Parliamentary debates: Wednesday, 23 July 2025

Good morning, members. The committee is resumed on the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. When we suspended last night, we were debating Part 1. Once again, the question is that Part 1 stand part.

Thank you, Madam Chair. As you noted last night, we were on Part 1—near the start of Part 1—and the Minister had engaged with a range of questions, which was very helpful to us because, of course, we’re in all-stages urgency and this is the only chance for us to ask questions and to get things on the Hansard, as well, which I think is helpful.

One of the questions that she answered yesterday—I was asking if she could name some of the places that have this space infrastructure, and she confirmed that SpaceOps NZ, which is in Awarua near Bluff and also in Warkworth, would definitely be covered. But I didn’t hear her say about the organisations that do both the launching—sorry, at Māhia Rocket Lab—but also the horizontal launching at Tāwhaki; if they would be covered or not. So it would just be useful to know the answer to those two questions—those two places specifically—and if there’s any longer list of the places that are already existing, not an exhaustive list, but if there are other places that would be captured by this. That’s just helpful to know.

Also confirming: I think she mentioned that universities and scientists would be covered, so they’re not exempt. We were talking about ham radio operators being exempt—so just to confirm that around new section 49A, which is clause 7. Then I’ll go through a bit further. We’ve also, to the Minister in the chair, a number of us have asked questions about the role of mana whenua in this. I don’t think that was commented on. If I go through now, I’ve got a couple of things I just want to touch on that the Minister might be able to answer quite quickly.

At clause 7 and new section 49D—maybe on page 8 of the bill—there’s mention of a “specified person or class of [person]”, and I was wondering if the Minister—

Achoo!

Bless you. That was quite the interjection. I hope the member is well. The question there is just if there is any example of a specified person; that’s referred to at (1)(b). I’m just going through my bill. Another thing where it might be useful to have examples is at clause 21 and new section 83B, which is the direction to stop providing electricity or internet services to the space infrastructure—if there are any examples of that sort of thing happening anywhere else in the world, where that idea to stop providing electricity or internet services came from, and if that covers everything or not?

Then, it would be also good—and other speakers might ask for specific questions on this—but we are amending the principal Act, which obviously will say how regulations are made. It would be useful for the Minister to discuss how the regulations will be made that are set out in clause 24—the new regulations; what sort of consultation there will be with people, given that this is all in urgency.

I also want to bring the Minister’s attention to an amendment, in my name, that is to enable a post-enactment review, because this is going through all stages in urgency. We accept the Minister has said that it needs to go through urgency and that there is a real need for this legislation to be in place. So, whilst we accept that, it would be useful to have a post-enactment review in case there are mistakes or somebody is going to be impacted in a way that we haven’t thought of during our time here.

This amendment in my name suggests going to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. However, I’m very happy, if the Minister is interested in this amendment, for that select committee to be the Intelligence and Security Committee, maybe, or the Regulations Review Committee might be another one. Then I’ve also said, in this amendment, that that select committee should report back to the House no later than 25 November 2025. So, again, that date is entirely arbitrary and one that I picked based on Tuesdays, because this Act is going to come into effect on a Tuesday.

Very happy for the Minister to suggest amendments to that and table other amendments or for the Minister to do that. But the point of this is that that committee would scrutinise the legislation that’s already operative, so the timing issue isn’t an issue, but properly look at the legislation and engage with those people who know about space infrastructure and then report back. Then, if the House agrees to those recommendations, then amendments suggested by that committee are treated as an amendment bill with the bill proceeding without all of the stages that we would have in a normal amendment.

That is the suggestion. I’d be very keen to hear the Minister’s views on that. As I say, the time frames and the select committees or if there are any changes—we are very pleased to discuss those. But the point is we’re going through all-stages urgency. We accept that there’s a reason for all-stages urgency, but there is no opportunity for us to have good engagement with people who know about the subject matter, and this would provide an opportunity for that to happen without inhibiting the bill from commencing.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and good morning to all members of the committee. A couple of interesting contributions already, one by the Hon Rachel Brooking and one by another member—I didn’t see who sneezed, but I hope she’s recovering. Ladies and gentlemen, a number of issues have been raised, both reiterating comments and discussions from last night by the honourable member, and I have the benefit of some of the analysis that flowed from those questions asked last night and now this morning, too. So please indulge me, members of the committee, if I run through those as best I’m able in terms of understanding the discussion that’s taken place so far.

The first is around the point about the coverage of the Acts, as compared with those different locations, versus those that the members asked as to whether they’d be covered by the ambit of the regime—up in Warkworth, which is an area within my patch, was referred to, as well as down South, where the member herself hails from. But in terms of vertical or horizontal launches, these would be covered, I understand, if they operate ground-based space infrastructure—that’s within the scope of the regime. So there’s no attempt to exclude or include more explicitly than that. But I should point out, for the sake of completeness, that activities that are already covered by the principal Act and are not being brought in or out of the regime by the amendment can be understood to be captured or otherwise already, in those terms.

As for “a specified person”, that will be a person specified in regulation. And I’m sorry, that sounds quite circular and possibly unhelpful at this point—except to say, of course, the regulation-making power, as the members referred to, will contain a certain amount of the necessary detail. That will be able to be updated as time goes on, in the way that regulations are more readily updated, of course, than primary legislation. So I’d point out that, in terms of the member’s thoughtful suggestion that a post-enactment review be mandated by the legislation, a certain amount of the detail will be under constant review by way of that regulatory process, including any regulatory review, but also, there’s a constant review—with a small “r”—that takes place, of course, in terms of the operation of any legislation. This being an amendment bill, the amending provisions would be reviewed constantly for effectiveness and also the extent to which they interact with other rights and responsibilities of New Zealanders, particularly. The Minister for Space feels—and I, in her place, am happy to relay but also support the notion—that we don’t need to specify a mandated review mechanism, be it in front of the Intelligence and Security Committee or, indeed, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, as per the original proposal.

In terms of turning off electricity as being a particular action that might be taken, the intent there, or the enabling of that action, is to prevent the remote operation of such infrastructure while a disposal order is carried out. So it buys a bit of time, in that sense, pending the disposal, and that’s where it’s deemed to be necessary on national interest grounds. And, just referring to the wording of the legislation, conditions imposed by the Minister are said to be those “which may include, without limitation,”—you know, those that are specified in the bill. So it’s deliberately not excluding the range of conditions or actions that might be taken—noting, of course, that in this highly technical realm and with developing technology, it might well be the case that there are conditions or actions that might be necessary in the future that we’re not able to contemplate now and would be inappropriate to calcify in primary legislation, as compared with responding on an ongoing basis through enactment of regulation.

As for urgency, of course, the member is rightly diligent to note that we need to examine, as carefully as we can within the context, the bill, and, of course, the committee of the whole House stage is at least one way of doing that. But I think it’s also worth reiterating a point that was probably made last night—in fact, I’m certain that it was—that this is an urgent proposition and the attention of the House, including its committee today, is important to deal with the issue as expeditiously as possible so that we can have the benefit of, effectively, these defensive measures in the case of those who would do harm to New Zealand and its national interest.

I’ll leave my contribution there; I see my five minutes is nearly up. But I will acknowledge the point made around consultation and say, again, there’s nothing to preclude that on an ongoing basis in terms of the way that the Act is operating.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Just to pick up on some of the answers that the Minister just gave us, I think the point with the post-enactment review is that, yeah, everyone around the committee understood what the Minister was saying: a gap needed to be plugged, and there is broader acceptance of that around the committee. I think the point is that you have to actually be sure that the wheels are going to stay on the wagon—are all the nuts and bolts actually screwed on properly? So a post-enactment review would enable us to actually have a more thorough look at it to make sure that it does what it says that it does.

Another question around the turning off the electricity part of it: I was wondering, well, what does that mean for people that are on solar, what does it mean if they’re on battery—how will the regulator know that? They might think that, actually, this ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI) is not doing what they said it was going to do so they’re going to turn off the electricity, and they think that’s all going to be fine. But, actually, there are lots of different ways around it, so I guess it’d be good to understand practical ways of how the regulator would deal with that particular issue.

I also have another question around the application process. I guess the question is: if someone gets the permit to be able to run a GBSI, and it’s a company, but then it on-sells that to somebody else and they on-sell it again and then, next thing you know, it’s in the hands of a nefarious, possibly foreign actor that is counter to our national interest, how does that work—how does the oversight happen on that, because, often, as we know, there are different kinds of arrangements that happen? So that is a question there around that possible scenario, which officials behind you might have already thought of—possibly already have—but I think it would be useful for the committee to understand that particular perspective.

Just coming back to the questions that have emerged about where exactly this applies, my hearing of it last night was that a situation like Waihopai wouldn’t apply, because they’ve got the Defence Force exemption, but that Māhia would apply, because they don’t have that exemption. But if I was wrong in terms of how I heard that, getting some clarification from the Minister about exactly what is being covered here, I think, would be really important. So those are my questions.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I do have some questions for the Minister, but I just wanted to start by speaking in favour of my colleague the Hon Rachel Brooking’s amendment. I think the response from the Minister was that there would be review of the relevant regulations, so there’s not cause for concern in that regard. However, I do think that yesterday, when the Minister spoke in the chair, she spoke about the regulations coming into force after a year and that she would be exercising powers in the meantime. So there are aspects that aren’t attached to the technical content of the regulations that, in my view, ought to be examined, ordinarily by a select committee. In this case, we don’t have that opportunity and so, in my view, the proposal is a valid one because there are very unique powers, in my view, that are being exercised within the national security space which otherwise wouldn’t be examined.

The other issue that potentially wouldn’t be examined in the ordinary process of creating the regulations is something that is unique to the House itself, which is whether the substantive content of the regulations is best suited to primary legislation or to regulation. Certainly, that happens through some Parliamentary Counsel Office advice to the Attorney-General, but my view is that that’s a legislative function, and, again, ordinarily that would happen within select committee processes. So in terms of those two aspects in particular, it doesn’t feel to me that there is post-legislation scrutiny on them. So, again, I’m just speaking in favour of that amendment.

There are some other specific questions just resulting from the discussion yesterday. The definition of “protective security arrangements” in regulation 3(1) lists not an exhaustive list but things that the applicant, if you like, would need to include. There has been a lot of discussion about nefarious actors and third-party actors, and I did wonder whether there was consideration of being more explicit in that provision, so speaking explicitly about corruption, explicitly about bribery, and what requirements, what investigations would need to be made of third-party actors.

I’m also looking at clause 6, “Section 6 amended (Act binds the Crown)”, which is the exemptions section that a few others have touched on. I was curious as to the meaning of new section (2)(b)(i). That’s the exemption for the New Zealand Defence Force, but it’s also an exemption for “a person assisting or providing services to, or working jointly with, the New Zealand Defence Force;”. I wonder if the Minister could give us an understanding of the scope of that and whether that could include foreign actors who we act in partnership with, as well, and what the intended scope of that inclusion is.

The other exclusion is new section 6(2)(b)(iii), which lists “an intelligence and security agency;”. My question there is whether the intention is for that to read “New Zealand intelligence and security agency”. The reason I ask the question is because in new paragraph (iv), just under it, it specifies “the New Zealand Police”. So just considering whether there’s a need for an amendment there, or whether there’s a definition that I haven’t spotted that makes it clear that we’re speaking here about the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I’m seeking to take a call to respond to the thoughtful questioning from both members who have contributed, in the hope of staying on top of the issues that have been raised.

The wheels on wagon metaphor raised by Teanau Tuiono—of course, he’s right to say that we need to identify if the wheels might fall off a regime, but there are ways of doing that other than by specifying in statute that a particular type of review must take place at a particular time. To extend the metaphor, if the wheels are wobbly or the vehicle is otherwise not proceeding as it should in the right direction and in a smooth fashion, then it’s incumbent upon the Government of the day—including the Government agencies for which there is regulatory stewardship responsibility—to investigate that. It seems to me that this is a matter that is sufficiently high stakes that the appropriate degree of scrutiny as to the ongoing operation of the regime would be considered and watched carefully, such that any such shortfalls or mechanical difficulties would be identified in a timely fashion.

As for turning off electricity as a particular mechanism, I take the member’s point that solar and other ways of operating electricity exist beyond the traditional way. If not a switch to be flicked on or off, I assume that there are ways that power could be disabled in the way that’s contemplated by the legislation in respect of GBSI, or ground-based space infrastructure. I was remiss in not having spelt that out earlier at least once, but the acronym from there on is probably—hopefully—acceptable.

As for clarification in terms of whether the likes of Māhia Peninsula activities are caught by the regime, I don’t wish to be definitive in a way that would be unhelpful were I to seek to tender what would, effectively, be legal advice and be wrong. So I won’t venture an opinion on that except to, again, just reiterate the point that to the extent that activities and locations are already captured by the primary legislation as to be amended, we’re not necessarily displacing that by the addition of the measures in this amendment bill.

As to the points made by Vanushi Walters, I do take on board her point about regulations only being reviewable in that typical way, and also the time gap. If I may say, that seems to me a worthwhile point to make. Nevertheless, it happens all the time that the House will make a determination on that which is appropriate for the subject of primary legislation—as opposed to secondary or tertiary—at the point that the legislation is made, and then a determination of the content to fit within the regulations is made after. Of course, that’s the nature of a regulation-making power, as my fellow alumni of the Regulations Review Committee will appreciate, so I’m not sure that I can take that point much further except to acknowledge her having raised it. There’s always a tension between the detail that one includes in primary legislation versus the expansive ability to add, over time, technical detail in regulations that may be amended in a much more timely and flexible manner later.

As for third-party actors, I suspect it would be unhelpful to be more specific about the types of nefarious activity that we might want to include, even in the way that we might say that there might be other types contemplated. It’s probably typical within the realm of national security that we wouldn’t want to bind our hands in a way that we would find unhelpful—albeit, again, I acknowledge the tension between certainty and that going to the rule of law diktat, ordinarily, that the law must be knowable. I’m hopeful that the measures in the bill would be applied in an appropriate and proportionate way, and I know that the Minister for Space would understand and take seriously those responsibilities—not least of all because she’s the Attorney-General and, of course, understands that balance of rights approach that’s always appropriate, and no less in such occasions as this.

As for section 6 exemptions, I don’t myself yet know if those working with the New Zealand Defence Force might include non-New Zealand agencies or entities. If I receive some advice on that in time to be helpful to the member, then I’ll certainly look forward to relaying that.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to just direct attention to new section 3A of Part 3, inserted by clause 21: the provisions in 83A around disposal orders; 83B, giving the Minister the opportunity to unplug the electricity system; and 83C, forfeiture orders. These are, I think, by any measure quite Draconian provisions that give the Minister the power, if certain criteria are met, to order the disposal of private property and, ultimately, to put in place a forfeiture order. It’s easy to imagine a scenario where that would result in very significant economic harm to the owner of that ground-based space infrastructure.

I wonder, given how keen this Government is on enshrining the principle in law of compensation to the owners of assets that are affected by regulation, with the current passage through the legislative process of the Regulatory Standards Bill—the Government is obviously very keen on that principle. I just wonder whether or not the Minister for Space has considered the possibility of, let’s say, the Russians operating a bit of ground-based space infrastructure that we deem to be a threat to the national interest, or they’ve somehow inveigled their way into some other private sector operator providing a service and yet, the data is ending up in the hands of the Russians—just for argument’s sake—and the Government chooses to close that down, causing significant loss either to the Russians or their erstwhile partners. Would the Government consider compensation consistent with its adherence to the principle in the Regulatory Standards Bill?

I’d be keen to hear the Minister in the chair’s view on that but, also, I wonder whether, in fact, the Government has considered that there are embassies and diplomatic missions in New Zealand who operate ground-based space infrastructure. They operate satellite technology that I’m pretty certain would meet the definition of ground-based space infrastructure. If a diplomatic mission is conducting the interception of signals and so on from its properties here in the capital, and it was deemed to be doing so contrary to the national interest, would those diplomatic missions be covered by this bill?

Thank you very much. I look forward to responding to those points made by Mr Twyford. To come back, however, first to the question that was posed by Ms Walters: there isn’t a need to specify New Zealand in terms of security intelligence agencies because those terms are defined already in the principal Act, I understand. In terms of whether non - New Zealand actors could be said to be working with the New Zealand Defence Force such as to qualify for the exclusion, I’m advised that they could be caught by such an exclusion. This may or may not help to assuage the fears of Mr Twyford, or at least to answer the question that he has raised in terms of non - New Zealand actors, be they embassies or high commissions acting in this country. I suspect that there would be important conversations at a diplomatic level if there was any need for activity of that nature. That would be well above my pay grade, I hasten to add.

I also hear his concern about Draconian powers to switch off. Yes, these are important and serious powers, but they’re being legislated for a reason. By the way, I do acknowledge and thank the members opposite, so to speak, who have engaged with the principle of the legislation being important and, of course, asking questions to ascertain the detail. As far as those Draconian powers, and the segue into the Regulatory Standards Bill, I do wonder if Mr Twyford is signalling his intent to support that legislation, because he’s obviously very concerned about the right to compensation. I would be very surprised if the disablement of Russian ground-based infrastructure were to enable Vladimir Putin to get a red cent—and I use the phrase advisedly—as a result of this regime. I think he can feel as assured as possible on that point.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I have a number of questions for the Associate Minister of Defence, because we’re still on clauses 6 and 7, largely, and there are still a number of areas that should be covered.

Thank you to the Minister for his excellent, as always, response to our questions. I think to start with, in terms of the review clause, I want to draw the Minister’s attention to the regulatory impact statement (RIS), paragraph 145, which is around the fact that the principal Act includes the provision—in fact, in section 86 of the principal Act it actually includes a three-year review provision. The recommendation here is that we propose a similar provision to be included for review of the operation and effectiveness of the ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI) regulation regime two years after the commencement. However, that is not present in this bill, despite that being the recommendation in the regulatory impact statement. I just also want to support the tabled amendment by the Hon Rachel Brooking on this because, again, it is something that we see stated in the RIS but not reflected in the bill.

I just also want to pick up on what the Minister mentioned before and what the Hon Phil Twyford questioned in terms of what happens if we have this one-year transition period and, after, that the Minister is able to authorise the permit—yes, in some ways the permit—for the operations of GBSI. I want to pick up on what it says on page 10 of the departmental disclosure statement. I want to just check in terms of the reading here because it does say in 4.1 that the Minister has the power to require an operator to dispose of their interest. But right at the end, it says—you know, this could potentially go to a District Court—“the constable to dispose of the interest or right and pay any proceeds of the disposal to the recipient of the disposal order.” Would those proceeds also include, then—if the Minister wouldn’t mind elaborating—the cost of the interest in its entirety, or at least the market value of the cost of that particular interest, as part of that court order?

I’m just going to pick up on some of the conversations that we’ve had, and I just want to go into a little bit more detail around there. Picking up on something the Minister for Space mentioned last night—this is a question that I signalled in my second reading—which is, in the regulatory impact statement, there were four options given to how we could look at managing some of the gaps that we have in the current legislation around GBSI. The most persuasive options were options three and four; option three is authorisation regime, option four is licensing. The Minister mentioned about licensing yesterday so I wanted to check with the Minister in the chair today on whether the Minister wouldn’t mind elaborating on the decision between, why in the end, we decided to go with option three, the authorisation regime, and not option four in terms of licensing—because they seem to be, according to the RIS, of equal footing.

One of the other questions I had, which hasn’t been responded to, is around the definition of “authorisation holder”. In section 4, amended by clause 5(1), it talks about the person who is the sole holder of a GBSI, whereas I mentioned yesterday that in the Overseas Investment Act it talks about the possibility of a collaborator. So how would a collaborator be considered under this legislation when the authorisation holder is a sole holder? Without the sole holder it naturally encompasses collaboration, because in the example that is on page 4, it talks about person A and person B, and if person B, for lack of a better term, sublets that particular control from person A, the sole holder is still person A and not person B. But it still doesn’t go into any elaboration on collaboration, and it doesn’t specify—in this case, I’m assuming the accountability, and anything that person A has to answer to, falls on person A and not person B? So if the Minister wouldn’t mind clarifying that.

My final question, noticing that I’m very short on time, but I do have another question if I may, Madam Chair? My final question is around clause 7—Madam Chair?

Lawrence Xu-Nan.

Thank you. My final question is around new section 49A, inserted by clause 7, subclause 2A(i), and that is around communicating with a space object. Again, it kind of goes back to what I wanted to ask about accountability. When we are looking at communicating with a space object and also anything that’s relating to a GBSI, you’re also in the process of collecting data. I want to check with the Minister, from a data-protection and also data-sovereignty perspective, as part of the requirement for authorisation, whether the Minister would consider requiring the operator of GBSI to give a copy or all copies of data collected as a result of operation or be made available as a requirement of national interest.

Now, the regulatory impact statement was very clear that the reason we have something like this is mainly for our national interest and security, and particularly how it could be used for military purposes. I think it might be quite an important element for us to be able to at least readily view or require the operator to make the data they collect readily available by the relevant Minister in order for them to have the authorisation.

Those are a couple of my questions. If the Minister would elaborate on why has the bill gone against the advice of the regulatory impact statement for a two-year review, in paragraph 145; questions around the collaborator and the definition of sole holder; accountability measures; the difference between authorisation regime and licensing; and, finally, in terms of the requirement for the availability to review data that’s been collected by the GBSI as a requirement for authorisation.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I’m grateful to Lawrence Xu-Nan for a typically thoughtful contribution from him—and he’s flattered me into giving as helpful a reply as I’m able.

At the risk of going round in circles on the point about a mandatory review versus a non-mandatory one, it seems, to me, clear that the Government decision has been around retaining flexibility in terms of the time frame and manner of such a review—notwithstanding that there is advice that there could, or rather should, be a review specified in the primary legislation, with the rationale being that, as already canvassed with various colleagues, it will be helpful to monitor the ongoing operation and effectiveness of the Act. There are other ways to skin that cat, frankly, so the Government’s view is that it’s not necessary to specify that in primary legislation. I appreciate, in relation to the particular proposal put forward by the Hon Rachel Brooking and other comments made in the House, that that may be unsatisfying to some members of the committee, but I feel at this point I can’t take that point much further.

In terms of the property rights argument, as expressed by the Hon Phil Twyford, but also with a link to the data sovereignty element raised by Dr Xu-Nan, I think it’s worth exploring—but briefly—the mechanics of what would happen in the event of the measures being triggered within the Act, namely that there is a disposal order that would allow the person issued with it to dispose of their right or interest in an agreed manner. It might be that the switch be flicked at an agreed time or in an agreed way, and it could include selling those rights or interests—and data, of course, could be conceived as being within the ambit of the rights and interests associated with the physical infrastructure. Where there is a forfeiture order, on the other hand—as opposed to a disposal order—the Act allows for sale proceeds to be returned to the person. So, unlikely as it might seem in the case of hostile foreign actors, for those of a less aggressive or unsavoury element, it might be that it’s a matter of negotiation for the New Zealand Government to engage in a conversation about the way that the confiscation, effectively, of property rights not take place but instead an agreed and mutually beneficial outcome take place—that the evil is avoided without undue impingement on the investment of those who might, for non-nefarious reasons, invest in ground-based infrastructure.

In terms of collaboration, and therefore accountability, I’m not certain that there’s much I can say about its interaction with the Overseas Investment Act regime, but I would say that the intent of the legislation is to appropriately capture the activities of those who are effectively, as opposed to nominally, undertaking them. It’s my understanding from reading the legislation that there would be nothing to preclude as a nation—“us” being New Zealand and the Government through its various agencies—from acting in a manner that would reflect the intent of the legislation. Notwithstanding that it might—if you’ll excuse the legal language, and I know you will, sir—pierce the corporate veil in terms of the ownership and other structures around that.

As for licensing versus authorisation: yes, both are possible regimes. The member rightly points out that these are both contemplated as possibilities within the regulatory impact statement. It seems to me that the Minister chose the authorisation route as best reflecting the balance that we wish to have in terms of being empowering but also enabling flexibility and, of course, balancing those considerations on which we have already touched.

Finally, in terms of the data sovereignty point, I should also add that the power under the Act is to seek necessary information, and to ask operators to provide all data wouldn’t necessarily be practicable in the circumstances when that arose, whereas particular data could be stored if it’s needed. Again, the effort is to provide as much prescriptive enablement of the functions that we all, I think, wish to see provided in legislation but without constraining ourselves in the manner that that might take place.

I do have a few questions that I would be keen to put to the Minister. But just before I get into that—and I acknowledge the Associate Minister of Defence has said he’s not going to move on the post-enactment review amendment; I take that point—but I do want to register my emphatic support for my colleague the Hon Rachel Brooking’s amendment, for the reasons outlined by her and by Vanushi Walters. It is disappointing that is not going any further, given the circumstances under which we are passing this bill.

To my questions: I do want to put to the Minister a question that I put to the Minister for Space last night. I did see her nodding, but the House rose before I could get a response, so I will just lay that out again, and that is with regards to new section 49C(4)(b)—

Repetition!

Well, I didn’t get an answer, Mr Doocey, so I have—

I didn’t say anything.

Oh well, whoever said that; Tim, somebody. Anyway, what I want to know is, with regards to the national interests test and the regard that the Minister needs to pay to national security, specifically, it does say in new section 49C(5) that “Before granting a GBSI activity authorisation, the Minister may consult the intelligence and security agencies about—”, and it goes on to lay out the risks to national security and then the extent to which the risks can be mitigated through the authorisation conditions.

My question to the Minister was why it seemed to be written in a way that it was optional rather than a requirement. Given the emphasis on national security for this piece of legislation, why is it not a requirement to consult with the relevant Minister and the relevant agencies, there? Related to that, in clause 7, “Replace section 53(4)(a) with … in the case of a launch licence”—and it goes on to list a whole bunch of licences, and it says: “must consult the security Ministers in accordance with section 55; and … in the case of a GBSI”—this is (aa)—“activity authorisation, may consult the intelligence and security agencies about—” those two points: the risk and the mitigation to the risk. So just keen for some clarification why that consultation is not a requirement.

The other question I had was around what I understand is already happening, which is—and I get that this legislation aims to capture operators and not the host of the GBSI—but I understand that there are scenarios where the host is in New Zealand but the operator is offshore in a different country. Therefore, my question is whether this legislative regime would capture them in that scenario, as well.

My final question that I want to raise is to tease out a little bit the options versus the funding model that is laid out or touched upon within the regulatory impact statement (RIS). There’s a fair bit of detail and analysis around the different options considered, the four options considered. Totally take the point that’s made in the RIS why option one—which is the counterfactual—was not the way to go, and option four was probably too heavy-handed given the cost requirements there. So I take that point and it seems to be between two and three, and the Minister and the Government has landed on option three.

However, when it comes to the funding of the implementation, I would have thought that the concerns around effectiveness would have been both in the design of the scheme but also in the implementation of this regulatory framework. There is a fair bit of ongoing monitoring that is involved, as well, and yet it does say in the RIS somewhere that there isn’t specific funding for the implementation of this. In another bit, it says that the anticipated estimated cost is of two fulltime-equivalents at the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. It then goes on to say that the intelligence community may require further resources depending on the number of authorisations, but that they will need to assess as they go. So why wasn’t it then, perhaps, a decision to land on option two, then to move to three? Was that considered? Just keen to get a sense of how this is going to be funded, because that leads to the effectiveness of the framework, as well.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

I call the Hon Rachel Brooking, but before you begin your call, there is a lot of repetition that is now starting to come back. It doesn’t matter how differently the questions are phrased; we keep a close track of what they’re referring to.

Well, Madam Chair, we’re all going through this, and, as you know, we are in all-stages urgency—

I do understand.

—and we’re trying to work our way through this. I have some questions based on some of the Associate Minister of Defence’s responses so far. I was asking about Māhia and Tāwhaki and he said he didn’t want to get it wrong—to get the answer wrong; I don’t mean to be rude there at all. Can he clarify, then, the point is: if you already require, under the principal Act, a licence or permit for launching, but if you also have space infrastructure that will require the space infrastructure authorisation as well as whatever the launch ones are—so that’s one question.

Then, we’ve been talking a bit about the disposal orders—so that’s at new section 83A, inserted by clause 21. The Minister just went through that process, and I note that a disposal order may “specify any reasonable steps that must be taken in order to comply with the disposal order”. So if the Minister can confirm: some of this equipment is very large and I imagine—but can the Minister confirm my imagination—that it’s his expectation that any order would go through, in some detail, how it is that this large equipment would be disposed of.

Then, I note that the Minister has talked about, at 83A(4), “The Minister must have regard to New Zealand’s international obligations when acting under this section.” Are those international obligations the compensation that he’s referred to or is it something more than compensation, as well? Is it different trade agreements? Is it different treaties? What does he imagine that section to mean?

Then, wanting to just link all of that back into these questions about the host and the operator. So there’s: “An authorisation holder must—(a) comply with” and give a whole lot of information when applying for the authorisation. So that’s at new section 49D, inserted by clause 7. I’m particularly interested in 49D(e) which is: “if the authorisation holder operates, or proposes to operate, [the infrastructure] to carry out regulated activities on behalf, or for the benefit, of another person, ensure that the authorisation holder has in place partner due diligence arrangements that meet the requirements”, etc.

I know, I’ve visited space ops, just the one in the south, not the one in your electorate, Minister; this is big infrastructure and some of those—my colleague Ingrid Leary described them as a Dr Seuss - type thing whereby the antenna come up and move around—will be controlled offshore. Is it the idea that—so in this case, the person on the ground, which happens to be a council-controlled organisation, would have to show the relationships that they have with those operators offshore to get the authorisation and then the regulator would have to be satisfied that there is the right security arrangements in place, or not satisfied, and therefore, they wouldn’t be able to operate? That’s of particular, very real economic importance to those operators, and I’ve no doubt that they all want to do the best, I’m not saying that—but they will be interested in how these aspects are going to work in practice.

If you’ve got comments on that, and on what thought has gone into those relationships that the hosts—they seem to be the hosts, to me, because they are the people who have the land, and the big bits of equipment are on their land, but the antennae, the tracking that they’re doing on the satellites might be operated from offshore; how is that going to be regulated?

Thank you, Madam Chair. I love a good Dr Seuss reference and I feel like there’s something about Oh, the Places You’ll Go! in there. I feel like we’re in that waiting room on page 7 of the book—no, just kidding; I don’t know the page number, but it’s very familiar.

In response to the points made by the Hon Rachel Brooking in terms of the disposal of the large physical infrastructure, I think it’s a question that I might have anticipated from a member of Parliament concerned with environmental considerations, and rightly so. I would think, however, that there’d be nothing that would necessarily preclude the disposal of such infrastructure in a way that would be consistent with the usual manner of disposing of waste, as it would be by that point. The member will be more familiar with those legislative and regulatory frameworks than me, but it seems to me that it would need to be disposed of thoughtfully, but I don’t think that’s a matter to specify in this legislation in relation to, effectively, the data and space-related aspects of how the infrastructure is used.

In terms of international obligations, whether that goes beyond mere compensation, instinctively I would expect that it might, and we can all use our imagination about different international instruments to which New Zealand is a signatory that might become relevant, but, again, I think it’s appropriate in terms of the background documentation and the legislation itself not to attempt an exhaustive list of what those obligations might be for fear of missing out some, or unduly emphasising the importance of others, in a way that’s general, given the particular circumstances might dictate what is appropriate or not. And, of course, our international obligations do change over time as we enter into, and theoretically could withdraw from, international obligations of a bilateral or multilateral nature. So it seems sensible to me that we’re not more specific about that, but I can’t see a reason, personally, that it would be limited only to matters of compensation as to those obligations.

As to the authorisation process and what would be necessary to demonstrate security and other relationships with non - New Zealand actors, I can imagine well that a thorough process of determining such factors and investigating them will be necessary for authorisation to be passed, but, again, it’s not something that I can comment on in terms of the content of the law that’s in front of us as to how those discussions might play out in any particular case.

Passing to the points made by the Hon Priyanca Radhakrishnan, to respond to that point that she’s raised regarding whether the Minister for Space should be required, on a mandatory basis, to consult the security Minister; she’s rightly pointed out that the Minister for Space “may” but we’re not saying “must”. That’s because, in practice, consultation will take place between the regulator—which is the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, of course—and security agencies for every authorisation application, as agreed from time to time by Cabinet. So that’s, we think, a more efficient approach requiring consultation that would actually lead to the same outcome than necessarily requiring that particular formal element whereby consultation must take place in a way that’s understood by that term. So we think that, overall, the regime will provide for appropriate advice to the decision-making Minister; and, of course, the Minister herself, or himself, potentially in the future, would make decisions on behalf of the Government, in any case.

The other points made by Priyanca Radhakrishnan seem to me to be around costs and funding, and we think that the effectiveness of the design and implementation is appropriately set, but, again, all these matters are not set in stone and can be reviewed and should be reviewed in terms of practice as well as the policy over time. Then she’s again made the point about the regulatory review proposal, and I’d hate to repeat my own answer on that and thereby risk the committee of the whole House stage being shut down by the Chair—because we wouldn’t want that to happen, would we now?—but if I were to dwell on it for one more moment, she said she wants to express her view on that. Of course, parties will be able to do that through a vote in due course, at some point, on the proposal as encapsulated by Ms Brooking’s tabled amendment.

I think there is still room for new material.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I actually just have quite a small question on an area that we haven’t covered yet. This is clause 7, new section 49E, “Minister may vary, revoke, or suspend GBSI activity authorisation”. I actually just have a very small question on this. Understandably, the Minister may vary or potentially may revoke and suspend a particular authorisation, but can I just check if the Minister would consider—if there’s the scope, for example, to give a prior warning first, to say, “Look, you are operating out of the scope of the particular thing.” Is there going to be some sort of criteria that the Minister for Space is going to be looking at when there is a suspension of a particular authorisation?

