill makes it cheaper and easier for vehicle importers to meet the clean vehicle standards so New Zealanders can benefit. I think members know that the standard is about fuel efficiency. It does help lower the cost of living by making it easier to buy cars that use less fuel and cost less to run, and the standard also contributes to our emissions reduction targets—but the standard is having the opposite effect at the moment. It’s actually making it harder and more expensive for people to upgrade to better vehicles. There are four changes in this bill as reported back. The Government intends to move an Amendment Paper, which I think has been well signalled, and we will do that in the committee of the whole House stage. My understanding is that that Amendment Paper has been tabled for members to have a look at.

Returning to the four changes: the bill lets the Minister of Transport recommend uniform carbon dioxide targets for vehicles. This will be quite important, actually, when weight-adjusted targets, which currently give heavier vehicles easier targets, are no longer fair or justified as more low-emissions vehicle options become available. The second change is to extend the life of emissions credits from three years to four to give importers more time to use the credits they earn from exceeding targets. This is about rewarding good performance and keeping costs down. The third change is that it keeps the option for importers to borrow credits from future years, so if they fall short one year, they can make up for it in the next year. It’s a common-sense way to avoid charges that would otherwise be passed on to consumers. It allows credit trading between new- and used-vehicle importers. Currently, new-vehicle importers can only trade credits with other new-vehicle importers, and used-vehicle importers can only trade with used-vehicle importers. This change will give importers of both types greater options to offset chargers. Ultimately, it will make it easier for them to meet the standard.

The bill is a short bill. I want to thank everyone who took the time to share their views during the select committee stage. I also want to acknowledge the work of the Transport and Infrastructure Committee. The committee, as I understand it, received 25 submissions—not a large number—but the range of views was wide, and the depths of insights were valuable. It is fair to say that this bill and the changes that that Government intends to move during the committee of the whole House stage reflect the submissions that industry have made to the Government and the select committee around meeting the clean vehicle standard. With that in mind, I want to acknowledge the input of the Motor Industry Association and the Imported Motor Vehicle Industry Association. The feedback has made it clear that there are changes required to the standard if it is going to work and lower the cost of living for New Zealanders and, ultimately, green our fleet over time.

The Government intends to conduct a full review of the standard in the first six months of next year. We’ve now had two goes as a Parliament at getting in place a workable standard; the 2023 regime, which I think everyone acknowledges was deficient, and the changes made last year, in 2024, to bring the scheme in line with Australia. That also has not worked. We do need to kind of go back to almost basics and first principles and work out exactly what we are going to do in terms of making the scheme work. Anyway, that’s all for another day. In the meantime, this bill provides sensible, useful changes, and, of course, we’ve got an amendment coming to lower the carbon dioxide amounts that are charged, which will come at the committee of the whole House stage. That Amendment Paper is on the floor of the House for members to have a look at. I commend the bill to the House.

The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Kia orana, Madam Speaker. Look, the Labour Party will not be supporting this bill this evening. That shouldn’t come as any surprise to members opposite, given our different view has been published in the select committee’s report.

I’ll come to the specifics as to why, at this stage, we are not prepared to support this bill, but before I do that, I do want to just make some comments on the select committee process that was undertaken. Much has always been referred to the fact that the Transport and Infrastructure Committee is a hard-working committee, and I do want to acknowledge the submitters that did take time to engage with the committee. The Minister’s correct: there weren’t many—25—and we heard from a handful of those. I also want to acknowledge the officials who advised and supported the committee through its work, as well.

It’s really interesting that this bill has been reported back quite early in the piece. It was meant to be no later than 22 December, and there were steps taken to expedite things—and, of course, it’s just about 11.10 p.m. on a Wednesday evening while the House is in urgency because, really, the Government is up against the clock in terms of trying to appease some of the concerns that have been raised directly with them.

I do have a question for the Minister—that’ll be in committee—but I am signalling the regulatory impact statement that has been tabled, whether it’s relevant in terms of this bill or not, because it seems to reference all of the previous pieces of work that was done with, I guess, bill No. 1. So just signalling that for the Minister.

But we are not supporting this bill, because it is yet another example of this Government who are stepping back from leadership in the climate space, who are watering down policies that have a real impact on our environment, our economy, and our communities. Let’s be very clear: the reason that the Government are pursuing this is because they made a decision to take some action in cancelling a Clean Car Discount opportunity alongside the Clean Car Standard, and they have failed to do anything since they took that course of action.

