Thank you Mr Speaker. I rise on behalf of the Green Party to oppose this bill for a number of reasons. But I want to say, first and foremost, that, yes, everyone should be free to travel around their communities and around our country without risking death or serious injury, and we can have that transport system that is free of death and that serious injury. Yes, it is true that no one should ever drive while seriously impaired. It puts themselves and others at risk. However, there is a lack of evidence that this bill or the drug-driving regime will address the root cause of dangerous or impaired driving, or of drug harm. I just want to unpack some of that, and what we observed in the committee stage.
I think one of the first things is the Land Transport (Drug Driving) Amendment Bill has often been equated with drink-driving, but the thing is, we must understand that the way that we quantify and look at drink-driving in terms of the interaction between ethanol and our body and our digestive system is vastly different from the myriad of drugs that have been discussed in this particular bill.
Indeed, in clause 4, when we’re looking at qualifying drugs—or a “family of qualifying drugs”, under the definition—one of the things that we did try to explore during the committee stage was around the idea of what it means when something shares a substantially similar chemical structure, particularly in light of benzodiazepine or amphetamine. Unlike ethanol, there are a lot of different compounds, particularly for medicinal uses. So, for example, anxiolytics or, potentially, central nervous system stimulants for ADHD treatment are some things that can have that particular chemical compound, particularly when we’re looking at benzodiazepine and having similar structures, which benzodiazepine, for example, have in terms of having both a benzene as well as a diazepine ring structure in its chemical structure.
The other concern that we have, for example, is the inconsistency when you’re talking about pharmacological effect. So, again, pharmacological effect is when we’re looking at the interaction between a particular drug or particular substance with the human body, and particularly when we’re looking at what is considered the first-pass effect through the liver. But when we are looking at some of these clauses—let’s say clause 12(3), which replaces section 64(6)—we’re looking at the idea of the proportion of the drug in the system. It is not simply about impairment, and it doesn’t take into account that certain people process certain compounds faster than others. So, naturally, we are seeing—again, unlike ethanol—possibly a discriminatory effect when we’re looking at people being stopped for these sorts of tests. I think nothing in this bill finds itself with the baseline of impairment, because a lot of these come down to the proportion of the available drug, or the proportion of a qualifying drug, in a person’s blood.
So it does beg the question, from the very definition of qualifying drugs: are we looking at a discriminatory element, especially when you’re looking at someone who is having certain mental health issues which will require certain drugs being administered—or, indeed, who has certain neurodivergences, such as ADHD—not being a part of this? We’re seeing that even in the primary Act, under Schedule 5. For what is considered a qualifying drug, it actually determines the amount that should be present in the system.. But this bill, again, doesn’t actually show those amounts, and we have no indication and no clarity from the Minister of Transport on when that Order in Council will be made that clarifies the actual amount within that, in terms of families of qualifying drugs. The example that I gave during the committee stage was bromazepam, which is anxiolytic, but it does share a similar structure to benzodiazepine, but it’s not currently in the schedule of the primary Act, so we do need to have an amount that’s specific to this.
The other concern—and it also ties up, in general—is that, indeed, very rarely, do we see a bill that fails the BORA test, and that’s the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act test here in Parliament. This particular one does require the Attorney-General to produce a section 7 report. But I think what has been quite a disheartening factor about that is even though there is a section 7 report that has been done on this, there are a number of sections which I think would have been pertinent for the Attorney-General, and also for the Government, to consider under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, and which have not been considered as a result.
To give an example, when we are looking at—for example, I gave a couple of cases on this particular issue. One of them is the Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board case, which was from 1984 and went all the way up to the Court of Appeal, which very much challenges the very essence of natural law theory and particularly the presumption against self-incrimination. Indeed, this particular one touches on the BORA principles in sections 23(4), 25(d), and also 27(1), none of which were explored as part of the section 7 report, despite the fact that, again, we have a section 7 report as opposed to a consistency report against the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.
This is a serious concern because, for many of us, we know that, under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, we have natural rights under natural law, one of which, the presumption against self-incrimination, very much doesn’t allow one an absolute right—potentially, if you want to argue that—against self-incrimination. By having a police officer pull you up and force you to take a test, that very much touches on, some would say, one of the fundamental rights against self-incrimination. I think one of the things that has been particularly evident in the Attorney-General’s report as a result of this was actually that, yes, maybe one could argue that, on balance, particularly if you are applying section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and the limitations, maybe there is a reason for us to limit that particular right. However, we have also seen that the oral fluid test cannot prove impairment. That’s one of the major issues because it is not like alcohol, where the relationship between breath and blood levels is more strongly correlated with impairment. Yes, there may have been some things that have been said in terms of the accuracy of this particular oral test, but, to be honest, it doesn’t actually offer the same level of reassurance as what we’re currently seeing in terms of the breath alcohol test.
The other thing that I want to mention as also part of the same vein in terms of potential challenges in terms of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is actually a very recent case where the ruling just came out a few days ago, which is aptly named Lawrence v New Zealand Police. This is a High Court ruling that talks about when a person—in this case, Mr Lawrence—was stopped by the police. He was allowed to consult a lawyer, as your natural right is to consult a lawyer. But one of the things that the officer failed to consider is that under section 23(1)(b) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the right to consult the lawyer also requires the right to privacy, as in you are supposed to consult the lawyer in private. Because of the fact that the police officer just happened to be in the car with Mr Lawrence at that precise time, it also meant that that particular test was considered inadmissible in court because of the fact that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act had been violated.
So we are actually going to be seeing a lot more potential challenges when it comes to this. With regards to clause 27 of this particular bill where it talks about how an enforcement officer must forbid a person to drive a motor vehicle for the 12-hour period if the person fails or refuses to undergo an oral fluid screening test without delay, one of the other things we haven’t managed to get clarity on during the committee stage is what “without delay” actually means. I think what it does is it opens our enforcement officers up for a lot of legal challenges under the court of law.
So, to sum up, the Green Party will not be supporting this. Not only, from a pharmacological component, have we not gotten the reassurance that—when we’re looking at qualifying drugs or interaction of drugs or even drugs that are available for certain treatment of anxiety and neurodiversity—it has the protection for those people, but we’re also seeing some severe challenges in terms of the fundamental New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, both through the section 7 report and also through some of the case law that I’ve expressed.
But there are other ways to deal with this. I just want to leave in saying that unsafe speed is actually a factor in more fatal crashes than alcohol or drugs. Thank you.