That’s actually, essentially, my question, which is around whether there might be a notification period to say, “Hey, we’ve noticed something that you’re not supposed to be doing. Please correct yourself before further actions might be taken.”, or maybe it depends on severity—that’s it, you know, you violated it, you get your authorisation revoked. If the Minister wouldn’t mind elaborating how that revocation would work.

I feel as though the mechanisms already have a degree of flexibility in the fact that there would be a discussion, or could be a discussion—could be a discussion—and the disposal of data in an agreed manner could contemplate the opportunity to respond, if the Minister, acting on behalf of the Government for the people of New Zealand, were to determine that was appropriate. So it seems to me there’s nothing that precludes that, but, at the same time, we don’t want to be so prescriptive in law, as in the other factors that have been raised, in a way that would be unhelpful in the future.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I just wanted to respond to the Minister’s response on a question relating to exemptions. This is actually more to do with the Minister’s lack of power in terms of granting an exemption or preventing an exemption, on the basis of the Minister’s response. I asked a question earlier about new section 6(2)(b)(i), in terms of who that exemption would apply to. The response was that it could apply to a foreign actor as well, potentially. My colleague the Hon Phil Twyford asked questions about embassies in New Zealand. Putting those two together, it feels to me like partners such as our Five Eyes partners could potentially fit into that space.

Now there may, of course, be times when it is appropriate that an exemption would be granted. However, on New Zealand territory, it would seem to me that that ought to be a decision of the Minister, in terms of the scope of an exemption. I’m not ordinarily one to argue for an increase to discretionary powers, but it just feels to me, in light of the way that clause is drafted, that either ministerial discretion should apply or the clause should be drafted more closely. Another example of how the clause could be drafted more closely is that there’s also an exemption for a person who’s “providing services to … the New Zealand Defence Force”. That’s it. It’s not couched by more limiting language. I wonder whether the Minister would be open to limiting that, for example, by including the words “security or intelligence service” to the New Zealand Defence Force.

I’m just wondering whether there is either an appetite for more closely drafted language to ensure that New Zealand is still retaining its autonomy in terms of potential third-party actors or whether, appropriately, the Minister should have discretion to prevent an exemption from being granted in certain circumstances—and, if so, whether that should be drafted into the legislation.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I think I understand the point made by Vanushi Walters, but I also think that the discretion could be applied—or would be applied in practice—at the stage that the New Zealand Defence Force would choose to work with the other partners, be they other Government agencies of New Zealand, including the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service or the Government Communications Security Bureau, potentially, or overseas players. I think there’d be enough flexibility in the system such that they could choose with whom they work. Therefore, to give the Minister either more power or discretion, on the one hand, or to more tightly constrain her or him, on the other hand, isn’t necessary.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

The Hon Rachel Brooking’s tabled amendment to Part 1, providing for post-enactment review of the bill by a select committee, is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

Members, we come now to Part 2. This is the debate on clauses 26 and 27, “Amendment to Outer Space and High-altitude Activities (Licences and Permits) Regulations 2017”. The question is that Part 2 stand part.

Thank you, Madam Chair. First of all, I just want to point out again that one of the things the Minister said yesterday as part of the first reading was that the consistency report against the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (BORA) will be available on the Ministry of Justice website. I want to, first of all, raise the point that that BORA report is still not available on the Ministry of Justice website—so if the Minister wouldn’t mind looking into it.

My question is around clause 27, “Regulation 3 amended”. I understand that when we’re looking at the licence and permits, the revocation of the definition of “protective security arrangements”, as expressed earlier, is due to the introduction of the authorisation regime, particularly when we’re looking at the activities under permits and licences, which are replaced by the definition of “protective security arrangements” being inserted into section 4 of the principal Act by clause 5. That is also a covered activity under “GBSI activity authorisation”, and, again, just going back to the regulatory impact statement, when we’re looking at table 1 on page 8, which covers what the existing regulatory environment and non-regulatory environment is, versus what the authorisation regime will be doing, my question to the Minister is this. By revoking—sorry, just another piece is that we already see there’s still a degree of overlap between, for example, the new authorisation regime and other legislative environments, such as the Overseas Investment Act, around collaboration with overseas parties.

Can I just check with the Minister as a reassurance that the revocation of the protective security arrangements in the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities (Licences and Permits) Regulations isn’t going to create a gap in the regulatory environment that the authorisation regime doesn’t cover. Is there any possibility that we have inadvertently created a separate gap?

Thank you, Madam Chair. This is a very simple question for the Associate Minister of Defence because, as he will be aware, Part 2 of this bill is very, very short. What clause 27 does is amend an interpretation in the regulations, and—just to make sure we’re all talking about the same thing—that regulation has a definition of “protective security arrangements”. It seems that the definition in the regulation is very, very similar to the new definition that is coming in through this amendment bill and the only difference is that it now refers to an authorisation. So my question is: am I right—is the point of this clause in Part 2 simply to delete the secondary instrument’s definition because it’s now going to be in the primary instrument?

Thank you, Madam Chair. Just to respond to the question posed by the Hon Rachel Brooking: that’s my understanding—yes—that that’s the intent of what lawyers call a switcheroo, of course, whereby revoking the definition at the same time as creating the new definition within primary legislation will be so as not to create a gap. So I think we’re on the same page with that, and it’s a fair point, of course, to seek clarification.

A fair point, as well, Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan has raised is around coverage, or the possibility of a gap between this legislation and the Overseas Investment Act. That’s a piece of legislation in which I take a certain degree of interest as the Minister for Land Information, wearing another hat. I’m currently moonlighting for the Minister for Space. Some might unkindly call me a space cadet, but I’m sure that wouldn’t be a phrase everyone else would agree with in any other context. As land information Minister, I’m naturally interested in the operation of the Overseas Investment Act, and it seems to me if the passage of this legislation were to result in any kind of mismatch or undesirable duplicate of coverage or—more importantly—a gap, then that would be a matter that we can and should review. So I’ll take that as a helpful point from the member.

In terms of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act vet, it’s unfortunate if the member doesn’t have access to that by way of it being uploaded to the Ministry of Justice website. This is something I’ve encountered myself before, and it’s not a particularly helpful situation. But, for what it’s worth, I can relate to the member at least that my understanding is that the vet passed, which is to say that there is nothing in this Act that was considered to be inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.

Tēnā koe e te Māngai. Tuatahi tēnei te mihi atu ki a koe e te Minita.

[Thank you, Madam Speaker. First, I would like to acknowledge you, Minister.]

Who called you a space cadet? How unkind! Anyway—

He did.

Oh, you called yourself a space cadet? OK.

No doubt there will be continued discussions about the role of kaitiakitanga of space. Hoi anō rā [However], we are talking about ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI), te whenua, tae noa mai ki te mana whenua [the land, and also the authority over the land].

I want to acknowledge Rocket Lab, obviously, which is a shining star in part of my electorate, in the beautiful Te Māhia, and one of the things as to why they stand out is that they support around 12,000 jobs, which is always a great thing, but we’ve also learnt some excellent lessons from Rocket Lab in terms of working with mana whenua. While neighbours such as Tawapata station happily coexist, throughout the establishment there were concerns around cultural impacts, environmental impacts, access to moana, consultation concerns—you know, some people felt as if the process was rushed—and genuine engagement.

So, as we look at the Schedule to the bill and at clause 9 in the new Part 2 to be inserted in Schedule 1 of the Act, it says that they “must be granted a GBSI activity authorisation for the operation of GBSI for the activity.”, my question to the Associate Minister of Defence is: knowing what we know from the establishment of Rocket Lab, how will Māori land owners, or mana whenua, be involved throughout the process—not just in consultation about establishment of the GBSIs but the ongoing monitoring of the licences? Indeed, it is any neighbouring landowners, not just mana whenua, because I think that’s a concern for anyone who is a neighbour of such establishments, especially when space is still the final frontier for a lot of people, and so this might just seem a bit out outlandish for the landowners and neighbours.

Also, there is the consideration of wāhi tapu, or sacred land, and how that’s going to be taken into consideration—if at all—and, as I said, there are environmental concerns. Koirā aku pātai mō tēnei wā. [Those are my questions at this time.]

Thank you, Madam Chair. Just to acknowledge the points made by the member, it’s positive to hear that there’ve been constructive relationships locally with the operation of Rocket Lab, whom she has rightly acknowledged as a significant employer but also a major player in terms of the activity within that part of the world. The engagement with local iwi sounds as though that has been very constructive.

Broadening out the conversation in terms of new ground-based space infrastructure, it seems to me that our resource management laws and requirements and regime, more generally, and decision making outside the remit of this legislation will continue to govern that. I take the member’s point that this is important, not only because there is a land-based element, or the ground-based or whenua aspect of what is included within the remit of the bill, but also the cultural aspects and the access to the moana, etc. I just acknowledge those points, but I say that I don’t think that it’s necessary for this legislation to contemplate some sort of new way of understanding what should be approved in the first place or the ongoing interaction, because that’s covered elsewhere within our statutory frameworks.

Members, we now come to the final debate. This is clauses 1 and 2, which is the title and commencement.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Again, this is a very short part, and I have one question on clause 1 and one on clause 2.

The first one is about the title, which is the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Act. I ask whether the Minister for Space would consider any amendments or changes to put in some brackets there like “(Regulating Ground-based Space Infrastructure)” after “Activities” and before “Amendment” just so that when people are looking for the amendment, they might be able to find it more easily, because it does seem that all of our discussion has been about that ground-based space infrastructure with its quite odd-to-say acronym.

Then, on the commencement date, my question is around the fact that it comes into force on 29 July 2025—so that is next Tuesday. That late July date—not necessarily Tuesday, 29 July, but late July—has been bandied around by the Minister for some time now as being the time that she wants this legislation to be enacted and enforced. So my question is: why is it that we only saw the legislation yesterday and that it’s being progressed under all stages in urgency when it has been in train and in progress for some time?

We accept that this legislation is needed and we’re supporting it, but it could have been in the House last week and been with the select committee over the weekend and back in the House this week, for instance. We know that there are not a huge number of people in the country who know about ground-based space infrastructure, but there are some, and it would have been useful to get their views on this and to make sure that we were asking the good questions about it. So that is my question about the commencement date, and also about the title.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I too have a very quick question for the Associate Minister of Defence on clause 2, “Commencement”, but from a different approach than that of the Hon Rachel Brooking. I agree with the Hon Rachel Brooking that the question that she asked around the commencement date is an important one, particularly in light of the fact that we do see that the consultation with the operators has been done since 2024, and so this is something that’s been in train.

However, my question is around the fact that this bill has been brought into the House under urgency—all stages under urgency—with the Government citing that this issue is something that potentially will create security risks and this bill is in our national interest, and yet the commencement date isn’t the day after Royal assent, but, instead, it is next week. I just wanted to check if there’s any potential—like what could happen now that people know about this, because, again, the House didn’t know about this bill until it was placed on the Table during the first reading. There was no heads-up and no way for anyone to know—including the New Zealand public—because of the national security risk, and yet we are now left with five days of people knowing that this is something that’s happening. So what is the potential risk from now until 29 July, and why was the commencement date not the day after Royal assent?

Thank you, Madam Chair. To address the two time-based elements, I take the point made by both members, actually, in terms of the time frame. But it’s probably helpful to note for the record, by way of background, that consultation with existing ground-based space infrastructure holders did take place in the formulation of the policy—and perhaps even in terms of the drafted outcome for that policy—and, likewise, with a couple of experts in this space. So I take Ms Brooking’s point that there are some others in New Zealand, albeit a limited number, who would have expertise to speak in this space, and, no doubt, again, without rehearsing old ground too much in terms of the ongoing nature of review of the operation and effectiveness of the Act, I’m sure that we’ll welcome hearing any well-informed opinions about the extent to which that is working well and as intended.

As for the time frame element that Dr Xu-Nan identified, I suppose that whenever there is a gap between the passage of the law and it becoming effective in the real world, there is a possibility of actions being taken in contemplation. The fact that it’s a relatively short time frame I think mitigates as best as possible the risk that particular activities ramp up in the meantime, but, of course, that’s at the same time an argument against having a long lead time for the legislation to be coming into effect. We don’t want people to take contemplation of this in a way that takes advantage of a gap that’s now, arguably, highlighted by the fact that we’re now discussing and identifying potential vulnerability in our arrangements.

Finally, as to the name of the bill, I suppose one can always be more explicit about the contents of a bill within its title. The length of it already is considerable and, hopefully, it will be reasonably obvious to those reading the bill, and for anyone who’s minded to be even more diligent and read the Hansard of this discussion—they’ll get a pretty good idea, I think, of what’s in it.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Just a quick question around—and I was listening carefully to the Associate Minister of Defence—those time frames. We had that consultation process with around 21 of the entities that are ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI), and now we’re at this particular point here. Just for clarification for the committee: did something happen between awareness from those discussions with these different entities, and is that why we are in this situation of moving through urgency? I think that will help to alleviate some of the questions that we’re having around the committee in terms of that gap between that consultation process that happened, and the fact that we are moving through urgency at this particular time and are looking at 29 July as the commencement date. So a quick question there.

The other thing is that I support what the Hon Rachel Brooking was saying around making it easier for people to be able to find this amendment. You might want to not use the entire sentence, because I get what you’re saying—it’s a paragraph, and we don’t want that. But you could have “GBSI”, or whatever it is as the acronym, to make it easier to find things. That’s just a helpful suggestion for the Minister.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to the Associate Minister of Defence for answering my questions before. I just want to put it to the Minister: does he agree that there is a difference between consultation on policy versus the drafting of the full and final bill—do words matter?

I’m happy to confirm for the committee of the whole House that words do matter. As for the period of time between the consultation taking place, the substance of the consultation, and the time frame of the effectiveness of the legislation, there’s no particular insight I have in terms of what was consulted upon that led to that time frame being specified as 29 July 2025.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

Madam Speaker, the committee has considered the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill and reports it without amendment. I move, That the report be adopted.

This bill is set down for third reading immediately.

on behalf of the Minister for Space: I move, That the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill be now read a third time.

Thank you to all members for their contributions during the first and second readings and also for the thoughtful debate that we’ve just experienced during the committee of the whole House stage.

This bill represents a significant step forward in strengthening New Zealand’s space regulatory framework. As our space sector continues to grow, so too does the need to ensure that the ground-based infrastructure, such as satellite tracking systems and telemetry systems, are subject to appropriate oversight and standards. Ground-based space infrastructure plays a vital role in supporting satellite operations and space activities, but without regulation it can pose risks to national security and other national interests. This bill ensures the operators of such infrastructure are authorised, accountable, and operating in a way that protects New Zealand’s interests.

It’s been done because it is needed, quite simply. During the past five years, there have been several deceptive efforts to establish and/or use ground-based infrastructure in New Zealand to harm our national security by foreign actors. They’ve deliberately disguised their affiliation to foreign militaries and misrepresented their intentions. To date, these risks have been managed through non-regulatory measures, including relying on the goodwill of ground-based space infrastructure operators. These measures are no longer enough. Passing this bill establishes an authorisation regime for ground-based space infrastructure, backed by enforcement powers to safeguard the national interest. It also provides for a transition period, allowing operators to meet the new requirements, while ensuring that the responsible Minister, being our colleague and friend the Hon Judith Collins the Minister for Space, can act immediately if risks arise.

The bill will therefore help maintain New Zealand’s reputation as a trusted and capable spacefaring nation, one that takes its responsibility seriously and is prepared to manage the risks and opportunities of space activity here on Earth.

I’d like to thank the teams at the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment and the Parliamentary Counsel Office for their work in supporting the passage of the bill. I also acknowledge the contribution of stakeholders, who helped to shape the policy and ensure that the regime is practical and effective. Thanks to the MPs across the House who have supported the bill and, again, to those who engaged thoughtfully in the debate of the committee of the whole House. I commend this bill to the House.

The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. As the Associate Minister of Defence just noted, this is a bill that Labour has been supporting because we do agree that space activity should always be in the national interest and that it’s an important part of our economy. I guess a lot of people will think about space and the first thing you think of is the rockets launching off and then you might think about what it is that they are taking into space. But we don’t probably spend as much time talking about this ground-based space infrastructure that does the tracking of those satellites that are deployed in space by the launch that is regulated when it comes from New Zealand. So now this ground-based space infrastructure will also be regulated, and that is a sensible thing.

I do want to briefly comment on an amendment that I put up during the committee stage that was ruled out of order, and that was about a post-enactment review. It doesn’t matter as to the form of it. It is the general idea that whilst Labour accepts that there is a need for urgency in this case, and to go through all-stages urgency because of what is best for our national interest and our security interests—we accept that—we can have both things, though. We can have both something going through urgency and getting the benefit of the national security that it will bring by it being passed and commencing next week, on 25 July; but we can also spend a bit more time on the bill with a post-enactment review. The Government had an opportunity to not use all-stages urgency in a cynical, negative way—which I say this Government often does. They had the opportunity to say, “We’re actually using urgency for a good reason this time, but we do acknowledge that it is not a great way to make laws. And so to fix that not great lawmaking aspect of it, we will have a post-enactment review.”

But the Government has chosen not to do that. I implore them, anybody who’s listening, that there is still an opportunity to put this to a select committee, in some form or other, to make sure that it does have the proper scrutiny. We heard from the Minister, and we saw in the regulatory impact statement (RIS), which we only saw once the all-stages debate on this bill started, that some groups of people have been consulted, and they were consulted on the policy, and the Minister in the chair just before alluded to the fact that some of them might have seen some drafting as well. It is unlikely, and I do not know, but I am assuming that they have not seen the full bill as drafted for comment before they saw it as it was introduced last night. That is a shame, because words matter and we don’t want to get them wrong.

I still didn’t have a clear answer from the Minister in the chair about the relationship of the people who own the site and own the land to other operators that might be coming in and contracting with them. I understand that it looks to be that when the land holder—the person who has the ground space—is applying for their authorisation, they have to demonstrate that they have done the correct due diligence for national security for anybody who might be using some of their equipment from time to time. I think what happens, then, is that if the operator of that equipment is largely offshore or a different entity, that different entity will have to get their own authorisation as well. But, again, this is something that could have been worked through.

Unfortunately, the National Party backbench MPs kept jumping up to call for a closure motion in the committee stage. That is very disappointing when this is all-stages urgency and we we’re trying to make sure that we all understood this bill. So I say to them, shame on them. That just really shows a terrible understanding of how unusual it has been in previous parliaments to do all-stages urgency of a bill. But, of course, this is a term—[Interruption]

All right. That’s a barrage, not an interjection.

Fake news.

I’m hearing it’s fake news. I’ve got a lot of statistics on this and all-stages urgency has been used by this Government time and time again, and this is the one time that I’ve come across where it makes some sense, and we are agreeing to the all-stages urgency. Yet members opposite still jump up and try and close down these very civil, thoughtful debates. What does that say about their attitude to lawmaking? It is just arrogant. That is all it is: arrogant and not wanting good lawmaking.

Where was that view in the last Government?

I’m asked now, when was that view in the last Government? Well, the last Government didn’t do all of this all-stages urgency. I can provide the member those numbers—

Point of order.

I think we can have this debate—oh, sorry. We have a point of order from Tim van de Molen.

Yes. Madam Speaker—

I was halfway through making a statement, so if it’s relevant to this—

Yes, I was just pointing out that that was a factually incorrect statement and I suggest the member might want to withdraw it from the House.

Well, look, I think the member’s stated a view; she hasn’t put any numbers on it. She’s just made the observation that the closure motions have been called, and she’s expressed a view. She hasn’t made any statements about the frequency in the number form. But what I was about to say is that this is away from the actual bill itself, the debate that was going on across the House. So we’ll give the member a chance to finish her third reading speech.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. My point remains, and I’m happy to give information to the members across the House, that there is a lot of legislation that has come through this Parliament in all-stages urgency, and it does not lead to good lawmaking, and they should take that seriously.

Just like the last Government did—or didn’t.

No, very much unlike the last Government, Mr Mooney.

OK, we’re not having that debate. The member’s made a point; now we’ll come back to the third reading. Thank you.

Very different—sorry. I’ve noted some of the issues that I don’t think were well traversed in the committee stage, and that is a shame. But I’ve also noted that the space industry is important to New Zealand, as is our national security. So that is why Labour has been in support of this bill, if any of the members opposite had been listening. I will end my contribution there. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I rise on behalf of the Greens on this third reading of the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. For those just tuning in today, this is a piece of legislation that establishes a regime for ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI) and imposes an authorisation regime on persons who operate GBSI, which is what we’re calling it these days, to carry out activities. The activities include telemetry, tracking, and control, including activities that could disrupt satellite operations of space objects; space surveillance and identification of space objects; satellite data reception; and other activities of concern if prescribed in regulations.

This bill is passing through all stages under urgency, and we began talking about this last night. We had an interesting discussion with the Minister in the committee of the whole House, and what the Minister told us and what we have accepted is that the bill has been introduced in response to the assessment by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service of the security threat environment that found that New Zealand organisations had been approached by entities seeking to develop space infrastructure. These entities claim the infrastructure would be used for civilian research purposes but it was subsequently found that the proposed activities could have assisted foreign military activity with potential risks to New Zealand’s interests.

That assessment also said, and I quote, “The full capabilities and some of the affiliations of these entities were deliberately hidden. If these projects had gone ahead we would have inadvertently allowed another country to install equipment in New Zealand for plausible military or intelligence functions. To have done so would have risked New Zealand’s sovereignty. By hiding their affiliations, the foreign entities undermine New Zealand’s ability to make informed decisions based on our national security and national interest.” So there’s an obvious gap there and the Greens support that—if you’re going to build something in someone’s backyard, it’s important that we have eyes over that. There was a regulatory gap, so making sure there were some regulations in place is incredibly important.

There were also some very good questions posed. For example, I know a number of people will want to know when this threat became known. As through our discussions and the departmental disclosure statement, we did find out that there had been discussions with 21 GBSI operators, and that began in 2024. So there have been ongoing discussions, and 21 is not a small number. That’s a few people that are doing this. I’m guessing that through those discussions something emerged, which, of course, is why we find ourselves in urgency at this particular time. So I accept that premise from that side of the Chamber while we’re here in urgency.

I do support what was said, I think, very well, by the Hon Rachel Brooking about having a post-enactment review of some kind. The issue is that when we go through urgency like this, we do want to make sure that all the nuts and bolts are holding the wheels to the wagon, so that we can have the best, most robust legislation that we can. And that’s whether you support the legislation or don’t support the legislation—if we put something into the legislative system, we want it to be the best it can be.

We also had some really interesting discussion around the authorisation regime. There were four options, and we heard the various reasons why this particular regime was the one that was picked. I guess there were some interesting discussions there and some questions that I continue to have around exactly happens—because we’re in a very fast-moving world where somebody might be a GBSI operator and that’s what they’re doing, and then they onsell to another group, and then that group onsells to another group. What are the actual parts in place to ensure that there is proper oversight over that? Also, if there are nefarious foreign actors, if I can put it that way, who are influencing some of these GBSI operators, we need to make sure there is oversight over that as well.

There was also, I think—and this is where I have some unease on this; an unease that is out of the scope of this amendment bill but it is definitely connected to it, and I think the Hon Phil Twyford mentioned this a number of times around the national interest element of it. Of course we don’t want people building stuff in New Zealand which is against the national interest and could be harmful to Aotearoa. So making sure we have a regime that is in place to deal with that is important. But it gets difficult when we have different interpretations of what the national interest is. In the regulatory impact statement, it talks about how we need to be careful of foreign actors that do not share New Zealand’s values. Well, the question I have is: what are New Zealand values? Those things develop over time and they evolve, and we do, I think, as parliamentarians, want those values to be the best kind of values. Many of us often make the point that we’re in the Pacific. We are a Pacific nation and part of a family of Pacific nations, so making sure we do everything we can do to take care of our neighbourhood is an important thing to do.

Outside of the Pacific, things are changing incredibly rapidly. We had a ministerial statement yesterday about the situation in Gaza, and a number of countries that would typically align themselves with the US have spoken out on what’s happening in Israel. Does that show that our New Zealand values are changing? Are they developing? I hope so. I think evolving values in a way that puts people at the heart of them is incredibly important.

There was an argument around having more specificity in terms of what the national interest is. There is part of that in this amendment bill—I think there are three or four aspects. But the argument was made that you could be more specific. So, for example, with the launching of payloads, you can’t launch things that would contravene our nuclear-free legislation. That makes sense. You can’t do other things that would cause environmental impact on other satellites in outer space. That also makes sense. I think you can be prescriptive, but I also think we need to have some space to allow for our values to develop in a good way. That’s a good thing as well. So that, although outside the scope of this amendment bill, is foundational to the entire Act as well. I hope that the Minister takes on board those points of clarification, which I think would make this a stronger piece of legislation.

The other thing that was not answered at all, I felt, was the part around the role of tangata whenua. A few years back, I did go up to Māhia to talk with the whānau up there who are unhappy with what Rocket Lab was doing. They said it was one thing, and the next thing you know, other things were happening and it was impacting the wider community. Yes, they might be funding this, that, and the other, but the intention around making sure you take care of the environment and don’t launch military payloads on behalf of foreign actors—the US—is an important point that has been made to me repeatedly when I visited them.

The other thing that the Minister also talked about and that we talked about for some time was around the exemptions. The New Zealand Defence Force gets an exemption. My understanding of it is if you’ve got a Waihopai-type situation, that exemption applies, but if you’ve got a Māhia Rocket Lab situation, that falls under the Act. I didn’t get a lot of clarity from the Minister as to whether that distinction was correct or not, so if people on that side of the House could clear that up, that would be really good for people who are watching this at home. On that note, I commend this bill to the House.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I’m taking this call on behalf of ACT to support this bill. We just had the committee of the whole House before this reading, and it was really good to see that the Minister answered questions that came from various members. I can fully understand, as this bill is going through urgency, members had lots of questions, and those questions were addressed in the committee of the whole House.

It is totally justified that this bill is going through urgency, given that we know there are risks, and these risks are real risks, because through the ground-based space infrastructure, we know that some entities, while they are using this infrastructure, this technology, for everybody’s benefit—this technology can also be used to strengthen their own space capability while degrading others’ capabilities. That’s the big risk that we have. We cannot let anybody compromise or undermine our national security.

This bill is about ensuring we are protecting our national security, protecting our reputation, because when we talk about national security, it’s not just our country; it’s the entire region as well. It also puts everybody on notice because, from next week, all the authorisations will become a transitional authorisation—so, basically, they will be on notice, and they will have to prove that their activities align with our national interest. It’s a great bill, and I support this bill and commend this bill to the House. Thank you.

Madam Speaker, thank you. I’m delighted to rise on behalf of New Zealand First to speak in support of this bill in the third reading. Look, it’s very, very clear that space is a rapidly evolving environment, and what we’ve heard in terms of that rapid evolution goes to a need for speed in terms of this legislation. Also, what we’ve heard from the Minister for Space—in fact, both Ministers who’ve supported this bill—is that there have already been malicious operators seeking to take advantage of what is a gap in our legislation as it is at the moment.

It’s been great also to hear the stories about, and to see the numbers about, how important the space industry is now to New Zealand, across several parts of our country. We’ve got a fantastic range of entrepreneurs and, typical to New Zealand, we have innovation, and space is no exception. In the five years to 2024, we read that the space sector grew by 53 percent, and at 2024, it was a $2.5 billion contribution to our economy, and that is only going to rise. But that means it’s really, really important that that sector is regarded as trusted and is regarded as reliable, and so this legislation itself, in a sense, also helps not only our national security but also our national economy.

I’ve heard comments made about Rocket Lab in particular. Having visited them a few months ago, what I did see in here is the importance that they place both on employment but also on training and development of local people. I thought that was absolutely fantastic to see around the Māhia Peninsula.

This is an amendment bill. The 2017 Act, which it seeks to amend, is very, very focused on the things that we send into space, the payloads that we send into space. I think what this bill is doing is it’s identified that there is a sizeable gap about the space-related infrastructure which actually sits on the ground and communicates, if you like, with the satellites that are sent into space. Satellites are now an essential part of so much of what we do—whether it’s communications, navigation, weather forecasting, scientific research, being able to watch sport, all of those things. Satellites make a huge difference.

What are some of those things there? We’ve got relaying signals; broadband internet if you’re not on cables; secure financial transactions—that’s very, very important—global positioning system, GPS; real-time tracking of vehicles, deliveries, and all of those sort of things; aviation and maritime safety, surveillance, search and rescue; and environmental monitoring. There are a huge number of things which satellites are part of, but they’re also used for less productive, more malicious, more nefarious, and more aggressive purposes. That’s what this bill is about, trying to make sure we have a means of dealing with this.

I think that we all now understand that New Zealand is in a strategically important location for space. We are an island in the middle of the Pacific, which means there’s not a lot of other places for you to base this kind of ground-based infrastructure on. Australia’s a long way one way, and South America is a very long way the other way, so we are an important location also in relation to the South Pole. I think we also accept that there are now increasingly malicious operators who would like to disrupt things and would like to launch things from our sovereign soil, and this bill is about making sure that that does not happen. We want to ensure that our national interests are protected, as well as those of our friends and neighbours, and to ensure that we as a nation remain a reliable, trusted partner which upholds the law, and that is also good for the businesses which operate out of New Zealand. I commend this bill to the House.

The next call is a split call.

Tēnā koe e te Pīka. Māku ngā kōrero mā Te Pāti Māori, otirā te iwi Māori mō te anga o tēnei pire. Nō reira kaua koe e māharahara mō taku hāte. Tēnā tātou.

[Thank you, Madam Speaker. The statements on behalf of Te Pāti Māori, indeed the Māori people regarding the direction of this bill, is up to me. So don’t you worry about my shirt. Greetings to us all.]

We do not support the bill, and it’s for a fairly straightforward principle. It’s a principle of Te Tiriti o Waitangi. The bill, not its predecessor nor the amended bill, mentions anything about Te Tiriti o Waitangi—about the partnership that Te Tiriti o Waitangi created, or the place of Māori in it.

Whilst we might be here talking about space and an emerging field of technology and an emerging economic opportunity, this lesson has been learnt, has been tracked, time and time and time again by this Parliament. We arrive at a new technology and then the Parliament takes the view, “Oh, Māori don’t have anything to do with that technology—don’t have anything to do with that.” This was the same thing that happened when the spectrum case came up in the early 2000s—the spectrum case—and the somewhat arrogant view of the Government at the time was that Māori didn’t have any use or history in the use or utilisation of the spectrum. This would ultimately be disproven, right?

Start a business. Give it a go—have a go at starting a business.

This would be disproven. So here we are again—

Encourage people to start a business.

Here we go. Here we go. We’ve got the 1840 guy over here. What were the ancestors of the Brits doing in 1840? Not a lot in space. The principle is the same. The principle is the same.

Who developed the technology?

I hear the supporters of the myth of technology idea over here on my left—astounding, astounding. A new resource is available, there’s some regulation wanted for it, being proposed for it, and Māori are being regulated out of it. It’s worth billions of dollars into the future.

Ngāi Tahu are doing very well out of it

Oh, Ngāi Tahu did very well out of it? We’re sticking to the root facts here. Māori have a long cosmological history. They have deep knowledge. We’ve been navigating the biggest ocean in the world for 10,000 years using the stars. We’ve managed to name every planet, every constellation. Māori—

So has everyone else.

“So has everyone else.”—the attitude of this House, when it comes to this type of discussion, is deplorable. It’s deplorable. It’s a joke. It’s an utter joke, the attitude of this Government. The House isn’t built to facilitate the Te Tiriti o Waitangi conversation. I can say that to the Speaker, absolutely 100 percent knowing that: this House isn’t built to facilitate the Te Tiriti o Waitangi conversation. This Government isn’t interested in the Te Tiriti o Waitangi conversation. They keep spewing out stupid views that I’d love to take a little bit more time to rip to bits, but we don’t have it right now.

Anyway, a great mentor of mine, an uncle, Moana Jackson, spoke about colonial myths a lot. One of them was the myth of technology, Andy—the myth of technology—and that the colonial settlers and the successive Governments and power structures of this country built colonial myths into our history. One of them is the idea that all Māori development halted in 1840, and that’s where we should stay. You should go and look up the myth of technology, e hoa mā—go and look it up.

Go look up Tāwhaki.

I know about Tāwhaki. I know about Māhia-mai-tawhiti. We know about all of those things. I also know about Ihirangaranga. I also know about Mātairangi. I also know about things like Matariki. Everyone knows about Matariki now—

At least read the title of the bill.

He doesn’t even know about Tāwhaki.

Oh, here we go, here we go—no decent debate from this side of the House, just slanging stuff. Slanging stuff, eh? [Interruption] I’ll just give it a minute to simmer down. I hope everyone’s listening. Although you can’t hear at home, I hope everyone’s at least getting a feel of the attitude here when I’m raising quite a simple point—a simple principle—and it’s the principle of Te Tiriti o Waitangi. This House has passed laws that protect these rights that Māori possess. You’ve passed laws, and here you are just riding roughshod straight over the top of them. Nō reira, kia kaha koutou. We do not support the bill at all.

Point of order, Madam Speaker. I’m not going to raise a point about the member Tākuta Ferris not addressing the bill, but I am going to raise a point of order in regard to wearing a political slogan on the previous speaker’s shirt, which has a logo, as well. If that’s the ruling, I’d just like some clarification—you don’t need to give it to us now—because we could all wear T-shirts in the House with party logos and slogans on them, but I just want to know what that ruling is. So I’ll leave that with you.

I can’t see a party logo from here, but I can see that the member has a T-shirt with something on it. But it’s not visible from the Chair, and I don’t know if it’s visible on the TV screens.

Speaking to the point of order.

If the member wishes to speak to the point of order, I’m happy to take that.