That is the real reason why we are here under urgency progressing this: because the Government have been lobbied by industry participants and they simply have failed to actually do what was expected of them. That is exactly what the committee did hear from industry players and participants: that the Government have basically made an absolute shambles over this. These were the very issues that we raised last year when Simeon Brown was the transport Minister and was progressing changes, which is why this bill is called the “Land Transport (Clean Vehicle Standard) Amendment Bill (No 2)”, because we had a No. 1 and the Government had failed to actually sort out the issues at that point in time, and they’re coming back to say, “Actually, we don’t care about the environment, we don’t care about community—about engagement in that space—and actually, what we’re going to do is we are just going to make things easier, change it, and actually set this country back at the same time.”

This is entirely over the actions taken by the Government, and they need to take responsibility in their failure in that particular regard. The genesis of this is about trying to ensure that whatever the framework, whatever the structure, whatever the threshold is when it comes to tackling emissions, we are actually preparing for the future. What we want in the Labour Party—and this is why we introduced the Clean Car Standard in the first place, let’s not forget about that; the former Government—is because we actually believe in a future where transport is cleaner, it’s safer, and it’s more affordable, and it also actually tackles the issues around low emissions.

We all know that when we step back and look at the profile in terms of transportation, the emissions component is a huge contributor in terms of what this country does provide, in turn, as a community, and how we go about the things that we do. However, this bill is a backwards step. It really does weaken the integrity of the standard, and it really also delays the progress that this country needs. We need a Government that is going to be leading in this space, not seeking to continue to weaken the standard and other opportunities each day in the week.

This bill does a number of things, and I’m sure colleagues will touch on them specifically. The first one I want to speak about is it extends the lifespan of the carbon credits from three years to four years. This is, effectively, late in the piece as we head towards the end of the year, to say, “Well, actually, we’re going to not stick to the three-year time frame now because it’s getting too—well, it’s not just getting too hard; actually, the time frame is coming up pretty quickly.” That is a very clear step that has been taken by the Government, as opposed to try and identify possibilities around incentivisation or working with industry in a different frame to try and reduce the change that is needed there.

The other significant change is the ability to—as it stands currently, there are restrictions on the ability for industry participants to effectively transfer their credits. While players will hold a certain number of credits in the bank, so to speak, there is currently an inability for those credits to be transferred between used vehicles and new vehicles across the fleet. This, again, is another example of the Government simply weakening the standard by adding to—yes—the delay in terms of three to four years, but also more flexibility to basically offset what is currently held across used and new vehicles. Further, in terms of time frames, this is a bill that seeks to extend the borrowing of future credits beyond the end of this year, as well—and so, yet again, this is painting a picture where this is a Government bill under urgency, where they’re up against the clock and they’re not interested in addressing and tackling some of the real issues that are so important in this country.

The final change, which did come a little bit late in the piece, was—we all know, generally, that heavier vehicles take a little bit more fuel or juice to get them around, whether that’s electric or whether that’s a bit more traditional, and so this will be a bill that will remove the weight-adjusted targets. They’re not going to just sort of tinker with them; they’re going to just wipe them all together so that there are not going to be any weight-adjusted targets that will provide differentiation between heavier vehicles and lighter vehicles.

In tandem—well, the four of them together, I guess, indicates a real change in direction in terms of where the country is heading around really tackling issues around climate change, taking seriously our ability as a country and our desire as a country to be reducing our emissions when it comes to transport, as well. Now, on the surface, one could be excused for thinking that, actually, these changes that we’ve just talked through could be technical in nature—perhaps even harmless, some might suggest. But the reality is that these changes will simply make it easier for importers to delay compliance. That is the bottom line. It is loosening the standard by giving more flexibility to importers to simply delay what is expected, what has been asked of them, what has been signalled for quite some time.

I recall this House, with the former transport Minister spending a lot of time looking at the comparability with Australia in terms of targets and getting some assurances from the Minister of Transport at the time that these were able to be delivered. It’s very clear that we’re in a very different situation because—even though he’s no longer the Minister, thank goodness—he has failed to be able to deliver in that respect, as well. Every single day, we must turn our minds to how all participants in terms of the transport sector are able to play their part and do what they can to ensure that we are effectively dealing with issues around emissions and the like.