Yeah, speaking to the point of order, I’m not sure who the sovereign party is, but I do know that the Deputy Prime Minister has been pulled up in this House about three or four times for wearing his ACT pin. So if you want to come and clear that up, you’re welcome to it.

Speaking to the point of order.

Look, as long as it’s constructive, I’m happy to follow up. But there is no visible party branding on the member who was just speaking that I can see from here.

Sure. The member is using a tactic that’s well-known in bullying circles, which is to raise a different issue when there’s an issue on the table, and—[Interruption] Points of order are heard in silence, and I think—

No, look, I’ll tell you, the member has been attempting to make a speech and has had a lot of barrage and interjection from the Government’s side of the House, which—I think it’s been coming from both sides, and I’m not prepared to accept that that particular member has been directing what he’s been saying at this, other than to react to interjections.

Thank you, Madam Speaker, and a related point of order—

Speaking to the point of order.

Just a moment, we’ve got a member on his feet.

As the Deputy Speaker has acknowledged, it’s hard to read what is written on the shirt of the member. The member did actually just refer to what was written on the shirt, so it would behove the House to look at Standing Order 119 in regard to what the member has just said, as to whether that is an affront to that Standing Order.

I’ll follow that one up. Thank you.

Speaking to the point of order, with regard to the first part of the member’s point of order, deeming the relevance of Te Tiriti o Waitangi to a debate in this House as some sort of act of bullying and not being relevant to this bill is one of the stupidest things I’ve heard to date.

Look, that actually wasn’t a point of order. I’m going to shut this down now. I accept that there has been some to and fro going from both sides and, as I say, when the member was actually making his speech, there were a lot of interjections coming at him, which made it hard to speak. I’m closing down the points of order now. I can’t see what’s on the member’s T-shirt and I’m accepting that I cannot see any political logo, and we’re going to move on. Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan.

Speaking to the point of order, Madam Speaker.

No, I’ve ruled—I’ve ruled and I’m moving on, and I’ve called Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan to make his participation.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. Who knew that this bill, which was introduced under urgency, could be so contentious?

I rise on behalf of the Green Party to speak on the third reading of this bill. I want to start by pointing out that the Green Party does support this bill from the perspective that it does address a gap within the current regulatory and non-regulatory environment—that would be beneficial from the perspective of our security, but also from a so-called national interest perspective. So it is important in that regard. I just want to point out a few things that we have discussed during the committee stage. It doesn’t mean that there aren’t concerns that we have regarding this bill and particularly around the regulatory-making power of this bill.

Firstly, regarding the urgency that we see for this bill, we did ask the Minister that if there was consultation on this bill—and since 2024 they have consulted with 21 operators, according to the departmental disclosure statement—why was this bill introduced under urgency? There is the idea that, yes, there’s a security risk, but then we also pressed to ask why, if they had the time to consult with 21 operators since 2024, there were no Māori hapū iwi collectives consulted as a requirement of this bill. That was not fully clear as a part of that committee stage. So that’s the first thing that we wanted to address.

The other thing that we’re asking about in the context of GBSI or ground-based space infrastructure is that this does give the Minister a lot of powers in terms of approving those authorisations. One of the clearest things, and this is from the perspective of regulatory-making power and also from the Regulations Review Committee, is it will cause some nervousness. And then there’s the fact that the Minister, in the end, despite the fact that they talk about flexibility and all of that, did not take on the departmental recommendation in clause 154 of the regulatory impact statement to put in a review period.

Now, the regulatory impact statement was very clear. They recommended a two-year review period because something like this is very new internationally, and that will also be in line with the principal Act, specifically section 86 of the principal Act, around the review period, which was three years in the principal Act. So there will be things that people are going to be picking up, as a result of this.

Now, the third point I want to address is that we do constantly go back to the idea of our national interest, and we do acknowledge Aotearoa New Zealand’s strategic geographical location globally as someone who has this relatively rare and quite expansive Southern Hemisphere GBSI coverage. There are two issues with this. Number one: we go back to the issue of the role of Te Tiriti and the role of Māori within this space, and how that relationship will be rebuilt, will be made stronger despite the lack of consultation. I think that is something we have yet to see the Minister making a commitment on, and we would like to see further work being done in that space.

The second area is around what is considered “national interest”. Now, I want to be very clear. The Green Party has always talked about the need for an independent foreign affairs policy here in Aotearoa New Zealand. We are concerned with the fact that we have seen Five Eyes expanding beyond what is an information-sharing agency to potentially interfering with even something like this around GBSI. Because the bill does say that the Minister may seek advice from the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) and, as we know, the NZSIS has a singular target and a singular country that they are targeting as a result of this. So in this case, is this national interest or is this Five Eyes interest? I think we need to be very clear on that.

So, yes, the Green Party does support this bill, but I think there’s a lot more work to be done around this area.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. Now, I want to pick up, firstly, on the blatantly untrue statement made by Ms Brooking before, in her contribution, that the previous Government had not used urgency to pass any bills through all stages. That was, verbatim, what she said—incredible. A short Google search shows 24 bills were passed through all stages under the last Government, 17 of those were outside the Budget process, and, indeed, that included changes to the electoral law of this country—a totally unjustified use of urgency.

This case is a particular case for a particular purpose that has been well traversed for sensitive issues. So I commend the bill to the House.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I just want to set the record straight, given that the member that just resumed his seat has claimed that the Hon Rachel Brooking said that our Government never passed any legislation under urgency. That’s not what she said; what she said was that we didn’t do it as much as this Government is doing it, and we didn’t do it for reasons that seem completely unjustified for significant bills, as this Government has done repeatedly, time and again. However, she also acknowledged that this bill is not an example of that. So it would pay for the member who made those claims to actually listen in future, and that would go for members opposite who have been unnecessarily nasty during this debate, given that members on this side are actually supporting this bill.

The purpose of this bill, of course, is to manage national security and other risks to New Zealand’s national interests that are posed specifically by GBSI, or ground-based space infrastructure, and it does that through the enactment of a regulatory regime. We all know from the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) threat assessments—the most recent one in 2024—that companies that are focused on technology and innovation are particularly vulnerable, and we’re seeing that; we’ve seen that in recent years. They are particularly vulnerable to being used by foreign States to advance their own military and intelligence goals. Often this has happened in instances where we’ve then found out that, initially, those malicious activities or that malicious intent was not actually even realised by companies here in New Zealand.

Entities have approached New Zealand organisations specifically to develop space infrastructure in New Zealand territory. They have claimed that the purpose of that infrastructure was for civilian research, but it was then later found out in each one of those cases that that was not true; that the infrastructure was designed to assist foreign military activity and the affiliations between those foreign entities and the entities that approached New Zealand companies were deliberately hidden. So none of us disputes the need for this legislation, which is to plug the gap in our regulatory frameworks or regulations legislation that we currently have.

We know that the ways in which this was addressed to date has been through non-regulatory measures. We know that space is increasingly contested and competitive, that technologies change rapidly and therefore legislative fixes are required to continue to ensure our national security, and that is why Labour is supporting this bill. However, there were a few concerns that I raised, questions that I asked during the committee of the whole House stage that we’ve had. I will also make the point that this is being considered under all-stages urgency. We accept the Minister for Space’s point that this is being done for national security purposes, and we don’t question that; that is fine.

However, I want to emphasise the point that my colleagues have made, both the Hon Rachel Brooking and Vanushi Walters, in their contributions at the committee stage, and also the amendment by Rachel Brooking which was for the Government to include a post-enactment review clause. This legislation is being considered through all stages under urgency; we accept that—but there is a mitigating factor given so much detail is in regulations, given that consultation has been minimal. The consultation document was put out to 21 operators that are known to the regulator. However, only two have substantively responded to that consultation. That was on the policy intent of the bill. The actual bill itself, as far as we’re aware, has not been consulted on.

So the suggestion from this side was a review clause so that we can mitigate potential loopholes created by the quick enactment of this bill and also mitigate the lack of consultation on this legislation. It is disappointing that the Minister has chosen not to take that any further and I do want to put that on the record.

The other point that I raised was the lack of requirement within the legislation, within the amendment bill, for the Minister for Space to consult directly with Ministers relevant to intelligence and security and the security agencies. The Minister has clarified in the committee stage that there is a requirement for the regulator to consult with the security agencies, and I accept that. However, I don’t see it necessarily written into legislation.

Finally, the point that I made in committee that I felt was not addressed adequately was the fact that this particular option—there were four options laid out—option three, which the Government has decided to proceed with, is what has led to this bill. I get that it’s a balance between the effectiveness of the design and the implementation regime versus it being cost-effective; I take that point. However, I have questioned the lack of resource that has been put in to ensuring the effectiveness of the implementation. The Minister has said it’s basically a movable feast. However, I don’t necessarily think that gives this side of the House a huge amount of comfort that it’s being resourced enough to be effective and protect our national security in that sense.

Those are the main issues that we have traversed and ultimately, though, on balance, given this is a bill that aims to protect our national security interests, I commend the bill to the House.

I quote Rachel Brooking: “I’m asked … when was that … in the last Government? Well, the last Government didn’t do all of this all-stages urgency.” That is the direct quote. Let’s just get that right—

As it relates to this bill.

That’s not what she said, Madam Speaker, and I don’t think—

No, I’m saying to you—

Well, this relates to this bill because that was her—

I know. It’s been well—

—direct quote from this reading on this bill and that is what the debate has centred on. What I would like to centre it on—

Order! Mr Costley, what I’m saying to you is please relate your debate to this bill.

Yes, Madam Speaker—absolutely. This is a debate on this bill. My debating point is to counter two speakers in a row now, who have stood up and said that that quote was never made. It is in the Hansard. It would be outrageous if we couldn’t reference that.

Madam Speaker, this bill is actually something that we started out yesterday evening agreeing on, that there is a need here, for our national security, to act. We’ve got a Minister for Space that is acting quickly. We should move on, and I commend this bill to the House.

E te Māngai, ka tū atu awau ki te tautoko i tēnei pire mā te Pāti Reipa, arā te pire, Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill.

[Madam Speaker, I stand in support of this bill on behalf of the Labour Party—that is, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill.]

I just want to commend that side of the House for having the wisdom to quote this side of the House—very smart. Hoi anō rā [However], in the committee stage, I raised a few points that had been reinforced—

What did “Chippy” say?

You can just wait and listen, then you can quote me—you can quote me for some words of wisdom.

I assure the member that I am listening.

While we support this bill, some of the things that I raised during the committee stage must remain pertinent.

At a time when people are telling us that they need jobs, better healthcare, and homes, I know that it can be tempting to support initiatives for their economic development, but we must make sure that this remains about national security, which, in these trying times, is actually at the forefront of a lot of people’s minds who it may not have typically been.

While reference to Te Tiriti o Waitangi has been badgered this morning, it actually is very relevant. While I’ve said that we have learnt lessons from the establishment of Rocket Lab, the relationship with Rongomaiwahine, and while, of course, it’s pleasing to hear not only the educational support but the employment support that comes from such projects, we have to make sure that Te Tiriti is honoured and mana whenua are honoured, because while we’re talking about space—and, like I said, that debate will continue about kaitiakitanga and space—we are talking about ground-based science infrastructure. At the end of the day, whenua is for ever and kaitiakitanga is for ever. So these conversations must go beyond consultation.

In the committee stage, I also raised the fact that while there was consultation, it felt rushed. Even when consultation is done well, the relationship with landowners, iwi, hapū, and mana whenua must not end with consultation, otherwise it’s mere lip-service and it’s a mere tick-box exercise. This relationship must go beyond that to include the monitoring and the review of this bill.

At the moment, you’ve got to get authorisation from the Minister for Space, and this bill empowers the Minister to assess whether proposed activities meet the national interest. That’s quite a lot to put on an individual responsibility.

So, hei whakakopi, like I said, Rocket Lab is doing some great stuff but there are lessons to be learnt there about the involvement of mana whenua, because, like I said, whenua is for ever and kaitiakitanga is for ever, and that relationship needs to be from the start and enduring. So on behalf of the Labour Party, I commend this bill to the House.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I rise in support of the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill in its third reading.

I’m the MP for Banks Peninsula, where we have Tāwhaki based. That’s a wonderful partnership between the Crown and two of the local rūnanga. It’s a real exemplar of how the Crown and Māori can work together, and given that it is a site of advanced aviation and potential space industry, I commend this bill to the House.

The concluding remarks, really, in this debate from me are just to observe that this bill is filling a gap in our regulatory framework. I noted earlier in these debates that many other like-minded countries have modernised their regulatory framework to properly keep an eye on, and control the use of, ground-based space infrastructure to protect national sovereignty and to protect their national interests, including other countries who have space programmes, and so it’s right that the regulatory framework that was largely developed from an economic development perspective to support the growth of the New Zealand space programme is improved in this way.

Notwithstanding all of the debate we’ve had over the last 24 hours on this bill, I think it is a no-brainer that we should be supporting it, because it is putting in place a mechanism that will allow this and future Governments to protect New Zealand’s national interest.

I’ve actually enjoyed the debate, notwithstanding the fact that urgency has meant that it’s been pretty challenging to tease out some of the detail and complexity—collectively, I think—to get our heads around the detail of the bill, but I think it hasn’t been too bad a discussion in spite of that. We remain, on the Labour benches here, disappointed that the Government has not supported Rachel Brooking’s tabled amendment that would have added a post-enactment review. We think that, on a matter of this importance with some granularity in terms of the processes and the systems in place, it would have been much better. Given that it’s been rushed through under urgency without any select committee scrutiny or expert or public submissions, it would have been a prudent thing to do to legislate that review. This House is very familiar with the defects and the flaws of law that is too rushed.

I’ve enjoyed the discussions that we’ve had around the national interest test and national security. I remain of the view that this regulatory framework would benefit from the additional principles that support the application of the national interest test in relation to the launch of payloads from New Zealand. Those principles spell out a much more precise definition of things that would prohibit certain payloads being put up. I think that when we consider the potential threats posed by ground-based space infrastructure, there are some parallels there, and I think that a much more precise definition of the national interest test would be good for New Zealand.

I thought one of the interesting things that came out of the debate, from my perspective, was what I call the Waihopai principle, where, actually, ground-based space infrastructure managed by the GCSB, our signals intelligence agency, over quite a long time in New Zealand was found to have been conducting mass surveillance on New Zealand’s friends and neighbouring countries with little to no public oversight or parliamentary scrutiny. We should learn from that episode in our history. In the modern era when much more advanced technology and much smaller kit is available to a range of private-sector operators, we should be vigilant that ground-based space infrastructure cannot be used for that purpose in New Zealand without proper scrutiny and oversight. My hope is that this legislation will enable this and future Governments to take that responsibility seriously.

Finally, I remain intrigued by the possibility that some future Government may regard the ground-based space infrastructure of some embassy in New Zealand to be conducting a regulated activity under this law and, therefore, exercise some oversight and control over that. Foreign embassies here, and all around the world, routinely use ground-based space infrastructure for the purposes of intercepting communications and carrying out intelligence-gathering activity and surveillance. That’s no secret, and, in general, Governments tend to turn a blind eye to that sort of activity. But the intent and the substance of this bill really asks us to consider whether or not we would consider that that sort of activity carried out in New Zealand for purposes that may or may not be consistent with our national interest should be properly regulated. I commend this bill to the House.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I am pleased to rise and take this last and final call on the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. We fully support the bill. We are pleased to see a regulatory framework for ground-based space interests. I’m not the MP for Māhia, but I am a frequent visitor. I am just next door, and my good friend and colleague Katie Nimon is the MP for that area. So on behalf of both of us, I commend the bill to the House.

I present a legislative statement on the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill.

That legislative statement is published under the authority of the House and can be found on the Parliament website.

I move, That the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill be now read a second time.

This bill aligns New Zealand’s laws with the requirements of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, also known as the Budapest Convention. The Budapest Convention is the first binding international treaty on cyber-crime, and it aligns members’ national laws relating to computer-related offences, improves investigative techniques, and streamlines evidence sharing. By acceding to this convention, we join almost 80 countries party to the convention who are committed to working together to tackle cyber-crime. This positions New Zealand to negotiate further agreements creating key infrastructure, and underpins international criminal justice cooperation.

Now, what does this mean for New Zealanders? Why do we care about all this? Well, obviously, the Government has a very clear target to reduce the number of victims of serious crime and to restore law and order more broadly. The broad area of fraud and cyber-crime has been growing significantly over time. The Ministry of Justice public perceptions reporting shows that 78 percent of New Zealanders are worried about this, as they should be. Over the past three months of 2024, for example, the National Cyber Security Centre reported that New Zealanders lost $6.8 million worth to cyber-crime; a 91 percent increase in 12 months—so it’s a big issue; it’s a real concern.

The purpose of this legislation is to enable us to be part of this Budapest Convention and to share more information more quickly, deal with evolving threats more quickly, and it helps us to be part of a coordinated international response to the broader issue.

The bill was reported back to the House from the Justice Committee. I want to thank the committee for their careful consideration of the bill. I want to thank the submitters who took their time to share their views.

From copyright infringements to computer-related fraud, violations of network security to child exploitation material, this bill will help safeguard New Zealanders from cyber-crime. It makes several important amendments. The bill amends the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 to introduce a new tool for law enforcement called a “preservation direction”. A preservation direction enables law enforcement agencies to require a person in a company to hold a specific document to preserve it for a specified period, protecting vulnerable evidence, such as digital records, from being deleted or destroyed. So that’s important. We’ve got new disclosure requirements. Further amendments to the Search and Surveillance Act create an offence for everyone affected by a preservation direction to disclose that the direction exists. Where police have a warrant to undertake surveillance, it will be an offence for anyone who assists them to carry out that warrant, to disclose its existence—that’s obviously important for successfully achieving that.

Then, we’re making an amendment to the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992, which governs the assistance we give to other countries in criminal investment investigations. The bill enables police to apply for production orders and surveillance device warrants in response to a request for assistance from a foreign country. That’s how we share our information.

Then, to safeguard human rights, all existing requirements in the Search and Surveillance Act and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act must be met before a production order or a surveillance device warrant can be issued for mutual assistance purposes. So those are very important protections, by allowing only a mutual assistance order or warrant to be issued by a High Court judge. Collectively, these amendments will enable New Zealand to accede to the Budapest Convention.

Now, the Justice Committee recommended some important changes to strengthen the policy of the bill. Two amendments to clause 37: ensuring the judge considers the public interest in both avoiding prejudice to proceedings as well as investigation, and ensuring the seized thing is not sent out of New Zealand before the person concerned has the opportunity to challenge. It also recommended clarifying section 10(1)(b) and (c) of the Telecommunications Interception Capability and Security Act 2013 to not require an internet service provider to obtain traffic data—that is, information identifying the nature of the telecommunication—if the telecommunication is not the internet service provider’s own product. So we welcome those amendments.

In conclusion, this is an important part of our effort to meaningfully cooperate with other nations in our fight against cyber-crime, and will ensure that our laws protect New Zealanders in the digital age, and will send a strong signal internationally of our commitment to combat cyber-crime while upholding a rules-based international order that protects fundamental human rights. On that basis, I commend this bill to the House.

The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Kia ora. Thank you, Madam Speaker. Oh, the Minister’s approaching me across the—no, he’s not. The Labour Party supports this bill. This is a convention which was acceded to, I understand, in the last Labour Government. I do want to point out that these cross-border matters raise some quite difficult questions. When we get to committee stage, I do want to interrogate the Minister on New Zealand’s approach to this, because cyber-crime in particular is borderless, and the whole point of the Budapest Convention is to ensure that the response to cyber-crime is borderless, as well. That means ensuring that telecommunications—which is, in one form or another, pretty much the vehicle for cyber-crime—can essentially be searched and surveilled effectively. But we in New Zealand and in the common law world hold dear privacy and freedom from arbitrary search and seizure.

So here in this bill, we need to make sure that the framework on this, around these telecommunications, is robust and consistent both with the Budapest Convention but also with the things that we hold dear. The main innovation or new aspect in this legislation is, as the Minister said, the preservation direction. That is the direction that a telecommunications provider essentially hold and preserve information that might have content; it could be an email or a text message, something of that nature, or it could simply be traffic data—there were telephone calls that went in this direction, or there were encrypted messages between these two parties.

Now, again, there needs to be more than just an interest, and I think it’s important to recognise that not all countries have the same robustness in their criminal justice procedure as we do. Equally, not all countries have the kind of scrutiny about what ought to be criminalised as we do. There’s always a risk, particularly when we’re assisting foreign nations, that we are assisting them in doing things that we wouldn’t accept in New Zealand.

We have to be very careful when the authorities here—and the Attorney-General has an important role in this legislation—when those authorities are given, we need to have more than just a weather eye; we need to be vigilant that we are not being unwittingly used to further either political ends or to allow a foreign State to pursue a proceeding against something that might be a crime in a foreign nation, but it certainly isn’t a crime in New Zealand and shouldn’t be something for which criminal sanction follows.

So that’s what I mean when I say these cross-border matters raise really significant issues, because we do not want to be essentially assisting foreign States in oppressing others. The Minister mentioned the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, and if we look at the parties to that, that is to say those foreign States who we are required to assist, that includes the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. We know that some of the things that are criminalised there are very much free speech here. So that’s this kind of thing. We certainly don’t want to be having surveillance orders and preservation directions in respect of messages which are simply political activities in New Zealand, so we need to be very careful about that. I think we also need to make sure that we’re not subjecting people who are innocent parties to inappropriate surveillance.

Of course, one of the things that this bill does, because aspects of it are quite technical, is it shows the pathways of communications. People might want to know, for whatever reason, where messages are routed and who has passed those on. So those kind of things need to be examined, as well. The legislation creates a raft of new offences which I think, again, any time an offence is created—they’re generally offences about non-cooperation or destruction of material—we need to make sure that they have the right settings; that a criminal offence shouldn’t exist unless there’s, particularly, an appropriate mens rea element.

A lot of these offences are organisational offences, because if you’re going to be seeking preservation directions from a telecommunications company, you’ve got to make sure the left hand knows what the right hand’s doing—and if some junior member of the organisation deletes files in a routine way, we’ve got to be cautious about imposing genuine criminal liability for that.

So there’s a whole lot of stuff in this legislation, but at the same time, the Budapest Convention is a convention which requires New Zealand to essentially take a cooperative attitude. I must say, one of the challenges in cross-border enforcement is timeliness. Whilst the timeliness aspects in the domestic setting in this legislation, you know, I think are pretty much OK, if you look at the length of time that orders can exist in respect of cross-border orders, it seems quite extraordinary. The length of time seems very long, and so information can be held in abeyance.

I guess the other thing that I’d point out and try to preface what I intend to raise in the committee stage, is the suggestion that there can be essentially secret seizures—that items can be seized, including communications, and sent to a foreign State, and the person who is affected doesn’t know. Now, “secret” and “justice” are two words that don’t usually go together. So I want to know—I will be wanting to know—exactly what the kind of threshold is for us sending secret evidence to foreign States, especially when we think about some of those foreign States that will be asking for it and their own record.

So there is actually a lot in this bill. To the uninitiated, it’s a very dry piece of legislation. But in fact, it touches on freedom from arbitrary search and seizure, it touches on open justice, and it touches on criminal offending. They’re all, actually, pretty important matters. It might not be as kind of headlining as some of the criminal justice material that comes before this House, but it is important. And to be honest, the Minister did make a good point when he said cyber-crime—crime which often is scams; is often depriving people of their hard-earned money—is serious criminal offending and it’s very hard to detect. We need to absolutely be pursuing those crimes, because they cause real harm. For the victims, it can cause extreme financial distress to lose tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars to scams and other cyber-crime.

And of course, hacking—the space bill we’ve just done, essentially underlying that is a hacking issue that, you know, the idea of blackmail by hacking is another massive issue. We need to be on top of that. It’s a massive security risk as well as a commercial risk.

So yes, we do support this bill, but I do think that, particularly as it’s being heard under urgency, a robust committee process will be important, and I look forward to that shortly.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I take this call on behalf of the Green Party to speak to the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill. The Green Party have reviewed this bill carefully and in good faith throughout first reading and select committee stage. At the first reading, we supported it through to select committee, as this is the place where we sought to raise concerns with how this bill is currently drafted. It should be of the utmost importance to all MPs to make sure that our laws that we are creating are fit for purpose.

I want to be clear that the Greens are committed to the underlying kaupapa behind this bill and acknowledge that the implementation of the Budapest Convention was a recommendation of the royal commission of inquiry into those horrific 15 March attacks, where it was clear that our laws and our processes did not protect the people of Aotearoa. We are committed, across this House, to ensuring that those atrocious acts never happen again here in Aotearoa. Here in the submission from the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ) to the royal commission of inquiry into the attack on the Christchurch mosques, I just want to start by showing the 51 names of the people who lost their lives in that attack in my hometown of Christchurch. It is so important that we listen to the people that were most affected by those attacks. We all recognise the responsibility that we as a legislator have in ensuring that our policy settings in Aotearoa are safe and protect all of us.

The Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill amends two key pieces of legislation, the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 and the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992, to better equip our collective resistance against cyber-crime, because cyber-crime knows no bounds and no borders. Offenders can be located in one country, their victims in another, while the evidence is stored on a server in a third. The Budapest Convention, which this bill implements, provides a framework that allows countries to work together on criminal investigations. It covers critical cyber-crimes such as the deployment of virus software, fraud, the distribution of child exploitation material, and terrorism.

With that responsibility comes the responsibility to make sure that we are passing the best law possible that seeks to achieve the intent it says it will. At the first reading and throughout the select committee stage, we engaged constructively and worked across the House to raise concerns on some of the specific clauses and sections in this bill. However, as the bill has not subsequently addressed these concerns in its current form, we cannot at the Greens support this bill in good faith.

I want to be very clear that if these concerns are addressed in the committee of the whole House stage, which is coming up just after lunch, and our Amendment Papers are agreed to—Amendment Papers that we have created through consultation with our trusted stakeholders like FIANZ—then we will passionately support this bill. We have a responsibility to ensure that Aotearoa is safe for all of us.

The Greens remain concerned about the definition of “an offence”, specifically the use of terminology such as “improper conduct”, which remains unacceptably broad. This could leave interpretation open as to whether individuals or groups could be operating as part of a foreign power when engaging in non-violent protest or criticism of the state. The language used in this bill leaves open the possibility that an individual engaging in political protest, in solidarity with an international movement, could be swept into the scope of an offence. If we narrow this definition, it will make it much clearer that we will be sticking in line with the laws of Aotearoa New Zealand.

This bill does not make the distinction clear, and the Greens are committed to passing legislation that is fit for purpose and achieves the intent of keeping communities safe. Now, while we support the intent of this bill, which was to strengthen international cooperation on cyber-crime and protect victims, there are provisions that, as currently drafted, raise serious concerns and must be improved at the committee of the whole House stage, which I’m looking forward to getting into with my colleagues after the break.

Specific concerns are new section 88A(4), which could allow surveillance of political refugees simply because their country of origin is a treaty partner. This risks undermining human rights obligations—something that we don’t want to do in Aotearoa. Further, new sections like 88B and 88V in Subpart 1 of the bill, and new sections 20A and 43 in Subpart 2 of the bill, lack clear human rights and proportionality safeguards. We can put these safeguards into our legislation, and that is what the committee of the whole House stage is there for. Without these, New Zealand might be required to assist in investigations into conduct that isn’t even a crime here, or cooperate with countries that do not meet basic standards for a fair trial or privacy protections. Furthermore, the Greens remain concerned about the new offences introduced in Part 2 of the bill, particularly new sections 253 and 254. This is work we will continue to push for—and across the House—at the committee of the whole House stage.

I would also like to take this call to raise my disappointment in the consultation process of this bill. A big failing of this process was not hearing from FIANZ. I spoke with our trusted stakeholder, the Federation of Islamic Associations New Zealand, and their representative Atif, who expressed their concern around the lack of consultation, and they have provided a quote here: “Despite being the community most directly impacted by the March 15 terrorist attacks, the national umbrella body FIANZ was not consulted. The royal commission of inquiry clearly recommended that meaningful consultation with affected communities must be a core part of the Government process. With the release of the New Zealand National Security Strategy, it is essential that such consultation becomes standard practice, ensuring that communities are not only informed but actively involved in shaping the politics that affect them.”

So, on one hand, we are bringing in one of the recommendations of the royal commission of inquiry, but whilst ignoring another one, and we can do better than that. I urge the Government to actively consult with FIANZ moving forward to ensure the best possible outcome for this bill.

To conclude, the Green Party acknowledges the sobering context which led to the introduction of this legislation. The royal commission of inquiry into the March 15 terrorist attack made it clear that together we must strengthen our collective ability to prevent harm, particularly where online platforms are being used to spread extremist content and incite violence.

We must protect our sovereignty and our core values as Kiwis. We need to be careful that we are not upholding laws from other countries that do not even fit with our own laws. While we cannot support this bill in its current form, we are working to put forward constructive amendments to address these concerns. We continue to do so in good faith and in the hope that with the support across the House, this legislation can be strengthened to achieve the outcome we all want: a safer Aotearoa for everyone.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I rise in support of the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill, on behalf of the ACT Party. Firstly, I’d just like to acknowledge the previous speaker’s acknowledgment and recognition of the victims of the mosque terrorist attack. Also from Christchurch, I feel that really deeply, as do all the members of Parliament here in New Zealand, and I acknowledge that this was also a recommendation of that report, to ratify or to enact our agreement as part of the Budapest Convention.

I was actually in the EU—was it last week? Gosh, I can’t remember—a couple of weeks ago, with my colleague James Meager, who I believe sits on this committee, and I actually had some meetings with our counterparts around a lot of these kind of issues and where we could work together in order to make New Zealand and the world a safer place.

I share some of the same opinions as the Hon Dr Duncan Webb around privacy and around foreign States and how they may manipulate this legislation in order to harm individuals that are New Zealand citizens. I do share those concerns, but I think, on balance, we need to think about some of those countries and what they’re doing in the space of cyber-crime and how that does, in fact, cause foreign interference here in New Zealand. I think that in itself is one of the main reasons why we need to work together with other like-minded countries when it comes to these issues. We need to make sure that our sovereignty and our security is, in fact, protected. Being a tiny island nation at the bottom of the planet in a digital world, we need to make sure that we do have strong links and strong ties with other like-minded countries in order to tackle these really big issues. We don’t want to be left behind.

So I’m really keen to hear some of the points hashed out in the committee of the whole House stage because, like I said, the ACT Party does always consider the sovereignty and security of our residents here in New Zealand—our citizens—and we do take that really seriously, but I do commend this bill to the House.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. It seems a very appropriate time, given the two previous pieces of legislation we’ve considered—this Budapest Convention is our ratification of an international treaty, in effect. That’s, essentially, exactly what we were doing yesterday in ratifying the UAE trade agreement. So we are showing ourselves as a responsible partner—in that case it was a one-to-one; in this case, it’s a multilateral arrangement—as a responsible part of the global community.

The other piece of legislation, of course, which we just considered was the one relating to outer space. Why is that relevant? That’s an area which is changing very, very fast. So is the area of cyber-crime, and so this is about us responding to a fast-changing situation, as well. We talked, in those discussions, about being a responsible global citizen. That’s true here, too. What this legislation is all about—what the convention is all about—is encouraging and allowing for a cooperation between what we’ve heard is over 40 nations to combat cyber-crime, which is obviously something which we experience ourselves here directly. I mean, even this Parliament has been under attack in terms of cyber activity, and so we are well aware of that.

The legislative statement, interestingly, says that it ensures that New Zealand’s legislation fully aligns with the requirements of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (the Budapest Convention). But it’s interesting that the Justice Committee actually says that there are a number of areas where legislation in New Zealand needs to be tweaked to ensure that we do actually fully comply. So there’s a slight discrepancy there in terms of the language that is being used. It’s all about preservation of documents—so if the document is suspected as being something related to cyber-crime, it requires that preservation, that prevents disclosure of that. So there are some very useful initiatives which are being taken there.

I did hear the concern about some of the broad definitions. I guess one of the things that I would say is—and I’m asking questions of the Minister about whether this is the same language that other countries which are signatories to this convention are also using. I note, also, that there are a number of reservations that would not apply to New Zealand: the reservation about the range of offences—so they are more severe offences, more significant offences, rather than relatively minor ones; and the second reservation that would limit New Zealand’s ability to prosecute New Zealanders who commit cyber-crimes outside New Zealand to only those most serious and severe offences, such as terrorism and human trafficking.

I look forward to the ongoing discussion about this. But this is about us being a responsible player in the global environment in the area of cyber-crime. I commend the bill to the House.

Thank you. Madam Speaker, I rise on behalf of the Green Party to speak on the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill. Now, as the previous speaker has already mentioned, this particular legislation does amend two key pieces of legislation: the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 and the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992. Also, there are different elements of the Crimes Act in there, as well.

This is something that is addressing an issue that we’re currently seeing manifesting in a greater capacity due to the prevalence of online presences, in general, in our daily lives. One of the other things that is also really important, as a result of this legislation, is that it does come on the back of the recommendation from the royal commission of inquiry into the 15 March attack. I want to really acknowledge my colleague Kahurangi Carter who, in her speech, talked about the way that we have supported this in the first reading. It has gone through the select committee in good faith in order to try and get an outcome that both addresses the concerns but also doesn’t diminish the rights of people here in Aotearoa New Zealand. Unfortunately, during the select committee stage, we haven’t really got to that stage, so the Green Party cannot support this bill in its current form in the second reading. But, of course, if the Minister is open to conversations and discussions and amendments in the committee stage, we may revisit our position in the third reading.

Just in terms of the process itself, we have heard from a range of submissions around this particular bill during the select committee stage, but I think it is important to, again, highlight the fact that while this bill was a recommendation of the royal commission of inquiry into the 15 March attack, one of the most affected communities as a result of that attack was not consulted as part of this—we heard that loud and clear from the Federation of the Islamic Associations of New Zealand, FIANZ, in their submission—which is disappointing because it is something that we were hoping would strengthen our domestic legislation and make our people safer. But there are certain parts of this bill that do fall short of that.

I think the other really important thing, as we’re looking at it from a New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (BORA) perspective, is the way that this legislation that provides the ability for people to conduct search and seizure, and also investigation, does touch on a number of New Zealand Bill of Rights Act concerns, specifically things like clauses 14, 15, 17, and 21—anything from freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of association in terms of religion and also thoughts and thinking, and also the conditions around unreasonable search and seizure. The reason that this bill touches on a lot of these particular areas and has drawn BORA concerns from the Green Party is the ability for us to investigate or even survey people here in Aotearoa who are captured and who are protected by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act on the basis that our treaty partners, potentially, would consider these people to be a threat without us, at least from a legislation perspective, going into the detail of whether those requests from our international treaty partners are in line with our domestic value and the value that we hold really close to our hearts in Aotearoa New Zealand—and that’s particularly from the perspective of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as I have mentioned.

There are specific concerns that we have seen, and I think the consistency report that we do see against BORA doesn’t quite go far enough to unpack the severity of this. Finally, I want to say that one of the things we’re also going to be looking into a lot more as a result during the committee of the whole House stage is the Amendment Paper that the Minister has also released, which wasn’t seen during the select committee stage. We look forward to that in the committee stage, as well.

Thank you very much, Mr Speaker. It gives me great pleasure to rise in support of the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill. To our friend from Te Pāti Māori—who has turned up to give a contribution, which is great—I want to clarify for him that this bill fully aligns with the requirements of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, hence why it is known as the “Budapest Convention”, which is quite useful and quite good to clarify for members across the House. I know others will have substantive contributions on the material involved with this legislation. I commend it to the House.

Thank you very much, Mr Speaker, for an opportunity to take a call on this bill. The Budapest Convention is designed to update New Zealand’s legal framework to combat cyber-crime more effectively. It paves the way for New Zealand to be able to join the Budapest Convention, and it also enhances our international cooperation in this space. Can I just highlight how important it is, particularly in cyber-crime, to have those international connections when we know that cyber-crime criminals, those operating in this space, specifically work to exploit where there are gaps between countries and to exploit those gaps for their own financial and personal gain. So the more that we can join up and have a network of agreed rules and how we cooperate with each other—it reduces the opportunities for those cyber-criminals to be able to carry out their work.

This bill introduces new tools to be able to do that work, new tools for law enforcement such as limited data preservation orders—sounds long, but we’ll talk about that later; big fan of limited data preservation orders. This helps to secure digital evidence—really critical to trace who is doing the crime on the internet and, also, how we try and hold those individuals accountable. That is an incredibly difficult thing to do in cyber-crime.

This also improves the mechanisms for accessing electronic data and cooperating with other countries on cyber-crime investigations. That’s an important note to make. I think it’s important for anyone who’s been a victim of cyber-crime, who understands the different forms it can come in—whether it be phishing scams that we’re all trained here in Parliament not to click on the links; ransomware attacks; identity thefts; financial fraud that’s online; and also hacking into computers—we are all familiar with those and how cyber-crime operates.

But it is interesting that in New Zealand, what I often hear in terms of electorate inquiries is that if someone has been a victim of identity theft or someone has been a victim of cyber-crime, it does appear that the threshold for law enforcement action is a lot higher than it would be if it happened in real life. So if shoplifting—we know that under $500 under National is not investigated by police, but say it’s over $500—is over $500 and you get someone turning up to investigate that crime, whether it’s been shoplifting or a burglary, that threshold for cyber-crime does appear to be quite a bit higher. So when you have someone who’s been a victim of a scam and they may have lost $10,000, they’re often directed to simply go through their bank or go through other channels as opposed to trying to actually have a proper investigation on that.

It doesn’t seem right that we have different thresholds for the fact that things happen online as opposed to in real life, because what that does is that sends a green light to criminals who operate in this space that if you’re wanting to take people’s money, then you’re less able to be held accountable online than in real life. That is why having these agreements in place but also backing up these agreements with the appropriate resource so we have a specific unit that is able to investigate and hold criminals accountable for cyber-crime, whether they are based in New Zealand or whether we are cooperating with our international counterparts—we want to be able to share that information and hold people accountable, because the tighter the net is around these areas, it reduces the chances of people being scammed and losing their savings, particularly for those who are new to using the internet.

I think of people in my parents’ demographic, where they’ve clicked on links and had themselves exposed to ongoing text messages or ongoing scams to try and extract money. It can be really stressful for people who’ve retired, who’ve got their fixed income, who have their retirement savings. They are targeted often through operations such as this.

What this bill does, in fact, is it amends the Search and Surveillance Act, which was passed back in 2012, and it also amends the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act. The primary change to the Search and Surveillance Act introduces preservation directions in support of domestic criminal investigations and also overseas criminal investigations and proceedings. It establishes an agreed network of cooperation to minimise the opportunities for criminals to use online tools to extract money and to extract threats from people.

This bill enables the Commissioner of Police here in New Zealand to issue a preservation direction requiring documents—and that includes computer data, it’s important to note—to be preserved where there are grounds to believe that documents are particularly vulnerable to loss or modification. A preservation direction is an interim measure, and that interim measure ensures that the evidence—in the form of documents—is preserved before a production order is sought requiring those documents to be produced. It’s essentially an evidence-gathering tool that can be used not only to trace who is doing the offending but also to hold them accountable from where they’re operating from. If those actions are taken earlier on, then it shuts down that operative from preying upon more and more individuals, whether they be here in New Zealand or in other countries across the world.

This bill also requires a person who is subject to a preservation direction or assisting in executing a surveillance device warrant—such as, for example, a telecommunications provider—to keep the existence of the direction or warrant confidential for a period of time to avoid prejudice in a criminal investigation. We know from the select committee process and from hearing some excellent evidence and information provided from telecommunications providers that there were some concerns about how long they would have to hang on to large amounts of data. And so we talked through all of those issues in detail to be able to understand how we can make sure that the telecommunications providers are still able to operate effectively, but, at the same time, they are also doing their bit to enable that data capture to occur when required.

As mentioned, this bill also amends the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act to enable production orders and surveillance device warrants to be applied for in support of international criminal investigations and proceedings. This is about New Zealand doing its part, because we do know that those cyber-criminals are operating in big-scale scams right across the world. So if we are participating alongside other nation States, then that reduces those opportunities for them to take advantage of people and their savings. There are appropriate oversights to ensure that human rights are upheld, and this ensures that the full suite of investigatory tools are available in New Zealand, where appropriate, to be able to support those international criminal investigations and proceedings.

Labour supports this bill because we support the Budapest Convention in order to try and fight cyber-crime. We believe that we have a clear role in taking up our part in a global fight to increase cyber-security capabilities and international cooperation. This bill builds on Labour’s previous efforts to join the Budapest Convention, and it also implements the recommendation from the royal commission of inquiry into the Christchurch terror attack. It also has the benefit of modernising New Zealand’s legal framework to effectively combat cyber-crime, and that is important. It maintains a balance with privacy and human rights protections while also ensuring we increase our cooperation and ability to get on top of cyber-crime.

The legislation strengthens our law enforcement tools, improves international cooperation, and demonstrates our dedication in Labour to have public safety in the digital age—so incredibly important. By joining the Budapest Convention, we aim to position New Zealand as a responsible global actor in addressing cyber-threats. And we know that this crime area is growing; this is an area where there’s more crime happening. Not only do we need to make sure that we’re signing up and participating, but also in making sure our law enforcement agencies here in New Zealand are adequately resourced so that we can take our part on the world stage to reduce cyber-crime.

Thank you, Mr Speaker, for the opportunity to speak to the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill. The Budapest Convention is the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime. With cyber-crime posing a serious and significant threat to the public, and because our international partners are mostly already signed up as parties to the convention, and because we take cyber-crime seriously, we support the bill and the cross-border mutual cooperation to enforcement that it enables. I commend this bill to the House.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I stand to take a call on the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill, which Labour continues to support. We signed up to the Budapest Convention, so it’s good to see that this important work continues.

A number of speakers have already discussed the borderless nature of cyber-crime, and that’s what can make it so difficult to detect and to prosecute offenders unless we have an appropriate level of international cooperation. That’s what the Budapest Convention sets out to achieve. When these offences are committed online, you can have an offender in one jurisdiction, the victim in another, and the evidence of the offence being held in a server in a third country or territory. It can be very difficult, with various countries’ legislation, to join all of that together to be able to track down and, ultimately, apprehend and prevent further cyber-crime from happening.

Cyber-crime can take many forms, and I think it’s worth taking a moment, as we step through this legislation that we all agree on, to look at a particular example of some fairly abhorrent cyber-crime that has happened here in Aotearoa New Zealand, where a Taranaki grandmother has lost close to a quarter of a million dollars to an AI deepfake that featured Prime Minister Christopher Luxon—an online, manipulated video purporting to be a message from the Prime Minister. As a result, this person has lost a quarter of million dollars online into cryptocurrency.

The way that this happened was that a video advertisement appeared; the person listened to the message, apparently from the Prime Minister, and started to engage with what they thought was an investment advisor online. Over a series of weeks, $20,000 each time was taken out of term deposits that were, in fact, the victim’s inheritance. A lot of the funds were also earmarked for the victim’s grandchildren. No one can afford to lose a quarter of a million dollars, but this was someone for whom that was essentially their life savings, and, over a series of days, the funds were drained and transferred, converted into cryptocurrency in a foreign account, and then bounced away out of reach of the New Zealand-based victim.

Potentially the worst part of this, because the scammer was able to access this person’s online banking and watch and manipulate her actions—the last words that the scammer ever said on the phone while speaking to the victim was an aside to someone else in the scam centre they were operating from. They simply said, “This woman has no money.”—“This woman has no money.” That scammer had literally drained all of the funds out of that victim’s account and only stopped when there wasn’t a single dollar left for them to take. That’s why legislation like this is so important to be able to track down people operating from other territories that do those kinds of attacks.

There was an interesting comment—because the Prime Minister, rightfully, was questioned about this and said that he would never endorse a particular investment, and the best way for people to protect themselves was to be vigilant and aware of risks. To a point, absolutely, that’s true, but, also, legislation like this helps to protect people and helps to provide international cooperation around enforcement.

On that note from the Prime Minister, that very sage advice where he says the best way for people to protect themselves is to be vigilant and aware of the risks—that comes with any scam. If, for example, 21,000 people are promised that they will be eligible for FamilyBoost and only 153 are actually delivered the funds that were promised, then that, potentially, could fall into a scam, as well, and, in my opinion, should be a risk that all New Zealanders need to be aware of. Whether it’s a deepfake or a shallow fake, a promise that’s not delivered and a promise that’s broken is shameful. But I do commend this bill to the House.

I’m glad we can all agree that rising cyber-crime is of great concern for New Zealanders. That’s why we’re here in the House today supporting the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill. This legislation improves cross-border investigations and prosecutions related to cyber-crime, all while upholding human rights and, particularly, the right to be free from unequal search and surveillance. It’s all a part of our plan to restore law and order and to restore real consequences for crime. I commend this bill to the House.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. It’s a pleasure to rise in support of this bill. As the House has gone a little bit quiet, I thought I’d speak about urgency for a little bit, because we are still an urgency—we are still in urgency. I was just wanting to make a brief point and then extend—I was going to say, “extend a fig leaf”, but no—an olive branch to the other side, because I do think the issue of urgency is an important one for the House to think about when we use it.

I did obtain some research from the Parliamentary Library on the hours that the House has been in urgency this term compared to last term. In the 53rd Parliament, the House was in urgency for 15.7 percent of those total hours. For this Parliament, up until 9 May, the House was in urgency for 22.6 percent of the total hours. There absolutely has been an increase in terms of hours, but I also do think, particularly for my National Party colleagues, that it does a disservice to the people of New Zealand when we point fingers at each other, both ways.

In truth, there is a sense that urgency is being used more often than it should be, and there is an opportunity, as the Standing Orders Committee considers the Standing Orders, to think about the parameters under which urgency should be used. You will not find an objection, in terms of my Labour Party colleagues and I, that there are good reasons for using urgency. The question is simply when it should be used and how legislation that has gone through the House under urgency should be reviewed. I did speak earlier about other countries who’ve adopted various measures, including post-legislative scrutiny; including sunset clauses, as well. I do hope that members opposite will take that on board as we head into a period of reviewing the Standing Orders.

I do rise in support of this bill. As my colleagues have pointed to across the House, cyber-crime is absolutely an issue for New Zealand, and it’s an increasing issue. The Ministry of Justice’s Crime and Victims Survey 2019 showed that over 320,000 people experienced one or more incidents of fraud or cyber-crime in the 12 months preceding the survey. But as my colleague Ginny Andersen also pointed out, there is an issue in terms of policing this and monitoring it and ensuring that people get a response. I do think this legislation is important, but I also do think we need to think about how we give it effect.

Interestingly, this isn’t the only international convention in existence, in relation to cyber-crime. There is the Budapest Convention; there is also a draft UN cyber-crime convention—and I think, in the international space, sometimes there’s confusion between the two. I wanted to briefly just set out the differences between the UN draft convention and the Budapest Convention, because I think it points clearly to why New Zealand is using the Budapest Convention as the model under which we’re developing legislation.

The UN convention, firstly, is broader in scope. It goes far beyond what would be considered cyber-dependent crimes. The UN convention also creates new offences that aren’t in the Budapest Convention, so it’s far broader. It has also expanded jurisdiction, and what was interesting when the UN convention was being negotiated was that there were countries, like Russia and China, who wanted to include what are called “content” offences. This is where you might find freedom of speech significantly limited, and that was absolutely the intention: to reach into quite a different space in terms of monitoring what, potentially, their citizens were saying overseas, as well as others.

The UN convention also has fewer human rights safeguards, and that, alongside these extensive criminal definitions, I think, is problematic—and certainly a lack of safeguards in terms of procedural requirements, which members have spoken about today, in terms of the person who is accused. While I do think that the Budapest Convention is a better model for us to develop legislation, we do also still need to be careful that we’re managing the fine balance of preventing global cyber-crime while also protecting the rule of law and, certainly, rights against unlawful search and seizure.

I did want to speak to a couple of aspects in this regard. Firstly, in relation to the requirement that requires a person subject to a preservation direction to keep the existence of the order confidential—keeping this confidential from the individual who is accused, if you like—not only do we have the protections and legislation; I think often, in the House, we forget that we also have principles of common law that apply in this case. The duty of candour is essential in our law, and, essentially, it provides that, where there are adversarial proceedings, ordinarily you will have a right of response if you’re accused of something. For obvious reasons, when it comes to a search warrant or it comes to situations like this, you may not want to, for obvious reasons—the information may be destroyed—so you may not be able to provide that information to the individual.

The duty of candour, in my view, still applies. You would still have a circumstance where the application for a preservation order would need to consider any potential objections that could be made before it is granted. While I couldn’t find case law precisely on this point, there is case law in terms of search and seizure, or certainly search, where the individual isn’t notified before a search is conducted. The case of Hager v Attorney-General is looked to fairly frequently in this regard. It says that that obligation must be satisfied. You have to look at how the individual might object.

The other issue is, of course, what happens when information is seized and then sent out of the country. This is an issue that the select committee raised, in terms of amending clause 37. The bill now includes a requirement that people affected by search are notified before seized material is sent out of the country. This is, essentially, so they can potentially bring a judicial review claim should they wish to prevent that information going out of the country. Interestingly, this was a point that also came out of case law in the Dotcom v Attorney-General case.

The reason this is important is something that my colleague the Hon Dr Duncan Webb pointed to, which is that there is misuse—or there can be; there’s potential to be misuse—in terms of requiring that information is sent overseas. Part of the misuse is due to a lack of dual criminality—if there are criminal offences that exist in a foreign country that simply don’t exist in New Zealand—and, sadly, around the world we’re seeing more of what’s called “transnational repression”. This is Governments who are actively looking to target often their own citizens and prevent them from speaking out against human rights violations. Certainly, the likes of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have commented on this very frequently.

We need to be extremely cautious that we’re not aiding that, in terms of potentially extraditing individuals—or even, without extraditing them, putting them in harm’s way because they have family members in a home country and evidence would be supplied by New Zealand to show that they were a dissident in some way that was considered illegal in their home country. Certainly there are many examples of that happening, even in terms of foreign nationals who are in the US. There were some fairly famous cases in the early 2000s of attempted kidnappings of Iranian nationals who were human rights activists. Now, of course, we haven’t seen that happen here, but what’s interesting is that, before those kidnappings happened, there were other measures that those Governments took to try and stifle their free speech.

I am supportive of this bill, but I do think it’s a very careful line that we have to walk. It’s a piece of legislation that I do hope we will rigorously examine, in terms of the committee stage, which I look forward to doing. Kia ora.

Before I take the next call, what I will do is take the National Party call and then I will come to the Te Pāti Māori call.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. It’s a pleasure to rise in support of the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill. This is a sensible piece of legislation. We’ve well discussed it throughout the House today; many really excellent points about the requirement to make online activity a lot safer and to tighten things up. I commend the bill to the House.

Mōrena. Tēnā koe, Mr Speaker. Tēnā tātou e te Whare. Exactly like my colleague on the right, I would repeat comments made this morning that unless the House recognises, appreciates, and completely embeds in any of our debates in this House and into legislation Te Tiriti o Waitangi—unless that occurs in a genuine and real way, we’re screwed. So here we go.

Just to say it is obviously easier to go from a “no” to a “yes”. We can’t support this, because it doesn’t quite have enough in it, from our point of view and from our experience, for us to support it going forward. Any international treaty on security must come with firm assurances. This is especially important when our own Government refuses to uphold Te Tiriti o Waitangi, our founding document. So when we discuss cyber-security, our security more broadly, we need to understand it through more than the Western lens or the comfortable and privileged lens. What security means to Māori may look very different, and it absolutely does. For us as Māori, security must include direction from Te Tiriti o Waitangi, particularly in the protection of Māori data sovereignty. And within the context of this bill, security must also protect us from Government overreach that disproportionately harms our communities.

Very recent history—let me recall it—when security powers are misused: the Government-sanctioned raids on Tūhoe, where false accusations of conspiracy led to a deeply harmful and unjust operation on one of the most recent large-scale examples of this behaviour. That poorly managed Government-sanctioned response costs lives. We cannot afford to open that door to that kind of behaviour again. Yet we need only fast forward to the absolute tragedy of the Christchurch mosque attacks. Where was the security for this community? A deeper look into the prevention failures from Government revealed that resources had been misallocated, driven by bias and prejudice against our Muslim communities. Once again, lives were lost.

This bill risks continuing that pattern by expanding surveillance and international data-sharing powers without explicit safeguards for Māori rights. That speaks directly to the issue of Māori data sovereignty. Our data and our information should be just that: ours. What this treaty risks is the ability for our people to exercise mana motuhake over our data. This is critical to the success of Māori self-determination for whānau, hapū, and iwi Māori businesses. Unlocking economic and social potential is enabled by Māori data collection and analysis. Māori must own Māori data, Māori future, Māori mokopuna, Māori whenua.

We do recognise here that there are some upsides to this bill but, like I started off, it’s easier to go from a “no” to a “yes” than a “yes” to a “no”. We’re still in the “no” lane. We acknowledge the kōrero that other members of the House have provided, but our role here has been and will always be to advocate for mokopuna Māori, for whānau Māori. Nō reira i runga i tēnā [And so, on that], just to again remind us that unless the House fully recognises—to my left and to my right—that Te Tiriti o Waitangi is and always for be our founding document. And just to encourage the House: please read some more. That would be really helpful. I think just filling that gap of knowledge, like my colleague on my right said very early in one of his first calls in this House, there’s such a huge gap of knowledge. So I’d encourage you please read some more. Kia ora tātou.

This bill is set down for committee stage immediately. I declare the House in committee for consideration of the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill.

Members, the House is in committee on the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill. We come first to the debate on Part 1. Part 1 is the debate on clauses 3 to 53, “Amendments relating to investigatory tools”, and Schedules 1 and 2. The question is that Part 1 stand part.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’d just like to preface the remarks, because, obviously, this a pretty technical and detailed bill, and sometimes I think we kind of can fail to see the forest for the trees, or fail to see the water for the stormy seas, as they say—and I do want to first say that, yes, we absolutely support this bill. But I want to note the overarching concerns, which are twofold. One is to identify that this is an exercise of State power against citizens, and we want to make it clear and put on the record exactly where that balance is struck. The second part or theme that my comments and questions will identify is the difficult tension in the New Zealand State in exercising its powers against citizens assisting foreign States, and particularly in assisting—I’m going to be frank about this—repressive foreign States, those foreign States who don’t have the same human rights values as we do.

From that, I’m not going to dilly-dally, but I’m going to get straight into it, and a lot of what I’m going to do is simply to invite the Minister to expand and explain to the public, for the record, what it’s all about. At the centre of this, one of the keystones of this legislation is preservation directions. So whilst we’ve already got production orders—that is to say, telecommunication providers can be ordered to go and find and present the particular information—this preliminary step is seen as important to make sure that whilst those production orders are being sorted out, no one goes around hitting the delete button, in short.

The first thing I want to ask about is on page 14 of the bill as reported back, and I’ll just talk about the new sections. New section 79A in clause 18 talks about “enforcement agency”, and I do think it’s quite important to understand what that means in terms of who has these powers. In terms of the mutual assistance provisions, it appears to be the police, and I’ll be interested in the Minister’s comments on whether an enforcement agency simply means the police and, obviously, things like Crown Law when they’re taking advice and so on, or whether it will extend to other enforcement agencies—like, a classic one would be the Customs Service—or, in fact, whether it could go broader than that, because, certainly, if we were to say that it was prosecuting agencies, there’s a plethora of prosecuting agencies in New Zealand.

That’s my first question and that’s actually a question of clarification, and then my second question is kind of an invitation to explain, because the very next definition talks about “pathway information”, because we know telecommunications data can be routed through numerous servers and so on. I’m asking this genuinely because I don’t quite understand it: why is pathway information important in a criminal investigation? I can understand why the sender and recipient information is important, but I’d be curious to understand why we’d need to know that it was routed through—or “rowted”, if you say it that way—this server or that server, and so on and so forth, particularly if we know that the telecommunications provider holds the relevant data, and they’d have the text message, or whatever it might be.

I’m going to just keep cracking on because this is a bill we agree with and I’m not going to hold things up, and so I’m going to squeeze another question in, as well. It’s around new section 79B in clause 18, which is entitled “Enforcement officer may apply for preservation direction”. It’s about the threshold, because it says that the enforcement officer can apply for it if that officer “is satisfied that conditions in section 79E for making a direction against that person are met.” Whenever you’re exercising search and surveillance powers, it’s all about suspicions and about the reasonableness of those suspicions—you know, reasonable grounds to suspect, reasonable grounds to believe, and those kinds of thresholds. You don’t often see a kind of very subjective test that the enforcement officer “is satisfied”. So I’ve managed to squeeze in three queries in there, and I will do a bit more later.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’m just looking here at Part 3 of the legislation, under “Subpart 1—Interpretation”, at new section 88A—and that’s actually on page 28 of the bill as it stands; I want to explore the rationale and ask the Minister to explain the reason for using certain definitions in the clause 88A(4), particularly regarding—

Could you just give us that page number again?

Sure. It’s on page 28—thank you—and it’s section 88A(4) in new Part 3A, under Subpart 1. This definition is regarding offences of “political character”. I’m wanting to explore that, and I would love the Minister to engage with my question around why the standard political offence safeguard appears to be narrower than in comparable legislation. Is there a reason for that?

I think it’s really important that when we are looking at bringing in a law that potentially opens us up to laws that don’t belong to New Zealand but that belong to other countries, but through this convention we would have to uphold them because of certain treaties we have with other countries. I think that us, as a country, and the everyday people out there really want to know that we’re not doing anything that goes against our national identity, but would want to ensure that our citizens are not being asked to uphold laws that don’t belong to us and that do not represent who we are as New Zealanders and our country of Aotearoa.

I guess that takes me into the next part. Just in this same section in new Part 3A, can the Minister clarify whether the term “serious offence” in section 88(1) is subject to any threshold test? We’d really want to make sure that any proportionality or dual criminality under New Zealand law is actually met, so we’re looking at whether that “serious offence” has been tested against what we in New Zealand deem as a criminal offence in New Zealand. I’m just really going back to that core concern that we have heard from trusted stakeholders like the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand, and I’m asking the Minister if you could please explain whether there are any safeguards in place to ensure that preservation directions are not guaranteed in relation to offences that would not be recognised as criminal in New Zealand. We just really want to make sure that in New Zealand, we are a place where we’re living by our laws, and we’re not importing laws that don’t belong to us and aren’t fit for purpose here in Aotearoa.

Just one more question on section 88A in new Part 3A, in clause 19: can the Minister explain the basis for new section 88A(4)(b), and how bilateral agreements are assessed to ensure they are consistent with New Zealand’s human rights obligations? We have our New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, which we commonly call BORA, and we have our Auditor-General, who audits and measures the things that we do here as a Government—our Government actions and our legislation—to uphold our laws and our citizens’ human rights, so we just want to make sure that that is being done here, in this law. So I ask if the Minister can explain how the bilateral agreements are assessed to ensure that they are consistent with New Zealand’s human rights obligations.

Mōrena, Minister. My questions in relation to this bill are centred on Māori data sovereignty, and you might have picked that up in my speech. I’m keen to just question why the Minister has not considered including provisions that would safeguard our people.

Māori have the right to control their own data—that might be a clue in there. Crown agencies could or should consult with Māori, including iwi authorities or relevant stakeholders. There should be an establishment of a Māori advisory panel to monitor how preservation directions and data sharing are used where Māori and Māori data are involved.

There should also be—if I might mention this before my question, which is coming—a cultural impact statement when sharing evidence internationally that involves Māori individuals, organisations, iwi authorities, and culturally sensitive information. This will protect against the misuse of Māori data, particularly in international contexts where tikanga Māori is not understood.

So, Minister, I’m looking at clause 4, which amends section 3(1) and inserts the definition of “surveillance power”. This clause updates the definitions in the Act to include new terms like “surveillance power” and “traffic data”, and states the relevant agencies involved in intelligence and enforcement, which is an oxymoron, sometimes, in this country—I’m just saying. Can the Minister confirm why, in clause 4, the definition of “surveillance power” does not include criteria that would safeguard Māori from disproportionate levels of surveillance or discrimination, especially in the context of the Tūhoe raids, which happened only a little while ago?

Speaking to the same section, Minister, I note there’s no reference to Māori data considerations in the definition of “traffic data” as it has been drawn from section 3AB of the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act 2013. However, I would question whether the Minister considers inserting provisions here to state and define Māori data or culturally sensitive data so that it better protects Māori interests. If he does not agree, I would ask the Minister to explain the reasons for that—this is us trying to get from the “no” lane to the “yes” lane, Minister. Kia ora.

Thank you, Mr Chair. Like my colleague Dr Duncan Webb, I just have some questions in relation to the restraint of power, because, obviously, these are considerable powers in terms of search and seizure, and, certainly, in terms of the preservation of documents, which to my mind triggers privacy issues. I’m just looking at clauses to see whether they’ve been drawn down or reasonably limited to ensure that we are walking that line.

I’m looking on page 12 at clause 10, which inserts new section 64A. This one is about the destruction of information that is found as part of that surveillance warrant process, and it says that “(2) The person must ensure that, as soon as is reasonably practicable after the warrant expires, that record—(a) is destroyed; or (b) is given to the law enforcement agency”. The first question is around whether there was consideration that that language should be restricted, as it’s very hard to determine what “reasonably practicable” may be in relation to.

The second question is in relation to clause 12, which inserts new section 71(2)(i), which says, “if the documents are sought to be produced on an ongoing basis, the facts relied on to show reasonable grounds to believe that those documents—(i) are in the possession or under the control of the person against whom the order is sought;”. There are two questions. The first is that if this is referring to documents that are produced on an ongoing basis, was there consideration of slicing that up to ask for a production order for each of those documents, as opposed to the set of documents, and the second is about the definition of “under the control of the person against whom the order is sought; or (ii) will come into that person’s possession or under their control”? Again, there’s no restriction in terms of timing there, but it stretches out to a document that will at some stage come into their position or under their control. All of that language is extremely broad. I have a question about whether there was consideration of bringing that down, as well.

In terms of new Subpart 2A, this is the start of the preservation directions section. I was first wondering about comparability of definitions across borders with countries of like jurisdiction whom we would be communicating with and whether the preservation order provisions are the same—that’s the general question.

The specific question is around an issue raised by the Privacy Commissioner, which is the fact that the Commissioner of Police is able to issue those preservation orders, and the Privacy Commissioner considered that to be quite unusual. The proposal from the Privacy Commissioner was that that’s the type of order that ought to require judicial oversight, and, certainly, that would be the more responsible thing to do, given the nature of the power, where someone is having information collected and held about them without knowing that that’s the case. So I’m asking whether there was consideration of just drawing that down and asking how that compares internationally. Thank you.

I move, That the committee report progress.

Leave is sought for that purpose. Is there any objection? There is objection. [Interruption] Could you repeat your contribution?

I move, That the committee report progress.

Madam Speaker, the committee has considered the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill and reports that it has made progress on the bill. I move, That the report be adopted.

Madam Speaker, I’m not sure of the protocol, but I’m informed that the House intends to lift urgency.

The Government has indicated that urgency will conclude. Therefore, the House stands adjourned until 2 p.m. today.

The House adjourned at 12.55 p.m. (Wednesday)

Almighty God, we give thanks for the blessings which have been bestowed on us. Laying aside all personal interests, we acknowledge the King and pray for guidance in our deliberations, that we may conduct the affairs of this House with wisdom, justice, mercy, and humility for the welfare and peace of New Zealand. Amen.

Members, I’m sure you’ll want to join with me in welcoming to our Parliament members of the European Parliament (MEPs), led by MEP Seán Kelly.

Members, yesterday, the Hon Kieran McAnulty asked me to consider the potential for misrepresentation of parties in replies to oral questions. The particular concern was that Ministers’ answers referring to “the other side of the House” might be taken to include all parties not in Government. There are rules and practices that address that possibility.

The first is Speakers’ ruling 205/5: Ministers shouldn’t bring parties not involved in the question into the answer. Unless the question is a blatant political attack, there is no reason to mention any party at all when answering a question. There is never a reason to bring a party not involved in a question into the answer.

The second Standing Order is 367, which enables members who have been misrepresented in an answer to a question to have their response put on the official record. This remedy is seldom used, and I accept that it is not likely to resolve a situation where the misrepresentation has occurred through the presentation of official parliamentary footage through social media.

There is, however, Appendix D to the Standing Orders, which provides remedies for using official footage to mislead. I refer members to Part 2 of that Appendix, 6, and 7.

No petitions have been delivered to the Clerk for presentation. Ministers have delivered three papers.

2025-26 statement of performance expectations for:

City Rail Link Ltd, and

Kāinga Ora, Homes and Communities

2025-29 statement of intent for Kāinga Ora, Homes and Communities.

Those papers are published under the authority of the House. Nine select committee reports have been delivered for presentation.

Reports of the Education and Workforce Committee on the:

2025-26 Estimates for Vote Tertiary Education, and

petition of Charlene Whyte

reports of the Environment Committee on the:

briefing from the Climate Change Commission about its recent monitoring and progress activities, and

petition of Alva Feldmeier

reports of the Finance and Expenditure Committee on the:

2025-26 Estimates for Vote Audit

2025-26 Estimates for Vote Finance

Fiscal Strategy Report

Budget Economic and Fiscal Update, and

2025-26 Estimates for Vote Regulation

report of the Health Committee on the notice of motion to approve the Misuse of Drugs (Classification and Presumption of Supply) Order 2025, and

report of the Social Services and Community Committee on the 2025-26 Estimates for Vote Sport and Recreation.

The notice of motion, the Estimates reports, and the briefing report are set down for consideration. No bills have been introduced.

Members, I’ve received a letter from the Hon Barbara Edmonds seeking to debate under Standing Order 399 the rising cost of living. In considering this application, I reviewed rulings by Speakers Harrison, Wall, and Mallard—and I quote: “A proposal to discuss a continuing problem … is not one contemplated by [Standing Order 399] in that it is not of a particular case of recent occurrence nor does it require the immediate attention of the House.” See Speakers’ ruling 221/2. The application is declined.

to the Minister for Regulation

Will New Zealanders benefit from the Ministry for Regulation’s work to remove unnecessary rules and regulations; if so, how?

The answer is absolutely yes. New Zealanders pride themselves on being the nation of number eight wire and can-do Kiwi attitude and Hillary knocking off Everest. However, it’s hard to keep that national psyche going when New Zealanders too often find themselves bound by pointless and expensive compliance activity. That is why it is so important to have, within Government, a department that champions less red tape and regulation by removing unnecessary rules that currently exist, by vetting new proposals for laws, and upskilling the regulatory workforce right across Government. That is precisely what the Ministry for Regulation does.

Can the Ministry for Regulation’s benefits be quantified?

Undoubtedly, they can. To give three recent examples: we have got rid of what turned out to be the pointless requirement for councils to go and inspect every hairdresser every year. That saves the average hairdresser around about $500, although often that cost was also being absorbed by the local council. I was thanked by a prominent mayor and former member of this House for that very fact at a recent Local Government New Zealand conference.

Who was that?

He was the Mayor of Nelson, who the member well knows. The agricultural and horticultural products review has estimated benefits of $272 million, while we’ve recently secured $90 million of medical conferences thanks to removing pointless restrictions that were preventing those.

Supplementary. [Interruption]

Just hold on. Just wait—just wait. Carry on.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. What should someone facing outdated or unnecessary regulations do?