The Labour Party continues to oppose this bill. It is a perhaps a small bill, but a very, very important one in terms of the impact that that will deliver for the sector. We have a number of Amendment Papers that we intend to progress and speak to as we work through the committee of the whole House stage, but it seems unless there is a complete U-turn by the Government at this late stage in the piece, our opposition will continue to stand. However, that will not mitigate the desire of the Opposition to continue to hold the Government to account as we progress this piece of legislation.

The amazing thing about electric vehicles and low-emission vehicles is that they are so great for New Zealand. It means we spend less money on imported fossil fuels just to get around. And yet New Zealand has lagged behind other countries because we had no fuel efficiency standard, no fuel economy standard, on vehicle imports, until a few years ago. At that point, we were almost the last country in the OECD to get a fuel economy standard. The only country now in the OECD who doesn’t have a fuel economy standard is Russia. But, of course, a fuel economy standard by itself was never going to be enough to get the transformation that we needed in our vehicle fleet.

Let me just go back—I’m just going to repeat this one more time, because members opposite, the Government parties, say they care about productivity. One of the simplest, easiest things we could do to improve productivity is to improve the efficiency of our vehicle fleet. There are direct gains from that, immediately. Importing fewer fossil fuels, using less energy to get around—just switching to electric vehicles, or even just more efficient vehicles, is a direct gain to New Zealand households.

The people who don’t benefit from fuel efficiency as much are the polluting vehicle industry. The polluting vehicle industry don’t want fuel economy standards. Why? Because it’s more profitable for them. So, of course, like every other industry that has lobbied Government successfully—like the tobacco industry, one that Minister Bishop will know a lot about—they’ve had this playbook where they come out and say that Government regulation is going to hurt consumers, that they’re going to pay the high price, when, in reality, it is the vehicle manufacturers who simply don’t want to have to sell more fuel-efficient vehicles.

There are vehicle companies now who are here in New Zealand because we brought in the Clean Car Standard and the Clean Car Discount—BYD probably wouldn’t be here. I know for a fact that back in 2021, my friends were trying to buy an electric Hyundai. They couldn’t get it and they were told it was going to be six months, at least, for them to be able to get this car.

Then the Government made its announcement about the Clean Car Discount, and they got a phone call from the dealer saying they could get it in a month. So the reality is that these policies shape the choices that consumers have, and the whole point of those two policies is to make it easier for New Zealanders to access efficient, low-emissions vehicles. And it’s fair—it’s fair. It’s fair that polluters pay. It’s fair that they pay a little extra, because there’s no way we as a country are going to reduce the fossil fuel emissions from our vehicle fleet unless some people are incentivised to drop emissions faster.

What about the ETS?

The emissions trading scheme (ETS) doesn’t work on fuel, and that’s why—fuel is not in the European ETS, and there’s a really simple reason for this. It’s because people don’t make their decisions about which vehicle they’re going to buy based on what the fuel economy is, what the price of petrol is. It’s a small component of the price of petrol, the ETS. And, by the way, this Government just crashed the ETS price. So it’s a total joke. And we know who that member is really in here to represent, and it’s not ordinary New Zealanders and it’s not people who want action on climate change; it is the fossil fuel industry that funds people like the ACT Party—to come in and mess up—

Just be careful with some of those accusations.

But this is the playbook—this is the playbook. Industry lobbies Government, claims that consumers will miss out, and who actually misses out? New Zealanders. New Zealanders who don’t get access to more fuel efficient vehicles will now have more polluting vehicles, which cost them more money to run, which makes the air dirtier, which means we pay higher health bills. They’re in total denial.

Let’s just see what’s happening in the rest of the world, because, actually, with this bill, the Government is caving to a polluting industry one more time. No one’s going to be surprised about that, because that’s literally been the last two years of this Government: caving to polluting industries that are reducing our chances of having a livable, thriving future, and every time they claim it’s going to save New Zealanders money, it’s actually going to cost New Zealanders more money.

To buy their vehicles, yes.

It’s going to cost them more money because they’re going to be spending more money to run their vehicles.

To buy them.

Grant McCallum, I know I’m never ever going to be successful in explaining basic economics to you, my friend.