Well, they should do what over 800 people have already done and go along to the Ministry for Regulation’s red-tape tip line where people who are annoyed by silly rules that tie them up, add costs, and don’t actually achieve anything for anyone in New Zealand can go along and report their problems. The ministry then analyses the rules that they complain about, often finds that they’re unnecessary, and, within Government, ensures that they are got rid of. This is dramatically reducing the amount of annoyance that New Zealanders experience.

What sectors are benefiting from the Ministry for Regulation’s work?

As I mentioned, there has been a comprehensive review already of the rules around importing agricultural and horticultural products into this country, and we estimate that the savings from that will be over a quarter of a billion dollars. We’ve looked at hairdressing, which I’ve mentioned. We’re also in the midst of seriously transforming the rules around running an early childhood education centre. That will see the number of regulations fall from 98 down to two-thirds of that number, with most of the rules being severely simplified and the enforcement being made proportional, a move that is already seeing early childhood centres—

That’s good.

—thank me for the improvements being made. We’re also doing sector reviews in telecommunications—

No.

—and another two to be announced very soon.

Haumi ē, hui ē, tāiki ē!

[It coalesces, it assembles, it is bound.]

Yeah, well, the member’s already experienced once, in this House, the exit door. Interrupting like that could see it happen again.

Point of order, Mr Speaker. I seek leave to repeat the answer, which was clearly enjoyed greatly by the Opposition.

Yeah, well, there’s also a Standing Order about trifling with the House and the Chair; that comes extremely close.

to the Prime Minister

Does he stand by all of his Government’s statements and actions?

Yes.

Does he agree with Christopher Luxon, “The first thing that we’ve got to do is we’ve got to reduce the cost of living.”; if so, has the cost of living gone up or down under his leadership?

What I’m proud to report to the member is that inflation is down. We inherited a situation where it was running as high as 7.3 percent; today, it sits at 2.7 percent. That’s a function of really good economic management and a Government that understands the economy.

Does he stand by his statement, “We are starting our 100-day plan with a laser focus on bringing down the cost of living”; if so, why, after 574 days, is the cost of living even higher and continuing to increase?

That is exactly what we have been doing. We have been controlling Government spending, getting rid of the wasteful Government spending that was going on, and what’s the consequence? We’ve lowered domestic inflation, lowered inflation, lowered interest rates—[Interruption]

Prime Minister, thank you. There’s an unacceptable level of barrage—people just speaking for the sake of it. Interjections should be rare and reasonable.

Well, as I was explaining to the member, what we have done is we have made sure that we’ve got rid of the wasteful spending. In doing so, that brings domestic inflation down; that has led to interest rates coming down by 2.25 percent. That, of course, has led to growth in the economy—you saw the first-quarter numbers—and, of course, that’s actually going to lead, ultimately, to people getting more work in higher-paying jobs.

Does he stand by Nicola Willis’ statement, “Prices coming down is exactly what we want to see”; if so, has the price of a typical family grocery shop increased or decreased under his Government?

Well, I thank the member for his question and his interest in this area, because the great news is that food inflation is down to 4.6 percent from what was 12.5 percent. Just two years ago, actually, the price of eggs was up 67 percent, chicken was up 21 percent, pasta was up 12 percent, frozen veges up 16 percent—all under his Government.

Can the Prime Minister confirm that the most recent Consumers Price Index revealed that 36 percent of the products monitored have come down in price?

I can, and the two numbers that I want people to understand is that under the member’s previous Government, food prices were up 12.5 percent; today, they’re up 4.6 percent.

Why did he claim, one year ago tomorrow, that food prices have been falling under his Government and the cost of living was getting under control?

Because they are. They’ve gone from 12.5 percent to 4.6 percent. We’re making good progress on inflation. We’ve got inflation back under 3 percent. We’ve got interest rates falling. I want to just say to the member that I really appreciate his interest, having created the cost of living crisis, in now wanting to help us solve it. I just say the biggest driver of inflation in this last week, as you would have seen, was council rates, and I’d love the member’s support to put a cap on council rates.

Is the purchasing power of someone on the minimum wage greater or lesser than it was when he became the Prime Minister, as a result of his Government’s decision to increase the minimum wage by less than inflation for two years in a row?

What I can say to the member is that infinitely New Zealanders are doing better under this Government than they would have done under his Government. Inflation is down from 7.3 percent to 2.7 percent. Interest rates are down 225 basis points, putting $320 a fortnight into an average mortgage holder’s back pocket. They’re the people we care about, and we want to make sure they’ve got money so they can navigate the cost of living crisis. And we’ve got our economy growing, after he put it into recession.

Why did he promise $250 a fortnight to families with kids if he can’t point to a single family that has received it?

Well, I really look forward to that member reversing some positions, because he didn’t support us on tax relief for low and middle income workers, adjusting the tax thresholds; he doesn’t support the FamilyBoost policy; he doesn’t support construction workers, by U-turning on his fast-track repeal—he should give that up immediately. I just say to the member: it’s a tough time for Kiwis; why don’t you get in behind and actually try to reduce the cost of living?

Why won’t he accept responsibility for his own Government’s actions given that, under his watch, the cost of living continues to go up, unemployment is going up, the number of people living rough on the streets and homeless is going up, and the number of people giving up on his Government and voting with their feet and leaving to Australia is at near-record levels?

Look, the member understands that he took the keys to our economy and he put it in a great big ditch. We’re hauling the car out of the ditch, we’re turning it up the right way, we’re getting into first and second gear, and we’ve got a plan. Our plan is working. We’ve got wasteful spending under control, we’ve got inflation down, we’ve got interest rates down, we’ve got growth in the economy—those are good things that support New Zealanders in a cost of living crisis.

Supplementary.

Think very carefully about the supplementary. The Hon David Seymour.

Was the Prime Minister at all taken by surprise when he was asked about “taking responsibility” by Chris Hipkins, of all people?

No, that’s not something he can answer. I did suggest to the member that he think carefully about that question. It wasn’t in order, and I would suggest he doesn’t do it again, because he’ll be straight out.

to the Minister of Finance

What recent reports has she seen on the economy?

Yesterday, Stats NZ released the latest trade figures for June. These reinforce how well New Zealand’s exporters are performing this year. In the three months to June, we exported $21.8 billion worth of goods. This represents an increase of 13 percent over the same period a year ago. Go exporters!

Which exports have been doing well?

New Zealand’s biggest goods exports are in the primary sector. Dairy, meat, fruit, and wood together make up over 60 percent of goods exports. These have all been performing strongly. In the three months to June, dairy exports were up 22 percent compared to the same period last year, meat exports were up 14 percent, fruit up 28 percent, and wood up 20 percent. I want to make a special shout-out to kiwifruit, which is now a $4 billion a year export industry; 12 months ago, annual kiwifruit exports were just $2.8 billion, so that is a significant increase.

What is behind the increase in export value?

Well, the value of New Zealand’s exports is a function of two things: export values, which is about how much we’re producing as a country. I am reliably informed that the Government’s efforts to remove barriers in the way of our exporters are paying dividends—for example, our renewal of the regional seasonal employment scheme has helped support that revival in the kiwifruit industry. It is also a function of the prices that exporters receive, which are largely set in overseas markets. The trade data released yesterday doesn’t do that breakdown, but an earlier Stats NZ release for the March quarter indicates that both export volumes and export prices have been rising.

What does the future hold for New Zealand’s exports?

Well, I am hugely optimistic for New Zealand exporters and, therefore, for the New Zealand economy and the prospects of New Zealanders. I have mentioned before in the House that international factors are likely to affect global demand compared to where it would’ve otherwise been. But Treasury forecasts in the Budget show both goods and services exports continuing to grow in the coming years. We make things the world wants to buy, and the Government—this Government—will keep backing hard-working Kiwi exporters. There is no better demonstration of that than the United Arab Emirates free-trade agreement enacted yesterday, so stay tuned for my colleague Todd McClay in question 11.

Question—

Supplementary.

Oh, supplementary. Apologies.

You’re welcome. Does she regret doing a Facebook video waving a block of cheese, complaining it was too expensive, only to see it increase under her watch?

No, not at all, because what I was highlighting at that time was that under the watch of the Government I was critiquing, food price inflation went to double digits—double digits—up over 12 percent. Every week, I recall coming down to this House and saying, “Would you please ease up on the wasteful spending? It’s charging the inflation and Kiwis are paying the price.” And you know what? There was a little election about that. Guess who won! [Interruption]

Does everyone want to go early?

to the Minister for Disability Issues

Does she agree with the findings of the Youth MP Parliamentary Working Group report that disabled people, especially disabled students, are consistently failed by our system; if not, why not?

Firstly, I’d like to thank all of the Youth MPs, especially Ryder Miller, who did an outstanding job representing the young people of Taupō. The disability working group engaged closely with the Ministry of Disabled People—Whaikaha, and I was really impressed with the work and the thinking demonstrated by the Youth MPs involved. Our Government is due to provide a formal response to the findings and recommendations of the working group by the end of August. I’m advised that Whaikaha is currently reviewing the recommendations in partnership with the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Disabled People has noted some parallels with ideas being considered as part of the work on refreshing the New Zealand Disability Strategy, which is a key focus for Whaikaha this year.

How will she respond to the findings that disabled learners remain an afterthought in resourcing conversations, and will she commit to the report recommendation to increase direct funding to learning support, assistive technology, and disability accommodations?

As I said in my response to the primary answer, Whaikaha are working closely with the Ministry of Education on a formal response to the Youth MPs. But what I would say as a reminder to the House is that in Budget 2025, the learning-support budget increased by $745 million thanks to the work from the Minister of Education, recognising that too many children are missing out on education, and that’s why this funding boost is significant.

Does she agree that teachers and teacher-aides are inadequately resourced to teach disabled learners, and, if so, what is she doing to ensure that teachers and disabled students are getting the funding, support, and training they need to succeed?

If the member has specific questions around education and education funding, I would invite her to put that to the Minister of Education. But what I would say, again, is that the working group of the Youth Parliament was very considered. There will be a formal response that will be led by Whaikaha but supported by the Ministry of Education. The other thing I would reiterate, again, is that we are working on a refresh of the New Zealand Disability Strategy, of which education is a core pillar, one of the five. No doubt, many of the issues that were raised in the Youth Parliament will be lined up as part of that work.

How will she respond to the finding that disabled young people are often marginalised, isolated, or shuffled into segregated spaces in schools due to being ill equipped, insufficiently resourced, and lacking support, which is in direct contradiction with their legal rights?

Again, I will say that for detailed responses around issues of education, I would invite the member to address the question to the Minister of Education.

Will the response from Whaikaha to the Youth MPs include any commitments to implement the recommendations from our Youth MPs, and, if not, why not?

As I said in my answer to the primary question, work is under way at the moment. Whaikaha is working closely with the Ministry of Education, and I’m pleased to say that we will be giving a formal response to the Youth Parliament.

Does the Minister agree that disabled people’s support systems are chronically underfunded across all stages of life, despite making up 17 percent of the New Zealand population, and does she find it acceptable that disabled learners’ voices are being ignored when fighting for less than the bare minimum?

I’m not sure if the question is intended specifically around education, but I have answered part of that in terms of the funding boost secured by the Minister of Education in the tune of $745 million in learning support. I would also put on record, again, the $1.1 billion investment in Disability Support Services last year, and another billion dollars this year into Disability Support Services. I accept that the challenges of those—particularly young people—with disabilities is still great, and that’s why our Government is focused on doing things that improve their lives.

to the Minister responsible for RMA Reform

What recent updates has he given about the Fast-track Approvals Act 2024?

This morning, I gave an update on the fast-track consenting regime. Six months in, things are going great. In the first six months, 50 projects have made applications. By the end of this year, at least eight projects will have completed, or are expected to complete, the full end-to-end fast-track process, including final decisions. Kiwis are sick of red and green tape holding this economy back. We cannot afford to hold these projects up. We need to grow jobs, grow the economy, and grow productivity to deliver better outcomes for New Zealanders.

How many applicants has the Minister referred into the process to date?

Projects that are not listed in the Act can apply for referral. I’ve referred seven projects into the fast-track process, meaning they can progress to the next stage of the process. Sixteen other applications are also under consideration. The latest three referrals I’ve made are the second stage of the Auckland surf park—which includes a large artificial intelligence data centre, a residential development of 400 homes, and a village centre—and The Point Mission Bay, which would see 252 new retirement homes and amenities for residents and visitors. These are the types of projects the Government wants to see under way and being fast-tracked.

When can New Zealanders expect the first approvals to be granted?

As I said, eight projects are currently before expert panels. We are expecting decisions on those projects by mid-September. If they’re approved, they will contribute billions to our economy. My understanding is that some will be under way very soon after approval. The fast-track regime is critical for New Zealand getting on with the job of rebuilding this economy after years of neglect.

to the Minister for Social Development and Employment

Does the Minister stand by her target of reducing jobseeker numbers by 50,000; if so, is the target closer or further away from being achieved?

Yes, absolutely. Our Government is committed to having 50,000 fewer people on the jobseeker benefit by 2030. Jobseeker numbers have been rising steadily since 2022 and are expected to peak later this year. Unfortunately, the forecast has always been that numbers would get worse before they get better. That’s why we’ve created a more active welfare system to support more job seekers into work. It’s also why our Government is relentlessly focused on growth, so that businesses have the confidence to hire staff to create better-paying jobs and New Zealanders can share in the benefits of growth.

Why is the Minister patting herself on the back saying that job seekers are moving into work when the number of people receiving jobseekers has gone up, homelessness has gone up, and Māori unemployment has increased every quarter since she’s been in office?

Well, as I said, rising unemployment is a lingering consequence of the economic times we have, and the numbers were always forecast to go up before they come down. That is the reality of where we are now. After years of high inflation, high Government spending, and low growth, jobs and employment are one of the last indicators to turn. But I’m really confident our approach is working, given that 98.4 percent of people who are on the jobseeker benefit are at green, which means they are taking the steps they need to in terms of their work obligations, and we’ve seen over 70,000 people exit the jobseeker benefit into work—a 19 percent increase on the same time last year. I think that’s pretty good news.

How are people supposed to get off jobseekers when 753 people applied for a support worker role in the Waikato, 998 applied for one admin assistant role in Southland, and 740 people applied for a supermarket ad for casual work?

Well, as I said—and I want to just put on record, as I have previously, for those who have become unemployed—it is an incredibly challenging time, and the labour market is very tight. That is why our Government is focused on growth. We’ve heard—just the question before this—a list of the fast-track projects that are due to be approved, and some of them will start, we expect, before Christmas. That’s in addition to the announcement at the weekend around infrastructure projects. That will also mean more jobs. Our Government is focused. The jobs and skills hubs are doing a great job of ensuring that when those jobs are there, our people are ready and in line for them.

How are Pasifika meant to deal with the rising cost of living crisis, when the amount of Pasifika on jobseekers has risen to over 28,000 under her watch?

I know that the number of Māori and Pasifika and young people are disproportionately affected when we have higher numbers on the jobseeker benefit, which is why we are focused on programmes that are successful, like by having 490 case managers working each and every day on the front line. That is the most intensive programme and the most successful programme. So I think the members should take comfort in the fact that there was an increase in the number of Pasifika job seekers exiting into work over the same time last year—1,500 more, a 21.3 percent increase—despite it being challenging out there right now.

In terms of young people: why should young people trust this Government, when young people are filling 21,000 fewer jobs than a year ago?

As I said in my last answer: unfortunately, young people are disproportionately affected when the jobseeker numbers are high. That is why our side of the House is absolutely focused on a far more active welfare system, and we are unwilling to accept young people staying on welfare for up to 20 years of their life. That’s why the under-25s are such a focus of our Government and we are rolling Welfare that Works out further.

How many more people losing their jobs will it take before the Minister admits and takes responsibility for her Government that is failing Aucklanders, failing Māori, failing workers, failing women, and failing New Zealand?

That’s a question that could be answered in part, but not necessarily responded to.

I’m very proud of our record, despite there being challenging economic times, significantly more people exiting off to the jobseeker benefit into jobs than a year ago. This side of the House recognises that having an ambitious target to reduce the number of people on the jobseeker benefit is achieved one person at a time, one job at a time, because that one life is significantly improved, as is their whānau and their community. That’s why we will not shy away from this target.

to the Minister of Education

What recent announcements has she made regarding school property?

We are delivering the classrooms in schools that our students need to thrive. I recently announced that we have put an end to open-plan classrooms, we’ve had a major investment into more classrooms for the Auckland region, and the establishment of the New Zealand School Property Agency to improve delivery of school property across the education system. Last year, we reduced the average cost of a classroom by nearly 30 percent at the same time as delivering 30 percent more classrooms than the previous year. We’re building more classrooms faster at a lower cost so our funding can go further, and more students benefit.

What announcements has she made for school property in Auckland?

In response to Auckland’s rapid roll growth, we’re investing more than $120 million into classrooms that our students need. Through Budget 2025, we’re establishing a new school at Chapel Downs, and we’re building an additional 137 new classrooms across 24 schools, creating more than 3,000 student placements in the network. These projects are expected to enter construction in the next 12 months. We’ve also confirmed a site purchase for a new primary school in Pōkeno, because this is a Government of action and delivery.

What announcements has she made regarding school properties delivery?

One of the recommendations from the ministerial inquiry into school property was the creation of a new separate entity to manage school property. We accepted this recommendation and will create the New Zealand School Property Agency. We will be bringing commercial discipline and oversight of a professional board to deliver better communication, better value for money, better transparency, and more warm, safe, dry classrooms for our kids.

How does this contribute to the Government’s infrastructure pipeline?

Excellent question. Over the next six months alone, there is $794 million of investment in school property works that will be starting. That includes new classrooms, a new school, and new redevelopment projects.

What feedback has she received on these announcements?

The response to the Auckland classrooms announcements has been positive. One principal said, “I’ve been at this school for 23 years and never before has our roll been this high or have we had the need to have classes operating out of our library, professional learning, and kitchen spaces until now. We’re very excited about this project and look forward to the arrival of our new teaching and learning spaces.” In response to the School Property Agency announcement, one principal said, “It is my view that this will provide the opportunity to ensure greater systemic efficiencies and reduce inequities.”

Can the Minister point to any progress in extracting better value for money in the cost per new classroom built?

As it currently stands today, we are providing classrooms for half the price that we did at the end of 2023. At the end of 2023, it was $1.2 million; today, to provide classrooms, it is about $630,000.

to the Minister of Health

What specific Māori health outcomes, if any, will improve as a result of his proposed changes to the Pae Ora (Healthy Futures) Act 2022?

Our Government is committed to improving health outcomes for all New Zealanders, including Māori. That’s why we’re passing the Healthy Futures (Pae Ora) Amendment Bill, to ensure the health system is focused on delivery for patients, not bureaucracy. Following previous decisions to remove health targets and restructure the health system in the middle of a pandemic, patients are being left waiting longer for treatment, accountability has been lost, and outcomes have gone backwards for all New Zealanders, including Māori. We’re turning that around, and this legislation makes amendments to specifically put health targets into law, which will require every part of the system to focus on delivery, and this will be across all five of our health targets: shorter stays in emergency departments, increased immunisations, shorter wait times for electives and specialist appointments, and our faster cancer treatment targets. These changes are about improving outcomes for all New Zealanders, including Māori.

What evidence does the Minister rely on to show that defunding Iwi Māori Partnership Boards (IMPBs) and removing Te Tiriti obligations will close the seven- to eight-year Māori life-expectancy gap rather than widen it?

Well, section 6 of the Act, which is the Treaty of Waitangi obligations, continues to provide the framework for giving effect to the principles of the Treaty.

Point of order. Just to clarify, the question was: what evidence does the Minister rely on?

Yes, I know that question asked about the removal of something, and the Minister basically said it’s not removed.

Which iwi, if any, asked to have their powers over Iwi Māori Partnership Board appointments stripped?

We went through a process to make a number of changes. We sought advice from the Hauora Māori Advisory Committee, and that advice has supported us in the process of drafting this legislation.

Point of order. My question was: which iwi, if any, asked to have their powers over Iwi Māori Partnership Board appointments stripped?

The Minister might like to expand on his answer.

Well, as I said, we went through a policy process. We engaged specifically with the Hauora Māori Partnership Board, who provided us advice in relation to the changes. The legislation is now going through Parliament, and there is an opportunity for all iwi and IMPBs and other interested parties to put forward their submissions.

Point of order, please, Mr Speaker. I don’t believe my question was addressed. It was: “Which iwi?”

Yeah, it was difficult to see how it was addressed. So if you perhaps just take another question, without loss of opportunity.

Why is the Minister ignoring leading Māori health experts, like Professor Sue Crengle and Dame Naida Glavish, who have warned these reforms will cause direct harm to Māori communities?

Well, as I said in earlier questions, we engaged with the Hauora Māori Advisory Committee—many of those members appointed under the previous Government—on these changes, and, ultimately, the focus here is about improving outcomes for Māori. And all of those health targets which this Government has reinstated, which the last Government removed, showed that health outcomes went backwards for Māori when the health targets were not in place. We have reinstated those targets—

Rubbish.

—and our focus now is on improving—I hear Willie Jackson say, “Rubbish.” Well, the reality is the rate of immunisations for our Māori tamariki went down from around 90 percent into the 60 percent under their six years in office. We are now focused on restoring the health targets and improving outcomes for all New Zealanders, including Māori. [Interruption]

Supplementary?

Just wait for a moment while the House composes itself.

Could I ask the Minister as to why the most critical element to change the effect of Māori longevity is diet, and why have we avoided that discussion in the health system?

Well, there’s a range of issues which the health system needs to focus on, and the way that this Government seeks to focus that on is through the health targets, which ultimately seek to ensure the system is delivering for all New Zealanders, including Māori.

Is it correct that the Minister did not consult with any iwi?

There was no consultation with iwi during the process, but there is an opportunity through the select committee process for iwi and for Iwi Māori Partnership Boards to be able to have their say, and I encourage them to do so.

How does the Minister reconcile his claim of improving equity, when Māori now have fewer rights, fewer resources, and less say on their own health than before this Government came to power?

Well, I would put it to you, Mr Speaker, that when you look at the statistics as to what happened under the last Government, when the health targets were removed, the outcomes for Māori went backwards. Whether it’s shorter wait times in emergency departments—90 percent of Māori were being seen within six hours; when we came back to office, it was down to 71.6 percent. When it comes to immunisations for our tamariki, when Labour came to office, 89.3 percent of two-year-olds were being immunised; when we came back to office, in 2023, it’s down to 64.8 percent. The facts speak for themselves. By reinstating health targets and ensuring accountability of the system, we will improve outcomes for all New Zealanders, including Māori.

to the Minister for Infrastructure

What is his plan to ensure there is the workforce to deliver the infrastructure pipeline, and how does it address the fact that more than a quarter of builders say that they don’t have enough staff to meet future needs?

A week ago, that member was complaining about how the people in construction were losing their jobs; and a week later, she was complaining about how they don’t have enough staff. The member needs to figure out what Labour’s position on—

Point of order. Sir, this is a primary question on notice and it is inappropriate for the Leader of the House, in particular, to start with a crack at the person asking the question.

Yes, that is quite correct. So while it might be appropriate to refer to a previous answer or a previous question, the manner in which that’s done needs to be somewhat more judicious than was exercised just then.

It’s good to see that the member acknowledges the significant infrastructure pipeline that is coming. We have $6 billion of central government - funded infrastructure starting between now and Christmas, where there are many elements to the Government’s plan to ensure that there are enough workers to meet this. One is ensuring we have a realistic infrastructure pipeline of deliverable projects, which we’re doing right now. Secondly, we’re ensuring employers have access to people that they need. We’re doing that through, in other ways, enabling immigration settings. We have a five-year work visa for high-skilled roles; we’ve dropped the median wage requirements for accredited employer work visas; we also have a green list for roles with significant skill shortages—there are eight roles on the green list in construction, eight roles in trades, and 28 roles in the engineering industry—and, of course, we have fast-track; and we have Resource Management Act reform to ensure our planning system is enabling.

Does he agree with Civil Contractors New Zealand’s chief executive’s summary of his infrastructure reheat as, “We knew of the projects anyway, so there’s no [real] surprises there.”; if not, why not?

Well the projects are public, so there’s nothing particularly secret about that. What’s different is that, unlike the last Government that announced them, we’re building them. The Middlemore Hospital recladding was first approved in 2019, and nothing was done. There’s a long list of other projects for which funding was approved, but no actual spades in the ground. So there’s nothing secret about the projects; the difference is that we put the pedal to the metal and they’re going to start construction.

Does he agree with Josh Galuszka, senior consultant at Key Skills Recruitment in the Hutt Valley, who said, “Governments tend to get involved. Infrastructure and education and health all have construction elements … but what’s happened is this government hasn’t done that. They’ve just pulled the pin on everything.”; if not, why not?

Well, no—no I don’t. The member mentions the Hutt Valley, which she has some connection with. The Hutt Valley is seeing, in the next five to seven years, $1.5 billion of investment in the Melling Interchange and RiverLink project, which will create thousands of jobs for tradies and engineers and civil constructors in the Wellington region and the Hutt Valley. The New Zealand Transport Agency and the council—both councils in Wellington—are engaging with the Chamber of Commerce and with local employers in order to upskill the workforce so that locals can be employed on that critical project.

Does he agree with the chief executive of the New Zealand Institute of Architects, who blames his Government’s cuts to infrastructure projects across social housing, health, and education for the downturn in work over the past two years; if not, why not?

Well, in relation to architecture—the member raises an interesting point—it is probably true that what the Government has done has led to a downturn in architecture. Let me explain why. In school property, for example, we are not building $1.3 million school classrooms and $100 million mergers of schools in Marlborough, which had bespoke designs and beautiful architecture for the school. In school property, we’re going back to basics, and, actually, that means fewer architects. On social housing, we are getting the build cost down for Kāinga Ora because we do not actually want architecturally designed, beautiful social houses; we want value for money. When it comes to roads, I’ve told the New Zealand Transport Agency, following on from the Hon Simeon Brown, to focus on building stuff. We don’t need the bells and whistles, we don’t need the gold plating, and we don’t need the architecturally designed artwork around the roads. What we actually need are roads built.

OK, that’s one for everyone for the day because there’s too much noise on both sides of the House during that time. There’s one member on the cross benches at the back there who does need to modify his interventions a little bit.

Can the Minister confirm that, last year, in school property, we built 583 classrooms compared to 2023, which was 444 classrooms, dispelling any myths that we are building fewer classrooms?

You cancelled $2 billion worth of projects.

Well, in relation to that interjection from the member who likes to talk a lot, you can’t cancel a project that had no funding. The previous Government was good—this is my exact point—at saying, “Oh, yes, this thing’s going to be built in the future here.” They were good at appropriating money and not very good at building stuff. They were past masters at big, glossy announcements and useless at building stuff.

Just wait for a moment.

Who will carry out his infrastructure builds, considering Civil Contractors New Zealand’s chief executive says, “It’s going to be quite difficult to find people.”, now that more than 17,000 construction workers have had to pack up their tools, many of whom have headed offshore?

Well, I pointed out at the start of the answer that the member has spent most of this year impotently raging into the void about the number of people who are losing their jobs in construction. She’s now claiming there aren’t enough workers. You can’t have it both ways. In answer to the question, the people who will be doing the work on the construction project in the next six months will be workers.

Will the Minister finally admit that his Government’s cuts to public housing and hospital projects have axed 17,000 construction jobs, gutted the construction workforce, and self-sabotaged his own plans to deliver infrastructure that we all need?

Right, we’ll just have a little bit of silence, and then we’ll have a very, very concise answer.

It’s hard to know where to start. Public housing building has continued, Kāinga Ora built thousands of houses in the last two years, and we have funded a future pipeline of social housing. Over the last 18 months, there has been a record investment in road maintenance, and the National Land Transport Fund is at record levels, and it is being spent alongside councils. The infrastructure pipeline, published by the independent Infrastructure Commission, shows that there are many projects in delivery both in the private and public sector. Right now, for example, Auckland Airport is building the biggest infrastructure project in New Zealand history. If the member wants to think that cancelling Auckland Light Rail, Lake Onslow, and Let’s Get Wellington Moving that were going to start construction, even under optimistic scenarios, in 2037, has led to a reduction in the number of construction workers right now, the member is entitled to that view—

That’s quite enough.

to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

What new commitments, if any, has the Government made to protect Aotearoa New Zealand’s marine environment following the United Nations Ocean Conference in France last month?

I attended the United Nations Ocean Conference in Nice, France, last month. No such country turned up, nor is such a country a member of the United Nations.

Sorry. Look, I ruled on this back in March. You can go against the tide if you want, but it is not inappropriate for members to refer to “Aotearoa New Zealand”. That’s a ruling that’s been made in the House and one that should be obliged. I’ll ask Teanau—

Point of order. Mr Speaker, the name of this country in all the documents, and the membership of the United Nations, is New Zealand. We are not going to have somebody unilaterally—without consultation; without consulting the New Zealand people—change this country’s name. For a start, it’s not the name of the South Island, for a start, where the Māori are concerned, and we are not going to put up with this sham, bogus pretence that our name has been changed when the New Zealand taxpayer has never been consulted.

Speaking to the point of order, Mr Speaker.

No. No further on that. I’ve made a ruling. The ruling is there. I’ll make it available to the member once again, but I’ll have Teanau Tuiono ask the question one more time.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I will follow the Standing Orders and read it exactly as it is written on the paper. What new commitments, if any, has the Government made to protect Aotearoa New Zealand’s marine environment following the United Nations Ocean Conference in France last month?

Because no such country exists, we made no such commitments. [Interruption]

Is everybody ready? Now, we’ve got a bit of a problem, because in the ruling that I made earlier in the year, I noted that the New Zealand Geographic Board also recognises and uses the term “Aotearoa New Zealand”. It would be utterly ridiculous for this House to ban such use if the Geographic Board itself is using that; it is a Government agency. If there is to be any change to the Government agency the Geographic Board’s position, it should be done by legislation by the Government. Ask the question again, and the question does need to be addressed in a reasonable fashion.

Again, what new commitments, if any, has the Government made to protect Aotearoa New Zealand’s marine environment following the United Nations Ocean Conference in France last month?

In all the discussions, all the debates, and all the papers before that conference, this country’s name was never mentioned in the way that that questioner has framed it. And I’m not going to be dishonest with this House and say that it was represented, because it wasn’t.

Supplementary?

Did he share with world leaders at the UN conference that this Government has abandoned plans to establish a new ocean sanctuary, allowed commercial fishing in the marine protected areas, fast tracked seabed mining projects, and repeatedly blocked international attempts to restrict bottom-trawling on vulnerable deep-sea ecosystems in the South Pacific, and, if not, why not?

If by “this country”, that questioner is asking about a country called “New Zealand”, no, I did not share that information because it is a total falsity.

Point of order, Mr Speaker. I just grabbed off the Table in front of you the Budget at a Glance, published by Te Kāwanatanga o Aotearoa, which is translated, of course, as “the New Zealand Government”. Is it the position of the House now that it’s acceptable for any Minister to stand up and say, if questioned on the Budget documents of Te Kāwanatanga o Aotearoa, that no such country exists?

No, and if you think about the last answer that was given by the Rt Hon Winston Peters, he made it very clear that the term was not used as it was asked in the question. It was well answered, given the question that was asked—but we’re not going down that particular track. There are some semantics involved here, without a doubt. Teanau Tuiono, you had another question?

Am I asking the same question again?

No. A new supplementary.

OK, cool. Does he agree with the former Minister of Foreign Affairs who said, in 2006, that “New Zealand has been prepared to support, in principle, the concept of an interim global moratorium on bottom trawling on the high seas, if such a proposal had sufficient global support”, and, if so, does he believe that New Zealand being the last country in the South Pacific to still allow bottom trawling constitutes sufficient global support?

Seeing as that member has raised a very insightful comment on 2006, yes, I totally agree, because we said “in principle” and we are still working on it.

Will the Minister introduce legislation to allow our country to join 49 other countries, including several of our neighbours in the Pacific, in ratifying the High Seas Treaty to preserve biodiversity in the high seas, or is he willing to allow us to lag behind our international partners?

Can I dismiss the last part of that comment; it was totally out of order? He did not finish with a question; he just finished with a criticism, and you should rule it out.

Well, to be perfectly honest, I didn’t quite pick that up so we’ll hear the question again.

Hear the question again—cool. Will the Minister introduce legislation to allow our country to join 49 other countries, including several of our neighbours in the Pacific, in ratifying the High Seas Treaty to preserve biodiversity in the high seas, or is he willing to allow us to lag behind our international partners?

Well, a question can be asked with two legs. The Minister should at least address the first part of the question.

Well, addressing the first part of the question: since the third United Nations Ocean Conference in Nice in June, New Zealand has made several policy and financial commitments in the areas of sustainable fisheries in the Pacific, including in ocean science, management, and governance.

Read it like you mean it.

Well, like you, you mean?

I always read it like I mean it.

Double-cross that bridge when you come to it. We have also launched an island restoration project and are building capacity across the entire Asia-Pacific in the area of seabird-safe fishing, and we will soon be updating New Zealand’s national plan of action to prevent, deter, and eliminate illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and we’re not going to have a bonfire of the vanities when we have decided on this policy.

Does he stand by his statement that “As a maritime state with one of the world’s largest and most”—

Sorry. To the member, would you mind saying again—there was a lot of conversation going on, making it difficult to ensure I know what you’re actually saying. Please, speak again.

Does he stand by his statement that “As a maritime state with one of the world’s largest and most biodiverse marine areas, New Zealand strongly supports a … system that secures the conservation and sustainable use of our oceans.”, and, if so, is he concerned about our international reputation, given that this Government has failed to announce a single new policy to protect the ocean?