The funniest thing—I do have to refer to this—that happened at the select committee, and I’m sure all those members who weren’t at the select committee would love to hear this, is Isuzu New Zealand came in and said they were opposed to the bill because they’re opposed to the Clean Car Standard. I don’t think he understood that the bill was actually making the standard weaker, but the person who was submitting held up this graph, which I know no one’s going to able to see, because it’s on my computer—oh, maybe you can—but, anyway, he thought this graph was evidence: “We didn’t need a tax to achieve this.” Now, let me describe what the graph shows. It shows the incredibly high proportion of passenger and SUV imports from 2015 to 2021 that are an internal combustion engine, and the tiny, tiny percentage that are electric vehicles or hybrid electric vehicles.

Then, suddenly, in 2021, something happened—something happened—and it had nothing to do with Government except it had everything to do with Government and it had everything to do with an evidence-based policy, which was the Clean Car Discount. Suddenly, there’s a dramatic increase in electric vehicles and hybrid electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids. And then, suddenly, at the end of 2023, it stops and it bounces back up.

So, look, you’ve got all the evidence right here, thanks to Isuzu New Zealand, who have no idea what they’re talking about when they come and present to the select committee. But the Government has torn away a policy that was the envy of many other countries in the world. I spoke to a car manufacturer today who said that a few years ago, everyone was saying, “How do we copy what New Zealand is doing? This is great. They have one of the highest rates of EV uptake in the entire world thanks to the Clean Car Discount.” With that, the industry was overshooting its targets. So, actually, that’s why the targets in the Clean Car Standard were set at the rate they were: because we actually do have to reduce emissions from the fleet and we’re basically becoming a dumping ground for the world’s polluting vehicles with a weak, ineffective standard that will continue.

That’s not good for New Zealand: it means dirtier air, higher fuel bills, more fossil fuel imports—it’s stupid; it’s stupid. I will say it again: this is stupid and unnecessary. If the members opposite were actually committed to helping New Zealanders achieve a more productive economy with a more productive transport system, with lower costs for everyone, they would support evidence-based policies that would mean we wouldn’t be the laughing stock of the world—which we are, because look at this—oh, again, unfortunately, I don’t think I’m going to be able to show you the whole graph—from 2023 to 2024, we were second to last in the entire world for the change in EV sales.

For the change in EV sales—you can’t really read that—we are second to last in the world, and yet here we are, a country with high renewable electricity production. We have high car dependency because the Government keeps wasting money on roads and not investing in rail. There was going to be one thing we were going to do that would benefit the economy and put us in a better position with respect to climate change: that would be to electrify our vehicle fleet, which this Government is comprehensively failing to do. It’s because they are in the pocket of polluting industry. They don’t listen to the evidence; they listen to the people who benefit the most, which is a tiny percentage of New Zealanders, because they can sell more highly polluting vehicles which have a higher margin for them. That’s it—they get a higher margin. Are we better off? Is the country better off? Absolutely not. We’re importing more fossil fuels as a result of it, and apparently they can’t understand that.

Again, it’s embarrassing for them. I say that every day. How embarrassing for this Government that their entire fossil fuel reduction strategy when it comes to transport is EVs, and they absolutely tanked EV sales, and now they’re caving to industry rather than doing something effective. The industry came to the select committee and said, “There’s nothing we can do to influence consumer demand.”, never minding the tens or maybe hundreds of millions of dollars the vehicle industry is spending on advertising on high emissions, utes, and SUVs to create the demand. OK, so that’s where we’re at. It’s stupid. It’s stupid and unnecessary, and it’s very embarrassing for them. Embarrassing—they don’t understand economics, they don’t understand how to get EVs in this country—

Ha, ha!

—and they laugh because they’re so unaware of their own mediocrity.

Just before I call Simon Court for the next speech, I’m just going to say to the National Party backbench that when you all talk at once, no one’s got a clue what anybody is saying, so maybe one at a time might be a better idea. Simon Court.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. Firstly, I want to acknowledge the previous speaker, Julie Anne Genter, and her passion for transport planning, for the environment, and for actually standing by and standing up for her values and principles. Now, I disagree with her on many issues, but I do agree with her on what she says, or what the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand says, in their differing view: improving the fuel efficiency of private vehicles imported to New Zealand has huge benefits. I know it does.

My first car was a Holden Commodore V8 station wagon—a V8 station wagon—it was a two-litre. I reckon it used about three times as much gas every week, or per kilometre, as my modern Subaru does. What that shows you is that over time, those vehicle manufacturers, making cars that are then imported, delivered to New Zealand, have actually improved fuel efficiency; they’ve improved their emissions; they’ve reduced the toxicity of their emissions to something that is negligible with catalytic converters. We have low-sulphur diesel; we’ve removed lead in petrol; and yet, it’s not enough for Julie Anne Genter and for the Green Party. But the ACT Party, we’re practical people. We’re here in Parliament, and we’re in Government to fix what matters. That’s why I’m proud, as an ACT MP, somebody who has recently sat on the Transport and Infrastructure Committee for a short time to consider this legislation, along with my colleague Cameron Luxton, who was a permanent member on the committee.

I want to acknowledge Cameron Luxton for the hard work that he did on this report, along with the chair, Andy Foster, who graciously gave me the opportunity to ask a few questions of submitters during the committee stage. Cameron Luxton has made, like I said, a great effort. He, also, has suffered from having to drive high-emissions, low-efficiency vehicles for many years, but he won’t give it up. Cameron Luxton is taking me around Tauranga in his V6 Suzuki Vitara four-wheel drive, and I tell you what: there’s a guy who knows how to get every last kilometre out of his vehicle. He ain’t giving that thing up. He ain’t giving that thing up until Suzuki come back around with a new Vitara, and so we’re holding on, probably until towards the end of this century.

I just want to speak to some of the matters the previous speaker, Julie Anne Genter, raised. Firstly, her conspiracy theory—and that’s what it was—about members on this side of the House being somehow beholden to or under the influence of what she called the “fossil-fuel industry”.

Shameful.

That is an outrageous claim, isn’t it, Dan Bidois? It’s an outrageous claim, and it also ignores the fact that every single New Zealander is dependent on fuel suppliers, on energy suppliers, on the private sector to supply the energy we need: liquid fuels, solid fuels, gaseous fuels.

When Julie Anne Genter and her friends in the Green Party fly around the country or go to overseas conferences, like in the jungle in Brazil to COP30, they had to bulldoze a road through the jungle, through the rainforest to this remote city, apparently, for thousands of people to go and have a big, kind of, seance about the climate. You know, all of those fuels—for the benefit of the member Julie Anne Genter—are supplied by the private sector, and they help you get where you need to go. Madam Speaker, I didn’t mean to bring you into the debate, I was just referring to all of us; we depend on it.

Now, coming back to electric vehicles, the member Julie Anne Genter made a good point. EVs are great. I mean, I have rented one occasionally, when I’ve been going around the country on parliamentary business. Firstly, I just want to say they’re very difficult to work out how to start them, because when they’re electric, I’m looking firstly for the button and then with a key. Really, I mean, they’re actually quite technically challenging for somebody from West Auckland who is used to driving a petrol- or diesel-powered vehicle. So they are very advanced, and I do welcome this step change in technology into New Zealand.

But one of the challenges we have in New Zealand is that we are already using more electricity on some days than we can produce from our existing generation capacity. That is why we have to keep a million-tonne stockpile of coal at Huntley to make sure that the lights don’t go out. So while it’s laudable that many New Zealanders have invested in EVs and drive them, we do have these actual structural changes in the amount of electricity we can deliver to those people who want to charge them at home or charge them at their business. That’s only going to become more of a challenge as we move towards the much more digital-, data-, and energy-hungry world that we are moving towards, whether it’s data centres or whether it’s entire fleet transitions to hybrid or plug-in electric vehicles, as many commercial fleets are doing.

But I want to come to the issues of this bill. The reason this bill was at select committee was because a previous Government—a Labour-Green Government—introduced not only the ute tax—the “clean vehicle discount”, they called it; put a nice little unicorn sticker on it—but it was going to be about five to eight grand more for a van or a ute, the kinds of vehicles that tradies and farmers needed—

I could only afford a Vitara.

Well, that’s why the former dairy farmer, and current licensed building practitioner, Cameron Luxton, probably couldn’t afford to upgrade from his Vitara.