That last statement is demonstrably incorrect. The Hauraki Gulf Tīkapa Moana and south-east coast of the South Island are two clearer statements. I don’t know where the member was when all this work was being done. There is more protection in place now than there ever was.

to the Minister for Trade and Investment

What opportunities will New Zealand exporters have following the third reading of the United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill yesterday?

A $500 billion opportunity. The New Zealand Government has cleared the way for Kiwi exporters to tap into a $500 billion market that imports 90 percent of its food. This agreement delivers real benefits for New Zealand exporters by lowering costs, increasing market access, and securing a strong presence in the Middle East. Two-way trade between New Zealand and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was worth $1.35 billion last year, and this agreement will accelerate growth by reducing red tape, boosting services trade, and supporting investment links.

What is the significance of a free-trade agreement (FTA) with the UAE?

This is the highest-quality and fastest-negotiated agreement by New Zealand that will immediately remove tariffs on 98.5 percent of New Zealand exports upon entry into force, rising to 99 percent just three years later. This high-quality trade agreement builds on New Zealand’s strengths and our FTA network. UAE consumers are actively seeking safe, fresh products from around the world and are willing to pay more for them, giving New Zealand exporters an opportunity to lead in this very competitive market.

How will the New Zealand - UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) boost New Zealand’s economy?

The agreement will see zero-tariff rates on entry into force for key New Zealand exports, including all dairy products, beef and sheep meat, honey, seafood, forestry products, horticultural commodities, and many industrial items. On entry into force, it unlocks $42 million of immediate savings and growing market access, which helps New Zealand double the value of exports over 10 years. Last year, New Zealand exported $84 million of services to the UAE; whilst a modest amount, this agreement grows two-way trade and has specific mention and focus on services, and business connections will quickly surpass the $1 billion mark in coming years.

How else is the Government strengthening ties in the Middle East?

New Zealand and the Gulf Cooperation Council concluded negotiations last year on a trade agreement that will unlock a $3 trillion regional economy and deliver duty-free access for 99 percent of our exports over 10 years. With the UAE CEPA combined with that, over half of New Zealand’s exports to the region will be tariff free from day one. Saudi Arabia presents a $1 trillion opportunity for New Zealand exporters. With 33 million people and 80 percent of its food coming from overseas, it’s a market where demand for high-quality, trusted products is growing. The Government will lead a trade mission to Saudi Arabia later this year to facilitate better trade for exporters and boost the economy, because when we grow our trade, we grow our economy, creating jobs, lifting incomes, and delivering better opportunities for every New Zealander.

Does this amendment bill have the support of all the political parties in the New Zealand Parliament?

It has the support of political parties that believe in trade and want to grow the economy, so it’s every party in the Government, but no—to the Minister—disappointingly, there are still some parties in our Parliament that put politics before the best interests of growth and jobs for New Zealand.

to the Associate Minister of Housing

How have homelessness statistics changed in each major urban centre, according to the Homelessness Insights report he received in June 2025, both in absolute numbers and percentage terms, when comparing the most recent reporting period to the previous one?

This Government takes homelessness seriously, and resolving homelessness is more than just housing. No one in this House wants to see fellow Kiwis living without shelter. The homelessness insights report confirms there are many people with housing need, but accurate numbers are hard to pin down, especially when you ask for absolute numbers or percentage terms across any centre.

Point of order, sir.

Point of order, the Hon Tama—the Hon Kieran Mog—Kieran McAnulty.

It’s all right, we all know who you mean—it’s all good. Thank you, sir.

Yeah, well, some people may not—you’re not that well known.

Ha, ha! I am in Eketāhuna, sir, so that’s all that matters.

Yeah, well, I tell you what, it’s centre of the Earth.

Anyway, we’ll get on with it, shall we?

Yep.

The question, again, was on notice and it was very carefully worded. It was asking for comparisons from the homelessness insights report that was released publicly today, to the previous one released in December. The Minister does not need to provide specifics or concrete numbers; he just simply needs to be able to provide the comparison between the two reports, as was outlined in each of them. He did not come close to that, sir.

Well, the point is he did address the question, and whether or not the question is satisfactorily addressed is not for me to judge.

Can the Minister confirm that the homelessness insights report finds it difficult to find data and relies on census data, and that will cause a challenge, given the Government’s decision to cancel the census?

This homelessness insights report has come about as a result of the new administration and over the last 18 months. The only official data and estimate of those living without shelter, and in other categories of homelessness, come from the census, the latest of which, of course, was Census 2023. As a result of this insights report, we know that there is a genuine need for housing, and many front-line providers have amplified that message.

How can he claim his policies are working, when his own report has shown that homeless in Tāmaki-makau-rau has near doubled from 426 in September 2024 to 809 in May 2025?

There is no doubt that the various reports from council, community housing providers, and others have expressed and exhibited a genuine housing need, particularly in the areas of homelessness. But what the report also says is—and I quote—“It is not possible to determine the extent to which changes described in this report reflect existing trends and broader economic and social contexts or are attributable to policy changes.”

Can he guarantee that the homelessness figures in the report he released a few hours ago have not been changed and has been released in full since he received them in June?

I can guarantee that this Government’s solution is not putting another $1.5 billion into a dark and dank moral catastrophe known as emergency housing. What we’ve actually done is asked Government officials to report and advise on further targeted interventions for those living without shelter, to provide recommendations to better utilise the existing half billion dollars that is put towards transitional housing and a number of other programmes, and, of course, to engage with credible providers. [Interruption]

Point of order.

Had had there not been those outbursts from that side of the House, making an inference against the Minister, I might have asked for the question to be answered again. Is this a point of order on that matter?

Yes. I seek leave to table the original homelessness insights report, as received by Ministers Potaka and Bishop, and the subsequent version that has been released today, which shows that there are no changes beyond—well, the members can judge for themselves, but there aren’t any changes to the data.

Leave is sought for that cause of action. Is there any objection? There appears to be none.

Documents, by leave, laid on the Table of the House.

Following the report, does he still believe the rise in homelessness is anecdotal, and, if not, when will he finally accept responsibility and admit that his Government’s housing policy is failing, making homelessness worse in our beautiful country?

As we all know and, of course, is confirmed by this report—the homelessness insight report—there are a number of front-line providers who have confirmed there is a genuine need amongst many, many New Zealanders. What we are doing about it, of course, is taking action, whether or not that’s the announcements around Māori housing that we undertook at Waitangi Day, $200 million for an additional 400 homes; whether it’s the “going for housing growth” mahi that Minister Bishop is leading; whether it’s the half a billion dollars of taxpayer funding that is put through transitional housing, Housing First, and a range of other programmes for which we seek to understand the optimal utilisation around; whether it’s the community housing providers, the 1,500 extra homes that we’ve supported on an income-related rent subsidy basis and the various methods in which we can help finance and fund those organisations asking for advice; whether it’s additional meetings on the national homelessness data report; and a whole range of activities being undertaken in Minister Upston’s office down at te Manatū Whakahiato Ora around housing support products or housing brokers. I think that this Government is taking action and resolving some of the concerns, the catastrophes, and the cataclysms that were left behind by our former colleagues from the other side of the House.

The time for oral questions has—

Point of order. I apologise to the House. I seek leave to correct a statement I just made in relation to the tabling of those documents.

Well, leave is sought for that purpose. Is there any objection?

I think I said—

Wait on—is there any objection? Carry on.

I think I said at the end of my seeking leave to table that no data had been changed. From memory, there are a couple of items: I queried whether or not a figure was correct, and the final document shows that the figure was wrong, and it was subsequently updated by officials. I didn’t want to mislead the House.

I move, That the House take note of miscellaneous business.

This Government was elected on a promise: a promise to make life easier for hard-working New Zealanders. But today, after months of spin, we now know that that promise has been comprehensively broken.

I stood opposite Christopher Luxon during the leaders’ debates in the last election campaign, where he unequivocally promised New Zealand families with kids that they would be $250 a fortnight better off under this Government. A year and a half in, not one New Zealand family is $250 a fortnight better off under this Government because of their promises. But it gets worse than that, because then they said that 21,000 New Zealand families were going to get help through their FamilyBoost policy, with $150 every fortnight. That was $100 less than what they were told they were going to get during the election campaign, but it was still $150 a fortnight that would mean a lot to New Zealand families struggling with the rising cost of living. So how many of New Zealand’s 5 million people are actually benefiting from that? One hundred and fifty-three. That’s 153 down—4,999,847 still to go. They promised Kiwis they were going to be better off, and yet New Zealanders know that things are getting worse, not better, under this Government. One hundred and fifty-three families; less than 1 percent of those who were promised they were going to be better off under this Government are getting what they were promised.

What we see instead is a Government that distracts, that blames, that spins, that attacks—not a Government that’s focused on actually delivering the things they said they were going to deliver. Number one on their list was tackling the rising cost of living. Let’s be clear about exactly what it was they said—and I have a few quotes. Nicola Willis said, “The first priority should be to respond to the cost of living crisis.”—and yet the cost of living crisis is getting worse. Another comment from Nicola Willis: “my simple message is this: cost of living relief is on the way.” When’s it arriving? New Zealanders are still waiting for the cost of living relief that they were promised.

Christopher Luxon said, “The first thing we’ve got to do is reduce the cost of living.” “Reduce”—note the word “reduce” in there, not “Make it get harder, just a little bit slower than it was before.” He promised that he was going to “reduce” the cost of living, and yet today in the House he was celebrating the fact that the cost of living is still going up, and saying New Zealanders should be grateful for that, when he promised them that the cost of living was going to reduce.

Nicola Willis said, “National will take action to get food prices under control once more.” Yet food prices continue to go up. It has never been more expensive to buy a block of butter in New Zealand. And, you know, I start to wonder. I used to think they were really good at spin, but watching Nicola Willis at question time today, I wondered what had happened to their political radar. Of all the days to be boasting about high international dairy prices, I’m not sure the day after you met with Fonterra to berate them for the fact that the price of butter was too high is the day to be talking about how great it is that we’re getting so much money from selling our butter internationally. What exactly is the Government’s position? Is it that international dairy prices are good for New Zealand, or is it that butter prices are too high? Because they seem to think that they can argue both of those things at the same time. The Government simply don’t have a consistent position on that.

What have the Government been doing in the meantime? It’s been all about the theatre; it’s been all about attacking other people; it’s been all about apportioning blame. But I can tell you that’s not what it’s about for the mother who is skipping meals for the kids. It’s not about that for the pensioners who are turning off their heaters because they cannot afford to pay the power bills. This Government was elected saying they were going to serve. They said they were going to solve those problems for New Zealanders. We are now more than halfway through this parliamentary term and New Zealanders can see the results of this Government. It’s getting worse, not better.

New Zealanders, I think, are a generous people. They gave the Government time, and now they’re looking at this Government and saying that they aren’t getting what they thought they were voting for at the last election. They deserve better.

I’m here to listen to the Opposition. I hear them in question time and in the media, and I feel a little sad that they’ve lost sight of a simple truth that we are 5.3 million people with shared challenges, and what we share in common is much, much greater than anything that divides us. Yet too often, politics overlooks that very basic and obvious fact.

People get much more, or at least they could, out of a contest of ideas than the prejudice of identity, and yet, when I listen to the Opposition, when I listen to politics around the world, in fact, what I hear is too much zero-sum thinking. I hear far too much identity politics. It’s a toxic mix that is the enemy of unity and progress for all people.

This zero-sum thinking—we hear too much of it; we hear it every day. I heard it from one of the Green co-leaders on the TV this morning. She tells her voters that their problems are caused by someone else’s success, and that the solution to their problem is therefore another tax to take their money off them. Well, if we’re to truly solve our problems, then we need the opposite attitude. Every policy question in this House, for any Government in the world, should be: will this policy help create an abundance of wealth for all people? Not only should we cast off the idea that there’s only so much to go round and the way to get ahead is to criticise someone else’s success, as if that caused the problems we might face, actually, we need to get rid of the other side of that toxic mix that is identity politics, that tells us that the differences between New Zealanders—such as when their ancestors arrived on these shores—are greater than the commonalities that we Kiwis all share. Only then do we have a hope of creating the kind of society that makes the progress that we all sorely want to see.

I just so happen to be proud to be part of a Government that gets that, that thinks in terms of positive sum, and that thinks in terms of our shared challenges and identity as Kiwis, rather than zero-sum thinking and the division of identity politics. You only have to look at the array of policies that this Government is putting in place to see that. Take the simple question of: can the next generation afford a house? Doesn’t matter what your background is or your culture, what people want is a pathway to property ownership in a property-owning democracy. For too long, it’s been too hard. I’m proud to be in this Government. Chris Bishop’s here, Simon Court’s here. Together, they’re working together to make a resource management law that says if you own some land, the presumption is you can build a home.

This Government’s also ensuring those pieces of land are connected together with infrastructure that’s properly funded and planned by city and regional partnerships, to see central and local government working together. When you start to do things like that, opportunity starts to open up that people can actually own a place of their own in their own country. That’s not something that you get from zero-sum thinking. It’s not about attacking the landlords or those people or that; it’s about saying how do we build more together, because all of us face the same basic challenges.

I’m proud to be part of a Government that is committed to transferring a knowledge-rich curriculum from one generation to the next, because when people are able to navigate the 21st century and all of its growing technological sophistication by learning real science and real language and truly understanding the future of the century that they’re going to live in, then their own mana and esteem and ability to chart their own path in life is all the greater.

Then I’m proud to be part of a Government that is ensuring everything we do is lighter on the regulatory impact we make on New Zealanders. We’re removing the red tape so people can actually spend more time providing for themselves and their families and the people they care about in their community, and less time filling out forms and being told no by the umbrella people who stand at the building site, watching while other people work in the rain.

That is the vision we need, that it is possible to create more and all of us benefit, rather than ranking New Zealanders by the arrival time of their ancestors. Let’s build more together.

It’s been a great week for infrastructure, jobs, and growth. On Sunday, we announced as a Government that in the next six months there are $6 billion of infrastructure projects starting around the country, and this is just a start. There are many more projects to come.

The response from the Opposition has been instructive, which is basically to say, “Oh yeah, nothing to see here. Move along.” Except for the fact that unlike the last Government, which talked a lot and put out a lot of press releases and set up a lot of working groups, we’re actually getting on with the job. In the answers to the Hon Ginny Andersen in Parliament today, I read out a couple of examples of projects—

Funded by Labour.

—which were first appropriated funding all the way back in 2019. Remember the Middlemore Hospital recladding? Remember the Middlemore Hospital? Jacinda Ardern, she made a big thing about it during the election campaign and straight after she said, “Oh, you know, National’s done such a bad job. There’s, like, poo running down the walls at Middlemore.”, and everyone probably assumed they were going to do something about it. That’s partly what the recladding project’s all about. Well, they put money towards it. Well, guess what! Here we are in 2025 and it’s taking a National Government to actually get on with it. We are as a Government building a credible infrastructure pipeline and fixing the mistakes of the past. It’s great to be part of a Government, as the Hon David Seymour says, that is building a brighter future for New Zealanders.

There are a couple of quotes from members opposite that I want to pull out for the House that I think deserve more oxygen and more ventilation. The first is in relation to Barbara Edmonds. Now, there’s quite a bit to talk about the cost of living. Fair enough, times are tough for many Kiwis. Let’s bear in mind that inflation three years ago was 7.3 percent. It’s now back within the band, thanks to the strong fiscal decisions of this Government and sensible economic management. We have got inflation back under control, but that’s not to pretend that life isn’t tough for many people.

The Labour Party’s going on about the cost of living; fair enough, I’d do the same if I was in their situation. But one might think they have some answers about the cost of living. Eventually, a journalist asked Barbara Edmonds this fact and said, “OK, fair enough. You’re moaning on about it. What’s your plan?” What did Barbara Edmonds say? “Oh, I’m not able to identify any specific Labour Party policy that tackles the cost of living.” No policy. No policy whatsoever. One might think, and one might ask, if the Labour Party is going to criticise the Government for the cost of living, that they had a plan. It turns out they have no plan, and to the extent they have a plan—which is based on borrowing, debt, and spending—it would make life worse for New Zealanders. The red tape that they support will make life worse for New Zealanders by driving up costs and flowing through to inflation.

The other quote I want to pull out is from Chris Hipkins, who’s put up a Facebook post or a tweet or something: “Nobody should have to leave the country to build a future.” Fair enough. Sounds reasonable. Slightly rich from the guy who basically stopped New Zealanders returning to New Zealand during the COVID years through the disaster that was the managed isolation and quarantine debacle that he imposed on the country. So a little bit rich, but he’s right. People shouldn’t have to leave the country to build a brighter future. We do want New Zealanders to stay here. But the Labour Party opposes every single thing that this Government is doing to create more economic opportunity.

I’ll give you a fast track. Now, the Labour Party has their own version of fast track, which has currently got some projects going through, but, of course, this Government has legislated for a much brighter and much more fulsome regime. The question for the Labour Party is: what are they going to do about it? Do they support it or do they not? Because a few weeks ago, they put up a Facebook post which said they would repeal it. Interestingly, that Facebook post has now been taken down, so one wonders what the official Labour Party policy is when it comes to fast track. They opposed it and voted against it on the way through.

There are now eight projects before expert panels, including, for example, the expansion of the Port of Auckland. There’s a project going through to expand the Port of Tauranga; 60 percent of New Zealand’s exports by value go through the Port of Tauranga. It is critical that that very important port is expanding. There are a range of infrastructure and housing and energy projects listed on the fast-track list that are going through. The Labour Party opposes it.

People leave New Zealand to go work in the mines in Australia, but the Labour Party opposes any liberalisation of our planning laws to make it easier for mines, make it easier for quarries, make it easier to build roads in this country. The Labour Party opposes Resource Management Act reform, which is the thing, as David Seymour says, that has been the millstone around the neck of this economy for 30 years.

So my message to Kiwis is this: it’s one thing to carp and moan, it’s one thing to put out endless press releases and fulminate against problems, but it’s another thing to actually have a plan. They don’t have one; this Government does. I’m proud of this Government and the work that we are doing.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. This is my first contribution in the general debate since the sad passing of our colleague Takutai Tarsh Kemp, so I say, hoki wairua mai—may your spirit come back amongst us here today.

I also want to acknowledge Ngāti Tamakōpiri, her people of Ngāti Whitikaupeka and of Mōkai Pātea, who received the country in mourning for our tuahine, for our colleague, and for our friend. I also acknowledge the good people of the township of Taihape, who saw an influx of people, influx of customers, who used it as their base to continue to farewell our tuahine. I want to mention in particular the Taihape rugby club, who welcomed me with open arms, presented me with a tie of Taihape, and wanted me to say, “Up the Hape!” I’m quite proud to wear this tie today, and I wear it to remember my tuahine and the kindness that her people showed to myself, my father, and, of course, everybody who attended the funeral of our colleague.

That leaves us in a position in Tāmaki Makaurau where a mandate needs to be sought. Today, we’ve heard in the House from the Government benches what is apparently going on in Auckland and what is going to lift Auckland out of the doldrums. It’s simply not enough.

What we heard from the Deputy Prime Minister in his general debate today is that he’s proud to say, “Now schools will teach real language.” What does he mean by “real language”? Well, what he means by “real language” is the diminishing of te reo Māori, the language of this land. He diminishes the efforts that many have made to revitalise te reo Māori. In fact, he also stands in contradiction to the words of his own colleague Erica Stanford, who stands up and praises her own efforts in trying to revitalise and support kura kaupapa in Tāmaki Makaurau and, indeed, across the country. We’ve heard from the Deputy Prime Minister today that he cares not for the Māori language.

I take the words of my good friend and colleague here Mr Shanan Halbert: “Who is the Deputy Prime Minister in this House to be handing out mana cards to people?” The person with the least amount of mana is handing out mana cards trying to tell us who we are as Māori and who deserves to be a Māori, not in this House but indeed right across the country. I think it’s shameful. It’s shameful that when there are real issues impacting families right across this country, the Deputy Prime Minister focuses on something like a “real language” and diminishes te reo Māori in this House.

The real issues are clear in this country. There is a cost of living crisis. The fact that this Government has, all of a sudden, turned their attention, not to address the matter, but to attack the Opposition benches on the critical matter of the cost of living crisis shows that they are trying to (1) remediate their failures in the past in dealing with this particular issue, because they promised in the campaign hustings in 2023 that they will deal with the cost of living crisis and they have not; and (2) it shows that they have no ideas to be able to bring us out of this challenge that is affecting so many people.

It’s winter, it is cold, and whether you live in Tāmaki-makau-rau, in the Far North, or in the Deep South, power prices have gone up exponentially. Our people cannot afford to warm themselves. Usually in Tāmaki-makau-rau, it’s warm; the other day, it was 4 degrees Celsius, and for somebody from the Bay of Islands, that’s freezing. But I want to be very clear: that impact is felt in every single household—whether you’re a young person, whether you’re a family, or whether you’re our kaumātua and kuia. Those energy prices are going up and up, and, of course, the wellbeing of our people is going down and down.

Our leader, the Rt Hon Chris Hipkins, rightly explained that all of the indicators that show wellbeing in this country—like the cost of living, like the cost of energy—they’re all going up. What’s clear to us, on this side of the House, is that the Government benches know that what is going down is actually their polling, so what do they do? They start the blame game. They blame Labour for everything. They blame us for absolutely everything. Well, I take the words from my 13-year-old daughter, who says, “Dad, I’m sick of the blame game because what actually is happening is the lame game.” They’ve come up lame on the cost of living crisis. They’ve come up lame on the extremely high energy prices that have caused heating prices in this country to go up exponentially. They’ve come up lame on opportunities to lift our country into economic prosperity, which we know will be able to help whānau right across this country.

We are in an important race. As we head towards the 2026 election, it’s clear that this Government has no answers, and I can tell them, in the famous words of the Rt Hon Winston Peters, “Help is on its way.”

Well, nobody will be relieved with the suggestion of that sort of help. But we’ll move on to things of greater substance.

Can I say that Chris Bishop said earlier that it’s been a great week for New Zealand infrastructure, and he’s absolutely right. We need to invest in infrastructure that grows the economy, that makes it easier for New Zealanders to move around. The reason that we are building more roads is because very few, certainly not enough, were built under the six years of the previous Labour Government. When you build roads, you get goods and services around more easily. You get goods to the port to get to overseas markets, but it’s fundamentally more simple than that. You free up time for men and women to go about their business more quickly, not be stuck in traffic, to spend more time with their families and a greater quality of family time. That’s a very important outcome when it comes to infrastructure.

Can I also say that not only has it been a good week for trade for New Zealand exporters because of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) free-trade agreement coming in, moving through the Parliament; it’s been a very good year for exports and trade and New Zealand exporters. I want to highlight a few of those, because behind every single one of these statistics, it shows greater trade overseas, New Zealanders who are better off, and more jobs.

The EU free-trade agreement entered into force a year ago—many, many months sooner than had been predicted, which we were told when we came to Government. There actually were opportunities for it to enter into force and be ratified by this Parliament before the election. But, sadly, that wasn’t a priority. In that period of time, in the 12 months under that agreement, our exports to the EU have gone up by 28 percent. It’s an extra $1 billion of goods exports for New Zealanders. Sheep meat is up 29 percent—an extra $216 million. Kiwifruit is up almost 70 percent—$316 million more. And, very important, machinery, of which a lot is agricultural machinery, exports are up 104 percent—an additional $173 million for the New Zealand economy. Every day, New Zealand is benefiting from trade agreements and from a Government that was quick to take action to get it in place so they could benefit so very much sooner.

The UK free-trade agreement, in place two years now—a 21 percent boost of our exports, up $644 million; services a 22 percent increase, which is important because although we are known for the highest-quality, safest food to be produced anywhere in the world that consumers all over the place in many countries want, there is a big opportunity in services. Goods exports are up 20 percent; meat a 46 percent increase—almost $500 million more over that period of time. Dairy, a 139 percent increase; fruit and nuts, 52 percent; tech services, 22 percent; and tech-related services are up 50 percent—an extra $221 million for the New Zealand economy.

Yesterday, the vast majority of parties in this Parliament voted in favour of the UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), and you heard me earlier in question time say that it is the fastest ever negotiated agreement and the highest quality, opening up unprecedented access for New Zealand exporters to a market worth $500 billion. The UAE imports 90 percent of their food. They don’t have the opportunity to grow it for themselves. They have choices as to where they import that food from, and they will now be choosing New Zealand, and whilst our trade compared to many nations is modest—we export a billion dollars to them—I predict that the trade in that market will go up significantly and so very, very quickly, because the two Governments have said that we want to do business with each other and we provide the certainty of a trade agreement for our business communities to grow and to flourish.

The NZ-Gulf Cooperation Council agreement concluded last year—there is a $3 trillion opportunity in that region. The size of that economy—the countries are all of significance to New Zealand, but Saudi Arabia certainly is the jewel in the crown. Over 10 years, 99 percent of our exports will be tariff-free and, on entry into force with the CEPA, it will be more than half of what we export, tariff-free. There is a huge opportunity in that market. The Saudis are transitioning their economy away from reliance upon petrochemicals to opportunities and growth in so many fields, from tourism where there are New Zealand companies already there helping them build their infrastructure, giving advice, architects, engineers, construction companies, and, of course, another market where they import 80 percent of their food—a great opportunity for New Zealand exporters. This is a Government that backs those exporters to do well.

Finally, we are negotiating with India. Our second round of negotiation has taken place and we are making great progress. I predict we will have a deal that is meaningful with India before the end of this term of Government.

The honourable—sorry. Can I call Rawiri Waititi.

I love it when you address me like that, Mr Speaker! Ngā mihi nui ki a koe.

Well, you know, you’re obviously an honourable man.

Tēnā tātou. Tēnā koe, Peeni, i ō mihi ki tō tātou tuahine i tēnei rā. Tika tonu, kei te mahana tonu tana wairua ki waenga i a tātou, me te mea hoki tika tonu kia mihi rā ki tōna hau kāinga, ki te nui o te iwi i tae ki runga i Taihape, ki Ōpaea Marae ki te tangi atu ki a ia. Me te mea hoki kei te tautoko i ō poroporoaki ki tērā o ō tātou tuāhine i tēnei rā.

Nō reira, Peeni, ngā mihi nui ki a koe, ki a koutou, Shanan, ki tō whanaunga, ki te tuahine rā. Kei te tangi tonu, kei te mihi tonu, ka poroporoaki tonu tātou ki a ia i tēnei rā.

[Greetings to us all. Thank you, Peeni, for your acknowledgments of our sister today. Very true, her spirit remains warm amongst us, and it is also very appropriate that we acknowledge her home people, to the many people that arrived in Taihape, to Ōpaea Marae, to grieve for her. And furthermore I support your eulogies to that particular sister of ours today.

And so, Peeni, many greetings to you, to all of you, Shanan, to your relation, to that particular sister. I yet grieve, I yet acknowledge her, and we will continue to eulogise her today.]

Just to acknowledge Takutai Tarsh Kemp in probably the first general debate I’ve taken part in since the passing of Takutai, and just to acknowledge the mihi today by Peeni Henare.

I want to just pick up, following the conclusion of the oral submissions on the Regulatory Standards Bill, on the rhetoric that continues to be pushed by the ACT Party, supported by the Government. Over 95 percent of Aotearoa saw this bill for what it truly was: a power grab by the ACT Party to sell off Aotearoa to their rich mates. So let’s look at that in a deeper sense. Approximately 131,000 submissions; 95 percent of those were against it—95 percent of those. That’s telling you that Aotearoa has spoken. But I want to, today, focus on one principle in this bill and what it means for our women, for our senior citizens—our kaumātua here in Aotearoa—who are not part of the 2 percent that control 50 percent of this country’s wealth.

In the Regulatory Standards Bill, you will find the following principle: “every person is equal before the law”. On the surface, this sounds like a harmless or even noble principle, but while David Seymour and the ACT Party failed to redefine Te Tiriti o Waitangi through the Treaty principles bill, they have succeeded in redefining the meaning of equality. They have convinced the public that sameness and equality are the same thing.

This is the mindset that justifies cutting the school lunches programme while giving a $3 billion handout to landlords, because, according to this Government, we all have the same opportunity to become landlords. We will be all treated the same. Whether you are rich or poor, you will be treated as though you are rich. Holding everybody to the same standard, regardless of whakapapa, culture, gender, ability, age, and class, can only lead to inequality. This is particularly true in a country founded on the displacement and manufactured poverty of indigenous people.

I want to address one of the ACT Party members today: Parmjeet Parmar, an Indian migrant MP who is waging war on Māori, based on race-based scholarships, study spaces, and entrance pathways. I wonder if she has written letters to the universities about the three Indian scholarships: New Zealand Excellence Awards, worth $260,0000; the University of Auckland India High Achievers Scholarship; and the University of Waikato Vice Chancellor’s International Excellence Scholarship for India. This is hypocrisy—this is hypocrisy. If this is about—

As the member knows, you can’t accuse someone of that in this House. So withdraw the comment and find another way to say that.

What comment am I withdrawing, Mr Speaker?

You cannot refer to someone in the—I’m not going to repeat it. You can’t use that term.

So I know what I’m apologising for?

Well, you’ve just accused someone of engaging in a practice that has perhaps got a—I’m not going to say it.

The “h” word—you can’t say the “h” word?

No—OK? Now, you’ve got it.

I apologise, Mr Speaker. But that doesn’t take away from the fact—that doesn’t take away from the fact—that it’s double standards; it’s double standards and it’s rūpahu—that is rūpahu. Look, earlier today, women representing over 300,000—this is the other part, so we’ll leave that there for the member to think about it, and I look forward to seeing her letters to the universities addressing that particular issue. But we want to make sure, everybody, that this piece of legislation based on everybody being the same under the law—absolutely rubbish.

It’s absolutely rubbish, and I tell you what: my plea is to our elderly people out there, to those who are on the super—that is under threat. Your super card is under threat because it’s preferential treatment to elderly—it’s preferential treatment to the elderly—and we don’t want to risk those particular issues that ensure that they live with some dignity.

We absolutely support the SuperGold card, and we absolutely support those scholarships that I just mentioned. But it’s double standards when it comes from that party when they’re targeting one race, which is te iwi Māori—and I want to bring that up, right now. We need to make sure—and I talk to our elderly citizens out there—that they write to Winston Peters. This is his flagship policy. Write to him and ensure that that bill doesn’t go through this House, because it will put everybody on notice who needs the dignity to live. Kia ora tātou.

Emotions have been running high in this Parliament since question time, especially on that side of the House, where they don’t like this side pointing out their record on jobs for what it is. This is a Government that has seen 47,000 New Zealanders leave its shores because of joblessness, because of the rising cost of living, and because they can’t save for a home and buy one. This is a Government that will be remembered for 17,000 jobs in the building and construction sector, since they were elected, gone—axed. Where are they now? They’re in Australia, building their roads, their schools, their hospitals.

When this Government crows about its infrastructure pipeline, what jobs are they talking about? They know that in their electorate, not one person is saying, “Oh, thank you, National, for that infrastructure pipeline that is kicking in in 2026. Oh good, my apprentice, who I’ve had on for two years down at my construction site, whose training I’ve invested in, and who I was promised by that National Government I would be getting the Apprenticeship Boost for in the election—they’re in Perth. Aren’t I lucky that the Government is giving me an infrastructure pipeline in five years to look forward to?”

Meanwhile, 20 percent of electricians in this country will be retiring in the next year. With gasfitters and plumbers, the situation is the same: an ageing workforce, that this Government is overseeing, having no one to replace them. And they say they are proud of their pipeline of work. Who will do that work?

When workers are under attack by this Government, it’s this party, the Labour Party, the party of workers, who will be standing up for them. The record of this Government will be that they have overseen the mass exodus of young people, of Māori, of the women who got into trades under the Labour Government—out and off to Australia. Those important construction workers who came in on technical projects like the City Rail Link and like the Manukau SuperClinic—they have gone. Because it’s this Government’s slogan that “Everyone must go”, they’ve overseen the leaving of all of those people who we desperately need when our economy is back in fit shape, under a Labour Government, to build again.

We’re the party of work, and building and construction is good work. It employs one in 10 Kiwis still, despite the massive cuts that have seen them leaving. More than 17 percent of the construction sector are Māori, and one in five Auckland workers are involved in the building and construction sector. That means that this Government’s record on the building and construction sector slump, which is heavier and harder than the global financial crisis now, is hitting Auckland particularly hard, and it’s hitting my community of Manurewa. You know what that means? It means that I walk down to the Manurewa town shops with my kids, and two of the four places where we can buy food, we can stop in, we can talk to the community—they have shut up shop, at the moment. They cannot make a living out of it, as bakeries and retailers; they are overseas visiting family because it costs them more to open their doors at the moment. The tradies aren’t coming through, the workers aren’t coming through, and if they do have a job, they don’t have money to spend.

What does this Government say? They say, “Don’t worry about it. We’ve got something in the infrastructure pipeline.” It’s stuff that we already knew about; it’s stuff that kicks in in five years’ time. That is not a record to be proud of; that is a record of overseeing a huge downturn in our economy, which will create scarring for a long time. Scarring for who? Scarring for the people who can least afford it.

We’re lucky to have some of those community housing providers at the moment building houses in my area, in South Auckland. I’m told that they are, in fact, the only housing providers that are getting housing consents through the council at the moment, because they are the only ones who can keep the pipeline going—no thanks to this Government—even though its policy is that community housing providers should be providing those houses that my community desperately needs. One in three people in Manurewa live in a Kāinga Ora home, and then this Government is saying that they should be providing housing by community housing providers who it’s not helping to continue to build those houses. Why is it not helping? Because it’s not helping with the funding and it’s certainly not helping them with the builders that they need.