The clean vehicle discount and this green vehicle standard was a double tax on actually getting the vehicles that Kiwis needed. If you think about the point I made—my interjection to Julie Anne Genter’s speech—about the emissions trading scheme (ETS), Kiwis already pay for their emissions through the ETS. They pay, typically, when the ETS is running at about 50 bucks a tonne of carbon, as it is now, somewhere between $9 and $11 every time they fill their vehicle up with petrol, and a similar amount in diesel. So what that means is for somebody who drives, you know, maybe 400 or 500 kilometres a week, like a lot of people do around town, if they’re going from one side of town to the other, like a tradie, like a parent, running kids to gymnastics or swimming after school and sports games on the other side of town. If your kids are playing sport, you’re probably paying your fair share—$10, $11 a week, maybe more—for your carbon emissions. So when you had the clean vehicle discount—the “dirty ute tax”, which is gone—you’re paying once, paying the clean vehicle standard, if you replaced your family vehicle with a new one, and paying twice—well, that’s almost gone—and again, the emissions trading scheme is all we need.

I just want to come back to some of the submissions that were made. The manufacturers: I was actually really concerned. Many of them had made the point in the 53rd Parliament, when the legislation that the previous Labour-Green Government brought in to put this clean car standard in place came through the Transport and Infrastructure Committee, which I sat on at the time, the manufacturers said it’s not necessary. All the vehicle manufacturers in Japan and Europe, they make vehicles that have a very low-emissions standard already. Any standard that New Zealand might like to stick on it just to feel good about itself isn’t going to shift the dial at all from an international or even a local emissions profile point of view. It’s not going to reduce emissions at all, because guess what, Julie Anne Genter? Japan and Europe are not making special cars just for New Zealand to meet our standard. Who knew?

The importers and the manufacturers told this previous Parliament—the 53rd Parliament—that. They predicted and they forecast exactly the situation we’re in now, where there is a huge deficit built up in trading accounts of importers and manufacturers, who have continued to deliver Kiwis the vehicles they need, taking the risk on this cost, that it’s going to land on their balance sheets and have to be passed on to motorists. Yet all of this prediction, all of this foresight, the previous Government ignored it. That’s why this Government is cleaning it up. That’s why we’re here to fix what matters tonight.

Now, it’s heartening to hear the Minister Chris Bishop say that there’s a paper on the Table where he’s proposing to reduce the amount of actual emissions charges per unit of carbon by about 80 percent. That’s going to save Kiwis tens of millions of dollars a year. But in the long term, what we do know is that the clean vehicle standard is unnecessary when we already have the emissions trading scheme. You’re already paying for your emissions every time you put fuel in the tank. There are already plenty of options out there, when it comes to EVs and hybrids. The Government does not need to be involved in this. The ACT Party welcomes this change, but we want it to go further.

Thanks, Madam Speaker. I want to start off just by saying some thanks as chair of the Transport and Infrastructure Committee, because this is also reporting back from the select committee. Thanks to the submitters. There weren’t many of them, but they were very good submissions. Thanks to the officials and thanks also to the committee. In this one, we haven’t agreed with each other, but it’s still really important that we had some good discussion on it.

We had to report it back quickly, or we decided we would report it back quickly in response to the Minister’s request.

Who decided?

Now, the reason for that actually—and the Opposition is asking why? I think the reason for that was made very clear by the Minister in public, which we don’t always get, but the Minister made it very clear in public that he regarded the scheme as it is as broken. The majority of the committee actually agree: the scheme is fundamentally broken.

Now, how does the scheme work? Well, in simple terms, basically if you’ve got a low-emitting vehicle, you’re going to end up likely having credits. If you have a high emitting vehicle, you’re likely to end up essentially having debits and you’re trying to manage the two together. The idea was that there should be those two should marry. But the reality is that the two of them are not marrying. We have far, far more high-emitting vehicles and much fewer low-emitting vehicles.

Why is that? What we heard quite clearly from submitters is that submitters don’t want to buy the vehicles that are being imported to try and meet the clean vehicle standard. So importers, manufacturers are bringing in a certain collection of vehicles and the public of New Zealand—so it’s not the Government choosing, it’s not anybody being paid, you know, or, say, the fuel industry paying us to persuade people to buy particular cars. It is New Zealanders who are choosing to buy a particular set of cars.

What we heard from the industry was that that hits them in two ways.

From the industry. That’s who you listen to.

One is—the industry who talked to us said that hits them in two ways. One is that they end up with a deficit, and that is a very significant deficit. They will have to buy credits which they have to pay for, ultimately. So, effectively, that is a tax. The second one is that they end up, effectively, stockpiling a very substantial number of vehicles which they can’t sell. So they get hit twice.

As a select committee, we were tasked to consider three things. We were tasked to consider the way in which the credit system worked and how long the credits will be able to be used. Secondly, we were tasked to look at the weight comparison situation, and thirdly, about the conversion rate between new and used vehicles. But the reality is that whatever we did with those things, and we did make improvements to those things, really, it’s deck chairs on the Titanic for the industry, because none of those things—you do all of those things, it still does not make the system viable and workable.

The industry told us that they are bringing in cars to offset each other, but the Kiwis, as I said, don’t want to buy that particular mix of vehicles. Now, Julie Anne Genter said that this is caving to the polluting car industry. No, it’s not. What this is is New Zealanders who are choosing to buy particular vehicles because the vehicles that they assumed that New Zealanders would want to buy when the system was set up, New Zealanders, funnily enough, have said “Actually, those are not the vehicles that we want to buy.”

What you need to do is to look at the assumptions behind the scheme. What the regulatory impact statement quite clearly says is that the assumptions behind the scheme when it was set up, basically, are wrong. That’s the fundamental thing that we need to be stepping back and actually reviewing the scheme and setting the fundamentals right and the assumption’s right, because we’ve got that wrong right from the beginning.

The industry actually, surprisingly to me, supports the idea of a clean vehicle scheme, but it doesn’t support the way in which it’s set up. So we do need to take a step back and try and make sure it’s done properly, because if we don’t do it properly, there will be really significant implications, not just for the vehicle industry, but also for New Zealanders who want to buy vehicles. I understand Julie Anne Genter said that we started off being way behind the rest of the world or much of the world. One of the problems with that is the last Government tried to catch us up very quickly. So where the rest of the world, by and large, had done this over 15 years, in New Zealand we tried to do it over five—over five.

The second thing we did is the industry has said the last Government did not engage with the industry. Now, they have regularly complained about this side of the House not consulting with whoever it is that they want us to consult with. In this instance they didn’t do that either. They did not consult with the industry. [Knocks over glass] Guess what that means!

Woah!

They did not—there was no water in it, thankfully. Guess what! That means that they did not get the settings right.

The other issue we have which comes in there that Simon Court has actually highlighted is when you buy a vehicle, you’re paying the emissions trading scheme (ETS)—when you operate a vehicle, you’re paying the ETS—and that should pay for those, you know, pesky emissions. But not only are they being taxed once, they were, under the last administration, being taxed under this clean vehicle discount scheme.

Thirdly, we had not only the Clean Car Discount; we also had the flip side of that, which wasn’t even funded because the Clean Car Discount actually costs more than the Ute tax, which we all remember as well. So it was a triple taxation. There’s an absolute lack of faith in the systems that were there. I agree, Julie Anne Genter, that, you know, it’s fair that polluters pay. It’s fair that polluters pay once, but it’s not fair that they pay twice and then three times. That is completely unfair. That is the system which was set up under the last Government.

As I said, I was surprised that the companies didn’t actually want to abolish the scheme entirely. I had some meetings outside of this as well. Julie Anne Genter, you said that you spoke to a car manufacturer this week. Well, I spoke to some big car manufacturers this week and they basically said if we didn’t fix this, they will be out of the country and those whole ranges of vehicles would not be available for New Zealanders to buy. I don’t think that that would do New Zealand any good whatsoever.

Greens don’t care.

The Greens don’t care about a lot of these things. They talk about evidence-based decision-making, but when it’s evidence they don’t like—when it’s evidence they don’t like—no, that’s not evidence at all.

The reason that these companies said that they still supported the idea of a scheme, but make sure that it is set properly, is because they don’t trust that some future Government—on the left wing side of the House—wouldn’t impose some completely new scheme, some completely new random scheme, that would be utterly unviable and unsustainable for them. They would rather have something that actually makes some sense. That is the important thing that we need to do. That is where, I think, the Minister is going. That is one of the reasons that the select committee was already keen to support the early report back of this—[Interruption]—by majority. If we don’t fix this, what it will result in is more expensive vehicles for New Zealanders and less brands available for New Zealanders.