This isn’t a plan; this is economic vandalism. It’s hurting the people who cannot save themselves, who cannot create an economic buffer for themselves. The reason why Governments should pay attention to jobs in an economic downturn is because those young people who we need to stay here on our shores, to invest in their education and to learn, those are the people who are most affected by this. They are the people who will leave and we will not get back. They are the people who the Government should be focused on making sure are in employment. They should carry through on their promise about Apprenticeship Boost. They should be making sensible changes to the building sector, so that they have somewhere to learn and something to hope for. But this Government is hands off when it comes to jobs; it’s hands off when it comes to young people, and that will be its record.

I want to talk about prudent financial management. We’ve heard a lot of speeches today from around the House about the problems that we have here in New Zealand. That issue has been well canvassed. We all know there are problems in this country, but what we haven’t heard are the solutions from the other side. So I want to talk about some of the solutions that this coalition Government has been undertaking.

Prudent financial management of the taxpayer’s money: I want to express why it’s important to me from the West Coast-Tasman electorate. This year’s Budget, as we know, was all about building the New Zealand economy, getting growth back into the economy, creating jobs, and lifting wages so that we can lift the prosperity of the cost of living so that it’s easier on Kiwis. But rather than focusing on the short-term sugar hit—which we all know if we feed our kids a heap of sugar, what comes at the end of that? The crash. So we don’t want the crash. We want long-term investment so that our country is set up for economic recovery and growth into the future.

Now, things like ensuring we lift the education standards in this country: there is nothing more important than investing in our students in our schools and universities, not only lifting the academic achievement but also building new classrooms so that they’ve got the most modern environment to learn in. Erica Stanford has done an amazing job at cutting in half the cost of building a new classroom. So what does that mean? It means we get twice as much for our money now. We’re getting twice as many classrooms for the same price as what the previous Government was spending. Now, it sets them up when they’ve got a greater education for higher-paying jobs. It gives them more future choices. But we’ve also got to stop the wasteful spending. This Government has done a huge amount in that space in the past, but we do know that we’ve got a lot more to do as well.

Growing our exports: Todd McClay has just expressed the important work that he’s been doing offshore. We don’t build those relationships and we don’t build those trade deals by staying at home and hoping people come knocking on our door. We have to be proactive about getting out there in the international environment and selling our country’s products offshore. And to know now that we have got access to a $500 billion market in the United Arab Emirates by the new trade deal, which was passed yesterday in this House, is a huge step forward, and the Minister has expressed what that means in economic terms.

But one of the most exciting opportunities for my electorate of West Coast-Tasman are the plans to double mining exports in 10 years to $3 billion. I’m very happy and enthusiastic about promoting mining, so I was very pleased to hear that, just late last week, another mining consent was granted by the West Coast Regional Council and Westland District Council for Westland Mineral Sands Company to begin mining just south of Hokitika. They’re going to be mining things like ilmenite, garnet, gold, and other rare earth minerals. They’re just below Hokitika—so a great opportunity to create jobs really close to a major town.

The other way that our electorate in West Coast-Tasman is doing well—and what we do well—is water. Hydro generation has huge potential for us on the West Coast. There’s no doubt that New Zealand does not have energy security going forward. I thought it was very rich today to hear from the Leader of the Opposition about how hard it is for our older people, that they have to turn off their heaters because the price of electricity is so high. I’d just like to remind the other side: who wrecked our electricity industry? Who wrecked our energy sector? Does anybody remember Lake Onslow? Lake Onslow was going to be an $18 billion or $16 billion project. So the industry players stepped back and said, “We don’t need to do this any more; the Government’s going to do it for us.” So we have now got a real gap in our energy infrastructure. No wonder the electricity price is going up, and the same with oil and gas. Thank God for the coalminers who are producing coal on the West Coast, keeping our processing plants running, because one captain’s call wrecked the oil and gas industry. I think this Government has done a fabulous job of laying the foundation stones for the future, and I’m very proud of the effort that West Coast-Tasman has played.

E te Māngai, tēnā koe. Otirā e te Whare, tēnā koutou katoa. This Government is failing one in 10 people in Aotearoa living with endometriosis. That’s more than 120,000 people, a figure likely to be much higher due to chronic misdiagnosis and impenetrable access to specialist care. And do not fall for this Government’s rhetoric, which seeks to embed anti-trans and misogynistic ideologies into our healthcare system. Yes, some woman can give birth, but so too can trans and gender diverse people, and the same can be said about those suffering with endometriosis.

This is a reproductive health issue, a human right, that has been ignored for too long by this Government. The silence and inaction must end, so whakarongo mai. We have heard, just this week in the House from the Minister of Health, that equity and targeted care based on social determinants like gender, sexuality, and whakapapa do not matter to this Government. The Healthy Futures (Pae Ora) Amendment Bill is just one example of that belief, manifested in legislation. We have seen this consistently during this term: smoke-free laws have been repealed which will disproportionately kill Māori; rainbow and takatāpui - specific mental health providers have been left high and dry; gender-affirming healthcare guidelines are being unnecessarily delayed; and people in desperate chronic pain needing specialist care for endometriosis are being rejected by the healthcare system.

Successive Governments have allowed entrenched medical misogyny to go unchecked in the healthcare system for too long. It is a disgrace that endometriosis, a condition which only affects women, trans men, and gender diverse people, takes, on average, eight to 10 years to be diagnosed in this country. Let’s not fail to mention the utter dearth of meaningful investment from this Government in research, infrastructure, training, and care that has been called on by people with endometriosis for decades—all this against the stark contrast of the Australian Government, which recently invested $500 million in targeted reproductive care.

We must do better. There are countless stories of too many people suffering from the immense pain of endometriosis, pain that goes beyond the physical, that infiltrates mental and spiritual health, that permeates and impacts relationships, that causes extreme stress on financial wellbeing and employment opportunities. I’ve heard from women who are told by their doctors that they just have painful periods; stories of trans men being turned away from care due to cis normative medical practices. Stories of gender diverse folk being ignored, erased, and humiliated by a system which fails to recognise their existence. If the option of treatment does eventuate, the rights of patients are often fundamentally undermined by a patriarchal system which prioritises hypothetical conception over a patient’s bodily autonomy.

It has been five years since the Hon Julie Anne Genter shepherded Aotearoa’s first best-practice guidelines for the treatment of endometriosis—a groundbreaking step at the time—but which has been totally disregarded since, with no attempts to review or invest in the next steps to continue the urgently needed progress in endometriosis healthcare. It is time to listen to the experts and community; they know what’s best.

Endometriosis New Zealand chief executive Tanya Cooke recently said that the Government needs to take up the call for a national endometriosis action plan that can provide a coordinated response to endometriosis in New Zealand. We must also address the legislative gap which fails to recognise endometriosis as an official disability. By doing this, people suffering from these severe health impacts and the insidious discrimination that it should not—but disturbingly does—entail, would be guaranteed rights and protections, which they are currently left without.

To continue a regime of under resourcing and apathy towards meaningful improvements to care for people with endometriosis is simply cruel and inhumane, but this Government has proven it does not care about equity in healthcare, it does not care about trans and gender diverse lives, and it does not care about the reproductive health rights of all people in Aotearoa—

The member’s time has expired.

Koinei te wā tuatahi kua tū ahau ki roto i tēnei Whare nō muri mai i te hingatanga o tō tātou hoa aroha, a Takutai Tarsh Kemp, nā reira i tēnei wā ka huri ōku whakaaro ki tōna wairua, te wairua i ū, i noho pūmau ki te rangimārie. Ahakoa te kaupapa, ahakoa ngā hōhā me ngā piki me ngā heke o tēnei Whare, kāore ia i ngaro i te ngākau mahitahi. E tino mokemoke ana tātou ki a ia.

Moe mai rā, Takutai, i te korowai mahana o ō tupuna. Ka maumahara tonu mātou ki a koe. Ia wā ka whai mātou kia pūāwai ngā hapori, ia wā ka rapu mātou i te huarahi kia kotahi ai, ia wā ka tū mātou i tēnei Whare, ā, ka taupatupatu ai ngā whakaaro me ngā mahere kia pakari ai te wairua o ngā whānau katoa. Mā mātou koe e maumahara tonu.

[This is the first time that I have stood in this House following the passing of our beloved friend Takutai Tarsh Kemp, and so, at this time, my thoughts return to her spirit, a spirit that was resolute and remained steadfast to peace. Regardless of the subject, despite the frustration and the ups and downs of this House, she never lost her collaborative heart. We miss her a lot.

Sleep well, Takutai, within the warm mantle of your ancestors. We will remember you every time we pursue the flourishing of communities, every time we search for the path of unity, every time we stand in this House and debate ideas and plans so that the soul of all families may be robust. We will remember you.]

On that day at Takutai’s marae, I was welcomed by a handsome MP wearing a Te Pāti Māori hat. He was seated beside Rawiri Waititi. Peeni Henare was his name. I caught a glimpse again, that day, of what this House is possible of, and of what Takutai brought. I thought it was a classic kupu whakarite—a classic metaphor—of what it was that she sought to foster in every interaction that I had with her, and so I want to acknowledge her today.

I want to stay on that theme. I want to turn my attention back to a conversation that I had that same week. It was with my Youth MP, Madeleine ’One’one, who has been here today with her fellow Tongan youth leaders from Onehunga High School. They were here earlier; then, they were watching these speeches from the Labour caucus room—I have some work to do, clearly. Right now, they’ve had to catch their shuttle to the airport, so, hopefully, they’ll be watching this later on. I wanted to mihi to them and acknowledge the passion that they have for our community. Mālō e lelei ‘a e fānau ako mā‘oni‘oni mo e kau taki ‘i he kaha‘u….lototo‘a These young leaders carry loto to’a - humble hearts and a dream to tautua to serve their community, as Takutai did. They are stepping up in debate, public service, and leadership, ko e ‘ofa, ko e lotu pea mo e ngāue, love, faith, and action. They are all alive in them, and it gives me some hope. I want to acknowledge the amazing leadership opportunities and development that is offered for so many young people at Onehunga High School, as it is in every one of our schools in Maungakiekie.

A couple of months ago I had the opportunity to be interviewed by a couple of young year 4 students from Onehunga Primary School who were doing a leadership project. Franco and Max were absolutely delightful. They asked such thoughtful, fantastic questions. I was tempted, at the time, to bring them to Parliament to coach MPs—perhaps not in the patsy questions. One of their questions was: what do you most appreciate about being a leader? I explained how much I loved the opportunity to turn the dial for people in our community on a daily basis. Those moves may not shift the course of the whole country, but for that person or for that whānau, it means everything.

Their next question was a more challenging one. It said: what do you most struggle with about being a leader? What do you most struggle with? I think I winced at the time. I said to them: “There are so many things that I wish I could change, both here and overseas, that are simply outside of my authority.” It’s something I’ve been reflecting on a lot lately—the limits of influence, particularly with so much injustice in our world. I told Franco and Max that wise leadership includes accepting those limits even when you wish it were otherwise, focusing each day on what you can do, and that’s why I celebrate the kind of leadership that’s fostered at our schools in Maungakiekie, at our charities in Maungakiekie, and our businesses.

A big shout-out tomorrow for the Onehunga Business Awards—because I’m on duty here, sadly I’ll miss it, but what a night it will be, celebrating the work, the care, the sacrifices that our local businesses make to create jobs, deliver services, and invest in our community. Those businesses, those community organisations, those schools, those whānau: they are the backbone of our community. They are the ones that call us to seek justice, to work well together.

Kia tau te rangimārie ki a tātou, kia whāia atu te kōrero tahi, kia whāia atu te whakapūāwai o tō tātou hapori.

[Let peace settle upon us, let us pursue discourse, let us pursue the flourishing of our community.]

Mālō ‘aupito, kia ora.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. Since this Government has come into power, we have seen attack after attack after attack on workers, not just with the loss of jobs that we’re seeing just getting bigger and bigger all the time but with an attack on workers’ conditions, an attack on workers’ wages, and an attack on the rights of workers. I know that 6 May brought one of the darkest days and the biggest attacks on workers in this country, particularly those women who have been fighting for so long to ensure that they have a fair chance at their pay equity claims. That is the day this Government announced they were going to gut the pay equity schemes within this country. That was the day they absolutely gutted that not only by changing pay equity in the country but by absolutely cancelling out the 33 active claims that were in place.

Today, we saw hundreds of people once again gather together on the grounds of Parliament, out the front, on the lawn, to see the handover of the petition “Protect Pay Equity - stop scrapping equal pay claims and law”, which 93,924 people have signed since 6 May. What an incredible number of people to sign a petition in such a short time. Those people are sending a clear message that New Zealanders will not accept the Government’s gutting of pay equity, and they are fighting back. They are very angry, and they told their anger out there today. In fact, we heard from young people as well saying how demoralising it was when this National-led Government didn’t consult anyone around their changes. They made the changes under urgency and wiped 33 claims—active claims—off the books, forcing a law change that takes money out of women’s pockets. And what did we hear from that Government? What did we hear from key Ministers, like the Minister for Women? Crickets. Absolutely nothing. They were not prepared to stand up and fight for what was right for women and workers in this country.

This was just another blow for women, who are already suffering under the cost of living under this Government. We know the difference that those pay equity claims make. We have heard about that difference, time and time again, and I want people in this House to think about people they know—and I’m sure that every single person has somebody they know—and how those claims have made a difference in their lives and the lives of their whānau. We heard today, out there, about the care and support workers—the people who had the first successful claim, with Kristine Bartlett back in 2017—who fought for that successful claim through the courts. We heard about the difference that that made, and we heard about the difference that it makes to their whānau.

I have a personal interest in that. I have a disabled sister, and I have met the people who have given her support over the years. These are the people who support our most vulnerable, in their darkest days sometimes. Those people help my sister, who I love dearly, to lead a life of mana and a life of dignity. Why is it that we, in a great country such as Aotearoa New Zealand, fight against them having the pay equity that they deserve? Why is that Government prepared to pay them, and keep them being paid, less than their male counterparts that do work of equal value? That is what it comes down to.

Today’s petition shows that people in this country know women are not worth less. They are not worth less than men, and the people who signed that petition today gave a very clear message to this Government. I want to acknowledge that message and say it here again today. This is only the beginning. We will not rest until every working woman in Aotearoa New Zealand—

The member’s time has expired.

Tēnā koe, Madam Speaker. Tēnā koutou e te Whare. This Government, we have seen scrambling in the past week, because the reality is that the decisions that they have made have led to a much longer and deeper recession, and huge cuts in the construction sector because of the large number of cancelled projects. While they’re out there promising that they’re putting money into infrastructure and that’s going to create jobs, the reality is that, overall, they have cut more than they are going to invest in. Most of the projects they announced last Sunday have been funded for years—literally since the previous Labour Government.

Let’s look at the numbers. Here’s the reality: an Infrastructure New Zealand survey found that 65 percent of firms have reduced staff over the past 12 months. I’ve got a graph here that everyone can look at. Make sure you can see this. This is a year-on-year comparison of insolvencies in key industries from 2024 to 2025. The orange is 2025. You can see the orange is going up in most sectors. That means there’s more insolvencies in 2025 than there were in 2024. This is, in large part, due to the Government’s response since they came into power. But the really large orange line here is the construction sector. This is January to March. In June of 2025, construction firms made up one-third of all company liquidations. As we can see, that has been increasing over time.

The Government came in, and they say, “Oh, we want cross-party support. We want cross-party consensus on infrastructure.”, and yet what they’re asking for is for the Opposition to support their 30-year strategy on infrastructure when, in fact, they cancelled a bunch of long-term projects that should have had cross-party support. What’s the perfect example? Right after they came in, they put a whole bunch of projects on hold from the Ministry of Education—hundreds of school projects. In the end, over 100 were confirmed cancelled. Kāinga Ora: 212 projects. Recently, 212 projects were confirmed cancelled. That amounts to 3,479 homes at a time when we have a housing crisis and the private sector is not in a position to be investing. While it’s the perfect time for the Government itself to be investing in housing, they cancelled housing. I know a builder in my own electorate who said he had $70 million worth of work over the next five years lined up, pulled out from under the rug or, in some cases, delayed by a year and a half even when those projects are carrying on.

Everybody knows about the ferries being cancelled, and supposedly this is fiscal responsibility. It’s absolute rubbish. Those ferries are a lifeline. They are fundamentally critical infrastructure between the North and South Islands, which now we have a whole lot of uncertainty for the next few years while we don’t even have a contract for new ferries. But it is also the case that construction firms, engineers, and others were all put out of work when the upgrades to the wharfs were unceremoniously cancelled. Could it have been reviewed? Could perhaps there have been some savings found? I would say yes. That would have been a much better deal than cancelling the ferries.

The Government cancelled the transport choices programme. Now, this removed safety infrastructure from the vicinity of 101 schools around the country. It hurt jobs, and it hurt safety around schools. Honestly, if there was going to be cross-party consensus about anything in this House, I would think that safety around schools would be one of those things, and yet the Government cancelled projects that would have improved safety around 101 schools, and then, of course, they forced local councils to put the speed limit up around schools.

I could go on. Obviously, the Dunedin Hospital rebuild was scaled back. Three waters: we couldn’t get all the figures on the three waters projects, but that three waters change had a huge impact on a lot of civil construction that had been lined up for the past year and a half. Now, coincidentally, we have parts of the country who are being told they have to be on a boil notice, potentially for years, while they wait for the infrastructure.

Now, the reality is that there are solutions, and the Green Party is talking about the solutions. We’ve put out a fully costed Green Budget that shows how, if we had a fairer tax system, we could actually address our infrastructure challenges, address climate change, ensure that everyone in New Zealand has a warm, dry home, and invest in smart infrastructure like rail. There is an alternative. New Zealanders are smart enough to see through the PR spin and stunts of this Government, who largely represents, and is funded by, oligarchs, the richest of the rich just looking to get richer. The idea that they care about New Zealanders and the long-term future of this country is a joke. New Zealanders, it is showing in the most recent poll.

The debate having concluded, the motion lapsed.

I move, That the sitting of the House today be extended into tomorrow morning for:

further consideration in committee of the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill;

the second reading of:

the Crimes Legislation (Stalking and Harassment) Amendment Bill;

the Responding to Abuse in Care Legislation Amendment Bill;

the Broadcasting (Repeal of Advertising Restrictions) Amendment Bill; and

the States Amendment Bill;

the committee stage of:

the Disputes Tribunal Amendment Bill; and

the Regulatory Systems (Primary Industries) Amendment Bill; and

the second reading of:

the Policing (Police Vetting) Amendment Bill; and

the Crimes (Countering Foreign Interference) Amendment Bill.

Point of order. Thank you, Madam Speaker. I seek leave to record 15 votes for the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand in opposition to the first reading of the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill.

Leave is sought for that purpose. Is there any objection? There appears to be none—so noted.

I declare the House in committee for further consideration of the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill.

Members, the House is in committee on the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill. When we last considered this bill, we were debating Part 1, which is the debate on clauses 3 to 53, “Amendments relating to investigatory tools”, and Schedules 1 and 2. Once again, the question is that Part 1 stand part.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I was wondering whether the Minister would jump to her feet, given that a number of questions and clarifications were sought prior to this debate being interrupted.

As I prefaced in my earlier remarks, we really just want to work through the legislation and raise some issues and some clarifications—really, for the record, and to make clear where the line is drawn in terms of this important piece of legislation.

I guess the next point I had was—and I was referring to the amended section numbers in Part 1, new section 79I, which talks about preservation directions and the duration of those directions. It says that they stand for 20 days—and that’s just 20 ordinary days, not working days; a relatively short period—but then it’s got, in subsection (2), that where an application for a production order is made, it continues until that is determined.

Now, I guess my point there: firstly, is 20 days long enough? This might seem a bit strange—is 20 days long enough? And then, until the application is determined, there’s actually an indeterminate length of time. My question is: is it appropriate for it to simply exist for an indeterminate length of time, particularly when a production order can in fact go on for quite a long period of time if it’s challenged? So that’s my first point—I’ll see how many I can squeeze in; I’ll keep an eye on the Minister just in case she wants to leap up because something’s just occurred to her.

The other one is reviews. There is a preservation order that’s made, and the entity against which that order has been made has a right of review. I guess this is a rule-of-law point. The review is by exactly the same entity. It’s against the commissioner who made the decision and also reviews the decision, which does seem very odd. You would usually expect to go one up, which means that this is an entirely administrative discretion, and I would have thought that you’d want some independent oversight. Now, I guess if you don’t like the review, you can go to the High Court by way of judicial review, but that seems very heavy-handed and quite a wasteful approach, when a much more obvious approach would simply be to have a kind of quick-fire right of appeal to the District Court.

I also note that although the review is notionally by the commissioner, the provision, in fact, makes it very clear that it’ll be a delegate—so it won’t even be the commissioner him- or herself who decides that review; it’ll be some delegate, which really buries it into the organisation and makes it highly administrative in nature.

I see I’ve got a minute left and the Minister is not yet ready to respond to these insightful points, and I guess my next question, then, is about new section 79N, which is about pathway information. In particular, when it says that you’re required to produce pathway information, it’s got to be produced in usable form, and the person who’s asked for it has to assist any person nominated by the chief executive. Now, I haven’t had a lot to do with these kinds of investigations, but I do know that it can take considerable resources to do this kind of electronic forensic work, and it doesn’t come cheap. So if you’ve got a provider, and not all these providers are large, some of them are quite small—and that’s a good thing—who bears the burden of this? Because this is an enforcement obligation, and the entity who happens to be communicating this data is being asked to present it in usable form and to render assistance. So it’s a compulsion to, essentially, provide a service and to assist in presenting and developing that evidence. I see my time has expired. I’ll save my further questions.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I am not sure, just before the break, there were already some questions posed, and I assume they’re still in the mix somewhere with the Minister or the Minister’s team. But I’d like to go to clause 10, if I may, new section 64A, “Record of information obtained, made, or generated by assistant”. This clause required anyone assisting in a surveillance operation to either destroy or hand over any information they record during that process. Speaking to new section 64A(2)(a), where the destructions of records are allowed, would the Minister consider whether an exemption or notification process where the data concerned Māori, including iwi, to ensure opportunity for data sovereignty? That’s one.

And if I can just quickly go to the second: will there be provisions, or can the Minister assure that there’ll be provisions, that ensure culturally significant information or data is not destroyed without consultation or oversight? These questions are on the back of that there’s very little recognition or, in our eyes, rigour as to how Māori data will be treated in any case. So the first challenge, I guess: should you or would you collect and for what good reason? And then, once you’ve got it, should you or could you destroy it and for what good reason? So there are my first questions in the first piece earlier this morning—posed the first set—and this is the second for now. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Like colleagues, I’m just recalling that there are some questions that potentially haven’t yet been answered by the Minister. I think the significant one for me is the one that was raised by the Privacy Commissioner in relation to the commissioner being not necessarily or not the appropriate individual to grant a preservation direction and that that should be covered by judicial oversight. Just a question about whether that submission by the Privacy Commissioner was considered.

Going to what is section 79C, inserted by clause 18, that sets out the form and content of applications that the commissioner would look at. It sets out a number of requirements, including that it has to be in writing—and I’ll speak further to that in a moment—but also the content of the application itself and a certification from the individual making the application that everything is true and correct. My question is in relation to the addition of new documents or new information within that one preservation direction and whether that is contemplated as a possibility. I haven’t noted anything specific in the primary legislation regarding that.

My concern is the following section—so that’s new section 79D—which allows the commissioner to accept applications made orally. There are a number of requirements for that to happen, but it would just seem to me that the evidence in that case would not be as reliable as if the individual had to go through the rigour of complying with all of new section 79C(2)(a) to (g), which are a number of criteria. So I think the question really is: what is the rigour around allowing that oral application? Is that a doorway for what would have been additions to the initial application being heard orally as separate applications; or is it considered that if there was truly a second application, that that would also need to be done in writing as well?

Madam Chair, thank you. I just want to respond to the questions raised by Vanushi Walters, on behalf of the Minister responsible. I believe the questions were around the Privacy Commissioner and the Police Commissioner and the variances between issuing orders rather than the judiciary. I’m advised that they did consider the commissioner’s suggestion but ultimately decided it would undermine the effectiveness of the bill. As is patently obvious, the bill grants the power to issue those preservation directions to the Commissioner of Police because it is likely to be the faster option, as opposed to the independent judicial authorisation. The point of that preservation direction, I’m advised, is for the rapid protection of evidence, and any delay, obviously, in issuing a preservation direction will subsequently have an impact. Also, I’m advised that the Law Commission’s 2017 review of the Search and Surveillance Act recommended that the power to grant a preservation direction does sit with the Commissioner of Police.

In response to some of the questions raised by the good Dr Duncan Webb around preservation directions not being conducted independently, I’ve touched on this a little bit, but anyone subject to a preservation direction is entitled to seek a review of the decision by a delegate of the Commissioner of Police, and that delegate cannot be the person who issued the original direction. A review by a delegate of the Commissioner of Police will be significantly faster than the alternatives, like the right of appeal in a District Court.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Just expanding on—certainly not repeating—Vanushi Walters’ point about oral applications, which are quite unusual. I note in the provision she referred to, there’s a requirement on, I think, the commissioner to record the grounds and so on. But my question is: why wasn’t consideration given to a kind of after-the-event written application? That would be quite normal, because there are urgent situations where you’d want to run down, get your preservation order, serve it, but then go back and put on the record, in a sworn or affirmed way, the evidence upon which that was decided, because if, of course, it’s going to be challenged, you need to see it there very clearly. That would, in fact, be a lot more reliable and more authenticated than simply recording what was said in what’s, essentially, a meeting.

However, my next point is about the retention of documents. Obviously, it’s important that the documents are retained, but the obligation on the Police to retain documents—in new section 79W, inserted by clause 17, on page 25 and over to 26—is actually quite short: it’s the date of completion of any proceedings, or the date that is two years after the date on which the application was first retained, which, in terms of retention of legal records where there might be some suggestion of misbehaviour or poor conduct, seems to be quite short. So I’m very curious—and they’re electronic records, right? So my question there is: why so short?

Then, my next question relates to new section 79Y, inserted by clause 17, which is on annual reporting. Look, very good—I’m really supportive of there being annual reporting. But my question is: why is it not the case that the number of orders made—it doesn’t appear to be reported. I might have that wrong, and your officials might be able to point me to the clause there. I think the thing you want to know most, because this is an invasive order for preservation of documents, is why is there no requirement to say, “We have issued a thousand of these”—which I hope we won’t; that would seem a little extraordinary—or simply a hundred? That would certainly, in terms of public scrutiny, give some assurance.

Then, I want to ask a question about new section 88B, inserted by clause 19. We’re moving now into foreign enforcement authorities, so this is foreign countries saying, “I want to know some stuff.”, and we need an order—a preservation direction—to find it out. And 88B sets the threshold, and it says that “an investigation has commenced in relation to a serious offence”. Now, that seems to me to be a very loose term, and it may be that that has a meaning and is defined clearly somewhere in the legislation, but it doesn’t appear to be. Elsewhere in the bill, it talks about offences of imprisonment of two years or offences of imprisonment of seven years. You can argue where the line should be drawn, but it’s clear—or some of them actually name the offences. But simply to say “an investigation has commenced”—which is, of course, a low bar, right?—“in relation to a serious offence”. So what does that mean? That’s my question there. And that’s quite an important one.

But, arguably, not as important—if I’ve got time, and I might ask the indulgence for another 30 seconds if I need it—as where it says that the commissioner may refuse to grant an application on a number of grounds, including where the offence is of a political character, and other things. But it doesn’t do things like, I think, what my friend called “dual criminality”, where the offence is not in fact an offence in New Zealand. It might be an offence we’d find repugnant—homosexual crimes, for example. If someone’s investigating homosexual crimes in a foreign country, and we think that’s a terrible kind of idea, do we have the ability to say no, essentially on public interest grounds—

The member’s time—

May I have another 30 seconds, Madam Chair?

I call the Hon Dr Duncan Webb.

Thank you. I’ll sit down when I make this final point. The other one is the death penalty. If someone’s investigating a serious offence and the punishment is death, is it the case that the commissioner can refuse to cooperate on that basis? So I did say I’d sit down in 30 seconds, and that was only 15.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I did want to just respond to a couple of those questions around new section 88A, inserted by clause 19, and the “serious offence” and whether or not it is subject to a threshold test and/or, indeed, the comments raised around dual criminality and whether or not serious offence is tested against what we deem as an offence here in New Zealand. Well, to confirm to the member: the purpose of the preservation direction is the rapid preservation of evidence. The more matters that have to be considered, obviously, the slower the process will be. Dual criminality—to respond directly to that question—will be considered before any actual evidence leaves New Zealand, alongside those broader human rights considerations. Indeed, I can confirm that the Attorney-General has vetted this bill for consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and hasn’t identified any inconsistencies. But further to that, under New Zealand’s existing mutual assistance legislation, a request for assistance can be refused due to a lack of dual criminality, but it does not have to be. That is the existing law, and this bill does not change that.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

We’re a long way from that I think, Mr Rutherford.

I just wanted to check before I take my call fully—I’ve had a quick look for the regulatory impact statement; if they’re able to direct us to whether that’s available, that would be helpful.

The point I would like to make in relation to this bill is the fact that it also amends quite important legislation, which is the Search and Surveillance Act, and also the new decision-making powers in relation to new offences in the Search and Surveillance Act. What these new powers, effectively, do is they create a limitation on the right of freedom of expression, and the bill grants the chief executive of the relevant law enforcement agency the power to make decisions about whether or not to lift that obligation. It does note that there are only limited circumstances in which the chief executive can decline to lift that obligation. I’m interested to know from the Minister what consultation was done in relation to that, because they are quite significant powers. I do note that we’ve got a section 7 report there, and that’s great, but the bill also does create new decision-making powers within the Search and Surveillance Act by giving the Commissioner of Police the ability to issue preservation directions. So if I understand that correctly, it means if a review of the decision to use a direction is sought, the bill also gives responsibility for conducting this review to the commissioner. So that sits with him as well.

So as a safeguard, the bill contains a delegation requirement to ensure that the decision is not able to be reviewed by the same person who made it. My question is—after my first one; my second question—given the nature of the preservation directions, whether or not these powers are likely to involve decisions that have a significant impact on rights and whether the Minister is satisfied that that checks and balances are satisfactory, particularly if you’re in situations where you’ve got the Commissioner of Police making that direction, and who’s going to be reviewing that. As the bill amends decision-making powers in the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act so that only a High Court judge can issue warrants under that Act—and so, effectively, this creates new decision-making powers to issue those production orders and surveillance warrants. These powers all have the potential to engage the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.

However, the point is that that decision-making power to the High Court creates a significant safeguard for the exercise of power, and it means that the ability to authorise search powers under the mutual assistance legislation is more constrained than similar search powers under the Search and Surveillance Act. So it will be interesting just to hear from the Minister whether she’s satisfied with that process in terms of the significance of the power and how those checks will be operating.

Finally, I would just like to touch on the provision creating a new decision-making power in the mutual assistance legislation by enabling the High Court to enable a judge to lift that obligation to notify affected parties before evidential material can be collected or sent offshore. So it’s, essentially, like a heads-up, and I’m assuming that that’s in place because it will be an investigation with police, and it’s a sensitive area, so there’s an ability for that to be lifted and to give that heads-up.

As the obligation has been included within the bill in response to a Supreme Court finding that notification is necessary to protect rights, dispensing of that requirement will naturally also have an impact on rights, in addition to limiting the decision of the High Court.

So, in those areas, I’m really interested to hear back from the Minister in terms of her satisfaction with where those checks and balances are, given there’s some pretty significant new powers that are being enabled through this legislation.

I’m wanting to talk to Part 3, Subpart 2, and looking at, specifically, new section 88B, the “Applications for preservation directions”. I just want to point out that this is different to the new section 79B around preservation directions that previous members have spoken to; even though it says, “preservation directions”, it is a different part of the legislation that we want to scrutinise here.

I’m wanting to look at that new section 88B and understand why it uses mandatory language, requiring a constable to apply for a preservation direction upon receiving a request, and what that actually means—that mandatory use of the preservation direction—whether any discretions are in place, and what exists in practice there. We’re wanting to make sure that this legislation is in line with our own laws and the way we do things here in New Zealand. So it’s really important that we understand what this sort of mandatory language actually means.

Speaking to, again, that new section 88B in Subpart 2—and this is on page 30—can the Minister please explain what oversight mechanisms exist to ensure that applications for preservation directions under that new section 88B are proportionate and consistent with privacy and human rights standards? Now, I know that the Minister has acknowledged that the Auditor-General has said that this bill is in keeping with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, which is wonderful—we all want to make sure that human rights are upheld. What I really want to understand is: what is in place to ensure that that proportionate and consistent application of this legislation is in line with privacy and human rights standards? We know that surveillance is a big topic, and New Zealanders really want to know how this will affect their lives and the lives of their friends and neighbours. We know that there are countries that are over-surveilled, and we don’t want to join in that wave.

Still speaking to that Subpart 2, new section 88B: can the Minister explain the intention behind new section 88B(2)(b), and whether any independent verification is required before relying on information supplied by a foreign enforcement agency? Of course, verifying evidence is a really important part of upholding truth and justice; it’s something that, here in New Zealand, we take really seriously. When a piece of information comes in, when evidence comes in, when there is an accusation, we make sure that that evidence is verified. So if the Minister could just engage with this question about whether there is any independent verification, that would be wonderful.

Before the break—before lunch, when we started committee of the whole House—I did ask the Minister questions around Part 3, Subpart 1, and the interpretation of new section 88A, which is on page 28, which haven’t been answered yet. It would be wonderful if we could get some clarity around the term “serious offence” and whether there is a threshold test for the proportionality around that. Thank you so much.

I’m going to wrap those two questions from both members from the Labour Party and the Green Party together, if I may, but just to respond to the last question first by Kahurangi Carter. She hadn’t quite made it to the House, but I did cover, in my previous response, about whether serious offences are tested against what we deem an offence in New Zealand, so I feel like I have covered that.

The questions around how the bill protects human rights—first up, the expectation of this Government is that all bilateral agreements are assessed against New Zealand’s human rights law before we enter into them, and that our Parliament itself plays an integral role in that process, particularly in its undertaking of parliamentary treaty examinations before New Zealand enters into any of these international arrangements, as it did with the 2021 Budapest Convention.

To respond to some of the questions raised by the Hon Ginny Andersen, to confirm, existing protections in the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MACMA) and the Search and Surveillance Act are extended to new powers in this particular bill, and that includes provisions in the MACMA to refuse assistance to a foreign country if their request appears to be aimed at persecuting—I was going to say prosecuting, but persecuting—someone due to the likes of race, ethnic origin, sex, sexual orientation, relation, nationality, political opinions, etc, and then also to confirm that surveillance device warrants and production orders will only be issued under MACMA if the existing requirements for these warrants under the current Search and Surveillance Act are met.

Tēnā koe. Tēnā tātou. Just re-reading one of the obvious expectations of the Budapest Convention, which is the harmonisation of laws, it’s ironic, given that there’s about as much harmony in Aotearoa New Zealand across laws, which I would compare it to Heaven and Hell. So we’ve got a long way to go.

Let me, if I can, take you to clause 12. In fact, if I may, just before that, the questions that I posed earlier today around surveillance and traffic data, I’m keen to get some kind of a response from the Minister in the chair, please, if I can.

I’m going to take you to clause 12, “Section 71 amended”. This clause sets out the information that enforcement officers must provide when requesting access to documents from someone, including for ongoing access. It always makes Māori really nervous, just saying—but you can only know that if you read about that, if you understand that, and only then can you appreciate it, but clearly that’s not the case.

Can the Minister confirm why after clause 12(2), there is no consideration of Te Tiriti obligations or the potential impact on Māori data sovereignty before applying for an order? Again, I mean, I emphasised it this morning, and probably in every conversation—it must be repeated in the House, for the House to understand what the founding documentation means in every possible way.

Then, let me take you to clause 13, “Section 75 amended (Form and content of production order)”. This clause updates what a production order must say, especially when it’s asking for documents to be handed over more than once over a period of time. There are so many comments that I want to make to that, but I’m just going to move on—just to say the constant, you know; I mean, we all know how hard it is to be asked about the same story a thousand times, but anyway. In new section 75(1)(a)(ii), it says that documents may be collected on an ongoing basis. In this case, what safeguards exist to prevent excessive or indefinite monitoring of Māori, especially where data may not relate to serious offending?

Additionally, Minister, in regard to ongoing production orders, should there be a review by an independent body or a Māori oversight entity when they relate to Māori data? I opened up, earlier this morning, by saying that it’s easy to go from a no to a yes. We’re still in the “no” lane. I’m really looking forward to hearing some affirming, really, if not informative responses to the questions. Thank you, Mr Chair.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I am looking at page 22, where we have new section 79Q inserted by clause 18, “Disclosing matters relating to preservation direction”. Of course, the Minister will know that this is the section that sets out the grounds for committing an offence as a person knowingly discloses to any other person that the direction has been made. It sets out some fairly serious penalties in subsection (3): so “(a) … imprisonment not exceeding 6 months; (b) if they are a body corporate, to a fine not exceeding $100,000.”

My first comment is a positive one, because there are a number of exceptions listed in subsection (4) which I think are really useful in terms of clarifying that for those people they can still seek legal advice and, under a number of other circumstances—for example, if they’re complying with the enforcement or with an enforcement order, they can then go ahead and disclose. I think there’s, of course, a practical consideration of whether one would feel that one could seek legal advice in those circumstances and whether they would actively do that or whether they would feel a certain amount of pressure, but, none the less, it’s good that that section of exceptions is in there.

My first question is really around the definitions of who is affected by a preservation order, which is in subsection (5) of that new section 79Q. It defines the affected person as either “(a) the person against whom the direction was made; or (b) an officer, employee, or agent of the person against whom the direction was made.” My sense is that there could be other individuals whose privacy rights are potentially impacted by a preservation direction. I wonder whether there was consideration of broadening out that provision to recognise that there may be other associates who are not necessarily agents of—there could even be family members who would fall within that affected person’s provision. To what extent does the Minister believe that the Privacy Act would protect those people’s rights, given that they’re not included within this definition section?

Then, turning the page to page 26, new section 79R inserted by clause 18, which is where written notice needs to be provided by the chief executive of the law enforcement agency and they must give, essentially, written notice, but it also sets out a number of exceptions to that, which are all framed very broadly. So I’m looking at subsection (2)(a) to (e). I wonder, in terms of limiting the powers, whether it would have made sense to just put some limitations on those powers. Right now, they’re framed as broadly as “(d) would prejudice any international relationships of the law enforcement agency”. Reading that one on its own, in the context of the Minister’s comments about New Zealand retaining its autonomy before it sends information out of the country, I would just be curious as to which takes precedence? Is it the international relationship or is it the rule of law as we know it within the country?

Then I would look also at—let me just find it—new Part 3A, new section 88A(1), inserted by clause 19. So the definition of “foreign enforcement authority” is defined extremely broadly. I don’t think it really does give us direction as to who the other entity overseas would be who is making these requests. It sort of just says that that would be akin to New Zealand Police set out in section 9 of the Policing Act, but could potentially be more broad than that. So I’m just asking if that is correct.

Lastly, Subpart 2 inserted by clause 19, new section 88B, says that “(1) A constable must apply to the Commissioner for a preservation direction against a person if a foreign enforcement authority requests the New Zealand Police for a preservation direction against the person”. So while there might be discretion in terms of the sending of that information overseas in line with our beliefs of the rule of law, the legislation is actually very directive about the constable having to apply to the commissioner for a preservation direction. The preservation direction is, potentially, prima facie rights breaching as well. So I’m wondering whether there was consideration of giving some more flexibility and perhaps using the word “may” there.

I just want to acknowledge and respond to questions raised by the member for Te Pāti Māori. In between the political points attempted to be scored, I think the questions were really around data sovereignty and the safeguarding of Māori data. It’s really important to acknowledge that in bringing this bill to the House, this is the Government of New Zealand taking responsibility and taking measures that help protect all New Zealanders from harm caused by cyber-related crimes, and that includes attacks on data.

Speaking specifically to Māori data, I don’t think cyber-attacks acknowledge creed or race or ethnicity. Cyber-attacks risk harm to Māori data sovereignty. If a cyber-attack on Māori data was carried out, this bill would in fact provide the tools necessary to detect and investigate and, of course, prosecute that crime, ultimately. It’s a real shame that that particular party can’t bring itself to be supportive of the impetus behind this, because data sovereignty concerns all New Zealanders, and so, as the Government for all New Zealanders, we are concerned that these questions raised must be balanced against the need to protect all New Zealanders from harm.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I just have a short question for the Minister at this stage. Now, I want to pick up from the previous speaker Vanushi Walters’ question. Specifically, when we’re looking at new section 79Q, which I believe is clause 18, new Subpart 2A of Part 3 inserted. And we’re looking at the exceptions. Specifically, when we’re looking at a person who is affected by a preservation direction and is able to make disclosure concerns, and they’re able to raise those kinds of concerns—it does list some of the criteria, but I want to check with the Minister in terms of the kind of consultation in this that was had with the ethnic communities, and particularly when we’re looking at it from the context of those who may not be able to speak English.

When something like this happens because of the fact that we do allow these sort of—particularly when we’re looking at foreign authorities and being directed by foreign authorities on certain elements, I did want to check that when something like this is happening, the person who is affected by a preservation order will be, at least at the minimum from the authority’s or appropriate enforcement officer’s perspective, eligible for translation services.

Just because of the fact that, you know, there’s one thing around translation, but there’s also another element. Sometimes, when we do look at direction from foreign authorities that we have that agreement with, that those who are affected here may not be able to express themselves or feel that they are able to challenge authority, because it’s not the standard norm from their country of origin.

So I want to check with the Minister that when we’re looking at this particular exception of new section 79Q(4) and that those two considerations have been made: number one, translation, and number two, the cultural and political needs of the people who are affected by a preservation order.

I had a couple of questions in relation to the preservation orders. In the actual convention itself, it says that New Zealand is required to implement these new search and surveillance tools, providing for the preservation of specific electronic evidence of criminal offending—and that’s exactly what this bill does—but the questions that I have are about how long data can be held for, and how long does this legislation require telecommunications providers to hold on to that data? We know that evidence is not deleted or modified before law enforcement agencies are able to obtain a production order from the court to have that information produced. But potentially, there could be quite a long period of time that would go on—it’s hard to estimate what that period of time would be—and given the rapid exchange of data that occurs in the current day and age, there could be situations where there is heaps of data that would be acquired under the production order.

So I think there’ll be some pretty valid questions from telecommunications providers or others impacted, where they would want to know how long they are required to be holding on to this data, and what are the implications if they’ve deleted it. So, say they did have a bunch, but it’s gone now—and, yes, there’s a request made for that data—what are the implications in situations such as that? An unlimited amount of traffic data is disclosed to law enforcement agencies so that other relevant service providers can be identified and served with preservation orders, if necessary. So it is also how do we define how wide that is going, and how does that work?

Of course, there are going to be quite clear implications in relation to the Privacy Act, which does require companies to delete personal information that is no longer required for lawful purposes. So I’m just interested to know: if companies aren’t able to hold personal information that is no longer required, but then subsequently a preservation order comes around, how do those two coincide in terms of the practicalities of how that might work? The regular deletion of data is a common business practice, particularly when a person closes an account, for example, and we know that offenders commonly close their accounts when they’re seeking to conceal or even to destroy evidence of their offending.

We know that the Privacy Act has an exception that allows companies to voluntarily refrain from deleting personal information if it’s to avoid the prejudicing of a criminal investigation. But it’s going to be really difficult for them to ascertain, when there’s large amounts of data, as to what to keep and what not to keep. So it would be interesting to know, with the passing of this legislation coming into law, whether there is any public engagement that the Government intends to undertake to talk to stakeholders who will be directly impacted by this—or will there be some guidelines for those businesses impacted on how to store their data and what to do with it, and is there any potential cost to these businesses for additional storage, to have to meet these obligations?

I do note—just saying that the Privacy Act exception allows companies to voluntarily refrain from deleting personal information to avoid that prejudice of a criminal investigation. This is not enforceable, and voluntary preservation is not adequate to meet the requirements of this convention. So I’m interested to know from the Minister how the practicalities of those preservation orders would operate—if they’re requiring entities to hold the specific information, relevant to a specific criminal investigation, to temporarily preserve that information on their systems, when an application for a production order or a request for mutual legal assistance is about to be made or has been made.

Like other search and surveillance powers, a preservation order would, I understand, override normal Privacy Act obligations. So I’m interested to know, from the Minister, if that is the case, whether a preservation order would override those Privacy Act obligations, and whether there is any guidance or communication that the Government will be entering into with all of those entities that will be impacted by the implementation of this legislation.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I remember this bill, so I will address a couple—I’ll get some advice from officials on the specific questions around preservation orders and how long data needs to be kept for and the implications for deletion, but in terms of the interaction with the Privacy Act, the Privacy Act’s quite clear. As the member mentioned in her speech, the requirement is to keep personal information only for as long as is reasonably necessary for the purposes of that useful collation. Of course, if that information is then deleted or returned back to the individual from whom it was collected and then there is a preservation order put in place, if the information no longer exists, then the information no longer exists and there’s nothing to preserve. I’ll get some further advice on those first two points.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’m just going to keep going through the provisions of the Act, and I’m interested in the cross-border stuff now. I’m looking at new section 88G, and it talks about the duration of preservation directions when it’s a foreign enforcement authority that’s requested it. Now, you will recall that the preservation order sits for 20 days domestically with no particular right of extension. But when it’s a foreign enforcement authority requesting it, it lasts for up to 150 days, which seems a very long time to have a preservation order. If you turn the page to page 34, new section 88I, you can apply for a renewal four times. So that’s roughly two years that the preservation order can sit. Now, the only reason a preservation order might properly sit is to get a production order, and it seems to me that that’s an extraordinarily long time. That actually requires some justification, because, as we’ve just heard, there’re genuine issues about the holding of personal information, and it is, essentially, a precursor to a search. So that’s the first thing: why is it up to 300 days for the preservation order to be in place?

The other thing is kind of a “please explain” and it’s about new section 88H. It’s this really peculiar section where a constable, a “responsible constable”, it’s called—you’d hope most constables are responsible—but forms a belief that serving a preservation order would prejudice an investigation or would be unlikely to result in preservation. I guess you’re thinking—and I’m really inviting the Minister to give us the case—about if you think serving the preservation order would be a tip-off to someone somehow, then they’re going to delete the information, and then you’ve got to go back. It appears you’ve then got to go back to the foreign authority and say, essentially, “Are you sure?” It’s just a very odd section. I may have that right, but it seems very odd that you’ve been requested to issue a preservation order and, essentially, the constable thinks it’s a bad idea and then has to go back and say, “Are you sure you want to do this?” Then, if they come back and say, “Yes, we’re sure.”, it appears you must do that.

I’ll try to squeeze three in at a go. The third one is around—yes, still on Part 1 and clause 36, but I think we’re at that for now, which talks about the different offence triggers. I talked earlier—and I don’t think the Minister’s responded on what’s meant by “serious offence”, earlier in the legislation. But then, we get to requests for “obtaining a thing”, which is a pretty serious thing—so it might be a computer hard drive, could be anything—and it relates to a criminal matter in a foreign country that is punishable by imprisonment of two years or more. So you’ve got a serious offence, on the one hand; elsewhere in the bill, you’ve got a seven-year trigger; you’ve also got triggers of particular offences; and now you’ve got a two-year trigger. Can we, perhaps, have an explanation of why there are these kinds of very different measures across what are fundamentally the same kind of things—which are preservation orders, production orders, and assistance in obtaining a thing—but they’re all, fundamentally, search and seizure orders. So why have we got this different range for different orders across those different things?

I think I’ll probably leave it there and let some colleagues have a go, and I’ll come back with some more.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’ll just finish off the questions raised by Ginny Andersen. In terms of preservation orders, how long does the data need to be kept for? Well, for the preservation order, for as long as the order itself lasts—or the application lasts for, once it’s successful; and then following a preservation order no longer being effective, then the other legal requirements around Privacy Act requirements, other corporate responsibilities around maintenance of data, apply. What are the implications for deletion? It is an offence to delete while a preservation order is in place.

Then, Dr Webb’s questions: the first one he raised was around why the duration of foreign preservation directions are longer than the domestic preservation directions. The officials provide that “The reality is that mutual assistance requests can take months or years. It’s an internationally recognised problem, and so, as such, the bill contains a longer period for foreign preservation directions to ensure the directions can be effective and do not expire before decisions are reached.”

Then on those last couple of questions around why the variety in the different measures for the offences: the official is going to provide some information shortly.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I want to first just remind the Minister that my questions around new section 79Q(4), inserted by clause 18, are still outstanding. There was a change in the Minister in the chair, so it’s fine if we’re still waiting to hear from that—that was: for a person who’s affected by a preservation order, has the Minister considered whether translation services would be offered, or taken into account the cultural and political context of the person who is affected by a preservation direction and where their country of origin potentially could be, especially if a foreign authority is involved in this?

I want to start by talking about new section 88A, inserted by clause 19. I really want to highlight two of my colleague Kahurangi Carter’s Amendment Papers. I would ask that the Minister would consider the two amendments, which are around two new sections being included.

The first one is the part that we’re looking at in terms of preservation direction and also investigation relating to foreign investigation or proceedings. It’s not applicable to a person who has been recognised as a refugee or is seeking protection on a political ground or has made a claim for such recognition, but it has not yet been finally determined. Now, the reason for this is that what we have seen in the legislation and through the select committee process is that there isn’t a sufficient safeguard from our end for these people who potentially would be prosecuted in their own country for something that we would consider as our inherent right under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. How would they be protected under this legislation? We have seen news being reported where people have been able to express their freedom of speech here in Aotearoa New Zealand by right; however, they have been subjected to investigation with the cooperation of New Zealand authorities while they are here on New Zealand ground, so it’s really important that there are protections for those who are either refugees or seeking protection.

Now, the second Amendment Paper that I will ask the Minister to consider is also applicable to new section 88A(5), inserted by clause 19, which is that this part does not apply to a person who engages in conduct or activities that are part of a lawful protest or demonstration or that engages in acts primarily motivated by economic interests, including industrial action or economic boycott.

Now, again, the reason for that is just to protect or provide some safeguards around some of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act sections, particularly around freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and freedom of association, so I would ask, as a starting point, for the Minister to consider those two Amendment Papers. They are crucial in terms of how the Greens would feel about this bill.

Now, the next thing I would like to address is around new section 88B, inserted by clause 19. I just want to check that when we’re looking at foreign enforcement authority—and forgive me; apologies if this has been covered already—what the scope of that is and how the commissioner on our end would potentially look into it when being requested by a foreign agency.

Now, moving further along in terms of section 88, the final question that I have is around new section 88V, which is when section 88U ceases to apply to affected person, but what we see in subsection (2) of this is if the commissioner gives written notice, before the date on which the direction expires or is revoked, to the person against which the direction is made. Now, my question is: under subsection 4(c), when we’re looking at something like “would prejudice the supply of information to the law enforcement agency”, what would be the threshold for that particular prejudice?

And we’re looking at new section 88V(5)(a), “keep under review the appropriateness of a notice given under subsection (2)”. What would be an example of that appropriateness? So there are a number of questions there for the Minister, and I look forward to the Minister’s engagement.

Oh, thank you, Mr Chair. We’ll just backtrack a little bit to Dr Webb’s question around the penalty thresholds. I’m advised that, in terms of the difference between two years and seven years, two years is the existing threshold in the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MACMA) and the bill replicates that in its amendment to search powers, and seven years is the existing threshold in MACMA also for highly intrusive surveillance—so trespass surveillance and interception domestically—and the bill replicates that from MACMA as well.

Just to address Dr Xu-Nan’s questions around member Carter’s proposed amendments: we don’t support the amendments. We think there are sufficient protections in place already. So, for example, section 27 of MACMA applies to any mutual assistance requests—that’s around freedom of expression. That sets out that mutual assistance cannot be granted for political offences. It also allows requests to be declined on the basis that the activity would not be an offence in New Zealand. That addresses some of the protections in place and it’s why we won’t be supporting those amendments.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I have some questions, beginning from page 31—so this is new section 88D, inserted by clause 19, under new Subpart 3. It’s in relation to the commissioner’s ability to make preservation directions, but I think it’s drafted in quite an unusual way, because it’s drafted with a presumption against being rights protective, and I think it’s quite unnecessary. Section 88D(1) says, “On an application for a preservation direction against a person, the Commissioner must make a preservation direction against the person.”, and then it proceeds to outline circumstances where the commissioner may refuse to grant the application in new subsection (2). I would just question the drafting style in terms of the presumption that a commissioner must make a preservation direction as a subsection (1) statement and then moving to circumstances where the commissioner may refuse to. So I’m just wanting the Minister to respond to that.

Also, new section 88D(2)(b) states that “the foreign enforcement authority’s request for a preservation direction”—this is where the commissioner might refuse. It’s where a “foreign enforcement authority’s request … relates to the prosecution or punishment of a person for an offence that is, or is by reason of the circumstances in which it is alleged to have been committed or was committed, an offence of a political character”. I can’t find the definition of political character, but just curious about the Minister in the chair’s comments that there was this sort of human rights lens, if you like, that was going to be applied. If it was, then I would question why we hadn’t used more broad language than simply using the words “political character”. However, it would be useful for the Minister, if the Minister would, to explain the scope of what is included within that.

On the same section—so 88D—there is also grounds to refuse the application if the commissioner believes “that the request has been made with a view to prosecuting or punishing a person for an offence of a political character”. So my question on this side, the lean is slightly different—it’s: who constitutes a person? The reason I ask that question is in reference to my second reading speech, where I quoted some of the work that’s been done internationally by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International and others as well who reported on seeking information for the purpose of committing human rights abuses against family members of the individual concerned in a home country. So is that part of the considerations that would be taken into account under 88D, or is it purely in relation to the individual against whom a preservation direction is being considered?

I then go to new section 88E, “Form and content”. This is the section where, if the documents described in the direction are no longer in the possession or control of the person, then they have to provide information to the best of their knowledge as to the location of the documents to a constable identified in the direction. Of course, it may be, in some circumstances, that the documents were never in the possession of this individual, and I just wonder whether it would be prudent to make it clear that, obviously, they can just say they do not know.

Also, the section states that they have to disclose this information “by the time, if any, specified in the direction”. My question here relates to their ability to get legal advice, which we’ve spoken about earlier, but certainly, if they have a direction which specifies a rather short period of time, they may not be able to seek that legal advice. So I’m wondering whether the Minister considers that it would be reasonable to insert that into 88E(1)(c). Thank you.

I’ll do my best to run through answers to a variety of questions. There was a question around why is it that the constable “must” make a direction and not “may”, and I am advised that although both foreign and domestic preservation directions are required by the Budapest Convention, the convention is more prescriptive about the circumstances in which a foreign preservation direction must be available. In section 88D, the new section provides that a request from a foreign country must be granted so long as mutual assistance request is required. So I’m not sure if that exactly answers the entire question, but, essentially, it is a requirement of the convention itself.

I’ll go to the question raised by Dr Xu-Nan around translation services, whether they would be provided. There is a general obligation in our criminal justice and in our justice system to make sure that anyone faced with legal rights or obligations are aware of those legal rights and obligations, so the expectation would be that translation services are enabled so that individuals can be made fully aware of their rights and what they are obliged to do—and of course, any court of law would enforce that.

Vanushi Walters asked a range of questions, one of which was: what is the scope of political character; how is it defined? The definition mirrors the existing mutual assistance law, which is section 2(6), of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act—the MACMA—which sets out that an offence of political character does not include conduct which we have already agreed with another country will not be treated as such. Also, it’s hard to prescribe what political character would look like. We don’t prescribe this in the law because it would be generally considered on a case by case basis, and once we start prescribing it in legislation, we limit what that could or could not look like. In terms of who is a person—I understand this was in relation to new section 88D. If you look in new section 88D(1), it’s kind of a circular answer, but, essentially, a person is the person against which a preservation direction is made. So it is that person in the context of that section.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’ve got a few questions. I’m actually getting through them, which is good. I guess my first question relates to replacement section 49A, inserted by clause 37, which starts on page 55. It talks about when matters are disposed of. Just clarifying in replacement section 49A(2)(b) and (c), first of all, that the matters disposed of when “(b) any proceeding in New Zealand that is commenced by a notifiable person and relates to the search warrant,”—so this is around those search warrants—“production order, or the proposed direction has been finally disposed of”. Now, I’m assuming that’s judicial reviews and appeal processes. Then the second leg of it is that “(c) the foreign country has given undertakings about any matter that the Attorney-General considers appropriate.” Now, I understand the Minister’s just identified that you can’t be too prescriptive in legislation about that; I accept that. But I think just an indication, for the record, from the Minister what those undertakings might be—I understand that it may well be, for example, the return of the property, it might be fair trial rights that the person will be given full ability to have counsel, or it might be that the death penalty won’t be imposed. So I’d be interested in that.

Then, the second question is about new section 49B, inserted by clause 37. This is quite interesting because it appears this is dispensing with the obligation to give notice. So “(1) The Attorney-General may authorise the New Zealand Police to apply for a dispensation from the Attorney-General’s obligation to give notice under section 49A of the … intention to direct that a thing seized … be sent out of [New Zealand]”. So if you’re Kim Dotcom and your hard drives are going to be sent overseas, you might think that that’s a very bad thing, and you might think that, in fact, it will be highly prejudicial to you or a third party, and you should be able to seek to stop it being moved. Now, that makes perfect sense to me, but this is the ability to send evidence overseas without the ability for it to be challenged; is that right? I mean, honesty, is that how it works? That does seem truly extraordinary that you’ve got, essentially, a secret and unchallengeable process. In terms of there being an exercise of State power, the stuff’s been seized, and then a further decision—a decision to send that evidence to a foreign power. Now, any exercise of State power should be challengeable, but you can’t challenge something you don’t know about.

So my question is: what’s going on here? Am I right about that, and, I guess, if I am, what the heck is the protection for the person whose evidence is being sent overseas from misuse of that evidence? If, as Vanushi Walters identified, the hard drive has family photos and addresses on it and all those kinds of things and that could be used for nefarious purposes—that, at the moment, the Government doesn’t accept, but you want to make that argument—you should be able to go to court and make that argument, and for it not to be sent overseas before that argument can be made. I want to leave my current contribution there because I think that’s an important point I’d like to hear addressed.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I just have a couple of questions that I wanted to ask the Minister that were sort of in relation to the economic effects of this legislation coming into force. So we know that cyber-crime, such as fraud, causes a huge economic loss for businesses, as well as for the Government and individuals. This is a big step forward for us as a country, for New Zealand—that we’re actually putting into place some important changes that will give our law enforcement agencies the ability to work alongside of other countries to be able to do this.

But I would be interested to know if any analysis has been undertaken as to what the potential gains would be for our economy by having this in place. We know that Search New Zealand has recorded approximately 4,700 security incidents—the last recorded was in 2019—and that had an impact of about $16.7 million in financial losses. The most common incidents were things like phishing for credential harvesting—which is stealing passwords—scams, frauds, and also things like unauthorised access. These are the things that concern Kiwis the most; these are things that people are constantly vigilant about in terms of protecting their passwords and protecting their financial security.

So, given the fact that we’re passing legislation that will make these changes, it would be good to understand what type of analysis has been done on the impact of preventing such crimes happening in the future. A half-yearly report from 2020 shows that cyber-security incidents have increased by 42 percent, compared to the same period in 2019, and that’s quite dated information that I found available. So is there any more recent information available to know this increase, because it would be really useful for us to start measuring the impact of this legislation on the increasing incidence of financial crime that is happening by cyber-crime?

The Reserve Bank themselves released a report back in February 2020, and that specifically focused on cyber-incidents in the financial sector. The rough estimate there was the average cost of cyber-incidents are around $104 million per year for the banking industry alone, and around $38 million per annum for the insurance industry. So there are quite significant implications. If those are the benchmarks we have now, it would be really good to know whether there are any processes in place, which Government department will be looking at this to see what the impact of this legislation will be, and what the benefits will be of being part of an international network of countries that are, effectively, working together, cooperating together, to be able to prevent cyber-crime.

We know that the National Cyber Security Centre recorded around 352 cyber-security incidents in the year it was last looked at, in 2020. And so, in addition to economic loss, cyber-security incidents have negative impacts for public confidence as well—public confidence in computer systems, for example, in relation to conducting business over the internet, and in providing personal information as we’re wanting to move into a digital age where digital identities provide a lot of our information online. People have real concerns, because they’ve had negative instances in the past, which have compromised not only their personal security but also their financial security.

So there’s been a lot of discussions—a global campaign in terms of deep “denial of service” attacks affecting a wide range of New Zealand organisations. New Zealand’s not alone in terms of its impact, and even our Parliament website has been impacted as well in the past. So in terms of making sure that we are, I guess, benchmarking where we are at now, what those financial impacts are, not only to businesses but also to individuals, and also to public trust and confidence in using the internet and providing personal information, I would be really interested to hear from the Minister in terms of what framework is in place to look at how useful signing up to something like this has been for preparing us for the future and encouraging, I guess, a society that has trust and confidence with using the internet safely.

I’ll just touch on Dr Webb’s question—or examples, actually; pretty good examples of the kind of undertakings that the Attorney-General might seek from foreign countries. He also raised the question of what happens when you don’t know that you’re subject to a preservation order. The bill introduces provisions to require notifications precisely so that people have the opportunity to challenge them in court—but, of course, there are some times where notifications could seriously prejudice ongoing investigations. In that case, the Attorney-General can seek a waiver of notification, but that waiver will require approval of a High Court judge. So there are some protections in place from our judicial system. There are other examples of parts of the law where, from time to time, a court will make a decision in absentia of the individual that is being affected.

Questions from Ginny Andersen: I’ll look at some further advice around what kind of analysis has been done and how do we know how useful this has been. But of course, the thrust of this bill, as well as enabling participation in the Budapest Convention, is, essentially, we are changing the law to enable foreign requests for preservation and production orders in New Zealand. So the changes in this bill won’t actually do much to, I guess, affect the level of crime in New Zealand, but of course it enables for that mutual assistance to be undertaken in other jurisdictions, and we can get some further information on that.

I’m going to take a call from Lawrence Xu-Nan. I want them fairly homed in now. We’ve covered a wide ground, but the Minister has just said that he’s going to get some further advice—so, really, just anything new. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I just have a short question around clause 19, new section 88Z—also, this is in combination with new sections 88O and 88P. Now, one of the things that we do see is, from new section 88Z onwards, that would provide a level of immunities relating to functions of commissioner and reviewers in the case of issuing preservation directions. I wanted to check with the Minister, with new sections 88O and 88P, for a person who may not be satisfied with the decision that was made by the commissioner but the commissioner has immunities, are new sections 88O and 88P—the ability for someone who is affected by preservation direction the right to review—the only avenue that is available for them in those kinds of cases?

I want to check with another thing the Minister said before—and I’m very grateful to the Minister for responding to my question, which is that translation services will be available for people within the criminal justice system, but would that extend to when the review is conducted as well under new section 88P? Would translation services be available for people then?

So those are my questions, which are: commissioner and reviewer have immunities, so is the only tool for the person affected by the preservation order stated in new sections 88O and 88P, which is ability to review, which means the ability to have, in accordance with new section 88P(4)(a)(iii), the revocation of a preservation direction, and whether translation services will be available for this, because it’s technically not within the criminal justice system?

I can see that Duncan Webb’s just got one more burning question while he’s waiting for the Minister to get his advice.

Thank you for that indulgence. First of all, I just want to say I think the Minister in the chair, James Meager, answered a question I didn’t ask, because I actually asked about new section 49B, inserted by clause 37, which is not about preservation orders at all; it’s about sending seized things out of New Zealand. I get that you don’t have to notify preservation orders all the time, and they’re a kind of a low-level thing, because they don’t even give evidence to a third party. I was interested in not telling someone that you’re sending something that you’ve seized from them overseas. That seems very Star Chamber, to not let them know and not give them an opportunity to challenge what might be very sensitive information going overseas. So I’d invite the Minister or his officials to address that.

The other thing is this, and it’s about—you’re surveilling someone, or the Government or police are surveilling someone, for a foreign nation, and then, under new section 50U, it says something quite unusual. We love the Parliamentary Counsel Office, but they seem to love double negatives, because they say in 50U(2), of this evidential material that’s being gathered, “The evidential material is not inadmissible in criminal proceedings in New Zealand merely because the surveillance device warrant … issued in relation to an offence against the law of a foreign country.” I hate double negatives. I’m not sure if they’re saying the evidential material is admissible even though it was about an offence in a foreign country, but I do think that is a really important point to clarify what that means. If it’s saying it is admissible, that’s one thing; if it’s saying it might be admissible, that’s quite another. At the moment, it appears to say it might be admissible rather than it is admissible, because “not inadmissible” doesn’t actually mean admissible; it means something less. If I was challenging it, it would suggest that I can say, “Well, it shouldn’t be admissible for the following reasons: the warrant wasn’t appropriately given”—or whatever it might be.

But I do think that’s an important point, because there is a danger here. This is a search, and you’ve searched someone for one purpose and you’re getting evidence for another purpose. Now, that does happen, and certainly, under domestic law, you might enter a property on a domestic violence matter and find a stash of drugs, and that would be admissible. Now, if that’s the rule for searches and surveillance for foreign powers, I think we need to say that clearly and not by use of some strange double negative. So those two things: first of all, things taken out of New Zealand being secretly taken out, and, secondly, is this evidence admissible or not admissible?

Thank you, Madam Chair. Dr Webb answered his own question. Essentially, you could read it as being it might be, but you can’t phrase it like that. So there are a whole range of reasons why evidence might be inadmissible. What this subsection is saying is that—OK, here we go; without reading the clause out itself—you know: you can’t reduce the double negative, otherwise you’re right, it would say the evidence is admissible, which is not the case. What it is saying is that evidence is not necessarily inadmissible just because the device warrant was issued in relation to an offence against the law of the foreign country. It might be inadmissible for a whole range of reasons as per the Evidence Act, but there is really no other way of phrasing it, and I think Dr Webb answered his own question.

To his earlier question about notice or what protections are in place for when things are actually being removed from the country, that’s what I was referring to rather than the preservation orders themselves.

Then to Ginny Andersen’s questions around what impact this will have on crime in New Zealand. Well, we know that cyber-crime has a cost of about $1.6 billion, and so time will tell what impact this will have on that, but, hopefully, over time, we will see that cost impact being reduced. There’s nothing in the legislation, and very rarely is there in legislation requirements for reports or research or evaluation on things like this, but I would expect that any sensible Government that implements these kinds of rules would do so with some sort of cost-benefit analysis or useful analysis along the way so we make sure that things that we are implementing actually work in our country.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

The question is that the Minister’s amendments to Part 1 set out on Amendment Paper 333 be agreed to.

The question is that Kahurangi Carter’s tabled amendment to clause 19 inserting new section 88AA to provide that new Part 3A does not apply to persons who engage in conduct or activities that are part of a lawful protest or demonstration be agreed to.

Quiet during voting, please! The question is that Kahurangi Carter’s tabled amendment to clause 19 inserting new section 88AA to provide that new Part 3A does not apply to a person who has been recognised as a refugee or is seeking protection be agreed to.

Kahurangi Carter’s tabled amendment inserting new clause 23A is out of order as being outside of the scope of the bill.