Just to finish off with, what the industry is saying is the industry may meet the standards in time, but they cannot meet it now. As we’ve already heard, New Zealand doesn’t make a whole lot of cars. We get those vehicles from other countries in the world, so we cannot drive what they produce. We have to receive what they produce, and we need to set our standards somewhere based on reality.

A dumping ground for polluting vehicles, and we all pay for it—we all pay for it.

Yeah, thank you—thank you. I think what I’ll do is I’ll leave it there. But the key thing is that we do need to reset the system, because if we don’t reset the system, New Zealand consumers will suffer and there will be no great benefit to the climate either. I commend the bill to the House.

The next call is a split call. Scott Willis.

Thank you, Madam Speaker.

You nearly missed it.

That would be a pity. That would be a pity, given that we have, now, the fantastic recognition of being the fossil of the day. The fossils opposite must appreciate that. We have global news that is not very happy. The world is dangerously close to overshooting the 1.5 degree climate target. Temperature records continue to be broken. We saw, in the Deep South, our farmers cut off from electricity, with storms running through it recently, having to rely on the wind farms, the solar, the battery storage that was there, and generators. Those extreme storms, the fires, the floods are happening more and more again. We know that scientists say that the window for stabilising the climate is closing really, really fast.

What we need is stronger action now, not policies that will slow or weaken our emissions reductions. New Zealand’s 2026 target is laxer than the targets of China, the United Kingdom, the USA, Canada, and South Korea. Let’s question what this bill does. It gives vehicle importers more flexibility to meet the Clean Car Standard by extending carbon credit lifespan from three to four years. It allows credit transfers between new and used vehicle importers with a two to one ratio. It extends the ability to borrow against future overachievement beyond 2025. These are presented as just technical or administrative fixes, but they have real climate implications.

Why is this bill being introduced? We hear that importers are struggling to meet targets because the Government cancelled the Clean Car Discount. Low-emission vehicle demand has plummeted. Electric vehicle importers were caught short when they cancelled the Clean Car Discount and had to sell them at a serious discount. We’re seeing compliance becoming harder because of the lack of a Clean Car Discount. This bill, effectively, lets importers stretch their old credits further, bank past credit achievements, and cover the current slump in clean vehicle imports.

Let me tell you why we oppose this bill. I think it’s pretty obvious really. Weakening our climate action when the urgency is on us to take every action we can now is not just stupid; it is dangerous. Greater flexibility usually means delayed emissions reduction. Near-term cuts are critical. We need cuts to our emissions to stay close to the 1.5 degree pathway, and we should be accelerating reductions, not slowing them. Furthermore, it is fixing the wrong problem. The problem, as has been discussed, was the removal of the Clean Car Discount, not the standard itself. Instead of reinstating an effective policy, the bill compensates. That’s what this Government is doing. It’s trying to compensate for their lack. It compensates for its absence by weakening the rules.

Furthermore, it risks undermining the integrity of the clean vehicle standard. The standard already has built-in flexibility, credits, transfers, and deferrals, and a standard with too much elasticity simply loses its climate purpose. What’s more, it’s going to cost more for those people who buy the dirtier cars, because they’ll be paying more for dirty fuel, not for the electricity that they could have off peak.

Our transport policy is guided by ecological wisdom. We’re at a point where the world is breaching climate thresholds. We can’t afford climate denial legislation that dilutes climate action. We oppose this bill.

It’s time we get back to Earth on this bill and, in particular, the select committee process. We heard very clearly from submitters two bits of feedback. The first is around the supply and demand mismatch for electric vehicles, and the second, and equally important, is that most importers are not going to meet the target and that will basically impose a hell of a lot of charges on the sector.

The changes that the Minister proposed in the select committee stage—and amendments in the committee of the whole House stage—aim to address this. I think it will, and I commend the select committee for recommending a review of the scheme. I think that will be timely, and I welcome the Minister’s review. I commend this bill to the House.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I’m just looking at the time; it’s approaching 12 a.m., but given I have 10 minutes, I fully intend to take that full 10 minutes. [Interruption]

Just give us four and a half and it will be sweet.

Ha! We’ll see what happens; we’ll see what happens. I may be regaled with such witty interjections that I change my mind. Who knows? [Interruption]

I can’t hear the member!